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SUMMARY 
 
The Roman Catholic Church has endured over many centuries.  It is governed by a system of 
ecclesiastical law found in the Code of Canon Law 1983, which has antecedents in Roman 
law.  Roman law valued the opinions of learned people to assist in decision-making.  It is not 
surprising then, that the Church encompasses, in its framework of canon law, a reliance on 
the use of experts in its administrative and judicial functions.  These experts are drawn from 
both the faithful and from professions in wider society.  Collaboration with these people 
represents an important form of dialogue between society and the Church in its quest for 
specialist, informed and sound decision-making.  The use of experts in the Church, however, 
has rarely been subjected to the scrutiny of rigorous research.  This study examines the use of 
experts in Roman Catholic canon law in both the non-judicial (administrative) and the 
judicial fora. 
 
The study identifies the relevant canons in the 1983 Code of Canon Law and other norms and 
reviews the areas which require consultation with experts.  Part I, comprising Chapters 1 to 3, 
focuses on the administrative forum, in particular: art, architecture and finance; admission to 
and suitability for Holy Orders and Religious Institutes; and education.  Although experts 
have many roles in these areas, sometimes consultation with them is essential for the validity 
of decision-making.  Part II, comprising Chapters 4 to 6, deals in detail with the judicial 
forum.  It examines the use of experts in relation to marriage nullity cases.  Chapter 4 focuses 
on the substantive law of marriage and its treatment of experts.  Chapters 5 and 6 set out an 
empirical study, of cases from the marriage tribunals of the Southwark Province and of 
Dublin, which ascertains whether or not there is compliance with canonical provisions: the 
former deals with what happens in practice when experts are consulted; and the latter with 
what happens when experts are not consulted. 
 
The dissertation suggests not only that through the use of experts the law of the Church 
enables a direct dialogue with expertise outside the faithful in wider society, but that some 
practices concerning experts particularly in the judicial forum, in the work of the marriage 
tribunals studied, raise serious issues about compliance with the legal norms of the Church 
resulting in adverse implications for the exercise of rights of those affected by judicial 
decisions in the field of marriage nullity, including non-Catholics.   
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The Roman Catholic Church has endured over many centuries.  It is governed by a system of 
ecclesiastical law found in the Code of Canon Law 1983 (CIC).1  Canon law has antecedents 
in Roman law.  From its origin, Roman law has always valued the opinions of learned people 
from various walks of life to assist in decision making and in the interpretation of norms.2  It 
is not surprising then, that today the Church encompasses, in its framework of canon law, a 
reliance on the use of experts in its administrative and judicial functions.  These experts are 
drawn from both the faithful and from professions in wider society.  Collaboration with the 
latter, particularly, represents an important form of dialogue between society and the Church 
in its quest for specialist, informed and in the broadest sense scientifically-sound decision-
making.  The use of experts in the Church, however, has rarely been subjected to the scrutiny 
of rigorous research.  This study examines the use of experts in Roman Catholic canon law in 
both the non-judicial (administrative) and the judicial fora.  As canon law does not define 
‘expert’, the study aims at a characterisation of the ‘expert’ appropriate to the proposed use. 
 
The Second Vatican Council, Vatican II,3 emphasized the role of the laity in the mission of 
the Church.4  As a result, one of the main legal changes to the structure of the Church, since 
Vatican II, is lay participation in Church governance.5  Today, whilst acknowledging all the 
baptized as the ‘people of God’,6 CIC defines laity as ‘others’; that is those who are not 
1 Roman Catholic canon law was first codified in 1917 (CIC 1917).  Throughout this study the English 
translation of the canons of the 1983 Code of Canon Law is taken from Gerard Sheehy, Ralph Brown, Donal 
Kelly and Aidan McGrath (Eds), The Canon Law Letter and Spirit (London, 1995) (hereafter L&S), unless 
otherwise specified.  Latin texts of the 1983 Code are taken from E Caparros, M Thériault, J Thorn (Eds), Code 
of Canon Law Annotated (Montreal, 1993).  Translation of the canons of the Code of Canons of the Eastern 
Churches, is that in Code of Canons of the Eastern Churches, Latin-English Edition (Washington DC, 2001) 
(hereafter CCEO).  Translations of canons of the 1917 Code are taken from Edward N Peters (Curator), The 
1917 Pio-Benedictine Code of Canon Law (San Francisco, 2001) (hereafter CIC 1917). 
2 O F Robinson, Ancient Rome (London, 1992), pp24-25; R W Lee, The Elements of Roman Law (London, 
1956), p441; and WW Buckland, A Textbook of Roman Law, Second Edition (Cambridge, 1932), pp605 and 
635.  For an Old Testament reference to the seeking of advice see Tobias IV: 19: Tobit says to his son, Tobias: 
‘Ask advice of every wise person; never scorn any profitable advice’. 
3 The Second Vatican Council, or Vatican II, held between 1962 and 1965, was the twenty-first Ecumenical 
Council held by the Catholic Church and was the second held at St Peter’s Basilica in the Vatican.  Church 
Councils, over the centuries, frequently took their name from the place where they were held.  
4 Paul VI, Dogmatic Constitution on the Church, Lumen Gentium (LG) (1964), 10.  See Appendix IV.  
5 Prior to Vatican II, and until the revision of  the 1917 Code (CIC 1917) culminated in the Code of Canon Law 
1983 (CIC), the law focused on clerics and contained no definition of laity.  CIC 1917 recognised: laity’s right 
to receive the sacraments and spiritual direction: the prohibition on laity to wear clerical dress; and parents’ 
obligation to raise and educate their children: CIC 1917, cc. 682; 683; and 1113.  Otherwise, the law focused on 
associations of the faithful, rather than on laity as individuals: CIC 1917, cc. 684 -725; see Appendix III.   
6 CIC, c. 204§1. See Appendix I. 
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clerics.7  Although only clerics are capable of the power of governance,8 or jurisdiction,9 the 
current law provides for the cooperation of the laity in the exercise of this power,10 and 
allows laity to hold ecclesiastical offices,11 provided certain conditions are met.12  Even 
without holding office, ‘suitable’ lay people can be ‘experts’ or ‘advisors’.  CIC canon 228 
provides:  
 
§1:‘Lay people who are found to be suitable are capable of being admitted by the sacred 
Pastors to those ecclesiastical offices and functions which, in accordance with the provisions 
of law, they can discharge.  §2: Lay people who are outstanding in the requisite knowledge, 
prudence and integrity are capable of being experts or advisors, even in councils in 
accordance with the law, in order to provide assistance to the Pastors of the Church’.   
 
The Code of Canons for the Eastern Churches 1990 (CCEO) makes similar provisions for lay 
participation.13  These Latin and Oriental norms increase the scope for dialogue and 
consultation between clergy and laity, and, indeed, between the Church and wider society.   
 
This use of experts in the Church has not to-date been the object of a critical, extensive and 
systematic analysis.  The seminal work by Breitenbeck (1987) compared the provisions in the 
first Code of Canon Law (CIC 1917) with those in CIC, rather than conducting a critical 
analysis of the revised canons.14  This study is important, therefore, as it examines the areas 
in which responsibility for Church governance is now shared between clergy and lay faithful 
serving as experts, and in which there is consultation with experts from wider society.  Canon 
law provides for the use of experts in both the non-judicial (administrative) and the judicial 
fora.  Constructive dialogue, therefore, between society and the Church is crucial in decision-
making.  Although canon law does not define the term ‘expert’, canonists have defined it, but 
7 CIC, c. 207§1.  See Appendix I.   Although this description might be considered negatively by some, it is 
understandable in a legal context when a group is to be divided into two sections ensuring nobody is excluded. 
For example, one speaks of ‘members’ and ‘non-members’ of a club or organisation. 
8 CIC, c. 274§1.  See Appendix I. 
9 CIC, c. 129§1.  See Appendix I. 
10 CIC, c. 129§2.  See Appendix I.  
11 CIC, cc. 145; and 146.  See Appendix I. 
12 CIC, c. 149§1.  See Appendix 1. 
13 CCEO, c. 408§1.  See Appendix II. 
14 Marie Breitenbeck, ‘The Role of Experts in Ecclesial Decision-Making in the 1983 Code of Canon law’, 
Doctoral Thesis (Catholic University of America, 1987) (hereafter Breitenbeck, Doctoral Thesis).  Breitenbeck 
addressed the question as to whether or not CIC extended the use of experts.  She concentrated descriptively 
(not critically) on a textual comparison of the canons.  This study seeks to analyse critically the revised canons.  
The other major work on experts pre-dated CIC.  See Emmett Doyle, ‘The Consultation of Experts: An 
Historical Outline of the Legislation and Practice’, Doctoral Thesis (St Paul University, Ottawa, 1949) 
(hereafter Doyle, Doctoral Thesis). 
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not always in relation to the individual areas in which their use is required.15  Furthermore, 
despite the fact that CIC requires the use of experts in both the administrative and judicial 
fora, the general norms governing experts are found in Book VII, which deals only with 
judicial procedures.16  Consequently, the law requiring the use of experts in administrative 
areas is vague.  Moreover, the majority of judicial cases heard in Roman Catholic tribunals 
are marriage nullity cases, which often involve people other than Roman Catholics.  
Therefore, this area is ideal to illustrate dialogue between society and the Church.  The origin 
of this project was the direct observation, on the part of the researcher, of inconsistencies in 
practice with regard to the use of experts in matrimonial tribunals, particularly in respect of 
psychological incapacity cases. 
 
Each Chapter begins by identifying the relevant canons in CIC which require experts, and the 
areas of governance to which the canons refer.  Part I focuses on the administrative forum.  
Chapter 1 deals with: art, architecture and finance; Chapter 2, with admission to and 
suitability for Holy Orders and Religious Institutes and the exercise of ministry; and Chapter 
3, with education (from parochial catechesis through schools to institutes of higher 
education).  Each Chapter describes, explains and evaluates the many roles played by experts 
15 Doyle, Doctoral Thesis, p1-2: ‘[An expert is] one who is experienced, or taught by use or practices; a skilful 
or practised person.  It signifies knowledge obtained by experience together with prudent judgment, rather than 
great learning.  At the same time, the word denotes a person who, possessing such knowledge and experience, is 
sought by others for consultation.  The statement that an expert is a man of experience rather than of learning is 
of prime importance, for not all persons with exceptional learning are included when we speak of the 
consultation of experts’.  At p3: ‘In a limited, more modern sense, the word expert means a scientific or 
professional witness who gives evidence on matters connected with his profession’.  Breitenbeck, Doctoral 
Thesis, p295: ‘Experts in official documents are presented as persons with a specialized skill or art, whose 
services are sought in the course of a particular decision-making process’.  Breitenbeck, at p7, cites Francis 
Wanenmacher, Canonical Evidence in Marriage Cases (Philadelphia, 1935), pp172-173: ‘[E]xperts in the 
grammatical sense are persons of special training, experience and ability in some craft or science.  In the 
canonical and probatory sense they are persons thus endowed, acting in the capacity of witnesses who testify to 
the existence of a fact. ... Experts testify to facts that escape the notice of those not equipped by special 
training…. [E]xperts render weighty opinion according to their special science and craft, derived from the 
special facts observed.  Thus the expert’s office is somewhat analogous to that of a judge in so far as he forms 
and expresses his judgment or conclusions on the nature, concomitants, causes or effect of that to which his 
examination has made him a witness’.  Kenneth Boccafola, in Ex Comm, p1328: ‘An expert is one whose 
knowledge and experience make him an authoritative specialist in some art or science’.  William J Doheny, 
Canonical Procedure in Matrimonial Cases, Vol I, Formal Judicial Procedure, Second Edition, Revised and 
Enlarged (Milwaukee, 1948), pp382-383: ‘An expert is one whose knowledge and experience make him an 
authoritative specialist in some art or science’.   Augustine, Vol VII, p241: ‘[E]xperts, or specialists, [are] 
persons learned or skilled in their own science or profession’.  Joaquín Calvo, Ann, p977: ‘[An expert is] one 
whose knowledge, experience, or art, makes him an authoritative specialist in a particular field.  This specialty 
should relate to particular facts, the perception, interpretation and assessment of which require a particular skill 
permitting assimilation of the facts, their causes and their effect, their relationship to other facts relevant to the 
case, and their influence on one another’. 
16 CIC, cc. 1574-1581.  See Appendix I. 
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in administrative areas and in relation to a wide range of decision-making (e.g., from advising 
on the value of precious images, through fitness of candidates for ordination, to advice about 
training teachers).  However, in some administrative areas, the use of experts is essential to 
the validity of decision making, which has an ethical dimension.17  Therefore, this study 
concerns areas fundamental to the life of the Church and the administration of its canon law.  
The research question addressed in Part I is: Do the norms governing experts in the 
administrative forum: mandate the use of experts in each area; clarify the disciplines from 
which experts are to be drawn; describe the qualifications required of experts and their 
functions; and state whether or not failure to consult them results in invalidity of subsequent 
decisions? 
 
Part II deals in more detail with the use of experts in relation to marriage nullity cases heard 
in the matrimonial tribunals of the Church, particularly with regard to psychological capacity.  
Chapter 4 examines the substantive law of marriage and its treatment of experts, with 
particular reference to psychological incapacity cases.  Whilst the intention is not to suggest 
that the substantive decisions reached on nullity are incorrect, Chapters 5 and 6 comprise an 
empirical study of anonymized cases heard in the First Instance tribunals of the Roman 
Catholic province of Southwark in 2009.18  Chapter 5 studies Southwark cases in which 
experts were consulted and these are compared with cases heard at the First Instance 
Regional Tribunal of Dublin in the same year.  A comparison is then made between the 
practice of these lower tribunals and that of the superior Papal Tribunals in Rome.  Chapter 6 
analyses cases from the province of Southwark in which expert opinion was not sought and 
seeks to identify the problems which arise as a result of this failure to consult experts.  The 
purpose of Part II is to establish whether or not these lower tribunals comply with the norms 
of canon law on the use of experts in psychological incapacity cases, and the possible effect 
of non-compliance on the rights of the parties involved (which may include non-Catholics).  
In short, therefore, the research question addressed in Part II is: Do lower tribunals in practice 
comply with the norms of canon law on the use of experts in psychological incapacity cases, 
and what effect does failure to comply with these norms affect the rights of the parties 
17 William L Daniel, ‘The Ethical Dimension of the Role of the Ecclesiastical Judge in the Rotal Allocutions of 
John Paul II’, Studia Canonica, 40 (2006), pp71-93.   
18 2009 was the most recent year in which almost all cases which had been submitted to Second Instance were 
completed. 
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involved?  Approval for this empirical study was granted by the Ethics Committee of Cardiff 
University on 12 February 2013. 
 
The majority of canon-law practitioners in the United Kingdom are not Latin scholars.  
Therefore, they rely on English Language material including translations of the decisions of 
the Papal Tribunals, which are sometimes anonymised and published in Latin.  This study is, 
therefore, limited to an analysis of English language materials, such as the Catechism of the 
Catholic Church (CCC), CIC, Vatican documents (including Papal Allocutions, Apostolic 
Constitutions, and Encyclicals) and the writings of canonists.  Differences in interpretation 
will be highlighted.  Comparisons will be made with the use of experts in the 1917 Code of 
Canon Law (CIC 1917) and CCEO.  Some suggestions for reform, both of law and of 
practice, will also be made.  In short, in terms of methodology, the research questions are 
answered by reference to a wide range of both primary and secondary documentary sources 
and, for the empirical work in Part II, through the examination of case files of the marriage 
nullity cases submitted to the tribunals studied. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
THE USE OF EXPERTS IN ART, ARCHITECTURE AND FINANCE 
 
Temporal goods are an important part of the patrimony of the Roman Catholic Church.  As 
such, the Church has a considerable body of norms on temporal goods: their acquisition, 
administration, maintenance, and disposal.  These goods must be held for prescribed 
purposes, and contracts entered into with respect to them must be valid at civil law.1  The 
Church has specific norms, integral to its approach to temporal goods, which govern: the 
restoration of sacred images;2 the building and restoration of churches;3 financial 
administration;4 and the alienation of property.5  The Church uses experts extensively in 
fields related to these matters as part of its processes of decision-making in these areas.  What 
follows addresses eight basic issues, namely: (1) whether the use of experts is mandatory; (2) 
the appointment of experts (and whether the experts are appointed from the faithful or from 
outside the Church; (3) the professional disciplines from which they are drawn and their 
qualifications; (4) their functions; (5) whether or not experts must be consulted individually 
or collectively; (6) whether non-compliance with the requirement to consult experts affects 
the validity of the relevant decision; (7) the weight and effect of the expert opinion or advice; 
and (8) whether the decision-maker is bound by expert opinion.  This Chapter describes, 
explains, and evaluates norms (in terms of their comprehensiveness, consistency, and clarity) 
in relation to each area.  It also compares these norms with those found in CIC 1917 and 
CCEO, and it proposes how the norms of the Latin Church may be improved.  The regulatory 
instruments examined include CIC and papal documents; the works of commentators will 
also be examined. 
 
 
1 CIC, cc. 22; 1254§§1, 2; and 1290.   See Appendix I. 
2 See CCC, p266, para 1160 for the role of iconography and sacred images in the Church.  See Appendix IV. 
3 Churches are used for worship: See Appendix IV: CCC, p456, para 2096. 
4 CIC, cc. 492-494.  See Appendix I. 
5 Francis G Morrisey, ‘The Alienation of Temporal Goods in Contemporary Practice’, Studia Canonica, 29 
(1995), pp293-316 (hereafter Morrisey, ‘The Alienation of Temporal Goods’), p294, explains that strictly 
‘alienation’ means ‘conveyance’ or ‘transfer of ownership’, but any transaction by which the ‘patrimonial 
condition of the juridical person could be jeopardized’ suffices for the provisions to apply.  See also Augustine, 
Vol VI, pp592-593, Robert T Kennedy, New Comm, p1500 and Velasio De Paolis, ‘Temporal Goods of the 
Church in the New Code with Particular Reference to Institutes of Consecrated Life’, The Jurist, 44 (1984), 
pp343-360. 
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1. THE RESTORATION OF SACRED IMAGES 
 
The Church considers the use of sacred images important because their veneration assists in 
worship.6  The Church’s Constitution on Sacred Liturgy, Sacrosanctum Concilium (SC) also 
ensures that images, over which it claims authority, comply with doctrine and tradition.7  
Their restoration is also regulated.  CIC canon 1189 provides: 
 
‘The written permission of the Ordinary is required to restore precious images needing repair: 
that is, those distinguished by reason of age, art or cult, which are exposed in churches and 
oratories to the veneration of the faithful.  Before giving such permission, the Ordinary is to 
seek the advice of experts’.8 
 
The canon is clear on three requirements before restoration: written permission of the 
Ordinary is mandatory;9 consultation with more than one expert is mandatory; and it is the 
Ordinary who is obliged to see the advice of the experts - there is no provision for delegation 
of this function by the Ordinary.  The protection afforded by this canon is limited to images 
falling within a conjunctive, rather than disjunctive, list.  They must be: ‘precious’;10 
distinguished by reason of their age, art or cult;11 exposed for veneration in churches and 
oratories;12 and in need of repair.  However, the canon does not: define ‘experts’; specify 
whether they must be appointed from amongst the faithful; nor indicate the person 
responsible for determining when repair is needed (though it must be presumed that this 
would be the Ordinary or administrator of the goods in question).13  Moreover, the canon is 
unclear as to: the experts’ professional disciplines, qualifications and functions; whether they 
6 CCC, p266, pars 1161 and 1162.  See also pp218-219, pars. 956- 958.  See Appendix IV. 
7 SC, 122.  See Appendix VI. 
8 The placing of this canon in Book IV on The Sanctifying Office of the Church (rather than in Book V on The 
Temporal Goods), reflects the role of sacred images in divine worship.  All Christians are called to holiness: See 
Appendix VI: LG, 40. 
9 CIC, c. 134§1 defines the term ‘Ordinary’.  See Appendix I. 
10 William Doheny, Practical Problems in Church Finance (Milwaukee, 1941), p23;  describes ‘precious’ 
objects as those having ‘notable value because of artistic or historical reason, or by reason of the inherent 
material of which they are made’, whereas he defines ‘sacred’ objects as ‘those (ecclesiastical) goods … which 
have been destined for divine worship by consecration or blessing’.  
11 This c. 1189 is also translated in Text&Comm using the word ‘cult’, but the more recent New Comm uses the 
word ‘veneration’.  Latin: ‘Imagines pretiosae, idest vetustate, arte, aut cultu praestantes, ….’.  In respect of 
canon 1186, in which the Latin text refers to ‘cultum aliorum Sanctorum’, Text&Comm, p841 uses ‘devotion’ to 
the other saints, and the later New Comm, p1413 uses ‘veneration’.  Therefore, a ‘cult’ is an approved form of 
devotion or veneration, through which one is drawn to the adoration of God.  CCC, p533, para 2502.  See 
Appendix IV. 
12  Other precious images, such as those stored out of sight or exposed in, for example, presbyteries are 
protected by CIC, cc. 1283 and 1284, which do not specifically mandate the use of experts.   See Appendix I. 
13 The Ordinary has the duty of care, but this can be delegated to the administrator: CIC, cc. 1276§1 and 1278.  
See Appendix I. 
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are to be consulted individually or collectively; and whether consultation with them goes to 
validity of the Ordinary’s written permission.  To address these issues, and the extent of the 
Ordinary’s discretion in exercising these functions, it is necessary to resort to other canons 
and norms. 
 
Disciplines, Qualifications and Functions of Experts: Instruments outside the Code shed 
only some light on these matters, but in varying degrees of detail.  A pre-Vatican II 
Encyclical Letter (1947) referred to an advisory diocesan committee for sacred music and art 
- but it did not elaborate on the specific qualifications of its members.14  However, a later 
instrument, an Instruction (1952),15 provided that committee members be ‘not only 
competent in the field of art’ but also ‘firm in their allegiance to the faith, brought up in piety 
and ready to follow the definite norms’ – yet it too did not specify the members’ 
qualifications or expertise.  Indeed, there was no need for experts – when experts were 
lacking, consultation with the Metropolitan Commission or the Roman Commission on 
Sacred Art was required.16  Nevertheless, these instruments implied that the experts would be 
from within the Church. 
 
Failure to detail these requirements continued in several Vatican II and post-Vatican II 
documents.  One of the aims of the Vatican II Constitution Sacrosanctum Concilium (1963) 
was to increase awareness and knowledge of ‘the ministry of art’ in the life of the Church; it 
articulates the Church’s right to make judgments regarding works of art, recognises the role 
of ‘religious’ and ‘sacred’ art in divine worship,17 and encourages their exposure for the 
purposes of veneration.18  Moreover, the Constitution charges Ordinaries with their care and 
with the care and training of the artists themselves, permits certain adaptations to local needs 
and customs, and provides for teaching about art during priestly formation (itself implying 
expertise on the part of those responsible for formation).19  Making provision for liturgical 
renewal, although stating that other commissions are desirable, the Constitution mandates the 
establishment of at least one diocesan commission on sacred liturgy, even if this is done in 
14 MD, 109.  See Appendix VI. 
15 CIC, c. 34§1.  See Appendix I. 
16 Marie Breitenbeck, Doctoral Thesis, p137, citing SA, AAS 44 (1952), translation CLD 3: 511. 
17 SC, 122.  See Appendix VI. 
18 SC, 125 and CIC, c. 1188.  See Appendix VI and Appendix I. 
19 SC, 126-129 and CIC, c, 1188.  See Appendix VI and Appendix 1.  The importance of priestly training in 
religious art was reiterated later in PCCCAHPC. 
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collaboration with other dioceses.20  However, for any judgment on works of art, it foresaw 
not only a diocesan commission for sacred art, perhaps fused with that on sacred liturgy,21 
but also the possibility of consulting ‘others who are especially expert’ and the commissions 
– this left room for wider consultation with experts beyond the Church, but it did not define 
their disciplines or qualifications.22  Further, an Instruction, Inter Oecumenici (1964) to 
implement the Constitution, made provision for ‘experts, including the laity’, in ‘Scripture, 
liturgy, the biblical languages, Latin, the vernacular, and music’, to assist bishops in the 
absence of a liturgical commission.23  This too may imply consultation with experts who are 
drawn from persons outside the Church.  In turn, the Instruction Musicam Sacram (1967) 
provides that the diocesan commission on sacred music, which it commends rather than 
mandates,24 might consist of experts in music and liturgy; but, once more, this instrument 
does not specify what the experts’ qualifications should be (though it does spell out in detail 
their roles).25 
 
A Circular Letter, Opera Artis (1971), sought to tighten the provisions for the protection of 
sacred art by further addressing the work of the diocesan commissions on art and liturgy.  
Using the strong wording of CIC 1917,26 the Circular Letter reveals concern both about 
damage to valuable works of art and disregard for legislation.  It: requires the approval of the 
20 SC, 44 - 45.  In SL (motu proprio, indicating a juridical text) no II, Paul VI, acknowledging that some 
provisions of SC needed more time before implementation, decreed that this provision was to be implemented as 
of 16 February 1964.  As this provision is not contrary to the provisions of CIC, it remains in force; CIC, c. 6§1.  
See Appendix I and Appendix VI.  
21 SC, 46; SL II.  This clarifies that the aim was to promote close collaboration between the commissions, if they 
were not fused.  See Appendix VI. 
22 SC, 126.  See Appendix VI. 
23 IO, 40 (b).  See Appendix VI.  This Instruction was approved in forma specifica.  A document approved ‘in 
common’ by the Pope remains one of the dicastory which issued it. The Regolamento Generale della Curia 
Romana clarified, in 1999, that unless the phrase ‘in forma specifica approbavit’ is included at the end of the 
document, papal approval has been ‘in common’.  Therefore, if it contains this phrase, the document is in effect, 
a papal document.  Moreover, according to John M Huels, ‘Assessing the Weight of Documents on the Liturgy’ 
Worship (2000), pp117-135 (hereafter Huels, ‘Assessing the Weight of Documents’), at p124, the words ‘in 
forma specifica approbavit’ change the value of the document ‘from an act of executive power to one of papal, 
legislative power.  This means that the norms in that curial document have the same force as other universal 
laws’. 
24 Although possibly fused with the liturgical commission. 
25 MS, 54; 61; and 68.  See Appendix VI. 
26 See CIC 1917, c. 1280 for the equivalent canon.  See Appendix III.  It was placed in Book III, on ‘Things’ 
and stated: ‘precious images ... shall never be restored’ without the written consent from the Ordinary, having 
consulted ‘wise and expert men’.  Doyle, Doctoral Thesis, at p304 explains that CIC 1917 contained the first 
law governing the use of experts in the restoration of sacred images.  Augustine, Vol VI, p243, considered the 
law long overdue as ‘ecclesiastical dignitaries often “restored” fine Romanesque churches of Gothic or Moorish 
architecture and converted them into whitewashed Barocco edifices.  We may also be permitted to add that 
some modern statues savor very much of the “salon”.  Take, for example, a good many representations of St 
Francis of Assisi and St Antony, which are anything but dignified in their fancy costumes’. 
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relevant commission for alterations to images; requires expert involvement in compiling 
itemized inventories of objects of artistic and historical importance, including their individual 
value; and urges regulation by Bishops’ Conferences, in accord with civil law.27  Although 
the obligation to compile the inventories lies with the rectors of churches or other places, the 
assistance of experts (perhaps also experts in civil law) in assessing the historical and 
monetary value of art is implied.  Here too, the inference is that experts from outside the 
Church might be required.  Later documents referred increasingly to training, qualifications 
and expertise, but do not provide any detail;28 one refers to the Church’s responsibility for 
training the experts.29   
 
The commentators differ as to who the experts to be consulted before restoration might be: 
some consider that members of the diocesan commissions are the experts; others consider 
that the Ordinary has discretion to consult beyond the diocesan commissions.  On the one 
hand, Breitenbeck acknowledges that when the law requires the utilization of ‘experts’ it 
envisions people ‘skilled and knowledgeable in a particular area’ but ‘all too frequently’ a 
limited interpretation is applied requiring only ‘a person trained’.30  She also concedes that 
the establishment of a diocesan commission on sacred art is not mandatory, but must be 
consulted if it exists; she understands that the mandatory diocesan commission is the group of 
experts consulted before restoration.31  Thomas appears to agree, holding that the experts ‘be 
a commission or standing committee’.32  On the other hand, for Huels, the experts include the 
27 OA, 2-7.  PCCCAHPC, 1; 2; 5; 6; and 12 refer again to this ‘ministry of art’ and to the urgency in addressing 
ongoing concerns, albeit for other objects also.  See Appendix VI.  Although not a legislative document, OA is a 
document of a Roman curial dicastory and makes several references to the provisions of legislative documents 
and urges compliance.  CIC, c. 477 defines the Bishops’ Conference.   See Appendix I.   
28 Breitenbeck, Doctoral Thesis, p184, citing SCDWDS, Letter, Durante los meses (8 November 1972), stated 
that the experts were to be trained and dedicated and be people on whom the bishops can rely.  See also LA, 79 
(d) (ii) in Appendix VI.  Sacred Congregation for the Causes of Saints, New Laws for the Causes of Saints, 
Norms to be observed in inquiries made by bishops in the Causes of Saints and General Decree on the Causes of 
the Servants of God whose judgment is presently pending at the Sacred Congregation (7 February 1983), 
provided that the Postulator, who handles the case for the petitioner, ‘must be expert in theological, canonical 
and historical matters as well as versed in the practice of the Sacred Congregation’.   
29 The Pontifical Commission for the Cultural Heritage of the Church, Circular Letter, The Pastoral Function of 
Ecclesiastical Museum (15 August 2001) speaks of establishing committees and appointing personnel to be 
assisted by experts and having well-trained guides.  Moreover, it speaks of establishing ‘specialized study 
centres in order to train experts in the areas of the cultural heritage of the Church’ on ‘a professional level’. 
30 Marie Breitenbeck, ‘The Requirements for Experts in Church Law’, The Jurist, 50 (1990), pp257-288, 
(hereafter Breitenbeck, Jurist), at p257. 
31 Breitenbeck, Jurist, p265, citing Julio Manzanares, Lamberto de Echeverría, (Eds), Codico de Derecho 
Canónico, Edición Bilingüe Comentada, Fourth  Edition (Madrid, 1984), p576 and Royce Thomas, 
Text&Comm, p841.   This could also be inferred from PCCCAHPC, 28, but this document concerned the 
education of future priests.   
32 Royce R Thomas, Text&Comm, p841, citing SC, 126. 
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commissions,33 but he acknowledges the possibility of consulting additional experts beyond 
the commissions.34  This understanding, that the commissions feature ‘among the experts’, is 
shared by de Agar.35  McLean too acknowledges the need to consult the commission, but 
experts must come from ‘the sphere involved’; even when images do not conform to the 
canon’s conjunctive list, the Ordinary is still obliged to receive expert advice.36  Huels, de 
Agar and McLean, therefore, reflect the Constitution Sacrosanctum Concilium, which makes 
no mention of either the diocesan or inter-diocesan commissions being comprised of experts; 
only that the interdiocesan commission be assisted by experts.37  Given this provision one 
can argue mutatis mutandis that expert assistance is also envisaged for diocesan 
commissions.38  Read suggests that if the required professional expertise is obvious, there is 
no need to legislate.39   
 
As the foregoing discussion indicates, there are no norms in these instruments outside the 
Code dealing specifically and in any detail with the functions of the experts involved in the 
restoration of precious images.  Indeed, as we have seen in the Introduction, all the norms in 
the Code explicitly governing experts are placed in Book VII on Judicial Process.  Therefore, 
as to the experts’ functions with regard to the restoration of precious images, recourse must 
be had to CIC canon 1577 obliging the decision-maker to specify the issues to be addressed.40  
Importantly, Breitenbeck sees the law’s silence on professional qualifications as freeing the 
local Ordinary ‘to select whomever he envisions as the most appropriate expert’.41 
 
In sum, whilst it is clear that competence in the relevant field is required, in the absence of 
any strict legal provisions about qualifications, experts to be consulted before restoration of 
precious images might include canon lawyers and, drawn either from the faithful or from the 
relevant professions in wider society, or both: civil lawyers; people familiar with the process 
of restoration; those familiar with the historical, artistic, cultural or monetary value of sacred 
33 Implying that experts serve on them, rather than assist them. 
34 John Huels, New Comm, p1415, citing OA. 
35 José Tomás Martín de Agar, Ann, p743. 
36 Brian McLean, L&S, p675, ft 3, citing SC, 126 and OA.   
37 SC, 22.2.  See Appendix VI. 
38 PCCCAHPC, 27 and 28.  See Appendix VI. 
39 Gordon Read, L&S, p268, citing Comm, 14 (1982), p214 at Can 401: ‘[T]he Revision  Commission took it for 
granted that [the diocesan chancellor] would be given a professional archivist to help him look after the 
historical material, and so thought it unnecessary to write this into the text’. 
40 CIC, c. 1577§1.  See Appendix I. 
41 Breitenbeck, Jurist, p265. 
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images; and insurance personnel.  Whilst no specific provision is made for the temporary 
transfer of precious images such as might occur during the process of restoration, experts in 
the removal and carriage of valuable art might also feature amongst those required.42  The 
lack of detailed regulation on these matters suggests that the Ordinary enjoys a wide degree 
of discretion in determining the disciplines, qualifications and functions of experts in this 
field. 
 
Consultation - Individual or Collective: Like CIC canon 1189, instruments outside the 
Code and the commentators are silent as to whether experts are to be consulted individually 
or collectively.  If appropriate experts serve on diocesan commissions they may be consulted 
collectively, whereas if outside experts are consulted they may be consulted individually.  It 
appears, therefore, by way of analogy with the use of experts in the judicial forum, that CIC 
canon 1578§1 applies, which means that the Ordinary has discretion in this matter.43 
 
Failure to Consult and Weight of the Expert Advice: When the Ordinary gives written 
permission to restore goods, this constitutes a juridical act.44  Although canon 1189 is silent 
on the effect of failure to seek expert advice (prior to giving permission), as well as on the 
weight to be given by the Ordinary to that advice, nevertheless, because under the canon the 
Ordinary is obliged to consult experts, CIC canon 127 applies; this provides: 
 
‘§1: When the law prescribes that, in order, to perform a juridical act, a Superior requires the 
consent or the advice of some college or group of persons, the college or group must be 
convened in accordance with Can. 166, unless, if there is question of seeking advice only, 
particular or proper law provides otherwise.  For the validity of the act, it is required that the 
consent be obtained of an absolute majority of those present, or that the advice of all be 
sought’.45 
 
 
42 The Holy See’s permission is required for their permanent transfer or alienation, but this does not involve 
experts; CIC, c. 1190§§2 and 3.  See Appendix I.  Commenting on CIC 1917, Augustine maintained that the 
temporary transfer of relics or images for repairs or other reason was permissible without recourse to the Holy 
See, provided they were replaced.  See Augustine, Vol. VI, p245. 
43 CIC, c. 1578§1.  See Appendix I. 
44 Aidan McGrath, L&S, at p72 defines a juridical act as ‘an externally manifested act of the will by which a 
certain juridical effect is intended’, citing Robleda ‘De conceptu actus iuridici’: Per 51 (1962), p419.  McGrath 
holds that the ‘defining feature’ of a juridical act is ‘its voluntary nature: it is a deliberate action by a subject; the 
object of the action is intended by the subject; moreover, the intention is in some way externally manifested: 
otherwise the act will remain purely internal, with no consequences for the social relationships between 
members of the Church’. 
45 CIC, c. 166§§1, 2 and 3.  See Appendix I. 
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Moreover: 
 
‘§2: When the law prescribes that, in order to perform a judicial act, a Superior requires the 
consent or advice of certain persons as individuals: 1º if consent is required, the Superior’s act 
is invalid if the Superior does not seek the consent of those persons, or acts against the vote of 
all or any of them; 2º if advice is required, the Superior’s act is invalid if the Superior does 
not hear those persons.  The Superior is not in any way bound to accept their vote, even it 
(sic) if it is unanimous, nevertheless, without what is, in his or her judgement, an overriding 
reason, the Superior is not to act against their vote, especially if it is a unanimous one’. 
 
CIC canon 1189 explicitly requires that expert advice be sought (not that expert consent is 
obtained).  However, it does not state explicitly that failure to consult invalidates; also, the 
law enshrines a principle that only those laws which expressly state they are invalidating are 
to be considered so.46  However, canon 127 explicitly states that consultation is required for 
validity; as such, it expressly states that failure to seek advice invalidates.47  Therefore, in 
applying canon 127, if the Ordinary fails to consult experts, his decision to permit restoration 
is invalid.  Moreover, if the Ordinary proposes to consult experts collectively (rather than 
individually) he must convene them as a group, unless particular or proper law provides 
otherwise.  In short, although canon 1189 is silent as to whether or not, in the absence of 
particular or proper law, the mandatory requirement to convene the experts affects validity, it 
is clear that the advice of all of the experts whether consulted individually or collectively 
must be sought for validity of the subsequent written permission for restoration.  
 
Contrary to the text of canon 1189, remarkably, Huels suggests that consultation by the 
Ordinary is not required – rather, reports of consultations with, or the recommendations of, 
experts suffice.48  This interpretation removes personal responsibility from the Ordinary, 
whose permission is required and who is obliged by the canon to consult.  Huels’ 
interpretation might be justified if the canon were silent or ambiguous on the matter, and 
46 CIC, c. 10.  See Appendix I. 
47 Augustine Mendonça, L&S, p9, para 29: ‘The term expressly is a specifically canonical one and must be 
understood as such.  If a matter is stated explicitly, then it is manifestly stated in an “express” manner: Can. 126 
is a clear example among many in the Code.  Equally “express”, however, is a matter which is stated implicitly, 
as is exemplified in the following Can 127: it is explicitly stated that “for the validity of the act, it is required 
that the consent be obtained of an absolute majority of those present …” thereby stating that without such a 
majority the act would be invalid’.  See also Michael Carragher, ‘Invalidating Laws: expresse vel 
aequivalenter’, A.A.VV., Iuri canonico quo sit Christi Ecclesia felix (Bibliotheca Salmanticenses, Publicationes 
Universidad Pontificia de Salamanca, 2002), pp171-216 (hereafter Carragher, ‘Invalidating Laws’), at p216; he 
warns that ‘it is perilous to read the canons in isolation from one another’.  At p173, warning that ‘canon 10 is 
deceptively simple in its declaration regarding the identification of invalidating laws’, he says that sometimes 
one has to look elsewhere for the invalidating clause.  
48 Huels, New Comm, p1414-1415. 
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recourse to ‘parallel places’49 led to provisions in the judicial forum permitting the judge to 
accept expert reports already made.50 
 
Nevertheless, Huels later acknowledges that amongst categories of constitutional law, which 
cannot be dispensed, are those requiring prior consultation or permission before action.51  
Carragher, on canon 1189, acknowledges that the Ordinary’s written permission is required 
before restoration but avoids addressing the effect of non-compliance with the requirement to 
consult: ‘[V]alidity is inappropriate here but not common sense’, suggesting that the Ordinary 
should ‘call upon greater resources of expertise and experience to advise on such work’; 
however, when discussing canon 127 he acknowledges that failure to consult invalidates the 
subsequent action.52  This is relevant, particularly if the goods form part of the stable 
patrimony53 of the diocese or juridical person - because the canons on alienation also apply 
when their value could be affected, for example, if they were to be damaged in the process of 
restoration.54 
 
Canon 127 provides that when advice is required, the Superior (including the Ordinary) is not 
bound by it, but must nevertheless have an ‘overriding reason’ for rejecting it.  Breitenbeck, 
acknowledges that under CIC 1917 there were those who held that expert advice should be 
49 CIC, c. 17.  See Appendix I. 
50 CIC, c. 1575.  See Appendix I. 
51 This is based on CIC, c. 86.  See Appendix I.  John M Huels, ‘Categories of Indispensable and Dispensable 
Laws’, Studia Canonica, 39 (2005), pp41-73 (hereafter Huels, ‘Categories of Indispensable and Dispensable 
Laws’), p44, states, therefore, that ‘define’ in c. 86, does not apply simply to legal definitions; it means 
‘determine’.  At p48, he explains that a strict interpretation, that is, ‘pertaining to the essence of a thing … 
without which both acts and institutes would be non-existent’ is too narrow and therefore incorrect.  He defines 
‘constitutive laws’ more broadly as ‘all laws regulating the fundamental and necessary aspects of every juridic 
institute in the canonical system’.   At p49, he includes, in the categories of constitutive law: ‘laws requiring 
some means of external control prior to or subsequent to action (permission, consultation, consent, approval, 
etc); fundamental laws related to required offices, organs, and other structures; laws determining juridic 
capacity; laws establishing fundamental eligibility requirements; laws determining competencies of an office, 
organ, ministry, or status’. 
52 Carragher, ‘Invalidating Laws’, pp190 and 207. 
53 Kennedy, New Comm, p1495 defines ‘stable patrimony’ as: ‘all property, real or personal, movable or 
immovable, tangible or intangible, that, either of its nature or by explicit designation, is destined to remain in the 
possession of its owner for a long or indefinite period of time to afford financial security for the future.  It is the 
opposite of free or liquid capital which is intended to be used to meet operating expenses or otherwise disposed 
of within a reasonably short period of time (within one or, at most, two years)’.  Adrian Farrelly, ‘The Diocesan 
Finance Council: Functions and Duties According to the Code of Canon Law’, Studia Canonica, 23 (1989), 
pp149-166 (hereafter Farrelly, ‘The Diocesan Finance Council’), p160 defines it as: ‘[A]ll goods which are 
designated as constituting the minimum, reliable economic base by which the juridic person can subsist in an 
autonomous manner and take care of the purposes and services that are proper to it’. 
54 CIC, c. 1295.  See Appendix I. 
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‘taken’,55 and others that it need not be followed.56  She holds that the Ordinary ‘should heed’ 
the advice of experts, but does not elaborate.57  CIC therefore clarifies the situation somewhat 
but leaves determination of the reasons for rejecting advice to the person canonically obliged 
to seek it.  Although the canon is silent on whether or not the ‘overriding reasons’ must be 
revealed or explained, the provisions governing the interpretation of experts’ reports in the 
judicial forum require this.58  CCEO makes largely similar provisions to CIC,59 but, for 
restoration, extends protection to ‘well-known icons or images’ that are held in great 
veneration by the people.60 
 
Therefore, the law governing restoration of precious images mandates prior consultation by 
the Ordinary with experts, permitting consultation both within the Church and also with 
wider society.  The law does not exclude non-Catholics from acting as experts.  However, 
canon 1189 does not clarify, nor do other norms, what professional disciplines or 
qualifications are required of the experts, nor does it clarify whether they are to be consulted 
individually or collectively.  Although not bound by the experts’ advice, the Ordinary’s 
failure to seek it invalidates his written permission which is required for restoration.  It would 
appear prudent, therefore, for Bishops’ Conferences to tighten provisions by legislating for 
their territories and affording stronger protection for the Church’s precious assets by 
clarifying what qualifications are required of experts, their role, and by explicitly stating that 
failure on the part of an Ordinary to consult experts invalidates any permission they give for 
the restoration of these goods.   
 
2. THE BUILDING AND RESTORATION OF CHURCHES 
 
Whilst many of the norms and issues applicable to the use of experts in relation to the 
building and restoration of churches are similar to those on their use in the restoration of 
55 Breitenbeck, Doctoral Thesis, p139, citing Henry A Ayrinhac, Administrative Legislation in the New Code of 
Canon Law (New York, 1930), p155.  
56 Breitenbeck, Doctoral Thesis, p136, citing Felix Cappello, Summa Iuris Canonici (Rome: Apud Aedes 
Universitatis Gregorianae, 1930), 2:255, although this referred to the building of churches. 
57 Breitenbeck, Jurist, p265. 
58 CIC, c. 1579§§1 and 2.  See Appendix I. 
59 The canons are placed under Title XVI on ‘Divine Worship and Especially the Sacraments’.  CCEO, cc. 
887§§1, 2; and 1009§1.  See Appendix II. 
60 CCEO, cc. 888§§2, 3; and 887§2.  Protection extends to those of little historical, artistic or monetary value.  
CCEO also requires certain permissions, sometimes written, before transfer to another church or alienation of 
some images: CCEO, 887§1.  See Appendix II. 
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precious images, unlike the latter, the Code prescribes that the advice of experts must be used 
in the building and restoration of churches.  This is unique.  CIC canon 1216 provides:  
 
 ‘In the building and restoration of churches the advice of experts is to be used, 
 and the principles and norms of liturgy and of sacred art are to be observed’. 61 
  
The written permission of the diocesan bishop, rather than the Ordinary, is required before 
any church is built;62 the bishop must consult others prior to giving this consent in order to 
determine inter alia a need for the building - but (unlike in the provision for restoration of 
precious images) experts are not explicitly included in that consultation.63  Whilst experts are 
not involved in the decision as to whether a church is to be built, their use is mandatory once 
a decision is made to build, or to restore, a church in terms of how this is to be achieved.  CIC 
canon 1216 is clear on this point.  However, there are ambiguities in the canon.  The 
provision that expert advice be used suggests that it must be followed, or at least that 
considerable weight be given to it.  Moreover, the canon gives no particular insight into who 
appoints the experts (unlike the norms on restoration of precious images under which the 
appointing body is the Ordinary).  Furthermore, like the norms on the restoration of precious 
images, the canon does not address key issues, namely: the professional disciplines or 
qualifications required of the experts; their functions; whether or not experts must be 
consulted individually or collectively; or whether failure to consult them and to use their 
advice invalidates the appropriate subsequent decision.  To these issues we now turn.  As was 
the case with precious images, we must look beyond the Code for clarity on these matters. 
 
Appointment of Experts: In contrast to the norms on restoration of precious images (under 
which the Ordinary is obliged to appoint experts), canon 1216 does not specify who is to 
appoint the experts in the building and restoration of churches.  Commentators are also silent 
on this issue.  Whilst it is the bishop who decides whether the church is to be built (and his 
permission is given without the requirement of recourse to experts), presumably the 
responsibility to appoint experts lies with the juridical person who will own the church to be 
built or who owns the church to be restored.  This may or may not be the diocesan bishop.64 
61 This canon is also placed in Book IV, but in Part II entitled ‘Sacred Places and Times’.  See CIC, c. 1214 for a 
definition of ‘church’; Appendix I. 
62 See ft 9 above. 
63 CIC, c. 1215§§1, 2 and 3.  See Appendix I. 
64 CIC, cc. 1255; 1256; 1276§1; 1278; and 1279§§, 2.  See Appendix I. 
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 Disciplines, Qualifications and Functions of Experts:  Sacrosanctum Concilium provides 
for inter alia the construction of churches and for the competence of Bishops’ Conferences in 
this area.65  To implement this, an Instruction (1964) sets out criteria for the design and 
construction of churches.66  It called on experts to be ‘generous’, but did not elaborate.67  The 
General Instruction of the Roman Missal, while referring to consultation, does not mention 
experts.68 
 
Doyle maintains that CIC 1917 required consultation with architects, who were not simply 
qualified in the science of construction, but also in church architecture.69  For Breitenbeck, 
CIC 1917 ‘limited experts to “approved” Christian traditions of ecclesiastical architecture’,70 
but included: ‘the best authorities on building’;71 those ‘competent in the field of art’;72 and 
those ‘knowledgeable concerning liturgical theology as well as the role of art in the liturgy’.73  
They had to be ‘willing’ both to ‘follow norms prescribed by ecclesiastical authority’74 and 
‘to work with other experts in liturgical art and other specialized issues’.75  Their role was to 
assist the Ordinary to: judge and approve architectural plans;76 ensure that places of worship 
provided a prayerful atmosphere;77 ensure that buildings fitted in with their surroundings; 
plan acoustics, and take financial resources into account.78  Therefore, although competence, 
knowledge and personal attributes were important, for Breitenbeck no particular expertise 
65 SC, 124; and 128.  See Appendix VI. 
66 IO, 91- 99.  See Appendix VI. 
67 IO, 46.  See Appendix VI. 
68 GIRM (2002), 291: ‘For the proper construction, restoration, and remodelling of sacred buildings, all who are 
involved in the work are to consult the diocesan commission on the sacred Liturgy and sacred Art.  The 
diocesan Bishop, moreover, should use the counsel and help of this commission whenever it comes to laying 
down norms on this matter, approving plans for new buildings, and making decisions on the more important 
issues’. 
69 Doyle, Doctoral Thesis, p304. 
70 Breitenbeck, Doctoral Thesis, p259. 
71 Breitenbeck, Jurist, p266, citing Harold E Collins, The Church Edifice and Its Appointments, Second Edition 
(Westminster, MD, 1964), p4. 
72 Ibid., p266, citing SA, AAS 44 (1952), p545; and CLD 3: 511. 
73 Ibid., p266, citing R Kevin Seasoltz, ‘The Sacred Liturgy: Development and Directions’, The Jurist, 43 
(1983), p21. 
74 Ibid., p266, citing SA, AAS 44 (1952), 545; and CLD 3: 511. 
75 Ibid., p266-267, citing NCCB Bishops’ Committee on the Liturgy, Environment and Art in Catholic Worship 
(Washington USCC, 1978), p27. 
76 Ibid., p267, citing R P Udalricus Beste, Introductio in Codicem, Third Edition (Collegeville, 1946), p621. 
77 Ibid., p267, citing Harold E Collins, op cit., p4 and Petro Vergari in Pio V Pinto, (Ed), Commento al Codice di 
Diritto Canonico (Rome, Urbaniana University Press, 1985), p698. 
78 Ibid., p267, citing Augustine, 6: 17. 
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was required, but the law now provides an opportunity to utilize creatively ‘the contributions 
of a wide range of experts’.79 
 
For Brown, the experts are members of the diocesan commissions.80  Richstatter omits 
reference to experts.81  Huels holds that a ‘reputable architect’ and ‘when possible, a 
liturgical consultant’ should also be consulted.82  In the absence of specific law, it seems that 
architects, archaeologists, engineers, builders, historians, canonists, theologians, liturgists, 
musicians, sound technicians, insurers and members of diocesan committees could be 
appropriate experts.83  Given the varied disciplines involved, these experts could be from 
outside the Church but would be required to work with those within it to meet all liturgical 
requirements. 
 
Consultation - Individual or Collective: As in the case of precious images, canon 1216 is 
unclear whether these experts are to be consulted as a group or as individuals.  However, 
consultation by the juridical person responsible for building or restoration is mandatory.    
 
Failure to Consult and Weight of the Expert Advice: In view of the mandatory 
requirement to consult experts, canon 127 applies.  Therefore, the same arguments regarding 
validity of the permission required before restoration of precious images are relevant here.  
However, it is not only the bishop’s permission which is at issue.  Although the bishop’s 
permission is required for building a church (but not for restoration), and the validity of that 
permission depends on prior consultation with others, prior consultation by the relevant 
authority with experts as provided in canon 1216 affects the juridical act of building or 
restoring the church.  Canon 1216 requires that expert advice be used.  While Huels 
acknowledges the duty to consult,84 only Breitenbeck refers to the duty to use expert advice; 
however, she refers simply to the differing opinions of commentators of CIC 1917.85  
Although canon 127 requires an ‘overriding reason’ to reject advice, this applies when advice 
79 Ibid. 
80 Ralph Brown, L&S, p687. 
81 Thomas Richstatter, Text&Comm, p848. 
82 Huels, New Comm, p1430, cites a national directory of consultants published by The Federation of Diocesan 
Liturgical Commissions in Washington DC and M B Mauck, Places for Worship: A Guide to Building and 
Renovating (Collegeville, 1995). 
83 Or members of the committees of the relevant juridical person. 
84 Huels, New Comm, p1430 concedes that amongst those whose advice must be sought are the diocesan 
commissions.   
85 Breitenbeck, Jurist, p265.   
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is to be sought. The significance of the stronger language in canon 1216, therefore, is 
unclear.86  Failure to use the advice, therefore, could invalidate. 
 
The mandatory requirement to involve experts may, therefore, be compared with the position 
under CIC 1917.  This obliged the Ordinary to observe Christian tradition, and laws regarding 
sacred art, when building or restoring churches; whilst consultation with experts was not 
mandatory,87 commentators recognise that consultation was common practice and particular 
law sometimes mandated it.88  CCEO generally requires the eparchial bishop’s written 
permission before building churches,89 but makes no provision for expert advice or indeed, 
for restoration, although that possibility is acknowledged.90   
 
To sum up this section, despite the expressed concern of the Church over damage to 
ecclesiastical goods and disregard for legislation, CIC is remarkably vague in relation to the 
building and restoration of churches.  Although the law mandates the use of ‘experts’ in this 
area, it does not: define the term ‘expert’; specify the professions or expertise required of 
them; nor clarify whether competence in the field suffices.91  Other juridical texts give little 
further insight.  Commentators help however in identifying the functions of experts here, 
more so than they do in respect of precious images.  Also, as with precious images, the law is 
unclear as to whether the required experts form part of the diocesan or inter-diocesan 
86 Text&Comm, p848 uses the phrase ‘the advice of experts is also to be employed’ and New Comm, p1429 uses 
the phrase: ‘after the advice of experts has been taken into account’. 
87 CIC 1917, c. 1164§1.   See Appendix III. 
88 Augustine, Vol VI, p17 considered consultation with experts to be a ‘dictate of common sense’.  See also 
Doyle, Doctoral Thesis, p304, referring to the long-standing practice of consulting experts, he says the first 
mention of experts used in the construction of a new church is found in F X Schmalzgrueber Ius Ecclesiasticus 
Universum, L. IV, pars III, tit. 19 and 20 (Rome, ExTypis Rev. Camerae Apostolicae, 1843-1845).  However, 
particular laws in Canada in 1863 and 1870 provided that in construction and restoration of seminaries, bishops 
‘should not’ give consent without consulting experts; the First Plenary Council of Quebec in 1909 contained the 
law later appearing in CIC 1917, but applied it, not only to churches, but to rectories and other ecclesiastical 
buildings.  
89 CCEO, cc. 868; and 870.  See Appendix II. 
90 CCEO, c. 873§§1, 2.  See Appendix II. 
91 Personal communication with the Archdiocesan Administrator, Archdiocese of Cardiff, 18 May 2007 revealed 
that, prior to carrying out restoration work on St David’s Cathedral, three firms of architects who had previously 
restored similar buildings were chosen and invited to give presentations on their proposals.  Two responded.  
The first provided drawings and plans of proposals and gave what was considered a ‘not very interesting’ 
presentation.  The second: envisaged carrying out a detailed structural survey of the existing building; expressed 
a need to see the liturgy ‘in action’; and proposed interviewing the clergy about their needs and liturgical 
practice.  A contract was entered into with the latter, although he had not produced the cheapest tender.  The 
Dean of St David’s Cathedral, Cardiff, said on 3 February 2008, that when deciding on an ‘expert’ architect to 
undertake renovations, other cathedrals which were recently renovated were also visited.  St Anne’s Cathedral in 
Leeds, which had been re-opened after major restoration work on 13 November 2006, was preferred and 
consequently the architect responsible for that work was commissioned.  
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commissions or act as outside advisors to them; moreover, commentators are divided on this 
issue.  However, it seems that dialogue and consultation with experts outside church bodies 
and indeed, with non-Catholics, is not prohibited.  Although canon 127 applies, and failure to 
consult the experts as to the building or restoration process invalidates, it remains unclear 
whether experts are to be consulted individually or collectively.  Commentators also fail to 
explain either the significance of non-compliance with the mandatory provisions to consult or 
the requirement to use expert advice in respect of the building and restoration of churches.  In 
short, Bishops’ Conferences should legislate to clarify these ambiguities by specifying: the 
professions and qualifications required of the experts; their precise role; whether or not they 
are to be consulted individually or collectively; what weight is to be given to expert advice; 
and whether they have to be Catholic or may be non-Catholic. 
 
3. FINANCIAL ADMINISTRATION 
 
In order to protect temporal goods, the law requires the use of experts in financial 
administration.  This section examines the canonical provisions for: a diocesan finance 
committee, on which experts serve; a diocesan finance administrator, who is an expert; and 
acts of restricted alienation of temporal goods, which require consultation with experts. 
 
The Diocesan Finance Committee:  
 
The law requires that a diocesan finance committee be established.  Canon 492§1 provides:  
 
          ‘In each diocese a finance committee is to be established, presided over by the  
           diocesan Bishop or his delegate.  It is to be composed of at least three of Christ’s faithful, 
           expert in financial affairs and civil law, of outstanding integrity, and appointed by the Bishop’.  
 
The canon is clear on some issues: the establishment of a diocesan finance committee is 
mandatory;92 the bishop is responsible for appointing to the committee at least three experts 
92 This canon is placed in Book II on ‘The People of God’.  Text&Comm, p398 uses the term ‘truly skilled in 
financial affairs as well as in civil law’.  New Comm, p646, uses ‘truly expert’.  American translations and 
CCEO use the term ‘finance council’. Latin: ‘consilium’.  CIC also mandates the establishment of a finance 
committee for each parish (CIC, c. 537) and other diocesan bodies, such as the council of priests (CIC, c. 495§1) 
and the college of consultors (CIC, c. 502§1) but there is no canonical requirement for experts among their 
members.  
21 
 
                                                            
in finance and civil law;93 lay people are not explicitly excluded;94 and the bishop or his 
delegate presides over this committee.95  
 
Other canons regulate the committee’s role.  The committee: prepares the diocesan annual 
budget and accounts for expenditure annually; and examines accounts submitted to the bishop 
by his administrators of temporal goods.96  The committee has an advisory role also.  The 
diocesan bishop must consult the committee before he: performs any act of administration of 
major importance;97 determines what acts ‘go beyond the limits and manner of ordinary 
administration’ for his own subjects,98 when their statutes are silent;99 levies tax on public 
juridical persons under his authority,100 or an extraordinary tax on other physical or juridical 
persons; invests endowments; reduces the obligations attached to pious causes; or appoints, 
or dismisses a finance administrator.101  Moreover, the bishop requires the committee’s 
consent before he places an act of extraordinary administration.102  Given the provision for all 
juridical persons to have a finance committee or at least counsellors who assist in 
administration, the sharing of responsibility is an established principle.103  Canon 492 
93 Text&Comm, p398, uses, instead of ‘appointed’, the translation ‘named’, whilst New Comm, p646, uses 
‘appointed’.  Michael Carragher, ‘Papal and Episcopal Administration of Temporal Goods’, Joseph Fox (Ed), 
Render Unto Caesar: Church Property in Roman Catholic and Anglican Canon Law (Rome 2000), pp57-68 
(hereafter Carragher, ‘Papal and Episcopal Administration’), p66, uses the term ‘nomination’, which might be a 
more accurate translation.   Except in rare circumstances (see CIC, c. 523), it is the prerogative of the diocesan 
bishop to make appointments to ecclesiastical offices: See Appendix I: CIC, c. 157.  Ecclesiastical office can be 
acquired in four ways: See Appendix I: CIC, c. 147.  In the case of the finance committee, the canon is clear that 
the diocesan bishop appoints members; it is therefore, by free conferral.   
94 CIC, c. 228§2.  See Appendix I. 
95 The law makes provision for delegation of presidential duties, but not for delegation of other responsibilities, 
such as the appointment of committee members.  The question as to whom he might delegate is beyond the 
scope of this study, but it is important in respect of issues such as lay people cooperating in the power of 
jurisdiction (canon 129).  Commentators are divided as to whether or not the bishop’s delegate must be a cleric; 
see Gordon Read, L&S, p273; John A Alesandro, Text&Comm, p398; Francesco Coccopalmerio, Ex Comm, 
p1169: and Barbara Anne Cusack, in New Comm, pp646-647. 
96 CIC, cc. 493; 1287§1; and 1284§3.   See Appendix I. 
97 CIC, c. 1277 is placed in Book V on ‘The Temporal Goods of the Church’.  See Appendix I.  Although CIC 
contains no definition of acts of ‘major’ or ‘greater’ ‘importance’ or ‘moment’, Morrisey, L&S, p723, refers to 
such acts as affecting ‘the financial situation of the diocese’.  See also Text&Comm, p872 and New Comm, 
p1478.  Kennedy, New Comm, p1478, notes that the ‘proper place’ to find a precise determination of ‘acts of 
ordinary administration of greater importance’, is in the statutes of the relevant juridical person. 
98 Kennedy, New Comm, p1478, defines acts of ordinary administration as: ‘[In general], those which occur 
regularly or whose financial consequences are moderate’. 
99 CIC, c. 1281§2 (and CIC, c. 638§1, in the case of Institutes of Consecrated life and Societies of Apostolic 
life).  See Appendix I. 
100 CIC, cc. 113§2; 114§1; 115§1; and 116§§1 and 2.  Goods owned by private juridical persons are not 
ecclesiastical goods (CIC, c. 1257§2).  See Appendix I. 
101 CIC, cc. 494; 1263; 1305; and 1310§1.  See Appendix I. 
102 CIC, c. 1277.   See Appendix I.  Morrisey, L&S, p723, defines such an act as ‘that which has been 
determined as such by an approved decree of the relevant Bishops’ Conference’.  
103 CIC, cc. 1279§§1, 2; and 1280.   See Appendix I. 
22 
 
                                                            
provides further that committee members, excluding the bishop’s close relatives,104 serve a 
five-year term, renewable indefinitely.105  They are obliged to: carry out their duties in 
accordance with the law; give sincere opinions; and, if necessary, observe secrecy.106  The 
committee remains in place sede vacante.107 
 
Although CIC does not require the bishop to consult others prior to appointing the experts in 
finance and civil law, one eminent canonist considers that prior consultation with other 
‘experts’ is required.108  However, a number of ambiguities still remain.  Canon 492 does not 
clarify: whether any professional qualifications are required of the experts; whether all 
members of the committee must be expert in finance and civil law; what is meant by ‘Christ’s 
faithful’; the measure of ‘outstanding integrity’; who is obliged to provide information on 
which experts base their sincere opinions; and whether the fourth degree of consanguinity or 
affinity is included in the prohibition on appointment.  Moreover, the canons requiring the 
bishop to consult the committee or obtain its consent are not explicit as to: whether or not 
experts are consulted individually or collectively; whether or not seeking advice or consent 
affects the validity of the bishop’s subsequent act; or whether the bishop is bound by the 
committee’s advice or, when consent is required, whether he must act according to their vote.     
 
Disciplines, Qualifications and Functions of Experts:  Commentators agree that the role of 
the finance committee is to oversee financial systems, to provide relevant and timely advice 
on fiscal issues and to advise the bishop regarding policy decisions.109  However, except for 
Barr, who understands that the experts require a degree in law or business, commentators are 
silent on the issue of professional qualifications.110  On the one hand, Breitenbeck, by 
104 CIC, c. 492§3.  See Appendix I.  The canon is not explicit as to whether a fourth-degree relative is included 
in the prohibition.  This is discussed below. 
105 CIC, c. 492§2.  See Appendix I. 
106 CIC, cc. 127§3; and 1282.  See Appendix I. 
107 CIC, c. 423§2.  See Appendix I. 
108 Coccopalmerio, Ex Comm, p1170, although acknowledging that CIC does not require prior consultation, 
considers that the diocesan bishop ‘will not omit consulting with experts so as to choose committee members 
who are vere periti’.  Mgr Francesco Coccopalmerio is a member of the Church’s Supreme Tribunal, The 
Apostolic Signatura, and was appointed President of the Pontifical Council for Legislative Texts in 2007. 
109 Read in L&S, p274-275.  Alesandro, Text&Comm, p399.  Cusack, New Comm, p649-650. 
110 Diane L Barr, New Comm, p296.  Although commenting on CIC, c. 228 on lay experts, Barr acknowledges 
that ‘competence’ related to duties to be undertaken, is required, but special attention should be paid to 
qualifications and the ‘manner in which expertise was obtained’.  A member of the finance council ‘would have 
to have obtained the necessary expertise in law and economics in a more formal fashion, such as obtaining a 
degree in law or business’. 
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reference to ‘a council of experts’, implies that all members are ‘experts’.111  Cusack, 
preferring more than three members on the committee consisting of clerical and lay persons, 
considers that the committee is ‘an excellent arena’ for involvement of laity with ‘wide 
expertise’, such as in ethical investing, real estate, and the Church’s social teaching.112  Read 
refers to ‘expertise’ in finance and civil law.113  On the other hand, Caparros requires only 
‘competence’.114  Moreover, canonists disagree on the need for personal experience in the 
Church: Cocopalmerio, not ruling out an all-clerical or all-lay membership, but preferring a 
combination, recognises the opportunity to appoint a greater number of experts, but considers 
that ‘technical qualities’ trump moral ones.115  Other canonists consider experience as 
‘Christian faithful’116 and pastoral considerations to be important.117   Despite the different 
views of canonists, the canon, nevertheless, refers to the committee being ‘composed of at 
least three of Christ’s faithful, expert in financial affairs and civil law’.  It seems, therefore, 
that there is room, not only for more experts in these fields, but also for other members who 
might not possess these specific requirements, perhaps having expertise in other relevant 
areas, such as canon law. 
 
Consultation - Individual or Collective:  Although canon 492 is silent on the issue of 
individual or collective consultation, as the experts form, or form part of, the committee, it is 
reasonable to assume consultation as a group.  Therefore, as we have already seen, under 
canon 127, when their consent is required, they must be convened in accordance with canon 
166 (which allows for legitimate absence).118  For the validity of the bishop’s subsequent act 
he must have the consent of an absolute majority of those present.119  If advice only is 
111 Breitenbeck, Doctoral Thesis, p266. 
112 Cusack, New Comm, pp647-648.   
113 Read, L&S, p273.   
114 Caparros, Ex Comm, p185. 
115 Coccopalmerio, Ex Comm, pp1169-1170.  Cusack, New Comm, p647:  Appointment should be determined by 
‘financial and civil law expertise’, rather than ‘ecclesiastical status’. 
116 Carragher, ‘Papal and Episcopal Administration’, p66: Members should be ‘expert in financial and legal 
matters’ but ‘input is not restricted merely to their technical expertise but rather calls upon their experiences as 
Christian faithful’.   
117 Alesandro, Text&Comm, p398: In addition to members’ expertise, ‘the advice of qualified accountants and 
attorneys may be insufficient or inadequate’ to address the pastoral implications of decisions. 
118 See Appendix I: CIC, c. 166. 
119 Royce R Thomas, in Arthur Espelage (Ed), CLSA Advisory Opinions 1994-2000 (CLSA, Washington, 2002), 
p12, defines ‘majority’ as ‘any number over 50% or 50% +1’.  Referring to Black’s Law Dictionary, Sixth 
Edition (1979), Thomas says ‘“majority” means “the greater number”.  If there are two candidates, then the 
greater number of votes.  But the term “absolute majority” is used to clarify the difference between “majority” 
and “plurality”.  Therefore, when more than two candidates or positions are being voted on the “absolute 
majority” would be the number greater than half the total valid votes cast’. 
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required, experts must be convened unless particular or proper law provides otherwise; for 
validity of the bishop’s subsequent act, he must seek the advice of all. 
 
Failure to Consult and Weight of the Expert Advice:  Some commentators on canon 1277 
requiring the bishop to consult (as to acts of administration of major importance), or obtain 
the consent of, the committee (as to acts of extraordinary administration), imply, by their 
reference to canon 127, that failure results in invalidity of the subsequent act,120 whilst others 
are unequivocal on invalidity.121  Canonists agree that the requirement under canon 127§2 to 
consult or obtain consent is not ‘a mere formality’, but an exercise ‘of responsibility’.122  The 
bishop is not bound by, but must have a legitimate reason to act against, the advice or 
consent.123  Hill maintains that even when the consent of others is required for the validity of 
a superior’s act and is given, the superior is not obliged to act; he or she may decide not to act 
or to delay the action.124  An important issue is whether or not the bishop can break a tied 
vote of the committee in order to be free to act; commentators agree that he cannot,125 as he is 
not a member of the committee.126   A delegate, therefore, would be in the same position. 
 
Christ’s Faithful: Opinion is divided over what is meant by ‘Christ’s faithful’ in this 
context.  Some imply,127 or understand,128 that experts must be Catholic, while others hold 
120 John J Myers, Text&Comm, p873 and Cusack, New Comm, p650.     
121 Kennedy, New Comm, p1478 and Mariano López Alarcón in Ann, p791, Morrisey, L&S, p723, and McGrath, 
L&S, p74, para 266 (although McGrath is commenting on c. 127). 
122 McGrath, L&S, p75, para 267; Myriam Wijlens, New Comm, p181; and Cusack, New Comm, p650.   
123 Morrisey, L&S, p723, para 2540, says the bishop is not bound but, referring to CIC, c. 127§2: ‘[H]e would 
act ... in the absence of an overriding reason, illegally and imprudently if he simply rejected it’.  Richard Hill, 
Text&Comm, pp91-92 holds that CIC, c. 127§2, requiring an ‘overriding reason’ to act contrary to a consensus, 
also applies to §1. The bishop is not bound and can ‘decide not to act or to delay acting’.  See also, Cusack, New 
Comm, p650. 
124 Hill, Text&Comm, p91.  However, this seems at odds with c. 127§2, 1°. 
125 Ibid, p92.  Hill, commenting on CIC, c. 127§1, concludes in the negative, because the superior ‘cannot give 
advice to himself or herself and cannot be said to consent to the action that he or she has presented with the 
recommendation that the group consent to it’; nor can he or she ‘supply the required consent by breaking a tie’. 
McGrath, L&S, p74, para 265, citing CCom: ‘... [I]in the event of a tie, consent has not been obtained and the act 
cannot be performed.  In these circumstances, the Superior cannot intervene to resolve the tie with a casting 
vote’.  Emphasis in original.  Wijlens, New Comm, p181 agrees; she explains: a vote ending in a tie ‘may not be 
interpreted as giving consent.  Such a vote implies consent is not given’. 
126 McGrath, L&S, p74, para 265: ‘[T]he group ... is an entity in its own right, distinct from the person of the 
Superior who is not a member of it’ .  Emphasis in original.  Also Juan Ignacio Arrieta, Ann, p362.  In response 
to the question as to whether or not the superior has the right of voting with the others at least to break a tie, the 
Pontifical Council for Legislative Text respondened in the negative on 14 May 1985; this was given Papal 
approval on 5 July 1985 and promulgated on 1 August 1985.  See Ann, p1619. 
127 Arrieta, Ann, p361: ‘ ... [T]he bodies established by common law within the diocese are ... to be entrusted to 
the faithful - clerics, religious and laypersons - according to their competence’.  Read, L&S, p273: The 
appointment is open to ‘lay people, religious or clergy, male or female’, which implies Catholics. 
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that it is sufficient to be Christian.129  As the experts’ posts meet the criteria for ecclesiastical 
office (given their five-year appointment),130 it follows that canon 149 applies.131  Although 
the Code binds only the Latin Church, office holders must be ‘in communion’.132  The law 
describes ‘full communion,’133 but recognizes all baptised as ‘Christ’s faithful’.134  According 
to McGrath, theologically, the term ‘Christ’s faithful’ refers to all the baptised, whilst 
canonically it refers only to those in ‘full communion’; he implies that when the law refers to 
‘Christ’s faithful’, ‘full communion’ is intended.135  In other words, these experts must be 
Catholic and in full communion.  This is supported by an Instruction (1997), stating that only 
those who possess the qualities required for members of pastoral councils, and who are in 
regular marital unions, may be elected to diocesan and parochial pastoral councils and 
parochial finance councils, which, unlike the diocesan finance committee, are not 
deliberative bodies.136  Given that that this Instruction does not contain an exhaustive list of 
requirements, it can be argued that at least the same provisions, if not stricter ones, apply to 
the diocesan finance committee, which is a deliberative body.137  However, membership of 
the committee is not necessarily linked with liturgical functions and neither expertise nor 
128 Alesandro, Text&Comm, p398: Members ‘must be Catholic’.  Carragher, ‘Papal and Episcopal 
Administration’, p66: Their ‘input … calls upon their experiences as Christian faithful who are fully engaged 
participants in the life of the Church’.  Emphasis added.   
129 Commenting on CIC, c. 149 requiring, for ecclesiastical office, ‘communion with the Church’, James H 
Provost, New Comm, p204, states: ‘something more than being baptized is needed’; and as the office is 
exercised ‘on behalf of the Church’, the holder ‘must have a positive commitment’ to the Church.  
Acknowledging the need to be Christian, he argues that the canon limits the ‘free choice of those who make 
provision for office’ and therefore, should be interpreted strictly according to canon 18 and because, unlike 
some other canons, the canon does not require ‘full communion’, interpretation ‘must stay with the wording of 
the text’.  Cusack, New Comm, p647, ft 204, holds that opinions vary regarding whether or not members of the 
finance council, as well as the diocesan finance officer, must be Catholic, attributing the dissonance to the 
interpretation of c. 149§1.   
130 CIC, c. 145§1.  See Appendix I. 
131 CIC, c. 149§1.  See Appendix I. 
132 CIC, c. 1.  See Appendix I. 
133 CIC, c. 205.  See Appendix I. 
134 CIC, c. 204.  See Appendix I.  This, however, is a theological statement recognising that baptised participate 
‘in their own way’ in the Church’s mission. 
135 McGrath, L&S, p115, citing: Comm, 12 (1980), 60-61; and Comm, 14 (1982), 157 at Can. 201.  See also 
commentary on CIC, c. 149, p88, para 324. 
136 CNOFSMP, Premis and Article 5§2.  See Appendix VI.  This Instruction was approved by the Supreme 
Pontiff, in forma specifica (see ft.23 above).  CIC, c. 512§§1, 3 and CCC, p369, para 1650.   See Appendix I 
and Appendix IV.  
137 Canonists appear to disagree on whether or not this requirement is one of disciplinary law, which can be 
dispensed under CIC, c. 87§1, or of constitutional law which cannot be dispensed.  Disciplinary laws are defined 
by Mendonça, L&S, p49, para 175, as: ‘those which command or prohibit something’, citing Paul VI, De 
Episcoporum Muneribus, IV (15 June 1966): CLD: 6, 396.  For the argument for disciplinary law, albeit 
cautioning against the practice, see Julian B Wellspring, ‘Appointment of a Qualified Non-Catholic as Defender 
of the Bond’, Arthur J Espelage (Ed), CLSA Advisory Opinions 2001-2005 (2005), pp361-362, at p362.  For the 
argument for constitutional law see Huels, ‘Categories of Indispensable and Dispensable Laws’, p49.  Huels 
includes, in the categories of constitutive law:  ‘laws establishing fundamental eligibility requirements’.   
26 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
personal qualities are expressly required for validity of appointment; therefore, non-
compliance (appointing a non-Catholic or a Catholic not in full communion) does not 
invalidate an appointment, but the appointment could be rescinded either by a decree of the 
competent authority or by an administrative tribunal judgment.138 
 
Personal Attributes: Although necessarily a subjective judgment, commentators agree that 
the purpose of the requirement for experts to be of ‘outstanding integrity’ is: to ‘preclude any 
suspicion of corruption’;139 to avoid scandal;140 or because ‘scrupulous honesty’ is 
required.141  However, given that officeholders are amongst ‘Christ’s faithful’, they are 
bound to preserve ‘communion’ with the Church.142  That the bishop’s close relatives are 
excluded from appointment as experts also avoids any appearance of nepotism or 
favouritism.143   
 
Responsibility for Providing Information:  The experts’ opinions must be sincere and 
consequently informed.144  The law provides, albeit regarding alienation, that advice or 
opinion not be given until certain conditions are met,145 but is silent on who is responsible for 
providing relevant information.  Myers simply acknowledges the canonical requirements.146 
Morrisey says that those whose advice is sought must ‘insist on being given that 
information’, which implies an obligation on the person who seeks advice or consent.147  
Carragher agrees.148  Therefore, the expert has a right to information which could influence 
his advice. 
 
138 CIC, cc. 10; and 149§2.  See Appendix I.  See also Gregory Ingles, ‘Does the Finance Officer Spoken of in 
Canon 494 of Necessity Have to be a Catholic?’, Arthur Espilage (Ed), CLSA Advisory Opinions 1994-2000 
(CLSA, Washington, 2002), pp121-123. 
139 Read, L&S, p273. 
140 Cusack, New Comm, p647. 
141 Alesandro, Text&Comm, p398. 
142 CIC, c. 209.  See Appendix I. 
143 Coccopalmerio, Ex Comm, p1171: ‘The “ratio legis” is possibly the fear of a conflict of interest between the 
committee members and the diocesan bishop’. 
144 Kennedy, New Comm, p1499: Informed consultation is ‘a principle of sound government, applicable by 
analogy, to all situations of consultation’. 
145 CIC, c. 1292§4.  See Appendix I. 
146 Myers, Text&Comm, p881.   
147 Morrisey, L&S, p73 
 
5. 
148 Carragher, ‘Papal and Episcopal Administration’, p66: the diocesan bishop is ‘canonically bound’ to inform 
the finance committee of any previous alienation so that the members are ‘au fait with the financial state of the 
diocese’, otherwise the transaction is ‘canonically invalid’ even though possibly valid in civil law. 
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Prohibition on Appointment of Bishop’s Close Relatives:  Although canon 492 prohibits 
the appointment of ‘persons related to the bishop up to the fourth degree of consanguinity or 
affinity’, it does not explicitly include the fourth degree in the prohibition.  Some 
commentators refer simply to a prohibition ‘within the fourth degree’;149 nevertheless 
Alesandro implies that the fourth degree is included.150  Cusack understands that a fourth 
degree relative is not included as the canon, unlike that providing for prohibition on marriage, 
does not explicitly include the fourth degree.151  As the principle is to prevent any appearance 
of nepotism or conflict of interest in the appointment of the experts, it would appear that one 
should err on the side of caution and include the fourth degree in the prohibition. 
 
CIC 1917 similarly provided for establishing a ‘council’, but not for a delegate.   At least two 
‘suitable’ men152 were to be appointed, but to be ‘expert’ in civil law was required only 
‘insofar as possible’.153  Prior consultation with the Chapter was required before 
appointment.154  The Ordinary was obliged to consult the council ‘in administrative actions of 
greater moment’.155  Members were obliged to take an oath to fulfil their duties faithfully 
before taking office,156 and had only a consultative vote unless the law,157 expressly, required 
their consent.158  No term of office was indicated,159 nor were the men required to be 
‘Christ’s faithful’.160 
149 Read, L&S, p272, para 982.  Read refers the reader to CIC, cc. 108-109.  
150 Alesandro, Text& Comm, p398: ‘No member may be related to the diocesan bishop within the fourth grade 
of consanguinity or affinity i.e., the bishop’s first-cousin, grandniece, grandnephew, granduncle, grandaunt, or 
their spouses’.  (Emphasis added). 
151 CIC, c. 1091§1.  See Appendix I.  Cusack, New Comm, p646, believes first cousins are not excluded on the 
basis that the canon does not say ‘up to and including’.  
152 The reference to ‘men’ remained in the draft canons throughout the revision of the Code, but was removed by 
Pope John Paul II during its final review.  See Breitenbeck, Doctoral Thesis, p257.  
153 Doyle, Doctoral Thesis, p305, citing Sacred Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith, Instruction (8 
September 1869), §27, Fontes, VII, §4876; Instruction (18 October 1883), §XIV, Fontes, VII, §4903.  Doyle 
notes that prior to CIC 1917, Instructions did not mention ‘experts’ but ‘better qualified clerics’, whilst CIC 
1917 ‘suggests’ that the chosen men be ‘experts’; he says the practice was to use priests and laymen such as 
lawyers and bankers.   
154 Edward N Peters, The 1917 or Pio-Benedictine Code of Canon Law (San Francisco, 2001), (hereafter 
Peters), p508.  See Appendix III: CIC 1917, c. 1520§1.  
155 CIC 1917, c. 1520§3.  See Appendix III. 
156 CIC 1917, c. 1522.  See Appendix III. 
157 Or foundation documents. 
158 CIC 1917, cc. 1520§3; and 1532§3 (which required the consent of either the cathedral chapter or the Council 
of administration and interested parties before alienating goods of a specific value) and CIC 1917, c. 1539§2, 
which required the consent of the council of administration for the exchange of titles.  See Appendix III. 
159 However, although not termed ‘experts’, a term of three years was stipulated for ‘provident men’ who were 
‘suitable’ and ‘of good repute’ with whom the local Ordinary was to associate himself, in the administrations of 
goods pertaining to other churches or pious places when no provision in law was made for their own council of 
administration.  See CIC 1917, c. 1521. These men would have dealt with issues such as property, endowments, 
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 Due to their autonomous nature, provisions for the Eastern Churches are more complex, but 
CCEO makes somewhat similar provisions to CIC for an eparchial ‘finance council’.  
However, the bishop is obliged to consult others before he appoints more than one ‘suitable’ 
person; suitability implying knowledge of financial matters.161  However, the canon requires 
merely that appointees be ‘expert, if possible, also in civil law’; therefore, this requirement is 
not absolute.  The council consists of members and a president, clarifying that the president is 
not a member.  There is no provision for a delegate.  The council’s role is similar to that of 
the committee under CIC.162  The eparchial bishop is obliged to consult, or obtain consent of, 
the finance council and others in similar circumstances.163  CCEO is explicit that members 
have only a consultative vote unless consent is required by common law or particular law.164  
It requires council’s consent before tax is levied on juridical persons and is explicit that no 
tax can be levied on offerings collected during the celebration of Divine Liturgy.165  It neither 
mentions a term of office nor requires experts to be of ‘Christ’s faithful’.  CCEO is also 
explicit that the obligation to inform those whose advice or consent is required rests with the 
authority seeking advice or consent.166  For certain acts of alienation, this provision can go to 
validity of that act.167  Unlike CIC, CCEO explicitly includes the fourth degree of 
consanguinity or affinity in the prohibition on appointing the bishop’s relatives.168 
 
In sum, the Bishops’ Conference should legislate, clarifying: the professional qualifications 
required of the experts and whether or not others, perhaps those possessing different 
expertise, could also be appointed to the committee; whether appointees must be Catholics in 
full communion or whether non-Catholics possessing the required professional qualifications 
in finance and civil law would suffice; who is responsible for obtaining or supplying 
information on which expert opinions are based; whether experts are to be consulted 
individually or collectively; the effect of non-compliance with the requirements to consult 
investments etc., and therefore would have been required to have knowledge and expertise in financial matters, 
civil law and canon law.  See also CIC 1917, c. 1521§2. See Appendix III. 
160 Although this is likely to have been presumed. 
161 CCEO, c. 263§1.   See Appendix II. 
162 To prepare an annual budget and to approve expenditure. CCEO, cc. 244§2; 263§5 and 934§4.  See 
Appendix II. 
163 CCEO, cc. 262§1; 263§4; 1049; 1024§2; and 1054§2.  See Appendix II. 
164 CCEO, c. 263§4.  See Appendix II. 
165 CCEO, c. 1012§1.  See Appendix II. 
166 CCEO, c. 934§3.  See Appendix II. 
167 CCEO, c. 1038§2.  See Appendix II. 
168 CCEO, cc. 122§1; and 263§3.   See Appendix II. 
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experts or to obtain their consent; the weight to be given to advice; and whether or not the 
fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity is included in the prohibition to appointment. 
 
The Finance Administrator: 
 
In addition to the diocesan finance committee, each diocese must have an expert in financial 
matters as finance administrator.  This is a new provision in CIC and a further example of the 
possibility for lay participation in the governance of the Church.  CIC canon 494§1 provides: 
  
            ‘In each diocese a financial administrator is to be appointed by the Bishop, after  
consulting the college of consultors and the finance committee.  The financial  
administrator is to be expert in financial matters and of truly outstanding integrity’.169 
 
This canon is clear that: the appointment of a diocesan finance administrator is mandatory;170 
the bishop must make the appointment; the bishop’s prior consultation with, inter alia, the 
finance committee, on which at least three experts serve, is mandatory; the appointee must be 
expert in ‘financial matters’ and be ‘of truly outstanding integrity’.  The canon further 
provides that the administrator: serves a five-year term, renewable indefinitely and, therefore, 
enjoys a degree of security of tenure.  A ‘grave reason’ is required for removal from office, 
the determination of which requires the bishop’s prior consultation with, inter alia, the 
finance committee.171   
 
However, the law remains unclear as to: the professional qualifications required of the 
appointee; whether or not the bishop’s prior consultation goes to validity of the appointment 
and removal; whether a contract valid at civil law is required, particularly for a lay appointee; 
169 The canon is placed in Book II on ‘The People of God’. 
170 Text&Comm, p399 and New Comm, p651 use the term ‘finance officer’.  The Latin text uses the word 
‘oeconomus’.  Albeit beyond the scope of this study, whether ‘oeconomus’ is translated as ‘administrator’ or 
‘officer’ has implications as to: whether or not the canons governing administrators of temporal goods apply; 
and whether or not the post is an ‘ecclesiastical office’.   Although CIC 1917 made no provision for this 
appointment, Peters, pp72, 168, 170, and 182, holding that in law the term ‘ecclesiastical office’ was interpreted 
strictly under CIC 1917, believes that the ‘oeconomus’ appointed during a vacant See, would hold ‘office’ in a 
broad sense.  He consistently uses ‘econome’ both when speaking of administrators of temporalities appointed 
during a vacant See and when speaking of priests with care of souls.  Augustine, Vol II, pp 481; 482; and 563-
564, and Vol III, p478, refers to: ‘administrators’ in relation to administering revenues during a vacant See, if 
‘appointed’, but to ‘procurator’ if elected; ‘vicar’ or ‘administrator’ in relation to temporary appointment to a 
vacant parish; and ‘substitute’ in relation to replacement of a suspended parish priest.  Breitenbeck, Doctoral 
Thesis, p272 and Alesandro, Text&Comm, p399 hold that the ‘oeconomus’ of CIC 1917 was ‘not a mandatory 
office’.   
171 CIC, c. 494§2.  See Appendix I. 
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what precisely is meant by ‘a grave reason’ required for removal from office, although it is 
clear that the bishop must consult, inter alia, the finance committee before determining its 
existence; and whether or not the bishop’s close relatives are excluded from appointment.  
Moreover, whilst some canons specifically apply to ‘all administrators’, others refer simply to 
‘administrators’, leaving it unclear as to whether or not the financial administrator is 
included.172 
 
Disciplines, Qualifications and Functions of Experts: The financial administrator’s role is 
to: administer diocesan goods according to the finance committee’s plan; pay authorised bills; 
and submit end-of-year accounts to the finance committee.173  The bishop may entrust the 
appointee with supervising the administration of all goods belonging to public juridical 
persons subject to him.174  The administrator is obliged to perform duties in accordance with 
law,175 and diligently.176  All involved in administration of temporal goods are liable for 
failure to discharge their duties.177  Canonists agree on the finance administrator’s role,178 and 
the need for financial ‘expertise’.179  Although expertise in financial matters is required, 
despite the administrator’s role involving both canon law and civil law matters, some 
commentators suggest that the administrator can rely on the finance committee’s knowledge 
and expertise in these disciplines,180 whilst others suggest that the administrator should ‘be 
able and willing’ to learn about canon law and civil law matters and their implications.181  
172 CIC, cc. 1283; and 1288, which refer to ‘administrators’ whereas CIC, c. 1284 refers to ‘all administrators’.  
See Appendix I. 
173 CIC, c. 494§§3 and 4.  See Appendix I. 
174 CIC, cc. 1276§1; 1278; and 1279§2.  See Appendix I. 
175 CIC, c. 1282.  See Appendix I. 
176 CIC, c. 1284.  See Appendix I. 
177 CIC, c. 1289.  See Appendix I.  Given that this provision applies also to those who do not hold ecclesiastical 
office, it can be presumed to apply to members of the finance committee and the financial administrator. 
178 Read, L&S, p275; Alesandro, Text&Comm, p400; Breitenbeck, Jurist, p273; and Cusack, New Comm, p651. 
179 Caparros, Ex Comm, p186, commenting on CIC, c. 228 on lay experts, says the appointee ‘must be a true 
expert in the subject’ involving the selection of ‘the most suitable persons’, whether cleric or lay, but subject to 
the requirements of cc. 1282; and 1283. 
180 Read, L&S, p274, states that financial expertise is a ‘sine qua non’, but legal expertise is not required as it is 
supplied by the finance committee.  But, at p275 he acknowledging that the administrator’s ‘basic 
responsibility’ is to manage diocesan funds ‘in accordance with canon law’, and he emphasizes that civil law 
must also be followed. 
181 Kevin E McKenna, Lawrence A DiNardo, Joseph W Pokusa (Eds), Church Finance Handbook (Canon Law 
Society of America, 1999), pp128-132.  These authors see the finance officer as the ‘chief’ amongst various 
people with different roles in the management of diocesan goods; the financial administrator must have ‘true 
skills in financial matters’ and must be able both to ‘to comprehend the breadth of ... temporal holdings’, and to 
supervise ‘for the purpose of accomplishing the common goal’.  They acknowledge that the finance officer is 
unlikely to be skilled in the ecclesiastical law of temporal goods at the time of appointment and therefore, must 
‘be able and willing’ to become acquainted with the requirements of canon law, particularly with the 
relationship between the parish and the diocese one to another and also vis-à-vis civil law.   For example, civil 
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Some canonists understand that the law requires professional financial qualifications,182 
which only laity can provide.183  On the other hand, Alesandro believes that financial 
‘expertise’ is required, but professional qualification is not an absolute requirement.184  This 
suggests that ‘expertise’ can be acquired by knowledge and experience.  However, Cusack 
acknowledges the involvement of independent auditors, which suggests the involvement of 
further and external qualified experts.185   For Breitenbeck, the administrator’s duties include 
responsibility for: fiscal policies; medical, property and liability insurance; retirement 
programs; and endowments.186  Given this wide range of responsibilities, knowledge of 
canon law and of civil law would appear to be not only appropriate, but necessary.  The same 
argument applies here as did to members of the finance committee regarding the requirement 
to be a Catholic.187  
 
Appointment and Removal: Issues of Validity: Consultation with the finance committee, 
as distinct from their consent, is a mandatory requirement before a financial administrator is 
appointed or removed; nevertheless, canon 127 applies.  As we have seen earlier, failure to 
consult invalidates any appointment and removal.   Moreover, Provost warns of the ‘domino 
law might recognise the bishop as owner of all diocesan property, but canon law respects parishes as dependent 
juridic persons, with the right to own property.  These authors conclude that the appointee must, therefore: have 
‘more than a nodding acquaintance’ with the canons; appreciate the ecclesial nature of the work; be able to 
implement canon law according to its spirit; and inspire others involved in the administration of temporal goods 
so that the ministry will be seen as service and be worthy of trust.   
182 Cusack, New Comm, p651 requires ‘expertise in the area of finances’ and a professional qualification, 
‘usually as a certified public accountant’ or similar.  Breitenbeck, Jurist, pp272 and 275, requires a ‘professional 
qualification of financial expertise’ and ‘special skills and particular expertise’, to cover the range of duties, 
citing J John J Myers, CLSA Proceedings, 44 (1982), 187.2 and A J Maida, ‘The Code of Canon Law and the 
Property of the Local Church’, Michel Thériault and Jean Thorn (Eds), The New Code of Canon Law: 
Proceedings of the 5th International Congress of Canon Law (Ottawa, 1986); 2: pp749, 752.   
183 Breitenbeck, Doctoral Thesis, p273, citing Charles J Ritty, ‘Changing Economy and the New Code of Canon 
Law’, The Jurist, 26 (1966), p483, credits him with the statement that the degree and variety of financial 
expertise required ‘could only be provided by qualified laypersons’ and that the ‘specific talents and expertise’ 
required for financial matters ‘are not the duties of shepherds of souls’; rather theirs are to preach, teach govern 
and sanctify.  This cited article pre-dates CIC. 
184 Alesandro, Text&Comm, p399: The candidate must be, inter alia, ‘respected for financial expertise’, but ‘in 
many cases’, depending on specific diocesan needs, ‘the office holder should be a certified public accountant 
and capable of working well with the many different people affected by diocesan payrolls and program 
budgets’.  
185 Cusack, New Comm, p652. 
186 Breitenbeck, Jurist, p274.   This is not inconsistent with the provisions of PO, 17; and 21. See Appendix VI. 
187 The post is an ecclesiastical office but CIC, c. 494 does not explicitly require the appointee to be a Catholic; 
as we have seen with membership of the finance committee, it would appear that the appointment of a non-
Catholic would not invalidate the appointment, but the appointee could be removed by a decree of the 
competent authority of by a judgment of an administrative tribunal.  See ft 138 above for reference.  However, 
Alesandro, Text&Comm, p399, states that the appointee ‘must be a Catholic’.   
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effect’ of invalidity of acts performed by officeholders who are invalidly appointed.188  This 
could have implications at civil law because acts invalid under canon law can, nevertheless, 
be valid at civil law.  Alesandro holds that a civil law contract of employment is not 
mandatory; however, acknowledging the need for dialogue between canon lawyers and civil 
lawyers if a civil contract is entered into, he suggests that account should be taken of the 
canonical ‘right’ of removal and ‘an appropriate civil instrument should be drawn up,’ 
providing ‘legal recognition of these powers and the ability to exercise these canonical 
responsibilities in the market place’.189  Coccopalmerio highlights the need for a civilly valid 
contract if the appointee is a lay person.190  Breitenbeck notes that the finance officer and the 
experts on the finance committee are the only experts appointed for a term determined by 
universal law.191  She points out that although administrators’ primary accountability is to 
their bishop, the canons relating to these experts are the only canons which provide for the 
accountability of one expert to other experts, the finance administrator being accountable to 
the finance committee.192  Given the five-year term and the civil law implications of the 
functions of the finance administrator, a canonically valid contract of employment, also valid 
at civil law, would appear appropriate, particularly if the appointee is a lay person.  
 
Grave Reason for Removal:  The finance administrator ordinarily remains in place sede 
vacante, which, in addition to the five-year term, is another indication of security of tenure.193 
Although all officeholders enjoy a degree of security of tenure,194 canon law nonetheless 
188 James H Provost, ‘Opinion on canon 127’,  in Kevin Vann and James Donlon (Eds), Roman Replies and 
CLSA Advisory Opinions (Washington, DC, 1995), p38, although dealing with situations in which consent is 
required warns: ‘… [T]he requirement of consent is clearly spelled out in canon 127, ... failure to observe the 
law would result in invalidity of actions thus taken.  ... [A]n invalid confirmation of the election would result in 
any actions preformed by the office holder, whether in spiritual or temporal matters, being invalid (c. 179§4)’.  
189 Alesandro, Text&Comm, p400.   
190 Coccopalmerio, Ex Comm, pp1177-1178, explains a two-fold reason for a fixed-term contract: ‘(a) an easier 
method of replacing the administrator if really necessary; and (b) to discourage the diocesan bishop from 
intervening, so as to guarantee the autonomy of the administrator before the bishop in administrative matters. 
Otherwise the bishop could remove the administrator as a sign of disapproval which would provide a reason for 
the administrator to act in ways which would ensure his favour’. 
191 Other canonists agree that the finance administrator enjoys greater security of tenure than do other 
officeholders.  See for example, Read, L&S, p274. 
192 Breitenbeck, Jurist, p274.  Also Breitenbeck, Doctoral Thesis, p276.  That is, the diocesan finance officer is 
accountable to the finance committee. 
193 CIC, c. 423§2.  See Appendix I. 
194 Provost, New Comm, p225, describes three different types of ‘subjective stability’ of office: (a) conferral for 
an indefinite term, which provides the greatest stability, that is, ‘full subjective stability’; (b) conferral for a 
definite term, which provides ‘the same kind of subjective stability’ but only for the duration of the term, which 
means that at the end of the term, no further cause or procedure is required other than notification of the 
cessation of the term; and (c) conferral ‘at the prudent discretion of the competent authority, which ‘has limited 
protection of subjective stability’. 
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provides for removal from office,195 albeit that the demands of natural justice and charity 
must be met.196  In some cases, an appointee can be removed freely;197 in others, a ‘just’ 
reason, a ‘grave reason’ or ‘grave reasons’ must exist.198  For the finance administrator, a 
‘grave’ reason is required for removal.  Canonists make different comparisons with other 
office holders, when ‘just’ or ‘grave’ reasons are required.  On the one hand, Alesandro 
compares removal of the finance administrator with that of the Judicial Vicar and tribunal 
judges, requiring a ‘grave’ reason.199  On the other hand, Coccopalmerio compares the 
removal with that of chancellors and notaries, requiring only a ‘just’ reason under canons 485 
and 193.200   For Barry, a ‘just’ reason might be a simple requirement by the bishop that the 
office holder is needed to serve elsewhere in another capacity.201  A ‘grave’ reason is 
described variously as: ‘mental or physical illness, irreformable incompetence despite 
strenuous efforts by the appropriate authority, etc.’;202 any ‘criminal act; inept and negligent 
management’, the bishop’s loss of faith in the office-holder;203 ‘misappropriation of 
funds’;204 or any reason mentioned in, or analogous to, those in canons 253§3 or 1741.205   
 
Therefore, tension exists between canons 193§2 and 494§2.  The former, dealing with the 
general requirements for all office holders, appointed for an indeterminate or a determinate 
time, requires the plural ‘grave reasons’ for removal from office,206 whereas the latter, 
dealing with the particular post of finance administrator, although the appointment is for a 
determinate time, requires only the singular, ‘grave reason’.  Moreover, if a ‘just’ reason is a 
simple requirement by the bishop that the office holder is needed to serve elsewhere in 
another capacity, it would appear logical that ‘free’ removal by the bishop requires at least a 
‘just’ reason.   Commentators do not address these tensions, but ‘full account’ of 
195 CIC, cc. 192; and 193§§1-3.  See Appendix I. 
196 CIC, c. 195.  See Appendix I. 
197 See Appendix I: CIC, c. 485. 
198 CIC, cc. 193§§1-3; 1422; and 1436§§1, 2.  See Appendix I. 
199 Alesandro, Text&Comm, p400. 
200 For example, Coccopalmerio, Ex Comm, p1179 considers that CIC, c. 485, dealing with chancellors and 
notaries who can be ‘freely removed’ by the diocesan bishop, for a ‘just reason’ (see c. 193§3) is applicable to 
the finance administrator.  However, c. 485 is silent regarding any ‘reason’.  See Appendix I for the full text of 
canons. 
201 John Barry, L&S, p833, para 2896, commenting on CIC, c. 1436§2, dealing with the ‘removal’ of the 
promoter of justice or defender of the bond, states that a ‘just’ cause ‘need not imply any reflection whatever 
upon their competence’. 
202 McGrath, L&S, pp107-108. 
203 Breitenbeck, Jurist, p274, citing Farrelly, ‘The Diocesan Finance Council’, p165. 
204 Cusack, New Comm, p652. 
205 Arrieta, Ann, p179.  CIC, cc. 253§3; and 1741.  See Appendix I. 
206 Latin: ‘graves causas’. 
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circumstances must be taken,207 ‘in light of equity, the good of souls, the common good, and 
the importance of office etc’.208  As canon 494 specifically requires a ‘grave reason’, to 
remove the finance administrator, there appears little justification for reducing this to a ‘just 
reason’, most particularly if the appointee is a lay person whose contract of employment is 
valid at civil law.  Furthermore, canon law provides that loss of office as a result of 
punishment for an offence is termed ‘deprivation’; this can only occur in accordance with 
penal law.209  Therefore, although a clear distinction must be made between the effect of  
illness and culpable negligence,210 lack of clarity remains over what constitutes a ‘grave’ 
reason for removal.  Despite all the foregoing, the bishop is not bound by the advice he is 
required to seek before removal of the administrator. 
 
Prohibition on Appointment of Bishop’s Close Relatives: Canon 494 does not explicitly prohibit 
the bishops’ close relatives from appointment as financial administrator.  Some commentators 
are silent on the matter.211  Others consider it would be imprudent to appoint such a person, 
given ‘the general intent … to avoid any appearance of nepotism’,212 and consider the 
prohibition ‘even more justifiable’ in relation to this appointment than to the finance 
committee.213  On the other hand, others argue that the financial administrator is not a 
member of the committee,214 which could be taken to imply that the provision excluding the 
bishop’s close relative to the committee does not apply to the finance administrator. 
 
CIC canon 494 has no equivalent in CIC 1917.   Because of the autonomous nature of the 
Eastern Churches more complex arrangements exist for their finance administrators.215 
Nevertheless, CCEO makes similar canonical provisions for the appointment, and removal 
requiring a ‘serious’ reason,216 of an eparchial finance ‘officer’, who must be Christian and 
207 McGrath, L&S, p108. 
208 Provost, New Comm, p226. 
209 CIC, c. 196.   Unlike Judicial Vicars, the diocesan financial administrator can be removed by the diocesan 
Administrator; CIC, cc. 1420§5 and 427§1.  See Appendix I. 
210 CIC, c. 1279§1.  See Appendix I. 
211 Read, L&S, p274 and Cusack, New Comm, p651-652. 
212 Alesandro, Text&Comm, p399. 
213 Arrieta, Ann, p363. 
214 Read, L&S, p273 says: ‘[The financial administrator] is a servant of the finance committee not a member of 
it’.  Cusack, New Comm, p652 agrees: [This officer may attend committee meetings ‘as staff to the council’ and 
‘should at least attend the meeting at which the annual report is examined’. 
215 CCEO, c. 122§1.  See Appendix II. 
216 CCEO, c. 262.  See Appendix II. 
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‘outstanding for honesty’.217  The term of office is left to particular law.218  The eparchial 
finance officer is explicitly entrusted with oversight of all eparchial goods, and the bishop 
must define in ‘greater’ detail the relationship between the finance officer and the finance 
committee.219  ‘Administrators’ are also required to take an oath to fulfil the office faithfully, 
but the canon does not specify ‘all’ administrators.220  CCEO is explicit that the finance 
officer ordinarily remains in place sede vacante.221  Moreover, CCEO explicitly states that 
the finance officer is a member of the finance council, membership of which excludes 
relatives of the eparchial bishop up to the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity 
inclusive.222  It can be argued, therefore, that the prohibition on the bishop’s close relatives 
becoming members of the finance council should be applied mutatis mutandis to the finance 
administrator.223  
 
Although the establishment of a diocesan finance committee and the appointment of a finance 
administrator are mandatory and the posts are ecclesiastical offices, neither current Code 
provides for specific professional qualifications for these experts.  Nor do the Codes require 
the experts to have knowledge of canon law.  Furthermore, the financial administrator is not 
required to have knowledge of civil law despite the role involving management of the 
financial affairs of the diocese which requires compliance with many fields of civil law.  
Whilst the bishop’s prior consultation with, inter alia, the finance committee goes to validity 
of the appointment, the personal qualities required by canon law do not. 
 
Again, by legislating, Bishop’s Conferences should clarify: the professional qualifications 
required of the financial administrator; whether a contract valid at civil law is required, 
particularly for a lay appointee; whether knowledge of civil law and of canon law is required; 
what precisely is meant by ‘a grave reason’ required for removal from office; whether or not 
the bishop’s close relatives are excluded from appointment; whether the finance administrator 
is bound by all canons referring to ‘administrators’; and whether dioceses are responsible for 
on-going training, particularly in the fields of canon law and civil law. 
217 CCEO, c. 262§1.  See Appendix II. 
218 CCEO, c. 262§2.  See Appendix II. 
219 CCEO, c. 262§3.  See Appendix II. 
220 CCEO, c. 1025.  See Appendix II. 
221 CCEO, c. 232§1.  See Appendix II. 
222 CCEO, c. 263§3.  See Appendix II. 
223 CIC, c. 492§3.  See Appendix I. 
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 4. THE ALIENATION OF GOODS 
 
The Church recognises that it is sometimes necessary to alienate property.224  The leading 
canon,225 on alienation,226 seeks to ensure that contracts of sale or transfer of goods are 
recognised at civil law.227  Permission of the competent authority is required before goods, 
which constitute the stable patrimony of a juridical person and which exceed the sum 
determined by law, are validly alienated.228  Bishops’ Conferences restrict alienation by 
setting value limits for their region: the statutes of a juridical person not subject to the 
diocesan bishop determines the competent authority whose consent is required for the valid 
alienation of goods which form its stable patrimony and whose value is within these limits; 
otherwise the diocesan bishop is the competent authority, but he must first obtain the consent 
of, inter alia, the finance committee on which three experts in financial affairs and civil law 
serve.229  Additionally, the Holy See’s permission is required in certain circumstances.230  
When the goods to be alienated exceed the determined minimum sum, additional 
requirements must be met to ensure that the risk of loss to the Church is minimized; CIC 
canon 1293§1 provides:  
 
‘To alienate goods whose value exceeds the determined minimum sum, it is also required that 
there be: 1º a just reason, such as urgent necessity, evident advantage, or a religious, 
224 Most particularly to help the poor.  See Augustine, Vol VI, p593: ‘… [I]t must be remembered that the 
purpose of Church property is wide, and that the poor and captives always had a special claim on the property of 
the Church.  Hence, alienation even of sacred vessels was not considered forbidden if captives had to be 
redeemed or the poor succored.  Forbidden, however, was any unwarranted and purposeless alienation, (under 
the feudal system any alienation without the consent of the Lord).  This is still traceable in the present 
legislation, the reason for which is stated in can 1518’.  Augustine, at p577 explains that this right ‘flows from 
the plenitude of his power, which embraces the final end of the Church as well as its means’. 
225 Ladislas Örsy, Theology and Canon Law: New Horizons for Legislation and Interpretation (Liturgical Press, 
1992), p56, explains: ‘A canon introducing a new chapter or a new topic in the Code can contain an important 
clue for the interpretation of all other canons in the same group’. 
226 The canon is placed in Book V on ‘Temporal Goods’, under Title III, on ‘Contracts and Especially 
Alienation’.  Morrisey, L&S, at p732 explains that the term ‘alienation’ in the present context includes more 
than the transfer of ownership of property from one person to another by gift or sale; it includes ‘any transaction 
whereby the patrimonial condition of the juridical person may be jeopardised’ and gives examples of loans such 
as a mortgage or lease or the use of funds for a purpose for which it was not intended etc.  See also Morrisey, 
‘The Alienation of Temporal Goods’, p311: ‘Three elements usually enter into account when determining 
whether there is a risk of jeopardy: (a) loss or diminishing of ownership; (b) loss or diminishing of sponsorship; 
(c) loss or diminishing of control’.  Emphasis in original.  See also ft 5 above.  See Appendix I: CIC, c. 1295.   
227 CIC, c. 1290.   See Appendix I.  When canon law embraces civil law and makes it its own, commentators use 
the term ‘canonization of civil law’.  See Kennedy, New Comm, p1493. 
228 CIC, c. 1291.  See Appendix I. 
229 CIC, c. 1292§1.  See Appendix I. 
230 CIC, c. 1292§2.  See Appendix I. 
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charitable or other grave pastoral reason; 2º an evaluation in writing by experts of the goods 
to be alienated’. 
 
In addition to the permissions mentioned above, before the alienation of goods whose value 
exceeds the determined minimum sum, a legitimate reason must exist, and consultation with 
more than one expert is mandatory.231  The experts’ function is to provide a written valuation 
of the goods.  Further provisions stipulate that: reasonable precautions must be taken;232 
conflicts of interests must be avoided;233 and weight must be given to the expert’s evaluation, 
as goods should not, generally,234 be alienated for a lower price.235  That weight must be 
given to expert evaluation is also implied by the requirement that those whose advice or 
permission is required are forbidden to give it until they are fully informed about relevant 
facts, such as the financial state of the juridical person concerned and about alienations which 
have already taken place,236 indicating that the law does not require them to have previous 
knowledge.  This is important because alienation can be valid at civil law even if canonical 
requirements are not met.237 
 
In relation to experts, the Code does not clarify: who appoints them; what professional 
disciplines or qualifications are required; whether they must be consulted individually or 
collectively; whether non-compliance with the requirement to consult experts affects the 
validity of the competent authorities permission to alienate; or whether the decision-maker is 
bound by expert opinion. 
 
Appointment of Experts: Commentators do not address the issue of who appoints the 
experts, but one suggests that the administrator involved in the alienation is responsible.238  
 
Disciplines, Qualifications and Functions of Experts: Whilst Alarcón suggests they should 
be ‘experts in the art or science for which the evaluation is requested’,239 others are silent on 
231 Morrisey, L&S, p735 describes ‘urgent necessity’ as:  ‘a tax burden’ or ‘another dept to be paid’. 
232 CIC, c. 1293§2.   See Appendix I. 
233 CIC, c. 1298.  See Appendix I. 
234 Morrisey, L&S, at p736 gives examples of exceptions: ‘a building or land which has become an expensive 
liability’ or offering the goods at a lower price to a ‘charitable’ or ‘apostolic’ purpose.  
235 CIC, c. 1294§1.  See Appendix I. 
236 CIC, c. 1292§4.  See Appendix I. 
237 CIC, c. 1296.  See Appendix I. 
238 Morrisey, L&S, p732. 
239 Mariano López Alarcón, Ann, p803. 
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professional disciplines, but warn against using ‘government evaluations’,240 and recommend 
an ‘appropriate formula’ involving assistance from ‘professionals’, and using ‘care and 
prudence’ in the choice of civil lawyers.241  Kennedy suggests that advice of the ‘highest 
quality’ is required; and canonists should understand civil law and civil lawyers should 
understand canon law.242   Canonists, therefore, appear more concerned that civil law is 
followed than they are about compliance with canon law. 
 
Consultation - Individual or Collective: Although canon 1293 speaks of ‘an evaluation’ 
(singular) but by ‘experts’ (plural),243 implying agreement, commentators are divided on the 
number of experts required; some require two;244 others, one.245  The emphasis here appears 
to be more on monetary value rather than on historical, artistic or devotional value. 
 
Validity of Permission and Weight of Expert Advice:  Whether or not failure to consult 
invalidates the competent authority’s permission to alienate is important because of possible 
validity at civil law.  Canon 1291 provides that the competent authority’s permission is 
required for valid alienation of goods constituting stable patrimony and whose value exceeds 
the determined sum.246  In the case of the diocesan bishop, he needs the prior consent of 
others before alienation of goods whose value falls within the determined limits.247  Although 
the first paragraph of canon 1292 does not mention validity of the alienation, the next 
paragraph, dealing with, inter alia, goods whose value exceeds the determined sum and 
requiring the Holy See’s ‘additional’ permission, does.248  It can be assumed, therefore, that 
valid alienation is implied in both situations.  Moreover, canon 1293§1, dealing with goods 
240 Kennedy, New Comm, p1501.  He suggests these are prepared for tax purposes and are frequently out of date 
or otherwise ‘not in accord with market value’.  
241 Morrisey, ‘The Alienation of Temporal Goods’, p304.  
242 Kennedy, New Comm, at p1493, suggests: (a) that this canon imposes a responsibility on canonists to know 
‘the basics of the secular legal system’, particularly in relation to contracts, so that they might ‘cooperate’ with 
civil lawyers representing church bodies; and (b) that civil lawyers should become familiar with the ‘canonical 
exceptions to the canonization of civil law’. 
243 Latin: ‘aesimatio rei alienandae a peritis scripto facta’. 
244 Morrisey, L&S, p735, holds that it is ‘generally accepted’ both under CIC 1917 and CIC that ‘at least two 
such evaluations’ are required.  Also Kennedy, New Comm, pp1500 -1. 
245 Myers, Text&Comm, p881, this translation uses the word ‘estimate’ instead of ‘evaluation’.   Myers sees the 
need for ‘expert consultation’ (singular) to ensure ‘objectivity and professionalism’ and refers to a written 
‘opinion’ (singular) while at the same time acknowledging earlier commentators’ understanding of the need for 
at least two experts.  However, he considers it ‘advisable’ that the ‘estimates’ (plural) be stated ‘as a range of 
values’, indicating an acceptable minimum and a hopeful maximum. 
246 CIC, c. 1291.  See Appendix I. 
247 CIC, c. 1292§1.  For Institutes of Consecrated Life and Societies of Apostolic Life, see CIC, c. 638§3, 
Appendix I. 
248 CIC, c. 1292§§1 and 2.  See Appendix I. 
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whose value exceeds the determined minimum sum, speaks of ‘also’ requiring an evaluation 
by experts, which implies that validity is still affected. 
 
Given that canon 127 applies even in cases in which alienation concerns goods whose value 
falls within the determined sums and experts are not involved, the consent of the required 
bodies goes to validity of the bishop’s permission required for alienation.  Moreover, 
disclosure of information regarding prior alienation of divisible goods is required explicitly 
for validity.249  Consent must be informed; the value of the goods proposed for alienation is, 
therefore, essential to the deliberations of those whose consent is required.  Expert evaluation 
could even establish whether or not the value of goods falls below, or between the minimum 
and maximum determined sums, or exceeds the determined sum, thereby, identifying not 
only the competent authority whose permission is required for alienation, but also the 
canonical provisions which apply.  It can be concluded, therefore, that obtaining expert 
evaluation goes to validity of the competent authority’s permission to alienate and therefore 
to the alienation itself.250 
 
Under CIC 1917 any transaction which could adversely affect the economic condition of a 
juridic person required written valuation from a ‘thoughtful expert’,251 although some 
commentators understood that more than one valuation was required.252  CIC has not clarified 
the matter. 
 
249 CIC, c. 1292§3.  See Appendix I. 
250 Eithne D’Auria, ‘Alienation of Temporal Goods in Roman Catholic Canon Law’, 12 Ecclesiastical Law 
Journal (2010), pp33-52. 
251 CIC 1917, c. 1530§1.  See Appendix III.  William Doheny, Practical Problems in Church Finance 
(Milwaukee, 1941), p28, citing Barbosa, lib. III, c XXX, n. 12; Reiffenstuel, lib. III, iti. 13, n. 18; Laraona, 
“Comm. Codicis,” Comm. Pro Relig., XIII (1932), p356, states that ‘urgent necessity’ was considered under CIC 
1917 to be ‘payment of an urgent debt, the redeeming of a mortgage, the danger of rapidly declining values 
because of special real estate problems, an opportunity to sell at particularly advantageous price because of 
urgent demand, the restoration of a collapsing church, the purchase of sacred vessels, vestments, and other 
indispensable objects’. 
252 Breitenbeck, Doctoral Thesis, pp131-132, citing John A Abbo and Jerome D Hannan (Eds), The Sacred 
Canons, 2 Vols (St Louis, 1952), 2; 736;  Henry A Ayrinhac Administrative Legislation in the New Code of 
Canon Law (New York, 1930), p 441; Alberto Blat,  Comentarium textus Codicis Iuris Canonici, 5 Vols, 
(Romae: Ex Typographia Pontificia in Instituto Pii IX. 1921-1938), at Vol 3, p547;  T Lincoln Bouscaren, 
Adam C Ellis and Francis N Korth, Canon Law: A Text and Commentary, Fourth Revised Edition (Milwaukee, 
1966), p839; Joseph F Cleary, ‘Canonical Limitation on the Alienation of Church Property’, Canon Law 
Studies, 100 (Washington, 1936), p62; and Edward L Heston, ‘The Alienation of Church Property in the United 
States’, Canon Law Studies, 132 (Washington, CUA 1941) p83. 
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Because of the autonomous nature of the Eastern Churches more complex arrangements exist 
for the alienation of property depending on whether or not the goods concerned belong to a 
patriarchal Church, or to an eparchy within the patriarchal Church, or to a juridical person 
subject to an eparchial bishop.  Different norms apply according to their value,253 whether or 
not they belong to an eparchy lying within or without the territorial boundaries of the 
patriarchal Church, and whether or not the eparchial bishop concerned exercises his power 
within the territorial boundaries of the patriarchal Church.254  Similar provisions to CIC exist 
in respect of the civil law of contracts.255  The consent of the finance council is required for 
alienation of property belonging to the eparchy or a juridical person subject to the eparchial 
bishop, the value of which is, according to the Synod of Bishops of a patriarchal Church or 
the Apostolic See, within a stipulated amount.256  The situation under CCEO is therefore, no 
clearer than that under CIC.  The decision to alienate lies with the competent authority and 
although not bound by the vote of the bodies whose consent is required, according to CIC 
canon 127, an ‘overriding reason’ is required to act against this advice. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The canonical requirements for consultation and dialogue with experts are important factors 
in the participative management of Church property, in which the laity can play a significant 
role.  Whilst some of these experts can be found within the Church, others may be found in 
the wider society, when required for restoration or building work, the management of finance 
or in the assessment of the value of temporal goods in cases of restricted alienation.  Despite 
the important roles played by these experts and that consultation with them goes to validity of 
the subsequent decisions, the law does not define the term ‘expert’.  No specific 
qualifications are expressly required.  Nor does the law oblige the Church to provide, or 
provide for, any special training or for continual professional development of experts. 
253 That is, whether their value falls between the minimum and maximum determined sums; or between the 
maximum and twice the maximum sum; or above twice the maximum sum.  Regardless of their monetary value, 
if they are ‘precious’ or donated, restriction also apply. 
254 CCEO, cc. 1035; and 1036.   See Appendix II. 
255 CCEO, cc. 1034; and 1504.   See Appendix II.  Nedungatt, p703 implies these provisions do not apply to 
alienation:  ‘The Code requires that the state law of the country is to be followed for contract and obligations (c 
1034), except for alienation’. 
256 CCEO, cc. 1036§1; and 1037, 2°.  In patriarchal Churches the consent of other parties is required for the 
alienation of goods, the value of which exceeds the maximum amount stipulated by the Synod of Bishops, but 
falls below twice the maximum (CCEO, c. 1037: 2º), or exceeds twice the maximum, or is given by vow, and in 
other cases if the value exceeds the amount established by the Apostolic See, or has been donated (CCEO, c. 
1036).  See Appendix II. 
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Canonists, even those who acknowledge the need for formal qualifications, fall short of 
defining skill and experience which characterise appropriate expertise; some merely require 
‘trained’ or ‘competent’ people.  Commentators are even divided as to whether these experts 
are to be found within the relevant diocesan commission or whether wider consultation is 
permitted.  Few suggest consultation outside the Church although this is not prohibited by 
law, at least in respect of restoration of precious images or building or restoration of 
churches.  Nor are commentators helpful on the precise functions of experts, particularly in 
relation to restoration.  Like the law, they are silent on the issue of individual or collective 
consultation.  They are also silent as to the effects of non-compliance with mandatory norms 
for consultation with experts; this is left to commentators on other canons, such as canon 127 
(dealing with individual and collective consultation) and 1277 (dealing with acts of 
‘administration of major importance’ or those of ‘extraordinary administration’).  Moreover, 
they do not explain the significance of the legal requirement to use expert advice in the case 
of the building and restoration of churches.   
 
Although the law requires members of the finance committee to be ‘of Christ’s faithful’ and 
suggests likewise for the finance administrator, by virtue of ecclesiastical office, 
commentators are divided on whether or not this provision requires ‘full communion’ and 
whether or not, despite the provision of CCEO, the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity 
is included in the prohibition of appointment.  Moreover, they are unhelpful in explaining the 
‘grave reason’ required for removal of the finance administrator.  In short, canonists appear 
more concerned about compliance with civil law than they are with compliance with canon 
law; only Provost warns against the ‘domino effect’ of invalid acts, albeit as a result of 
invalid appointments. 
 
No specific knowledge of canon law is required of the experts in any of these fields.  Lack of 
provision in universal law leaves competence to Bishops’ Conferences, comprised of a small 
number of members who may not have in-depth knowledge in the relevant fields.  The danger 
is that rather than seeking out true experts, competence in the specific field suffices rather 
than expertise.  It is suggested that new norms should be created, by the Bishops’ 
Conferences (or indeed by the Holy See) which address these issues.  Such norms should 
clarify: in which situations the use of experts is mandatory; who is responsible for appointing 
them; whether the expert must be Catholic or may be non-Catholic; the professional 
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disciplines from which they are drawn and their qualifications; their functions; whether or not 
they must be consulted individually or collectively; whether non-compliance with the 
requirement to consult experts affects the validity of the relevant decision; the weight and 
effect of the expert opinion or advice; and whether the decision-maker is bound by expert 
opinion. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
THE USE OF EXPERTS IN ADMISSION TO HOLY ORDERS AND RELIGIOUS 
INSTITUTES AND THE EXERCISE OF MINISTRY 
 
The sacrament of Holy Orders is fundamental to the life of the Church.1  Although all the 
baptised participate ‘in their own way’ in the priestly office of Christ, certain functions can 
only be fulfilled by ordained ministers.2  As these ministers act in persona Christi, their 
training, for which the Church claims exclusive authority, is an essential task.3  The Church, 
therefore, has norms which govern candidature for Ordination and the exercise of ordained 
ministry.  Likewise, the Church claims competence to establish Religious Institutes, which 
are also governed by their own law, to which admission, although not necessarily leading to 
Ordination, is also regulated.4  Experts in health care can be used to assist in decision-making 
regarding the physical and psychological fitness of candidates for Holy Orders and religious 
life.  This Chapter addresses four areas: candidature for Orders (irregularity and suitability); 
the exercise of ordained ministry; admission to religious institutes; and confidentiality.  As 
was the case in Chapter 1, this Chapter examines: whether the use of experts is mandatory; 
the appointment of experts; the professional disciplines from which they are drawn and their 
qualifications; their functions; and whether or not experts must be consulted individually or 
collectively.  It also explores: whether non-compliance with the requirement to consult 
experts affects the validity of the relevant decision; and the weight and effect to be given to 
the expert opinion or advice.  These matters are discussed critically, especially where norms 
are unclear.  Therefore, proposals for the creation of new norms are suggested. 
 
1. CANDIDATURE FOR ORDINATION 
 
Admission to Orders involves not only the call, and its discernment,5 but formation, by 
qualified personnel, over a six-year period, during which the candidate is educated and 
1 CIC, c. 1008.  See Appendix I.  There are three degrees of Holy Order: bishop, priest and deacon.   See also 
CCC, p348, para 1554; Appendix IV. 
2 CIC, cc. 204§1; and 274§1.  See Appendix I. 
3 CIC, cc. 232; and 1009§3.  See Appendix I.  See also CCC, p346, para 1548; Appendix IV. 
4 CIC, cc. 573§2; 607§2; and 641.  See Appendix I. 
5 William H Woestman, The Sacrament of Orders and the Clerical State (St Paul University, Ottawa, 2001) 
(hereafter Woestman, The Sacrament of Orders), p47-8, citing Pius XII, Apostolic Constitution, Sedes Sapientia 
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assessed.6  The only explicit canonical requirements which go to validity of the sacrament of 
orders are that the candidate be male and baptized.7  There are, however, other implicit, but 
nonetheless strict requirements.8  A priest is a ‘man of communion’, who, in relations with all 
people, ‘must be a man of mission and dialogue’.9  The Church, therefore, restricts admission 
to Holy Orders to those deemed capable and suitable.  Regularity for Orders is distinguished 
from suitability.  What follows deals first with irregularity for Orders and second with 
suitability for Orders. 
 
Irregularity for Orders 
 
It is not required that regularity, that is, freedom from irregularity,10 or freedom from 
impediment,11 be established positively; it is presumed.12  CIC canon 1041 provides:13 
 
‘The following persons are irregular for the reception of orders: 1º one who suffers from any 
form of insanity, or from any other psychological infirmity, because of which he is, after 
experts have been consulted, judged incapable of properly fulfilling the ministry…’.14 
 
(31 May 1956), in AAS, 48 (1956), pp 334-345.  No 11, explains that ‘the divine call’ has to be ‘authoritatively 
approved, admitted, and controlled’ by hierarchical superiors.   José Maria González del Valle, Ann, p785, says: 
‘Vocation to the priesthood is not prior to the free choice made by the ecclesiastical superior’. See also CIC, cc. 
233§1; and 385, which impose (respectively) an obligation on the whole Christian community and the diocesan 
bishop to foster vocations; see Appendix I. The importance of the ‘call’ is a consistent theme in Vatican 
documents; see EA, 40; RI, 13; CDVPHT, 3; PDV, 10; and Gpsy in Appendix VI. 
6 CIC, cc. 232-264; and 1027.  See Appendix I.  See also OT, 5; and CDVPHT, 3 in Appendix VI. 
7 CIC, c. 1024.  See Appendix I. 
8 Eg., CIC, cc. 1009§2 and 1012.  Other canonical conditions are stipulated, but do not necessarily go to 
validity; see eg., CIC, c. 597§1.  See Appendix I. 
9 PDV, 18; and 26.  See Appendix VI. 
10 Irregularities are ‘perpetual’ impediments.  CIC, c. 1040.  See Appendix I.   Kelly, L&S, p562, para 2022, 
explains that there are other reasons for which a man may be barred from Orders, or forbidden their exercise, but 
these depend on the decision of the bishop or major Superior, and unlike impediments, the effects of which are 
automatic, recourse is possible against the competent Superior’s decision.  He defines an impediment to Orders 
as ‘a personal defect which, by ecclesiastical law, forbids the reception of an order or forbids the exercise of an 
order already received’.  Woestman, The Sacrament of Orders, p81, explains: ‘[Impediments are] canonical 
means to ensure the dignity and reverence of sacred ministry’. 
11 CIC, c. 1042 lists those who are impeded from receiving Orders, but the law does not require the involvement 
of experts.  See Appendix I. 
12 See CIC, cc. 1025§1 and 1043 for the ecclesiastical authority’s obligation nevertheless, to make a judgment 
of freedom from all impediments and for the faithful’s share in this responsibility.  See Appendix 1. 
13 The canon is placed in Book IV on The Sanctifying Office of the Church, Part I, The Sacraments.  
14 CCEO, c. 762§1, 1º uses similar terminology.  See Appendix II.  The American Commentaries use slightly 
different language:  Text&Comm, p729: ‘a person who labours under some form of insanity or other psychic 
defect due to which, after consultation with experts, he is judged incapable of rightly carrying out the ministry’; 
New Comm, p1214: ‘a person who labours under some form of amentia or other psychic illness due to which, 
after experts have been consulted, he is judged unqualified to fulfill the ministry properly’.  The Latin text uses 
‘inhabilis iudicatur ad ministerium rite implendum’.  
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Other irregularities involve direct action on the part of the candidate amounting to 
ecclesiastical offences;15 they can, for the most part, be objectively discerned by the 
candidate’s own confession and by civil or ecclesiastical documents.16  This canon clarifies 
that: the presence of irregularity due to ‘insanity’ or ‘any other psychological infirmity,’17 
must be positively established; and to do this, more than one expert must be consulted.18   
 
However, the canon does not clarify: who appoints the experts; the professional disciplines 
and qualifications required of the experts; the meaning of the term ‘incapable of properly 
fulfilling the ministry’; whether experts are consulted individually or collectively; whether 
failure to consult experts invalidates the declaration of irregularity; what weight must be 
given to the expert opinions; and the level of proof required to establish the irregularity.  
 
Appointment of Experts: Commentators are silent on who appoints the experts.  However, 
given that the judgments as to whether or not the candidate is capable of fulfilling ministry 
and whether or not to admit to Orders remains with the competent ecclesiastical authority, it 
would appear that this same authority is responsible for the appointments of the experts 
whose role is advisory.19  Neither the norms nor the commentators address the question as to 
whether or not the individual concerned has a choice in the selection of the experts.  Given 
the more recent Vatican guidelines (2008), which give a candidate for holy Orders a choice 
(albeit one which must be approved), it would seem that the individual has a say in the 
matter.20 
 
15 Therefore, they concern also the moral order.  See CIC, c. 1041, 2° - 6°.  González del Valle, Ann, p794 
suggests that ‘the only de facto irregularity of defect [as distinct from delict] is that of 1º’ of this canon.  
Moreover, ‘in reality … [the irregularity] speaks of those who suffer, not those who suffered’, consequently it is 
an impediment, as c. 1044§ seems to suggest, rather than an irregularity, which is perpetual in nature.  Emphases 
in original.  He further holds that ‘the system is not applied coherently: CIC, cc. 1047§3 and 1048 should refer 
to c. 1044 and not to c. 1041; c. 1049 should refer to c. 1044 as well as to c. 1041’.  See Appendix I. 
16 CIC, c. 1041 lists others who are irregular for the reception of Holy Orders, but the intervention of experts is 
not required.  See Appendix I.    
17 Latin:  ‘….qui aliqua forma laborat amentiae aliusve psychiae infirmitatis …’. 
18 Latin: ‘... qua, consultis periti ...’. 
19 This is consistent with CIC, cc. 1029 and 1025§§1, 2.  Earlier drafts of CIC, c. 1041 implied that the experts 
judged whether or not a person was irregular, but the wording was amended to ensure that the expert’s 
consultative role was clear and while they were competent to judge the existence of a psychological or 
psychiatric infirmity and its severity, the judgment as to irregularity for Orders remained with the ecclesiastical 
authorities.  See Kelly, L&S, p563, citing Epitome Juris Canonici Vermeersch-Creusen 3 Vols (Malines 1937, 
1940), Vol II, 175; Edward J Gilbert in Text&Comm, p729, citing Comm, 197; Robert J Geisinger, New Comm, 
p1216; Woestman, The Sacrament of Orders, p68; and Breitenbeck, Jurist, p259.    
20 See Appendix VI: Gpsy, 12. 
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Disciplines, Qualifications and Functions of Experts: Although canon 1041 does not 
specify the professional disciplines from which the experts might be drawn, nor their 
functions, its references to insanity and psychological infirmity infer the fields of psychiatry 
or psychology.  Whilst some commentators are silent on the matter,21 others focus on the 
definitions of insanity and psychological infirmity and, consequently, we have to infer from 
their understanding of these infirmities the professions from which experts are to be drawn. 
 
On the one hand, Woestman argues that the expert must be someone able to distinguish 
temporary and permanent psychiatric or psychological conditions and establish their severity 
and effect.22  He explains that ‘insanity’ does ‘not mean the temporary loss of the use of 
reason caused by an injury or a high fever, but a permanent state in which an individual is 
habitually deranged’.23  The term in the canon ‘other psychological infirmity’ includes 
‘psychotic disorders’.24  Likewise, McDermott suggests that expertise in ‘insanity’ and 
‘psychosis’ is required.25  Kelly, speaking of ‘competent experts’, argues (rather unhelpfully) 
for expertise in ‘insanity’, which means ‘a habitual lack of the use of reason’, and in ‘other 
psychological infirmities’, which include ‘a wide range of personality disorders’.26  Gilbert 
agrees: the required expertise is in ‘insanity’, ‘a disorder which habitually impairs the use of 
reason’, and in personality disorders, covered by ‘any other psychological infirmity’.27 
Therefore, these canonists focus on expertise in the disciplines of psychiatry and psychology.   
 
By way of contrast, Geisinger suggests that the experts are not necessarily to be drawn 
exclusively from the fields of psychiatry and psychology.  Rather than defining insanity or 
psychological infirmity, he suggests that the function of the experts is to determine the cause 
and effect of the candidate’s condition: ‘the impeding quality of the amentia or other psychic 
illness is seen in its effect’.  Geisinger holds that the ‘presenting ordinary or ordaining 
bishop’ ‘enjoys a certain latitude’ in determining the applicability of canon 1041, 1°’.  
Nevertheless, the bishop ‘may not be arbitrary’, although his judgment is subjective.  The 
21 González del Valle, Ann, p794. 
22 Woestman, The Sacrament of Orders, p68.   
23 Ibid., p67. 
24 Ibid., p67: ‘Such as schizophrenia, paranoia, etc; serious neuroses, anxiety disorders, obsessive-compulsive 
disorder, etc; mood disorders like depressive disorder, manic-depressive disorder, etc; and some infirmities with 
an organic basis, e.g., Alzheimer’s disease, Pick’s disease, Huntington’s disease etc’. 
25 Rose M McDermott, Text&Comm, p517, ft 20. 
26 Kelly, L&S, p563. 
27 Gilbert, Text&Comm, p729. 
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investigation must be ‘thorough’ and involve examination by experts; the law ‘presumably 
refers to psychological experts’ but relying on the canon’s silence on professional disciplines, 
Geisinger considers that experts ‘need not be exclusively those credentialed in psychology or 
psychiatry’ but could be experts in ‘civil or criminal law, education, or clerical formation’.28 
 
Canon 1041, although referring to experts (plural), does not explicitly require that insanity or 
other psychological infirmity be established having consulted more than one medical expert.  
Therefore, a medical expert might provide an opinion as to the existence of a condition, its 
severity and effect on the candidate’s ability to perform specific tasks, but an experienced or 
‘expert’ novice master or rector of a seminary might provide an opinion as to the candidate’s 
ability to fulfil ministry.29  Nevertheless, it appears from the nature of the irregularity that at 
least one expert in psychiatry or psychology is required to establish the existence of a 
condition, its severity and, above all, its effect.  Given that the candidate must be judged by 
the ecclesiastical authority ‘incapable’ of, or ‘unqualified’ to, ‘properly’ or ‘rightly’ carry out 
ministry, it seems logical that the experts should understand the meaning of incapacity. 
 
Interestingly, a candidate may also be irregular if he ‘gravely and maliciously mutilated 
himself or another’ or if he ‘attempted suicide’.30  However, there is no requirement for an 
expert to be consulted as to whether these events give rise to questions about the candidate’s 
mental state.  It is suggested that an ecclesiastical authority is not competent to determine 
this, and that an expert should be consulted.  Some commentators only note the issue;31 
others suggest that this should be dealt with under canon 1041, 1° as a psychological 
matter.32   
 
Incapacity to Fulfil Ministry: In light of the foregoing, expertise is needed to assist in the 
determination of the capacity or incapacity of a candidate ‘properly’ (or ‘rightly’) to exercise 
ministry.  Woestman explains that ‘properly’ (or ‘rightly’) does not translate ‘the full import 
28 Geisinger, New Comm, p1215-1216. 
29 A ‘rector’ presides over a seminary; see Appendix I: CIC, c. 239§1.  CIC 1917 defined the rector’s role as 
maintaining ‘discipline’; see Appendix III: CIC 1917, c. 1358. 
30 CIC, c. 1041, 5°.  See Appendix I. 
31 Geisinger, New Comm, p1218.  
32 Gilbert, Text&Comm, p730 and Kelly, L&S, p564, para 2027. 
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of the Latin text’;33 when CIC uses for incapacity the words inhabilis, inhabilitans, and 
inhabilitas, it means ‘incapacity to do something’, and in the case of irregularity for Orders it 
refers to the lawful reception of Orders; not to moral fitness or probity.34  Geisinger accepts 
that an irregularity is a perpetual impediment.35  Breitenbeck, not addressing the meaning, 
holds that this irregularity on psychological grounds can be dispensed; but nevertheless, she 
considers ‘consultation with the experts would be a most critical and important step’ in 
decision-making; this again seems to infer the need to consult experts in the fields of 
psychiatry or psychology.36  However, she gives no examples of circumstances where 
dispensation could be justified, but bases her argument on the fact that CIC does not list this 
irregularity among those for which a dispensation is reserved to the Holy See.37  This raises 
the question as to whether irregularity due to insanity or psychological infirmity is one of 
natural law or of ecclesiastical law.  Commentators hold different opinions. 
  
Only ‘merely’ ecclesiastical law can be dispensed.38  However, when suffering from insanity 
or psychological infirmity, a candidate’s inherent capacity is in question.  On the one hand, 
Kelly, holding that the bar is one of ecclesiastical law, simply states: ‘Whether an infirmity 
induces the irregularity in an individual case depends on whether or not it renders the person 
incapable of fulfilling the ministry’.39  Others, not addressing the issue as to whether the 
irregularity is one of natural law or ecclesiastical law, agree that an irregularity is ‘perpetual 
in nature’ but must be de facto current; past psychological infirmity leads only to a simple 
33 William H Woestman, ‘Canons 1041, 1º and 1044 §2, 2º:  Some Form of Insanity or Other Psychic Infirmity’, 
in Arthur J Espelage (Ed), CLSA Advisory Opinions 1994-2000 (Washington, 2002),  pp313-315 (hereafter 
Woestman, ‘Canons 1041, 1º and 1044 §2, 2º’), p314, citing Charlton T Lewis and Charles Short, A Latin 
Dictionary (Oxford, 1969).  The adverb ‘rite’ refers to ‘the fulfilment and the correct carrying out for a valid 
celebration of the acts placed according to the ordo [of the rite] itself’.  The correct and ‘original meaning’ of 
‘rite’ is ‘according to religious ceremonies or observances’.   This issue will be addressed further below as 
Woestman expands when dealing with impediment to the exercise of Orders already received.  See ft 162 below. 
34 Woestman, The Sacrament of Orders, p66.  Woestman, ‘Canons 1041, 1º and 1044 §2,2º’, p314, holds that 
the purpose of irregularities and impediments to the reception and the exercise of Orders is ‘to ensure the 
worthiness’ of priests, but this does not necessarily refer to moral behaviour. 
35 Geisinger, New Comm, pp1215-1216, holds that the canon: ‘does not state explicitly that the psychically 
impaired person is judged to be utterly incapable of fulfilling the demands of sacred ministry … he need not 
lack the use of reason or labor under an irremediable psychosis… .  ...The canon does not state whether the 
psychic problem need inhibit the person merely in liturgical ministry (e.g., presiding at Mass or hearing 
confessions), or rather in a broader pastoral sense as well (e.g., preaching, teaching, visiting, or parish 
administration) … .  [T]he problem must be recognizable and determined by experts, and must directly affect 
the person’s ability to exercise his office fittingly’.  Emphases in original. 
36 Breitenbeck, Doctoral Thesis, p251 and Breitenbeck, Jurist, p260. 
37 Breitenbeck, Jurist, p260.  See Appendix I: CIC, c. 1047§1.   
38 CIC, c. 85.  See Appendix I. 
39 Kelly, L&S, pp562-563. 
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impediment.40  On the other hand, McGrath, albeit commenting on CIC canon 99,41  holds 
that a transitory condition can render a person temporarily incapable of acting, whereas an 
habitual or permanent condition, like a ‘serious mental illness of extended duration’, can 
render the person unfit to perform a valid juridical act; interestingly, he adds, they are 
‘technically irregular for the reception of orders’, implying a bar of natural law.42  Huels 
seems to suggest a natural law basis: laws which define essential constitutive elements of 
juridical acts cannot be dispensed; ‘define’ in this context means ‘determine’.  Psychological 
capacity to ‘properly fulfil the ministry’ is both implicitly required and pertains to ‘the basic 
performance’ of the priest’s function; therefore, it is a constitutive element.43   
 
Consequently, because of the natural law basis for this irregularity, it can be argued that 
canon 1041 is an invalidating law.  It is, clearly, an incapacitating law; therefore, it must be 
interpreted strictly.44  It can be further argued that because the canon expressly requires the 
constitutive element of capacity to fulfil ministry, no dispensation is possible.  So, it appears 
that whilst disciplinary laws determining irregularities can be dispensed,45 irregularity, due to 
insanity or incapacitating psychological illness, cannot.46  An analogy can be made with the 
requirements for matrimony.47  As such, the experts are to establish whether the candidate 
can understand and freely choose to receive Orders and can assume the appropriate 
obligations required for ministry.  If the answer is affirmative, the candidate has capacity.  
Although ‘freedom’ means freedom from coercion, to establish irregularity on this ground, 
the experts would be required to establish lack of psychological freedom.48   
40 González del Valle, Ann, p649. 
41 CIC, c. 99.  See Appendix I. 
42 Aidan McGrath, L&S, p57. 
43 CIC, c. 86.  See Appendix I.  See Chapter I, ft 51.  Huels, ‘Categories of Indispensable and Dispensable 
Laws’, p52, reminds the reader: ‘The word express in c. 10 includes both explicit and implicit statements of 
invalidity and incapacity’. 
44 CIC, c. 18.  See Appendix I.  The natural law basis for incapacity is restricted to 1° of canon 1041.   
45 Albeit sometimes reserved to the Holy See.  See CIC, cc. 1041, 2° and 3°; 1041, 4°; and 1047 in Appendix I. 
46 Huels, ‘Categories of Indispensable and Dispensable Laws’, at p52, warns: ‘Constitutive laws establishing 
basic juridic capacity should not be confused with disciplinary laws that are incapacitating’.  See OT, 2 in  
Appendix VI.  Pope Paul VI speaks of the duty of Church ministers to recognize and consecrate ‘those 
candidates whose fitness has been acknowledged and who have sought so great an office with the right intention 
and with full freedom’.  See also CIC, c. 124§1 in Appendix I. 
47 CIC, cc. 1057§1; and 1095.  See Appendix I. 
48 CIC, cc. 219; 1026; and 1036.  See Appendix I.  The term in c. 1026, that ‘it is absolutely wrong’ to either 
compel anyone to receive Orders or to refuse Orders to anyone suitable, is a translation from the Latin ‘nefas 
est’.  ‘Nefas est’ is used rarely in CIC, reflecting the strength of the prohibition (e.g., in c. 927, concerning 
consecration of only one element of Holy Communion, or of consecrating both elements outside the celebration 
of Mass; c. 983§1, violating the seal of confession; and c. 1190§1, forbidding the sale of relics).  CCEO uses the 
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 Consultation - Individual or Collective: Canon 1041 requires consultation with experts 
(plural).  The requirement to engage more than one expert (from the field of psychiatry, 
psychology, or not), although not mentioned by some writers,49 is commonly accepted by 
others.50  Commentators are silent on the issue of individual or collective consultation.   
 
Failure to Consult and Weight of the Expert Advice: As we have seen in Chapter 1, 
although CIC canon 10 might appear applicable, one needs to look elsewhere for the 
invalidating clause.51  Both because the declaration of irregularity is a juridical act, and the 
law imposes a mandatory duty of prior consultation with experts, it can be argued that 
consultation is a condition on which the ecclesiastical authority’s competence to make the 
declaration rests.  Canon 127 applies and goes to validity.52      
 
Level of Proof for Irregularity: As regularity is presumed, the presence of irregularity on 
psychological grounds must be established positively, having consulted experts.  Breitenbeck 
makes no reference to the level of proof required to make a judgment on irregularity.53  Kelly 
states that ‘moral certainty’, of the presence of irregularity, ‘based on objective … and 
provable evidence’ is required.54   For Geisinger, a ‘subjective judgment’ is required, but 
based on solid objective data which lead the Ordinary to ‘moral certitude regarding the 
presence or absence of the impeding’ cause.55  As we will see later when discussing the level 
of proof required to establish suitability for Orders, it would seem that the competent 
authority must indeed reach ‘moral certainty’, which leaves no room for prudent doubt. 
 
The norms on each of these matters, in relation to irregularity for Orders on psychological 
grounds, may be contrasted with those in CIC 1917 and CCEO.  CIC 1917 distinguished 
phrase ‘not permitted’.  CIC, c. 1036 requires the candidate to sign a document as evidence of his freedom to 
enter the diaconate.  
49 González del Valle, Ann, p794.   
50 Kelly, L&S, p563, Gilbert, Text&Comm, p729, Geisinger, New Comm, p1215, Woestman, The Sacrament of 
Orders, p68, and Breitenbeck, Jurist, p258. 
51 See Chapter 1, ft 47. 
52 CIC, cc. 10; and 127.  See Appendix I.  See also Chapter 1, ft 51.  See also CCEO, c. 934 in Appendix II. 
53 Breitenbeck, Jurist, pp257-288.   
54 Kelly, L&S, p563.  See Pius XII, Allocution to the Roman Rota (1942) for a definition of ‘moral certainty’ in 
Appendix VII.  It is akin to the concept of ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ in secular criminal law. 
55 Geisinger, New Comm, pp1215-1216. 
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irregularities by defect from those by offence.56  Freedom from impediments was not 
presumed: this was to be established by testimonial letters from the Ordinary of each place 
where the candidate resided for more than six months since puberty; and banns were to be 
called in the secular cleric’s parish church.57  Although CIC 1917 recognised irregularity on 
psychological grounds, it did not require experts to establish the existence of the defect.  
CCEO is explicit in stating the role of the ecclesiastical authority in the ‘calling’ of a 
candidate.58  Like CIC, it requires, for validity, baptised, male candidates and Episcopal 
ordination.59  In contrast, irregularities are not distinguished from simple impediments; but to 
establish an impediment on psychological grounds, like CIC, consultation with more than one 
expert is required.60 
 
In sum, CIC canon 1041 requires experts to assist in determining irregularity due to insanity 
or other psychological infirmity.  However, it does not identify the professions from which 
‘experts’ are drawn; nor does it define ‘incapable of properly fulfilling the ministry’.  
Nevertheless, given the severity of the conditions required to establish this particular 
irregularity, psychiatrists or psychologists would appear the most suitable experts to consult. 
Most commentators agree on this.  Moreover, neither the canon nor the commentators specify 
who appoints the experts or whether or not experts are consulted individually or collectively.  
However, failure to consult experts invalidates the decision, weight must be given to the 
expert opinions, and the level of proof required for irregularity is moral certainty. 
 
Suitability for Orders 
 
Unlike regularity, but like irregularity, suitability is not presumed; it must be established 
positively, implying at least a human presumption of unsuitability.61  Reflecting the 
provisions governing entry to major seminary,62 the competent authority is obliged to ensure 
that candidates for Orders meet certain criteria: CIC canon 1029 provides: 
 
56 CIC 1917, cc. 984; and 985.  See Appendix III. 
57 CIC 1917, cc. 993; 987; and 998.  In the case of soldiers, a period of three months was considered sufficient 
to have contracted an impediment.  See CIC 1917, c. 994.  See Appendix III. 
58 CCEO, c. 323§1.  See Appendix II. 
59 CCEO, cc. 744; and 754.  See Appendix II.  
60 CCEO, c. 762§1.  See Appendix II. 
61 CIC, cc. 1052§1; and 1584 - 1586.  See Appendix I. 
62 CIC, c. 241§1.  See Appendix I. 
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‘Only those are to be promoted to orders who, in the prudent judgement of the proper Bishop 
or the competent major Superior, all things considered, have sound faith, are motivated by the 
right intention, are endowed with the requisite knowledge, enjoy a good reputation, and have 
moral probity, proven virtue and the other physical and psychological qualities appropriate to 
the order to be received’. 
 
The competent authority is required to make judgments about suitability for Orders and the 
candidate’s benefit to the Church.63  To establish suitability, the law requires that a candidate 
have, inter alia, ‘physical and psychological qualities appropriate to the order to be received’.  
However, no mention is made of the assistance of experts.  Moreover, although still without 
reference to ‘experts’, various documents are required to establish ‘fitness’ and the ‘physical 
and psychological’ qualities; the latter follows ‘proper investigation’.  It is in this context that 
experts might be involved.  CIC canon 1051 states: 
 
‘In the investigation of the requisite qualities of one who is to be ordained, the following 
provisions are to be observed: 
 
1º: there is to be a certificate from the rector of the seminary or of the house of formation, 
concerning the qualities required in the candidate for the reception of the order, namely sound 
doctrine, genuine piety, good moral behaviour, fitness for the exercise of the ministry; 
likewise, after proper investigation, a certificate of the candidate’s state of physical and 
psychological health; 
 
2º: the diocesan Bishop or major Superior may, in order properly to complete the 
investigation, use other means which, taking into account the circumstances of time and 
place, may seem useful, such as testimonial letters, public notices or other sources of 
information’.64 
 
It is under paragraph two of the canon, then, that the bishop may consult experts in his 
determination of suitability.  Nevertheless, the bishop is bound to keep himself informed of 
students’ progress.65  Under canon 1051, paragraph one, two certificates are required: one 
from the rector attesting to the candidate’s personal qualities and fitness; and one confirming 
the candidate’s ‘psychical and psychological’ status, although ‘experts’ are not involved.  The 
63 CIC, c. 1025§§1, 2.  See Appendix I. 
64 Gonzáles Del Valle, Ann, pp802-803, says one of the source documents for CIC, c. 1051 requiring 
documentary evidence was QI because documents were a ‘more effective means’ to ascertain the existence of 
the vocation and suitability of aspirants’; ‘testimonials’ are no longer obligatory.  However, CIC, c. 1020 
provides: ‘Dimissorial letters are not to be granted unless all the testimonials and documents required by law 
according to the norm of cann. 1050 and 1051 have been obtained beforehand’.   
65 CIC, c. 259§2.  See Appendix I. 
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American translations imply that a single ‘testimonial’66 from the rector suffices covering 
both the candidate’s qualities and his physical and psychological health,67 which is more in 
keeping with the Latin text requiring only the rector’s ‘testimony’, which, it appears, could be 
oral.68  These documents do not constitute an exhaustive list.  Importantly, under paragraph 
two, the bishop or major Superior may use, as a source of information, experts and others to 
complete his investigation, suggesting that this means is permitted if uncertainty remains. 
Presumably, in such a case, the bishop or major Superior appoints the experts.  However, the 
canon does not clarify: the professional disciplines or qualifications of those who provide the 
required certificates of physical and psychological health; or the degree of certainty required 
to establish suitability. 
 
Appointment of Experts: Although the use of experts is not mandated, their use is permitted 
if necessary.  Presumably, as the bishop may consult experts, it is he who appoints them.  
However, neither the norms nor the commentators address whether the individual whose 
suitability is in doubt has a choice in the selection of the experts.  Given the more recent 
Vatican guidelines (2008), which give the candidate a choice (albeit one which must be 
approved by the seminary), it would seem that the individual has a say in the matter.69 
 
Disciplines, Qualifications and Functions of Experts: Whilst canon 1029 on suitability is 
silent on this matter, commentators differ on the disciplines of those who assist in 
establishing suitability; indeed, one commentator considers that suitability is judged on 
‘conditions of nature and grace’, without further clarification.70  On the one hand, some 
commentators focus on establishing the required psychological health.  Kelly, by analogy 
with canon 642,71 which permits the use of experts ‘if necessary’ when assessing candidates 
66 Chambers Pocket Dictionary (Edinburgh, 1998), p936 defines ‘testimonial’ as: ‘a letter or certificate giving 
details of one’s character, conduct and qualifications’; The Concise Oxford Dictionary, Eighth Edition (1990), 
p1262, defines ‘testimonial’ as: ‘a certificate of character, conduct or qualifications’.  
67 Text&Comm, p734 and New Comm, p1229.  American commentators differ in their interpretation: Gilbert, 
Text&Comm, p734 refers to ‘testimonial letters’, whilst Geisinger, New Comm, p1230, under a heading ‘One 
Document, Dual Purpose’ says ‘the documentary requirements of CIC, cc. 1050 and 1051 may be integrated 
into one statement …’. 
68 Latin text: ‘... habeatur testimonium rectoris seminarii ...’. The Concise Oxford Dictionary, Eighth Edition 
(1990) at p1262, defines ‘testimony’ as: ‘An oral or written statement under oath or affirmation’; ‘declaration or 
statement of fact’; or ‘evidence, demonstration’.  The Collins Gem Latin Dictionary (1989), p334, defines 
‘testimomium’ as ‘evidence’, ‘testimony’ or ‘proof’.   
69 Gpsy, 12. See Appendix VI. 
70 Gonzáles Del Valle, Ann, p785, relying on QI and QR. 
71 CIC, c. 642.  See Appendix I. 
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for the novitiate, acknowledges that ‘many seminaries and religious institutes now have a 
system of psychological assessment’ and refers to ‘school[s] of psychological thought’, 
which implies the use of psychologists.72  However, any psychological  report ‘should not be 
allowed to become the sole factor in determining a candidate’s fitness for ordination … much 
less in determining whether … he be admitted to a seminary formation’.73   Gilbert makes a 
broad statement that the Church has ‘initiated psychological testing as part of the admissions 
procedures to seminaries’.74  He states that canon 1041, 1°, requiring consultation with 
experts prior to declaring irregularity, will be used by the United States National Conference 
of Catholic Bishops in its Programme of Priestly Formation ‘to reinforce its policy of 
requiring psychological testing as part of the admissions process for candidates for Orders’.75  
Golden holds, without explanation, that canon 241, on qualities required for admission to 
seminary (including ‘physical and psychological health’), ‘urges the use of testing to 
determine the fitness of an applicant’s mental health’ - but this does not necessarily contradict 
the Holy See’s warning against the use of psychoanalysis, which is ‘commonly understood as 
an extended treatment for probing the unconscious’.76  Geisinger’s says that whilst 
‘testimonials composed in accord with canon 1051, 1º are usually succinct’, nevertheless, 
‘there should be nothing perfunctory about the prior testing and investigation which 
culminate in the issuance of these testimonials’.77   These authors, therefore, imply the 
routine use of psychologists.   
 
On the other hand, Cunningham considers that in order to meet canonical requirements, in 
addition to a psychological assessment to aid in judging the candidate’s ‘motivation, stability, 
and capacity’, which implies routine psychological assessments, the help of spiritual directors 
for interviews, medical doctors and other professionals for examination of an applicant’s 
physical health is also required.78  Smith, although acknowledging that ‘suitability of 
character and sufficient maturity can usually be established through less formal but equally 
effective means’, considers ‘[t]he applicant’s physical and mental health is best attested to by 
72 Kelly, L&S, p557.   
73 Ibid.  Also McGrath, L&S, p138. 
74 Gilbert, Text&Comm, p725. 
75 Ibid., p729. 
76 Paul L Golden, Text&Comm, p182.  Emphasis added.  See Appendix I: CIC, c. 241. 
77 Geisinger, New Comm, p1230. 
78 Richard Cunningham, New Comm, p312-313. 
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professionals credentialed in the respective disciplines’.79  However, she acknowledges: the 
reservations of others regarding routine psychological assessments; the practice of ‘many 
institutes’ requiring applicants to present ‘various’ medical evaluations; the ‘difficult moral 
issues’ facing both those who draw up admissions policies and those recommending 
applicants in the face of medical advances which ‘enable the detection of HIV infection, 
chronic or debilitating diseases, and certain genetic predispositions’.80   
 
The law governing suitability for Orders, unlike (as we shall see) that governing suitability 
for admission to the novitiate, enables rather than mandates the use of experts in cases of 
doubt or necessity.81  Vatican documents infer that experts are only consulted where 
necessary.  The development of these documents is as follows.  The Apostolic Constitution 
Deus Scientiarum Dominus (1931) and an Encyclical (1935) highlighted the importance of 
training for the priesthood.82  A later Encyclical (1954) acknowledged the possibility of 
consulting experts, if necessary, particularly in assessing suitability for the assumption of 
specific obligations flowing from Holy Orders and religious life.83  A later Instruction (1961) 
called for a ‘thorough examination by a Catholic Psychiatrist’ for those with particular 
difficulties.84  Vatican II’s Decree on Priestly Formation (1965) did not require the use of 
experts to establish suitability; as this contains only general laws, Episcopal Conferences 
were charged with producing a program for priestly formation for their area, albeit requiring 
the Holy See’s approval.85  A Circular Letter (1980) encouraged the updating of these 
programs.86  To this point, then, there was little in the general law on the use of experts in 
establishing suitability. 
 
Concerned by cases of defection by, and dismissal of, priests, the Pope issued a Post-Synodal 
Exhortation (1992) on the formation of priests, considering this ‘one of the most demanding 
79 Rosemary Smith, New Comm, p807.  Smith suggests ‘testimonials’ as a ‘less formal’ means of accruing 
information.  
80 Ibid.  Smith holds that ‘dental’, ‘ocular’, and ‘general physical evaluations’ are required by some Institutes. 
81 CIC, c. 642.  See Appendix I. 
82 Pius XI, Apostolic Constitution Deus Scientiarum Dominus (31 May 1931) was the first plan of studies 
promulgated for universities and ecclesiastical faculties throughout the world.  Also Pius XI, Encyclical, Ad 
Catholici Sacerdoti (20 December 1935).  
83 SV, 50.  See Appendix VI. 
84 RI, 31.  See Appendix VI. 
85 OT, 1.  See Appendix VI. 
86 RFIS (6 January 1980).    
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and important tasks’ of the Church.87  A Circular Letter (1997) on the investigations required 
to establish suitability for Orders followed; this had several ‘attachments’ to facilitate 
application.88  Not containing new law, ‘in the strict canonical sense of the term’, the Circular 
Letter included a ‘strong recommendation’ that its provisions and those in the attachments, be 
followed.89  These documents require investigation of candidates at each of the four 
‘moments in the process of priestly formation’, the process of discernment being called a 
‘scrutiny’.90  The competent authority is required to reach ‘moral certitude’ of suitability, 
founded on ‘positive reasons’ not merely on ‘convictions or intuitions’.91  Care is required 
with initial selection because of seminarians’ expectations that they progress through the 
stages,92 and later changes require ‘new and grave precedents’.93  
 
A ‘Commission for Orders and Ministries’ is ‘appropriate’ for each diocese. 94  At its 
meetings, held in closed session, members freely discuss the information on each candidate 
and vote (in secret if necessary) on whether or not he is to be recommended for admission to 
the relevant stage.95  Moreover, important decisions regarding suitability for Orders require 
prior consultation with ‘experts and those informed of the appropriate facts’;96 canon law 
87 PDV, 2.  See Appendix VI.  This document summarized the nature and mission of the ministerial priesthood.  
88 CDWDS Circular Letter (10 November 1997) (hereafter ‘Circular Letter (1997)’) and attachments.  These 
documents were based on QI and Magna equiden, published in 1930 and 1955 respectively.  The purpose of the 
documents was: to facilitate the candidate’s free assumption of the responsibilities of Holy Orders; and to 
emphasize both the serious nature of the investigation into suitability (at N9), and the competent authorities’ 
‘grave moral responsibility’ in this regard (at N6).   
89 Ibid., N9.   
90 Ibid., N4.  The four ‘moments’ are namely, admission to: the seminary; the ministries of lector and acolyte; 
the diaconate; and the priesthood.  The provisions were applicable to candidates to the permanent diaconate 
also. 
91 Ibid., N2, N3.  
92 Ibid., N7.  At N6: Notwithstanding that genuine mistakes can occur, negligence or imprudence in making the 
decision to admit, which later results in defection, causes ‘grave harm’ both to individuals and the Church.  At 
N8: The cause of any unusual occurrence, such as a candidate coming from another diocese, congregation, or 
institute of consecrated life, or house of formation, should be studied and the reasons for dismissal or leaving 
another house of formation should be sought in confidence.  At N11: Judging whether or not a candidate is 
suitable for ordination to the transitional deaconate includes, of necessity, his suitability for ordination to the 
priesthood.  
93 Ibid., N11. 
94 Ibid., Enclosure III, Commission for Orders and Ministries, 1: The commission comprises ‘only priests 
endowed with experience, sound doctrine, and considered judgment’, appointed by the Ordinary ‘for a specified 
term’. 
95 Ibid., Enclosure III,  N6. 
96 Circular Letter (1979), N10: ‘Prudence, which is one of the virtues necessary in the exercise of the 
responsibilities of government, urges that decisions of importance not be taken without first having heard the 
views of experts and those informed of the appropriate facts’.  Neither ‘important decisions’ nor ‘experts’ are 
defined. 
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regarding, inter alia, impediments and irregularities must be followed;97 and the advice of the 
members of the commission must be sought as individuals.98 
 
The competent authority is not bound by the Commission’s opinion, but such an opinion 
holds ‘great moral value’.  Referring to canon 127§2, the provision that opinion ‘should not  
be set aside except for grave and well founded reasons’ is repeated.99  The Commission’s 
opinion, whether affirmative or negative, must be registered in the candidate’s file with an 
‘explicit indication of the result of the vote’.100  Admission ‘may not take place’ if ‘prudent 
doubt’ exists, that is, one founded ‘upon facts that are objective and duly verified’.101 
‘Written documentation’ is to be kept.102  Moreover, opinions ‘of persons and councils’ 
should be sought and only set aside for well-founded reasons.103  Specific reference to CIC 
canon 127 implies its applicability here also.  Documents required to establish suitability 
include:104 ‘certification’ concerning the candidate’s progress through the various stages, 
with ‘explicit’ reference to the evaluations;105 and a ‘medical certificate’.106   
 
It is clear, therefore, that the investigation is a serious one and the competent ecclesiastical 
authority, guided by ‘experienced’ priests, makes the ultimate decision.  Although canon 
1051, 1° requires a certificate of physical and psychological health, ‘experts’ are not 
necessarily involved.  The Circular Letter (1997) requires a psychological assessment ‘only if 
there exists a just reason’; it makes specific reference to canon 1051, 1°, supporting the 
premise that irregularity on psychological ill-health grounds must be established positively 
with the use of experts - but the use of experts is not mandated in establishing suitability, 
97 Ibid., N12, referring specifically to CIC, cc. 1025§1; 1041-1042; 1031§§1-2; 1032§§1, 2; 1035§2; and 1039. 
98 Ibid., N3. 
99 Ibid., Enclosure III, N7.  Emphasis added.  CIC, c. 127§2 states that the Superior ‘is not to act against their 
vote’ without ‘an overriding reason’. 
100 Ibid., Enclosure III, N8.  At N10: If a positive decision is reached it must be expressed in a Decree of 
Admission, which must be issued at least one month before the date of institution or Ordination. 
101 Circular Letter (1979), N2.  This echoes CIC, c. 1052§3.  See Appendix I.  
102 Ibid., N4.  A personal dossier for each candidate is required and it is to be transferred from the archives of the 
seminary to the diocesan curia or competent major Superior after ordination to the deaconate. 
103 Ibid., N3.  This echoes the provision of CIC, c. 127.  See Appendix I. 
104 Ibid., Enclosure II.  Documentation for the Scrutiny for Each (Liturgical) Stage in the Candidate's Progress 
Toward the Priesthood, at N8, makes provision for the proclamation of banns, with specific reference to CIC, c. 
1051 2º, permitting the use of other means to complete the investigation. There is no strict legal requirement to 
publish banns. 
105 Ibid., Enclosure I, Documentation for each candidate, N4. These documents are required to be kept in each 
candidate’s personal file. 
106 Ibid., Enclosure I, N7 draws comparisons with CIC, cc. 1051, 1º; and 241§1.  The latter, dealing with 
admission to the major seminary, does not explicitly require certification. 
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although their involvement could be requested to settle doubt.107  The question then arises as 
to how the required ‘psychological qualities’ needed for suitability are established routinely. 
 
Guidelines for the use of psychology in the assessment of candidates for Orders were issued 
in 2008.108  The guidelines acknowledge the requirement for ‘affective maturity’ and 
‘absence of mental disorder’ in candidates for Orders.109  Although discerning a vocation to 
the priesthood ‘lies outside the strict competence of psychology’, the advantage of meeting 
with ‘experts in psychological sciences’, ‘to compare notes and obtain clarification of some 
specific issues’, was noted - but this a general statement not specifically related to the 
assessment of individual candidates.110  Experts, who cannot be part of the formation team, 
must: have ‘specific competence in the field of vocations’; be ‘distinguished for their sound 
human and spiritual maturity’; and ‘be inspired by an anthropology that openly shares the 
Christian vision about the human person’.111 Thus, the experts need not be Catholic. 
 
As to the discharge of their functions, experts can have access to interviews and tests with the 
candidate’s ‘previous, explicit, informed and free consent’.  They can ‘offer formators an 
opinion regarding the diagnosis of – and, perhaps, therapy for - psychic disturbances’ and can 
‘help support the development of the human qualities’ required for ministry.  The importance 
of spiritual directors and confessors notwithstanding, ‘in exceptional cases that present 
particular difficulties – recourse to experts in the psychological sciences, both before 
admission to the seminary and during the path of formation, can help the candidate overcome 
…psychological wounds’.112  Moreover, these experts can help to assess a candidate’s 
capacity for the obligations of priesthood;113 and they can help the candidate to reach a 
greater knowledge of himself, of his ‘potentialities and vulnerabilities’.114 
 
107 Ibid., Enclosure I: N8. 
108 GPsy. See Appendix VI. 
109 Ibid., 2: The ‘extraordinary and demanding synergy of human and spiritual dynamics’ required during 
formation is acknowledged. 
110 Ibid., 4-5. 
111 Ibid., 6. 
112 Ibid., 5. 
113 Ibid., 8. 
114 Ibid., 15. 
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However, the use of specialist psychological or psychotherapeutic techniques must be 
avoided.115  The inference here is that these methods are unacceptably invasive and endanger 
the candidate’s right to privacy.  Specific regulation for the use of experts is to be provided in 
the competent authorities’ Programs of Priestly Formation.  Experts can play a role in the 
initial phase of discernment, if suspicion arises about the existence of psychic disturbance but 
any therapy should be undergone before admission to the seminary.  The expert’s task is to 
‘furnish the candidate with the appropriate indications concerning the difficulties that he is 
experiencing and their possible consequences for his life and future priestly ministry’.116  
 
The documents acknowledge the Church’s responsibility for choosing suitable experts.117  As 
a candidate cannot ‘impose his own personal conditions’, he ‘must accept with humility and 
gratitude’ the norms which the Church provides because of the responsibility she bears; 
therefore, sometimes a psychological assessment will be required.118  However, the 
candidate’s psychological consultation may only proceed with his previous, explicit, 
informed, and free consent’.119  His written consent is required for the expert to communicate 
findings to the formators exclusively and only for the purpose of discernment of vocation.120 
Confidentiality must be respected (see below).  Interestingly, the candidate may choose the 
expert, but the formator must agree the choice; the candidate can also refuse to undergo 
psychological assessment, in which case the formators ‘will prudently proceed in the work of 
discernment with the knowledge they already have’, bearing canon 1052§1 in mind.121 
 
Although predating the guidelines, some Bishops’ Conferences have produced, with the Holy 
See’s approval, programs of priestly formation for their own territories.  The Bishops’ 
Conference in Scotland produced their program in 2005.  The program considers 
‘psychological profiling’ to be ‘helpful’ in measuring the candidate’s ‘level of 
intelligence’.122  A ‘comprehensive medical report’ is required,123 from a doctor appointed by 
115 Ibid., 5. 
116 Ibid., 15. 
117 Ibid., 11. 
118 Emphasis added.  This might be suggested by the spiritual director.  This implies that it need not be routine. 
119 GPsy, 12.  
120 Ibid., 5-16. 
121 Ibid., 12. 
122 Bishops’ Conference of Scotland, Norms for Priestly Formation in Scotland (2005) (BCSNPF), 4.22.    
123 Ibid., paras  4.24; and 5.11. 
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the Bishops’ Conference,124 in addition to a ‘variety of background reports’ before admission 
to the seminary,125 although these are not defined.126   The bishop may consult widely; 
psychologists are included in this process.127  Psychologists, must however, be selected 
carefully from those with correct understanding of both Christian anthropology and the aims 
of priestly formation.128  This falls short of requiring Catholic psychologists.  During what is 
termed ‘The Applicant’s Year’ three interviews with three different ‘experts in the field of 
human development’ occur, in order to: ‘encourage the applicant to develop skills of personal 
reflection’; ‘help the applicant look at the way human development … supports the spiritual 
(vocational) development’; and ‘help the applicant explore his openness to formation and 
potential for growth’.129  This implies routine use of experts, at least during the first year. 
 
The United States Conference of Catholic Bishops (USCCB) produced their program in 
2006.  This requires ‘a thorough screening process’,130  including ‘psychological assessment’ 
as ‘an integral part of the admissions procedure’,131 implying routine testing.  It outlines the 
basic personal requirements for admission to the seminary in ‘human, spiritual, intellectual 
and pastoral’ dimensions,132 indicating the documents required to establish suitability,133 
including evidence of the ‘requisite level of affective maturity and the capacity to live 
celibate chastity’,134 verified by ‘expert consultants’, who are ‘are well versed in and 
124 Ibid., Norms, 1.16. 
125 Ibid., para 5.10: Examples of those ‘who are competent’ to give confidential reports, include the applicant’s: 
parish priest or the priest who gave notice of his application; his ‘house/form teacher or guidance teacher or 
chaplain in the applicant’s secondary school’; his previous employers; ‘responsible members of any organisation 
in which he may have been involved’; or any seminary in which the applicant has been in formation.  Also ibid., 
Norms, 1.17. 
126 However, McDermott, Text&Comm, p490, albeit referring to admission to the novitiate, suggests: Interviews 
with the candidate; a visit to the home; testimonials from former employers and teachers; and academic records. 
127 BCSNPF, 5.  At 8: ‘[The diocesan bishop] must judge candidates according to human, moral, spiritual and 
intellectual gifts, as well as physical and psychological health and right intention, … the bishop will associate 
others with himself in the  discernment process.  Priests, religious, lay men and women, educationalists and 
psychologists may all have a contribution to make’. 
128 Ibid., 7; and 10. 
129 Ibid., Norms, 1,10. 
130 United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, Program of Priestly Formation, Fifth Edition (4 August 2006) 
(USCCBPPF), 37; and 47. 
131 Ibid., 52. 
132 Ibid., 37.    
133 Ibid., 47: A criminal background check is required.  At 63: ‘Summaries of personal interviews with the 
applicant, evaluation from his pastor and teachers, academic records, standardized test scores, assessments by 
experienced formators of the applicant’s motivation, and if applicable, previous seminary evaluations’ are all 
required.  Marriage certificates of parents may be requested.  At 65: A thorough physical examination is 
required, ‘including HIV and drug testing’.  
134 Ibid., 39.  
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supportive of the Church’s expectations’.135  This, too, falls short of requiring Catholic 
experts.  Although the Holy See charged Bishops’ Conferences with regulating the use of 
experts in their Program of Priestly Formation, USCCB’s document charges individual 
seminaries with producing ‘guidelines for psychologists’,136 albeit that methods used must 
respect the candidate’s right to privacy, reputation and confidentiality’,137 and civil law must 
be followed.138  Psychologists or ‘other licensed mental health professional’ can be ‘a useful 
instrument of human formation’,139 implying their use throughout formation, but not 
specifying the sub-disciplines from which they might be drawn. 
 
In short, these two programs of priestly formation, and their particular norms, suggest routine 
use of psychologists in the assessment and formation of candidates.  However, they appear 
more focused on establishing suitability rather than irregularity on psychological grounds. 
Only the more recent Vatican guidelines (2008) refer to the candidate’s choice of expert.  
Given that Vatican documents imply the use of expert psychologists if necessary (not 
routinely) and encourage the updating of these programmes, one would expect up-dated  
programmes to reflect the provisions of the Vatican documents more closely. 
 
Level of Proof for Suitability: It is clear from the Circular Letter (1997), mentioned above, 
that the competent authority must reach ‘moral certainty’ of suitability for Orders.140  This 
was reiterated later in an Instruction (2005).141  Most commentators agree that the level of 
proof is high, but they do not all refer specifically to the expression ‘moral certainty’. 
 
Breitenbeck, although writing before publication of these documents, makes no reference to 
any level of proof.142  However, Kelly holds that the bishop has ‘a grave responsibility’ to be 
‘as certain as possible’ about the fitness of the candidate and ‘the mere fact that nothing is 
known against him is not sufficient; his fitness must be positively shown to have been 
135 Ibid., 51.  Particular law can provide for additional documents. 
136 Ibid., 51; and 105. 
137 Ibid., 52. 
138 Ibid., 57. 
139 Ibid., 80; and 105. 
140 Circular Letter (1979), N2; and N3. 
141 CDVPHT, 3.  See Appendix VI. 
142 Breitenbeck, Jurist.  However, Breitenbeck deals only with the canons in which experts are explicitly 
mentioned.  Assessment of suitability for Orders does not necessarily require the use of experts. 
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proven, in so far as is humanly possible’.143  Although not to any specific degree, Gilbert also 
requires that the bishop be ‘certain … that the suitability of the candidate has been 
established by positive arguments’.144  For Geisinger, ‘moral certitude of fitness for orders’ is 
required.145  Early dismissal is required when there is moral certainty that the candidate is 
‘not a risk worth taking’;146 the requirement that the candidate be judged beneficial to the 
Church ‘discourages a minimalist approach’.147  Given the requirement to provide 
documentary evidence for suitability, an analogy can be made with the requirement, albeit in 
the judicial forum, that to give any judgment, a judge must reach ‘moral certainty, based on 
objective proofs’.148  Woestman supports this stance: the competent authority must reach 
‘moral certainty’ in all judgments of human affairs.149  The law forbids the bishop to ordain if 
he has ‘definite reasons’ for doubting the candidate’s suitability.150  By using the word 
‘definite’, it is clear that an objective basis is required; if this doubt exists, the bishop must 
not ordain.  However, if suitability is established positively, the bishop must not refuse 
ordination.151  So, to refuse admission to Orders, the competent authority must have moral 
certainty of the presence of irregularity (or impediment).  To permit the reception of Orders, 
the competent authority must have moral certainty of the absence of impediment and the 
presence of suitability. 
 
The forgoing provisions may be compared with those of CIC 1917 and CCEO.  Under CIC 
1917, although experts were not required to establish suitability, the rector’s testimony 
regarding the candidate’s good morals was required, implying, like CIC, a presumption of 
unsuitability.152  Although CCEO requires ‘physical and psychic qualities’ consistent with the 
reception of Orders,153  and testimonial letters to establish suitability,154 medical certificates 
are not mandated before admission to Orders, but these can be requested.155  Rather than 
establishing ‘fitness’, a ‘testimonial letter’ from the rector regarding the candidate’s ‘good 
143 Kelly, L&S, p570, para 2051. 
144 Gilbert, Text&Comm, p734.  
145 Geisinger, New Comm, p1230.   
146 Ibid., p1204. 
147 Ibid. 
148 CIC, c. 1608§§1, 2.  See Appendix I. 
149 Woestman, The Sacrament of Orders, p38.  
150 CIC, c. 1052§3.   See Appendix I. 
151 CIC, c. 1026.  See Appendix I. 
152 CIC 1917, c. 993, 3º- 5º.  See Appendix III. 
153 CCEO, cc. 758§§1, 2; and 771.  See Appendix II. 
154 CCEO, c. 769§1, 4º - 6º.  See Appendix II. 
155 CCEO, c. 771§§3, 4.  See Appendix II. 
63 
 
                                                            
conduct’ is required.156  Unlike both CIC 1917 and the current CIC,  CCEO does not require 
that a candidate for Orders be judged beneficial to the Church. 
 
In sum, consultation with experts is mandated to assist in establishing irregularity for the 
reception of Orders, due to insanity or other psychological infirmity.  However, suitability 
must be established positively by the provision, inter alia, of certificates as to the physical 
and psychological health of the candidate - but this does not necessarily involve experts. 
Rather, the bishop may use any appropriate means to establish suitability.  In other words, 
consultation with experts here is not mandated, but is permitted.  However, the practice of 
routine psychological testing before ordination appears widespread.  Nevertheless, the 
professional disciplines and level of expertise of the testers remains unclear.   
 
2. THE EXERCISE OF ORDAINED MINISTRY 
 
Once Orders have been received validly, there is no specific requirement to monitor or 
continue to prove suitability.  But, determination of suitability for admission to the episcopate 
is made by the Holy See; and by analogy with canon 1051 2º, consultation with experts is not 
excluded.157  However, a cleric can become irregular for, or be impeded from, the exercise of 
Orders.  The law, like that governing admission to Orders, distinguishes irregularity for, and 
impediments to, the exercise of Orders already received.  However, unlike CIC canon 1041, 
which considered ‘insanity or other psychological infirmity’ which led to incapacity to fulfil 
ministry as an irregularity, curiously, canon 1044 considers this same incapacity, not as an 
irregularity but as an impediment to the exercise of Orders already received.  CIC canon 
1044 provides:  
 
‘§2: The following are impeded from the exercise of orders; … 2° one who suffers from 
insanity or from any other psychological infirmity mentioned in Can 1041 n1, until such time 
as the Ordinary, having consulted an expert, has allowed the exercise of the order in 
question’.158   
 
156 CCEO, c. 769§1, 4º.  See Appendix II. 
157 CIC, c. 378§1.   See Appendix I.  Nor does CIC make provision for the initial or ongoing formation of a 
bishop.  However, bishops are priests and therefore the canons on ongoing formation apply.  Sacred 
Congregation for Clergy, Directory for the Ministry and Life of Priests (31 January 1994), clarifies this. 
157 CIC, c. 378§2.  See Appendix I. 
158 CIC, c. 1044§2, 1° lists others who are impeded from the exercise of Orders already received, but there is no 
provision for the use of experts.  See Appendix I. 
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This canon confirms that the causes of the impediment of insanity or any other psychological 
infirmity are identical to those in canon 1041, 1° (which we have discussed in the previous 
section).  In the case of Orders already received, because the condition constitutes an 
impediment rather than an irregularity, the condition is not considered permanent.  An expert 
(singular) must be consulted before the Ordinary allows the cleric to resume the exercise of 
Orders following the establishment of the impediment.  But, it is clear from the reference to 
canon 1041, which requires experts (plural) to be consulted, that here too, experts (plural) 
must be consulted before the cleric is deemed to have suffered from the impediment.  
Moreover, also by reference to canon 1041, the impediment is incapacitating; therefore, the 
canon must be interpreted strictly.159  This impediment affects someone who either 
contracted the condition after valid ordination or whose condition, existing prior to ordination 
but not in sufficient severity to constitute irregularity, deteriorated after ordination, causing 
incapacity to fulfil ministry properly.  The canon also clarifies that the Ordinary decides 
whether or not to allow the cleric to return to the exercise of Orders.  
 
The canon does not, however, clarify: whether or not the cleric has any choice with regard to 
the expert to be consulted; the professional disciplines or qualifications of the expert to be 
consulted before the cleric in question is returned by the Ordinary to ministry.   
 
Appointment of the Expert: The law and indeed commentators are silent on who appoints 
the expert.  Presumably the Ordinary appoints, as the canon is clear that it is the Ordinary 
who must consult the expert prior to returning the cleric to ministry.  It would, however, seem 
reasonable that if the cleric had undergone treatment for the condition which caused the 
impediment, the professional concerned would be the most informed of his present status.  
No provision is made as to whether the cleric may be involved in the choice of the expert. 
Given the more recent Vatican guidelines (2008), which give the candidate a choice (albeit 
one which must be approved), it would seem that the individual has a say in the matter. 
 
Disciplines, Qualifications and Functions of the Expert:  Whether a medical expert must 
be consulted before the cleric is returned to ministry is unclear.  Some authors are silent on 
this issue;160 one simply refers the reader to canon 1041.161  Kelly speaks of ‘an appropriate’ 
159 CIC, c. 18.  See Appendix I. 
160 González del Valle, Ann, p796. 
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expert without further clarification.162  On the other hand, Woestman implies that an expert 
qualified in psychic defects is required.  He refutes the suggestion that the ‘psychic defect’ 
which impedes the exercise of Orders could refer to ‘any mental state rendering one 
unsuitable to function in the ministry’; rather, the irregularity (for reception of Orders) or 
impediment (for their exercise) renders the person ‘incapable of correctly exercising (rite) 
ordained ministry’.163  He notes that CIC 1917 required a greater defect to impede the 
exercise of Orders already received than was required to impede the reception of the 
sacrament;164 accordingly ‘the acts which can be correctly (rite) performed are not prohibited 
because of the defect’.165  Woestman cites other authors who agree.  For Woestman, ‘either 
one is impeded or is not; there is no middle ground’.  For example, one cannot be impeded, 
because of this infirmity, from celebrating Mass publicly and not be impeded from 
celebrating Mass privately.166   
 
The lack of clarity as to the meaning of the term ‘incapable of properly fulfilling the ministry’ 
which we met in relation to irregularity with regard to the reception of Orders, continues to 
be felt in this context.  ‘Fulfilling’ might imply carrying out all tasks relevant to the order in 
question, while ‘exercise of the order’ might imply carrying out limited tasks or even a single 
task, for which the reception of Orders is required.167  Establishing the severity of a 
161 Gilbert, Text&Comm, p731. 
162 Kelly, L&S, p566.  See also in relation to c. 689. 
163 Woestman, ‘Canons 1041, 1º and 1044 §2,2º’, p315, citing Russell E Smith, ‘Pedophilia and Church Law’, in 
Ethics and Medics, 15 (December 1990), 3.  Emphasis added.  Woestman explains that: ‘rite here does not refer 
to moral behaviour but to ritualità, i.e., the correct fulfilment for a valid celebration of acts placed in virtue of 
orders’, citing Velasio De Paolis, C.S, ‘Delitti contra il sesto comandamento’, Per, 82 (1993), pp 311-312.  In 
discussing irregularities and impediments to receiving and exercising orders, he points out that for the exercise 
of the priesthood a person must have absolute mental qualities which ‘are incompatible with a psychological 
illness vitiating the will’, citing Ado Groin, ‘Ordine sacro e difetti fisici nella nuova legislazione canonica: 
prime osservazioni”, Monitor Ecclesiasticus, 119 (1984), p169.  See also ft 33 above. 
164 Ibid., pp314-315.  Woestman explains that CIC 1917 ‘used the word rite in reference to physical defects or 
disabilities making a person irregular for the reception and the exercise of orders, but did not prohibit the 
exercise of orders received for those acts which “could be correctly performed” (qui rite poni possunt, c 984 
2º)’.  CIC 1917, c. 984, 2°.  See Appendix III.  See also ft 33 above. 
165 Woestman, The Sacrament of Orders, p67: ‘Rite means to celebrate according to the sacred rites or the 
liturgical prescriptions’.  Also Woestman, ‘Canons 1041, 1º and 1044 §2,2º’, p314: ‘Rite’ refers to ordained 
ministry in the strict sense, not to those ministries shared with the non-ordained. 
166 Woestman, ‘Canons 1041, 1º and 1044§2,2º’, p315, citing Apostolic Signatura, definitive sentence (9 March 
1993), Prot. No. 22571/91 (CA, Pittsburgen). 
167 ‘Fulfil’ is defined by The Concise Oxford English Dictionary, Eighth Edition (1990), p475, as: 1: ‘bring to 
consummation, carry out’; 2: ‘satisfy (a desire or prayer)’; 3: ‘execute, obey (a command or law), perform, carry 
out (a task)’; 4: ‘comply with (conditions)’; 5: ‘answer (a purpose)’; 6: ‘bring to an end, finish, complete (a 
period or piece of work)’.  Fulfil oneself: ‘develop one’s gifts and character to the full’.  ‘To exercise’ is defined 
by The Concise Oxford English Dictionary, Eighth Edition (1990), p409 as: ‘to use or apply (a faculty, right, 
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condition, required to declare irregularity for Orders and impediment to their exercise is an 
important task for the expert.  The expert needs to know what is required of the cleric.  
Woestman holds that this impediment has been too broadly interpreted and consequently 
incorrectly applied to remove priests from ministry who suffer from psychological infirmity, 
but who are not incapable of correctly celebrating the sacramental ministry; the Ordinary has 
other powers to restrict ministry.168 
 
The foregoing can be compared with provision under CIC 1917 and CCEO.  Under CIC 
1917, irregularity for exercise of ministry (which needed to be graver than one preventing 
ordination) or impediment for the same, caused someone to be ‘prohibited’ from exercising 
Orders already received.169   Although the use of experts was not mandated, freedom from 
irregularity due to insanity, epilepsy or possession by the devil, needed to be ‘certainly 
proved’ before readmission to ministry.170  While no declaration of irregularity or 
impediment appeared necessary, there was no formal procedure for the removal of a pastor 
prior to 1910, but the practice was frequently employed; a decree in that year set out the 
process.171  According to Doyle, one of the justifying causes for removal from ministry was 
insanity, ‘which must be such that according to the declaration of expert doctors they cannot 
forsee (sic) a perfect cure without danger of relapse’.172  Doyle held that the experts should 
be ‘medical doctors, and as far as possible specialists in mental diseases’ and the 
responsibility to consult them was that of the bishop concerned, who could remove the pastor 
if danger of relapse persisted.173  Curiously, this provision to consult medical experts did not 
find its way into CIC 1917, under which the bishop was obliged only to consult ‘two 
influence, restraint, etc)’; 2: ‘to perform (a function)’.  However, albeit in a theological sense, no separation 
between the munus docendi, sactificandi et regendi, is possible: See CNOFSMP, 2 in Appendix VI.  
168 Woestman, The Sacrament of Orders, p68, ft 22: ‘The Apostolic Signatura has accepted the broad 
interpretation of “ministry” to include the functions of teaching and shepherding or governing in CIC, cc. 256§1 
and 1008, in extreme cases and with caution for its application’.   At p80: ‘A cleric is impeded by a 
psychological infirmity only after his ordinary has taken into account the opinion of experts, and then judges 
that the cleric is incapable of properly fulfilling the ministry’.  The ordinary’s competence to restrict ministry is 
not affected. 
169  CIC 1917, c. 968§2.  See Appendix III.  Impediments to the exercise of Orders were not listed.  Presumably, 
if any of the conditions giving rise to impediment for reception arose after ordination, the cleric would be 
impeded from the exercise of ministry. 
170 See Appendix III: CIC 1917, c. 984, 3°.   
171 Doyle, Doctoral Thesis, p223, citing Sacra Congregatio Consistorialis, Decree, Maxima Cura (20 August 
1910), Fontes, V§2074. 
172 Ibid. 
173 Ibid., citing Felix Cappello, De Administrativa Amotione Parochorum (Rome, 1911), p33. 
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examiners’; this duty appears to have been met by consulting other priests.174  Moreover, the 
bishop was permitted to deny a pastor suffering ‘mental problems’ the opportunity to resign, 
presumably because he was deemed incapable of placing a juridical act.175  
 
CCEO makes similar provision to CIC for both impediments to the exercise of Orders176 and 
return to ministry in cases of insanity or psychological infirmity.177  Interestingly, 
consultation with experts is still not required by either of the current Codes before removing a 
parish priest, even on grounds of ‘permanent illness of mind or body’ preventing him from 
fulfilling his task.178  Therefore, the bishop may remove a pastor on psychological grounds 
without consulting experts, but the bishop cannot declare the priest impeded from exercising 
Orders on the grounds of psychological infirmity without consulting experts, and the bishop 
must consult an expert (singular) before permitting that (impeded) cleric to return to ministry.   
 
In sum, to forbid the exercise of Orders already received, the competent authority must have 
moral certainty of the presence of irregularity (which does not require the use of experts) or 
the presence of impediment (which requires the use of experts if it is due to insanity or other 
psychological infirmity).  To return a cleric who was impeded by virtue of insanity or other 
psychological infirmity, an expert must be consulted and the competent authority must reach 
moral certainty of the absence of the impediment.  The professional discipline of this expert 
is unclear, and the commentators do not assist on this issue, but given the nature of the 
impediment it would seem that a psychiatrist or a psychologist would be appropriate to 
ensure that the psychological infirmity was no longer sufficiently severe to constitute an 
impediment. 
 
3. RELIGIOUS INSTITUTES: ADMISSION AND PROFESSION 
 
Not all candidates for religious life are candidates for Orders.  However, analogies may be 
drawn between the requirements for the use of experts in admission to Orders and those for 
admission to religious life.  Analogies may also be drawn between capacity to exercise 
174 CIC 1917, cc. 2147§1; and 2154§1.  See Appendix III. 
175 CIC 1917, c. 2148§1.  See Appendix III. 
176 See CCEO, c. 763, 2º, for the addition of crimes to the list of impediments.  See Appendix II. 
177 CCEO, c. 763, 3°.  See Appendix II. 
178 CIC, cc. 1740; and 1741 and CCEO, cc. 1389; and 1390, 2°.   See Appendix I and Appendix II. 
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ordained ministry and the suitability of members of religious institutes to make further 
profession. 
 
 
 
 
Admission to Religious Institutes: Novitiate 
 
The law restricts admission to the novitiate of religious institutes to those who are both 
capable of living life in the particular institute and are suitable for it.179  CIC canon 642 
provides: 
 
‘Superiors are to exercise a vigilant care to admit only those who, besides being of required 
age, are healthy, have a suitable disposition, and have sufficient maturity to undertake the life 
which is proper to the institute.  This health, disposition and maturity are to be established, if 
necessary even by the use of experts, without prejudice to Canon 220’. 
 
Canon 642 is clear that the health, disposition and maturity of candidates must be established 
positively; but, where doubt exists, the use of experts is mandated.   The canon also implies 
that: the Superior of an Institute of Consecrated Life,180 or of a Society of Apostolic Life,181 
is both the decision-maker and the person obliged to consult the experts.  Unlike the law 
governing admission to Orders, the canon explicitly protects candidates’ privacy.182    
However, the canon does not clarify: who appoints the experts; the disciplines and 
qualifications of the experts to be consulted; the number of experts required; whether, if more 
than one is consulted, they are to be consulted individually or collectively; or what weight is 
to be given to the advice. 
 
179 For a description of the novitiate see RC, 10, 1 in Appendix VI.  See also Enid Williamson, L&S, p314; 
Williamson explains that each institute will have its own particular rules respecting ‘fidelity to the spirit, 
intentions and example of the founders and foundresses’.  Smith, New Comm, p812 describes the novitiate as: 
‘A preparation for life in the institute’ which is ‘an intense period of formation characterized by initiation into 
its life, mission, spirituality, and history; personal configuration to the paschal mystery; and discernment 
regarding the novice’s vocation to religious life in this particular institute’.  See also CIC, c. 646 in Appendix I.  
180 These institutes can be religious or secular, and are a canonically established stable form of living where 
members make formal profession of life according to the evangelical counsels.  See L&S, p314. 
181 Members live in community, but do not necessarily make formal profession of life according to the 
evangelical councils.  See L&S, p314. 
182 CIC, c. 220.  See Appendix I. 
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Appointment of Experts: McDermott considers that ‘a doctor’ recommended by the 
institute and familiar with [the institute’s] life and apostolate’ should be appointed, but she 
does not say by whom.183  Smith, however, although agreeing, states that ‘institutes must 
choose carefully’ experts who understand and respect the religious life.184  Others consider 
that the candidates should have a choice, albeit a limited one.185  Therefore, the institute is 
responsible for the appointment; if the candidate chooses the expert, the institute must 
approve that choice. 
 
Disciplines, Qualifications and Functions of Experts:  In order to evaluate a candidate’s 
capacity to fulfil the demands of the particular institute concerned, it is reasonable to assume 
that any experts consulted must understand these demands.186  Commentators largely agree 
that the experts required are drawn from the disciplines of medicine and behavioural sciences 
but some commentators are more specific than others.  Smith holds simply that candidates’ 
physical and mental health is ‘best attested to by professionals credentialed in the respective 
disciplines’ and refers to the results of ‘such tests’, although she acknowledges other authors’ 
reservations about requiring psychological assessment on a regular basis.187  Williamson 
suggests that medical doctors and psychologists are appropriate experts, but acknowledges 
that requirements for admission ‘should not be too severe’, because, during their novitiate, 
candidates are only beginning their formation for religious life; thus, experts ‘are to be used 
only “if necessary”’ when ‘suitability cannot be established by other means’.188   
 
McDermott considers it ‘wise to require candidates to undergo a physical examination by ‘a 
doctor’, implying routine medical examination, but she does not suggest that any particular 
expertise is required, other than knowledge of the demands of life in the institute.   Albeit 
emphasising the need to respect privacy, she acknowledges that ‘difficult’ cases ‘may require 
the services of an approved specialist in the behavioural sciences of high moral standards’.189   
183 McDermott, Text&Comm, p490.  Emphases added. 
184 Smith, New Comm, p807. 
185 Breitenbeck, Jurist, p283, citing R Hill, ‘Denial of Profession’, Review for Religious, 47 (1988), p938, in 
support of the member’s freedom to choose the expert: ‘The psychiatrist or psychologist or counsellor should be 
someone in whom both the member and the superior have confidence, and so there should be a short list of 
acceptable persons from which to choose ...’. 
186 CIC, c. 598§1.   See Appendix I. 
187 Smith, New Comm, p807. 
188 Williamson, L&S, pp354-355, for example, by ‘long-term contact, interview, pre-novitiate training or 
postulancy’.  Williamson also concedes that the requirements should not be too lax. 
189 McDermott, Text&Comm, p490.  Emphases added. 
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This, therefore, suggests that: the use of experts in behaviour sciences is not routine; 
consultation with one expert suffices; and the medical doctor dealing with routine admission 
is not always sufficiently ‘expert’ to deal with ‘difficult cases’.  Rather, a specialist, with high 
moral standards and knowledge of the particular institute’s demands, is required. 
 
Breitenbeck agrees that a doctor ‘familiar with the demands of religious life’ should verify 
physical health.190  However, mental health assessments undertaken ‘to detect serious 
psychological illness’ should be completed by ‘experts in behavioural sciences, especially 
those trained in psychological testing’.191  This implies that experts are required only when 
‘serious psychological illness’ is suspected.  Moreover: ‘[p]sychological experts should be 
open to the possibility of religious life as a viable life choice and not hostile or depreciative 
of such a choice, and be familiar with the emotional and psychological demands of religious 
life’.192  Breitenbeck considers that canonists confuse matters when they refer to doctors who 
assess the physical health of the candidate as ‘experts’; for Breitenbeck ‘expert’ opinion is 
only required in cases of serious psychological illness.193  Therefore, she distinguishes the 
medical doctor providing the routine medical assessment from the expert required to detect 
serious psychological illness.  Contrasting with Williamson’s contention that requirements 
should not be strict, Breitenbeck quotes the chairman of the commission revising the canons 
on religious institutes as saying that Superiors are ‘not to be easy in admitting candidates’.194  
She suggests that ‘guidelines for admission could state that if a prospective candidate does 
not undergo psychological evaluation, then the application will not be considered’.195 
Although implying first that consultation with experts was required ‘to detect serious 
psychological illness’, Breitenbeck implies here that candidates should undergo routine 
psychological testing; moreover, the institute’s own ‘guidelines’ should mandate this.  
Compulsory psychological testing is therefore required before admission. 
 
On the other hand, Rincón argues that the experts involved should be those from the 
discipline of psychiatry.  He holds that the requirement to protect privacy is intended to 
190 Breitenbeck, Doctoral Thesis, p287.  Physical disability is not necessarily a bar to admission to religious life. 
191 Breitenbeck, Jurist, p279. 
192 Ibid. 
193 Ibid., p280. 
194 Ibid., p281, citing M Said, ‘The Present State of the Reform of the Code Concerning the Section, “De 
Institutia Perfectionis”’, Studia Canonica, 8 (1974), p231. 
195 Ibid. 
71 
 
                                                            
‘curtail abuse’ in the ‘obligation to subject’ a candidate to psychological examination, which 
requires the involvement of ‘a psychiatrist who is “truly expert, prudent and commendable 
for his moral principles” … but only in particularly difficult cases’ and with the candidate’s 
consent.196  This not only narrows the field to psychiatry and suggests that the use of one 
such expert suffices, but acknowledges that psychiatrists are only required in particularly 
difficult cases, not routinely.  Moreover, it suggests that qualification as a psychiatrist is 
insufficient; rather a ‘truly expert’ psychiatrist who is ‘commended for his moral principles’ 
is required. 
 
In short, the commentators differ as to the precise disciplines from which the experts are 
drawn and whether and precisely when routine psychological testing by experts is required.  
This diversity of opinion is due to the imprecision of canon 642 and the absence of guidance 
in norms outside the Code.  As we shall see below, this lack of clarity should be addressed, 
and could be either by general norms or the norms of the religious institute in question.197 
 
Consultation - Individual or Collective: Commentators are divided on the number of 
experts to be consulted.  McDermott speaks in the singular,198 as does Rincón,199 but 
Breitenbeck and Williamson speak in the plural but do not elaborate.200  Given this diversity 
of opinion on the numbers of experts to be consulted, it is hardly surprising that 
commentators do not address the issue of individual or collective consultation.   
 
Failure to Consult and Weight of Expert Advice:  Commentators do not address these 
issues.201  The use of experts in admission to the novitiate is mandated if the Superior is in 
doubt: that is, if moral certainty of suitability is not reached.  In these circumstances, 
therefore, once again, canon 127 applies: the Superior who makes the decision must have an 
overriding reason to act against advice.  
 
196 Thomás Rincón, Ann, p516, citing RC, II, III.  See Appendix VI.  This reference seems to be more applicable 
to admission to profession that to the novitiate. 
197 Although subject to the Supreme Authority of the Pope (see CIC, c. 590), CIC, c. 586 protects the autonomy 
of each institute.  See Williamson, L&S, p322, para 1150.  
198 McDermott, Text&Comm, p490. 
199 Rincón, Ann, p516. 
200 Breitenbeck, Jurist, p279 and Williamson L&S, pp354-355. 
201 Williamson, L&S, pp354-355; McDermott, Text&Comm, p490; Smith, New Comm, pp807-808. 
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Neither CIC 1917 nor CCEO require the use of experts in the process of admission to 
religious life.  CIC 1917 is silent on the issue.202  Doyle cites a case, dated 1721, which relied 
on ‘experts’ to establish an alleged hermaphrodite’s suitability to join a religious order of 
women, but no mention is made of the type of expert; by 1894 it was established that the 
judgment ‘of medical men’ was ‘the most forceful argument’ in such a matter.203  CCEO 
provides that for admission to a monastery, ‘suitability and full freedom of a candidate’ must 
be evident to the Superior after investigation, without mention of the assistance of experts.204 
 
Admission to Vows: Temporary and Further Profession 
 
On completion of the novitiate, a novice in a religious institute is to be admitted to temporary 
profession if found suitable; otherwise the novice ‘is to be dismissed’;205 if doubt exists, the 
period of probation may be extended.206  The decision as to suitability is that of the 
competent Superior.207  Expert opinion is not mandated.  That a novice can be dismissed 
reflects the institute’s limited responsibility for those who have not yet taken vows.208  
However, once the period of temporary vows is complete, CIC canon 689§2 provides: 
 
‘Even though contracted after admission, a physical or psychological infirmity, which, in the 
judgement of experts, renders the member mentioned in §1 unsuited to lead a life in the 
institute, constitutes a reason for not admitting the member to renewal of profession or to 
perpetual profession, unless the infirmity was contracted through the negligence of the 
institute or because of work performed in the institute’. 
 
Prior consultation by the competent Superior with the institute’s council and just reasons 
(plural) are required before a member is excluded from making further profession on the 
202 CIC 1917, cc. 538-552. 
203 Doyle, Doctoral Thesis, p216, citing Sacra Congregation Episcoporum et Regularium (8 March 1894). 
204 CCEO, c. 453§2.  See Appendix II. 
205 There appears to be some tension in the use of the word ‘dismiss’.  CIC Book II, Chapter VI, Article 3 deals 
with ‘The Dismissal of Members’.  These canons address dismissal as the consequence of offences (cc. 694-
695).  ‘Other causes’, which are ‘grave, external, imputable and juridically proven’ (c. 696), and for those in 
temporary vows, ‘less grave reasons determined in the institute’s own law’, apply.  Williamson, L&S, p389, 
defines ‘dismissal’ as ‘a penal measure reserved for serious offences’.  However, in her commentary on CIC, c. 
653§1, dealing with the dismissal of a novice, she states: ‘[A] dismissed novice should never be made to feel 
lessened by the event – in fact, the contrary’.  It appears, therefore, that the meaning of the word ‘dismiss’ 
differs depending on whether it applies to novices or to those who have taken vows; it is a penal measure in 
relation to the latter.  
206 CIC, c. 653§2.  See Appendix I.  This concerns a novice, not a member in temporary profession. 
207 CIC, c. 656, 3°.  See Appendix I. 
208 CIC, c. 653§1.  See Appendix I. 
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completion of temporary profession.209  A physical or psychological infirmity, but not 
including insanity,210 which, in the judgment of experts, renders a member unsuited to life in 
the particular institute, constitutes ‘a reason’ (singular) for excluding the member from 
further profession.211  There are, however, two exceptions: if the infirmity was caused by the 
institute’s negligence or by work within the institute.  Canon 689§2 stipulates that the experts 
make a judgment on unsuitability for life in the institute; this contrasts with canon 1044 2º 
which, by referring to canon 1041 1°, requires that the impediment to the exercise of Orders 
already received be established by the bishop after prior consultation with experts.212   
However, the decision to exclude a member from further profession remains with the 
Superior.  A member has no personal right to further profession; the law requires that the 
competent authority judge the member ‘suitable’, otherwise the member must leave.213 
 
Although canon 689§2 states that more than one expert is involved in cases of physical or 
psychological infirmity, it does not clarify: the professional disciplines or qualifications of 
the experts; whether they are to be consulted individually or collectively; whether 
consultation goes to validity of the refusal to admit; or what weight is to be given to the 
experts’ judgments.  In preventing an institute from dismissing an insane member who has 
taken temporary vows, even though unable to make further profession, the law highlights the 
institute’s responsibility to care for members incapable of independent life, whether inside or 
outside the institute.  However, it makes no reference as to how insanity might be 
established.214 
 
Appointment of Experts: Commentators do not address the issue as to who appoints the 
experts.  Presumably, the Superior appoints, but there is no provision as to whether the 
candidate is involved in choosing the experts, yet Breitenbeck’s acknowledgment that 
‘[c]ommon sense and charity seem to require that the member have some degree of freedom 
in choosing this professional, but not unlimited freedom’,215 applies here mutatis mutandis. 
 
209 CIC, c. 689§1.  See Appendix I. 
210 The Institute has an obligation to care for a member who has become insane; CIC, c. 689§3.  See Appendix I. 
211 CIC, c. 689§3.  See Appendix I. 
212 Latin: ‘... de iudicio peritorum ...’.  However, this is an advisory judgment. 
213 CIC, c. 657§1.  See Appendix I. 
214 CIC, cc. 99; 124§1; and 689§3.  See Appendix I. 
215 Breitenbeck, Jurist, p283.  
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Disciplines, Qualifications and Functions of Experts: An Instruction, Renovationis 
Causam (1969), predating CIC, required that a candidate’s ‘human and emotional maturity’ 
be established; in ‘certain more difficult cases’ the Superior, with the agreement of the 
candidate, was permitted to consult ‘a prudent and qualified psychologist, known for his 
moral principles’ to examine the candidate, preferably ‘after an extended period of probation, 
so as to enable the specialist to formulate a diagnosis based on experience’.216  This, unlike 
canon 689§2, therefore, permitted consultation in difficult cases with a single psychologist. 
 
Commentators, however, are not all specific as to the disciplines, qualification and functions 
of experts under canon 689§2.  Williamson and McDermott are the most specific.  For 
Williamson, ‘doctors, psychiatrists and psychologists’ are the appropriate experts; their 
function is to establish ‘the history, cause, development and effects of the illness’.217  Like 
Breitenbeck, Williamson understands that the competent authority should question whether 
or not the physical or psychological infirmity is irreversible, suggesting that this must be so 
before a member of an institute can be lawfully excluded, although no authority is cited in 
support.218  McDermott, although using the term ‘experts’ in the plural, considers a ‘doctor, 
psychiatrist, [or] psychologist’ as appropriate.219  She further advises that ‘counselling during 
the time of temporary profession would help prevent shock at exclusion from subsequent 
profession’ but she does not elaborate on the counsellor’s professional discipline.220 
 
Breitenbeck is less specific.  She insists that any illness must be evidenced ‘in the opinion of 
experts, not in the thinking of the major superior’.221  She speaks only of ‘professional 
experts in the human sciences’.222  To exclude a member from further profession on 
psychological grounds, she says: ‘[I]t is obvious that the expert must be a highly trained 
professional, who possesses the requisite medical knowledge, psychological or psychiatric 
training which enables him or her to diagnose the physical or psychic illness’.223  This 
implies the requirement to consult a single, competent professional, but not necessarily an 
216 RC, II-III.  See Appendix VI.  CIC, c. 653§2 allows for a limited extended period of probation if doubt about 
suitability exists.  See Appendix I. 
217 Williamson, L&S, p386. 
218 Ibid., and Breitenbeck, Jurist, p282.   
219 McDermott, Text&Comm, p517. 
220 Ibid. 
221 Breitenbeck, Doctoral Thesis, p291, citing Lamberto de Echeverria (Ed), Código de Devecho Canonico, 
Edición Bilingüe Comentada, Fourth Edition (Madrid, 1984), p364. 
222 Breitenbeck, Jurist, p259. 
223 Ibid., p282.  Also Breitenbeck, Doctoral Thesis, p290. 
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‘expert’.  This is reinforced with her comment that the member should ‘have some degree of 
freedom in choosing this professional, but not unlimited freedom’.224  She notes that in 1961 
the Holy See warned against the use of ‘experts trained in the psychoanalytic tradition’.225  
However, she attributes the fact that neither this warning, nor the suggestion during the 
revision of the Code in 1979, that only Catholic experts should be used,226 found their way 
into CIC, to ‘an enhanced appreciation of the training, expertise and contributions of experts 
in general’, by those involved in the revision of Code.227   
 
Holland acknowledges the need for a ‘just cause’ (singular) to refuse further profession; in 
order to establish this in cases of illness, ‘appropriate’, ‘medical’ experts (plural) are 
required.228  However, she then goes on to speak of the functions of the expert (singular); that 
is, to ‘address the individual’s suitability for the life of the institute’, noting that the 
requirements of institutes will differ, as will those of individual candidates.229 
 
In short, the commentators differ as to the precise disciplines from which the experts are 
drawn.  This diversity is again due to the imprecision of canon 689§2 and the absence of 
guidance outside the Code.  Once more, this lack of clarity should be addressed. 
 
Consultation - Individual or Collective: In line with canon 689§2, Williamson speaks in 
the plural.230  However, Breitenbeck, Holland, and McDermott speak initially in the plural, 
but then, contrary to the clear wording of the canon, suggest that only one professional is 
required.231  They do not address the specific issue of individual or collective consultation.  It 
can be argued that the reference to canon 127 in the Circular Letter (1997) (dealing with the 
investigations for admission to Holy Orders), in relation to the obligation to seek advice from 
members of the Commission for Orders and Ministries individually, should be applied 
here.232   
224 Breitenbeck, Jurist, p283.  Emphasis added. 
225 Breitenbeck, Doctoral Thesis, p292, citing Suprema Sacra Congregatio S Officio, Monitum (15 July 1961), 
AAS, 53 (1961), p571. 
226  Breitenbeck, Doctoral Thesis, p293, citing ‘De Institutis Vitae Consecratae Per Professionem Concilliorum 
Evangelicum’, Comm, 12 (1980), p186. 
227 Breitenbeck, Doctoral Thesis, p293.   
228 Holland, New Comm, p859. 
229 Ibid., pp859 - 860. 
230 Williamson, L&S, p386. 
231 Breitenbeck, Doctoral Thesis, p291; Holland, New Comm, p859; and McDermott, Text&Comm, p516. 
232 Circular Letter (1997), 3.   
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 Failure to Consult and Weight of Expert Advice:  Some commentators, such as 
McDermott and Holland, are silent on these issues.233  Williamson states that although the 
illness referred to ‘could well justify’ refusal to further profession, ‘the canon does not 
positively require that it be for this reason refused’.234  In other words, even if the experts 
judge the candidate unsuitable, the Superior is not bound to refuse admission to further 
profession; the experts’ judgment merely provides ‘a reason’ for the Superior to refuse such 
admission.  McDonough holds that the experts ‘would have to qualify according to canon 
1574’;235 but considers their opinions are not required for validity.236  However, acting 
without the advice of such experts, ‘could easily result in recourse’ leading to reversal of the 
decision;  exclusion would be invalid if the physical or psychological infirmity were 
contracted through the institute’s negligence or as a result of work undertaken within it.237  
Breitenbeck, on the other hand, acknowledging that the experts’ reports are ‘crucial to the 
decision-making process’, states: 
 
‘While the language of the canon as such does not require the opinion of experts for the 
validity of the major Superior’s decision, there is no qualifying clause, such as “if necessary”, 
or “if is it seems opportune” or “if warranted”.  Therefore, the language of the canon is 
exceptionally strong in requiring expert judgment prior to exclusion of members from 
subsequent or final profession in religious institutes’.238 
 
However, canon 689§2 is limited to unsuitability due to ‘physical or psychological infirmity’, 
which, in the judgment of experts, renders the member unsuitable.  This judgment is, 
therefore, a pre-requisite for exclusion on these grounds.  Therefore, canon 127 applies 
although the commentators do not address this matter.  To exclude a member from further 
profession on the grounds of physical or psychic ill-health without consultation with the 
required experts and, moreover, without their judgment of unsuitability, would, therefore, be 
an invalid act on the part of the major Superior.  Moreover, canon 689§2 states that expert 
opinions supporting unsuitability provide ‘a reason’ for refusal to admit to further profession 
- that is one of the ‘just reasons’ required by canon 689§1.  However, the canon does not 
233 McDermott, Text&Comm, pp516-517; and Holland, New Comm, p860. 
234 Williamson, L&S, p387.  Emphasis added. 
235 CIC, c. 1574.  See Appendix I. 
236 Elizabeth McDonough, ‘Separation of Members From The Institute; Canons 684-709’, in Jordan F Hite, 
Sharon L Holland, D Ward [Eds], Religious Institutes, Secular Institutes, Societies of the Apostolic Life: A 
Handbook on Canons 573-746 (Collegeville, 1985), 221-273 (hereafter ‘Religious Institutes), p240.   
237 Ibid. 
238 Breitenbeck, Doctoral Thesis, p291-292. 
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impose an obligation to refuse admission, but by virtue of canon 127 an overriding reason is 
required to go against experts’ advice, especially if this is unanimous.   
 
These provisions contrast with those under CIC 1917.   This allowed an institute, for a ‘just 
and reasonable cause’, to exclude a member from renewal of temporary vows or from taking 
perpetual profession.  However, illness was not considered among these causes, unless it 
could be proven that the illness had been deliberately concealed at the time of temporary 
profession.239  Nevertheless, Doyle maintains that it was the practice of the Roman Rota, at 
least since the early eighteenth century, to use experts to prove nullity of religious profession 
due to insanity, using the same method of proof required to establish questions of inheritance, 
sickness and injury.240  On the other hand, CCEO uses similar terminology to CIC, also 
requiring consultation with experts before regarding a temporarily professed person unsuited 
to life in the institute due to physical or psychological infirmity.241   
 
4. THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND THE CONFIDENTIALITY OF EXPERT 
REPORTS 
 
CIC canon 220 protects the right to privacy of all Christ’s faithful.242  As we have seen, 
explicit reference is made to this right in relation to admission to religious institutes, but not 
in relation to admission to Orders.  Whilst canon 220 does not explicitly deal with 
confidentiality in the context of privacy, some canonists relate the two: confidentiality is an 
aspect of privacy.  Confidentiality is particularly pertinent when dealing with personal and 
sensitive data such as medical and psychological reports.  Although the sacramental seal of 
confession is inviolable,243 candidates for Orders and for religious life must be able to rely 
239 CIC 1917, c. 637.  See Appendix III. 
240 Doyle, Doctoral Thesis, pp215-216.  These ‘methods’ appear to have been the use of physicians, handwriting 
experts and arbiters.  Doyle cites a 17C case where a doctor reported on the mental state of a person whose 
religious profession was under investigation of nullity, and he cites Benedict XIV’s, Constitution  Dei 
Miseratione (4 March 1748), Fontes, II§385, as authority for permitting a religious superior to appoint a 
‘canonical expert’ from among the secular clergy to act as judge, but he makes no mention of the experts 
required to prove insanity. 
241 CCEO, c. 547§2.  See Appendix II. 
242 CIC, c. 220.  See Appendix I. 
243 CIC, cc. 983§1; and 630§1.   See Appendix I.  See also Patrick J Wall, The Manifestation of Conscience in 
Roman Catholic Canon Law, LLM in Canon Law Dissertation (Cardiff University, 2007).  At pp35 – 41, Wall 
discusses the development of the concept of manifestation of conscience with regard to Religious Institutes 
through the ages.  At p36, he notes that Pope Leo XIII, in his Decree Quemadmodum (1890), voided the 
constitutions of non-clerical members of religious institutes, with some exceptions, which required an annual 
manifestation of conscience.  What was intended as a non-sacramental ‘spiritual practice’ became a command 
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also on confidentiality from their spiritual directors and formators.244  Consequently, a 
number of issues arise as to whether ecclesiastical authorities have responsibilities in relation 
to: safeguarding the right to privacy and confidentiality; obtaining the consent of individuals 
prior to an examination of them by experts; the subject’s right to access experts’ reports; 
obtaining the subject’s consent to disclosure of confidential experts’ and other reports to third 
parties and to the use made of those reports; and the destruction of reports when their use is 
no longer required.  What follows deals with these issues in relation to Orders and religious 
life together (to avoid repetition), though often, as we shall see, some commentators address 
them separately, whilst others do not address them at all. 
 
Safeguarding the Right to Privacy and Confidentiality: General: Canon 220, protecting 
the right to one’s good name and the right to privacy, is based on the dignity of the human 
person.245  Nevertheless, some commentators are unhelpful in determining how this right is to 
be protected in light of the canonical requirements to provide ecclesiastical authorities with 
confidential information.  This is particularly pertinent when personal and sensitive data, 
sometimes including physical and psychological reports, are required for admission to Orders 
and religious life.  Moreover, such reports can sometimes be required after admission to 
assess an individual’s physical or psychological status.  Golden, commenting on canon 241 
on prerequisites for admission to the seminary, does not address either the issue of privacy or 
that of confidentiality.246  Cunningham, commenting on the same canon, states simply that an 
individual’s right to privacy must be respected by those processing admissions to seminaries 
and religious institutes.247  Provost, acknowledging the basic human right, maintains that as 
the right to privacy is ‘a developing area’ in civil law, ‘it will be a source of debate and 
development over the coming years’ in canon law.248  Kaslyn acknowledges that questions 
can arise over respect for privacy particularly in relation to psychological and medical testing 
of individuals in the admission process to seminaries and religious institutes and accepts the 
by superiors for ‘a complete scrutiny of the members without deference to conscience of the individual’.  Wall 
points out that Quemadmodum has since been abrogated, but remains ‘a persuasive source of the intent of the 
Holy See on the issue of manifestation of conscience’. 
244 CIC, c. 240§2.  See Appendix I.  However, spiritual directors and formators have responsibilities to guide 
candidates; see ACS, 71.  See Appendix VI. 
245 GS, 26.  See Appendix VI. 
246 Paul L Golden, Text&Comm, p182.  CIC, c. 241.  See Appendix I. 
247 Richard Cunningham, New Comm, p313, citing Sharon Euart, ‘Canon Law and Psychological Testing for 
Admission to a Seminary’, in R Wister (Ed), Psychology, Counselling and the Seminarian (Washington, DC, 
1993) pp185-193, and the opinions of J Anderson, R Calvo and R Gobbons, in P Cogan (Ed), CLSA, Advisory 
Opinions, 1984-1993 (Washington DC, 1995), pp44-52. 
248 Provost, Text&Comm, p153. 
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natural law basis for the right to privacy.249  He notes that this right is embodied, for example 
in: the freedom of seminarians and members of religious institutes, to choose a confessor; the 
prohibition against securing the opinion of a spiritual director or confessor concerning 
admission to, or dismissal from, the seminary; and  the prohibition on a Superior to induce a 
subject to manifest their conscience.250  
 
Because the canons dealing with pre-requisites for admission, to a seminary and to Orders, 
are silent on the issues of privacy and confidentiality, commentators on those canons do not 
deal in any detail with these issues.251  Geisinger, for example, mentions simply the need to 
show deference to the right to privacy and the protection of one’s good name in establishing 
irregularity for Orders.252  Although he expounds at length the lack of clarity in canon 
1044§2 on the impediment to the exercise of Orders due to psychological infirmity, he makes 
no mention of the right to privacy or confidentiality.253  Interestingly, Kelly when dealing 
with suitability for Orders (which does not mandate submission of experts’ reports), suggests 
that the law which protects privacy in admission to the religious life should be applied also to 
the investigation for suitability for orders.254  He is, however, silent on the issues of privacy 
and confidentiality when discussing impediment to Orders already received due to insanity or 
any other psychological impairment (which does require experts’ reports).255   
 
Williamson, commenting on canon 642 on admission to the novitiate, simply acknowledges 
that the candidate’s privacy ‘must never’ be violated,256 but she is silent on the right to 
privacy regarding physical or psychological infirmity after vows have been taken.257    
Rincón maintains that the reference to privacy regarding admission to religious institutes is 
intended ‘to curtail any possible abuse’, but does not elaborate.258  Smith too, acknowledges 
that the candidate’s right to privacy must be respected and they must not be required to 
249 Robert J Kaslyn, New Comm, p278, citing P Cogan (Ed), CLSA Advisory Opinions1984-1993 (Washington, 
DC,1995), ‘Opinions on c. 241§1’, p44-47, and ‘Opinions on cc 241§1; 1029; and 1051, 1°’, pp47-52 in relation 
to HIV/AIDS testing. 
250 Kaslyn, New Comm, p278.  CIC, cc. 240§§1and 2; 241; 603§§1and 5; 984; and 985.  See Appendix I. 
251 CIC, cc. 1029; 1041; 1044; 1050; and 1051.  See Appendix I.  Kelly, L&S, p563; Gilbert, Text&Comm, p729; 
and Woestman, The Sacrament of Orders, p67. 
252 Geisinger, New Comm, p1216. 
253 Ibid., pp1222-1224. 
254 Kelly, L&S, p557.  
255 Ibid., p566 
256 Williamson, L&S, p355.   
257 Ibid., pp386-387. 
258 Rincón, Ann, p516, p444. 
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manifest their conscience.259  McGrath gives little more insight: commenting on canon 220, 
and noting its natural law basis, he states that the right to privacy must be balanced against 
the common good.260  He acknowledges that this ‘could become a critical issue in the matter 
of candidature for the priesthood or for religious life’, but canon 220 ‘carries an implied 
warning to Superiors and others that, while observing the criteria laid down by the church, 
they must seriously take into account these basic rights of the individual’.261  McGrath warns 
that ‘strictness should always be brought to bear on the choice and testing of students [for the 
priesthood]’.262  In short, commentators offer very little detail on this matter. 
 
Consent of Individuals Prior to their Examination by Experts: The necessity to obtain the 
candidate’s prior consent before consultation with experts or testing is acknowledged 
amongst commentators.263  However, as Kaslyn warns, in applying for admission and 
agreeing to provide ‘certain confidential information’ an individual ‘does not thereby forfeit 
entirely the right to privacy’.264  Williamson says simply that the candidate ‘must willingly 
agree to undergo whatever tests are proposed’,265 implying little or no choice on the 
candidate’s part.  Breitenbeck holds that a prospective candidate should be informed of the 
required assessment of both physical and mental health.266  This, too, gives the impression of 
little choice for the candidate.   Rincón, on the other hand, refers to the ‘extremely cautious’ 
provisions of Renovationis Causam, permitting consultation with a ‘truly expert psychiatrist’ 
but ‘only in particularly difficult cases and provided that the person concerned freely 
consented’.267  McDermott acknowledges that experts can be consulted ‘with the knowledge 
and consent of the candidate, in keeping with the provisions of c 220’.268  Smith 
acknowledges ‘difficult moral issues’ for those charged with drawing up admission policies 
due to medical advances which enable the detection of HIV and chronic or debilitating 
259 Smith, New Comm, p808. 
260 McGrath, L&S, p124. 
261 Ibid. 
262 Ibid., p137. 
263 Kelly, L&S, p557; Gilbert, Text&Comm, pp725- 731; and Geisinger, New Comm, p1216.  
264 Kaslyn, New Comm, p278. 
265 Williamson, L&S, p355. 
266 Breitenbeck, Jurist, p280.  Also Breitenbeck, Doctoral Thesis, p288.  See also Religious Institutes, p119:  ‘… 
[T]he institute or experts employed by the institute are to conduct their examination without prejudice to the 
right of a person to protect his or her privacy.  This is an important consideration for institutes to use in guiding 
experts so that they do not use methods that would violate privacy or in any way harm the reputation of the 
institute’. 
267 Rincón, Ann, p516, citing Comm, 12 (1980), p186 and RC, II, III.  Emphases added. 
268 McDermott, Text&Comm, p490.  
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diseases and certain genetic predispositions’.269  She also acknowledges the ‘serious 
dilemmas’ facing institutes with regard to confidentiality, as information gleaned may be 
‘new’ to the applicant; but she does not suggest how these difficulties can be overcome.270 
 
Hite concentrates on the rights of the seminary or institute.  Although Vatican guidelines now 
permit competent authorities to proceed to admission on the basis of information they already 
have, when a candidate refuses psychological testing,271 Hite, albeit writing earlier, cautioned 
against admission without sufficient evidence of suitability.  He maintained that if access to 
information was denied to the institute on grounds of violating or ‘seeming to violate’ rights 
to privacy, the institute ‘should forego seeking information but it should not place itself at a 
disadvantage by granting admission on inconclusive evidence of suitability’.272  Superiors 
‘must consider the potential harm that can be done to the candidate and the formation 
program or institute by admitting … someone who is unqualified or unprepared’.273  On the 
other hand, Woestman, sees no conflict between requirements for psychological testing and 
the protection of confidentiality and privacy.274  The practice of physical examination and 
submission of the report to the supervisors, but with the strict caveat, requiring the 
candidate’s explicit, informed and absolutely free consent, can also be applied to 
psychological health.275  Woestman says that although the candidate has a right to refuse 
examination, so also the competent Superior may refuse admission if the candidate has not 
been positively screened.276   
 
269 Smith, New Comm, p807. 
270 Ibid. 
271 Gpsy, 12.  
272 Hite, Religious Institutes, p120.  However, at p119, Hite acknowledges:  ‘… [T]he institute or experts 
employed by the institute are to conduct their examination without prejudice to the right of a person to protect 
his or her privacy.  This is an important consideration for institutes to use in guiding experts so that they do not 
use methods that would violate privacy or in any way harm the reputation of the institute’. 
273 Ibid. 
274 William Woestman, ‘Canons 241 and 1051, 1º’, Arthur Espilage (Ed), CLSA Advisory Opinions 1994-2000  
(Washington, 2002), pp64-67 (hereafter Woestman, ‘Canons 241 and 1051, 1°), p66. 
275 Woestman, The Sacrament of Orders, p45.  He cites Pius XII, ‘Venus de mode entier’ (10 April 1958): ‘If the 
consent is unjustly extorted, any action of the psychologist will be illicit; if the consent is vitiated by a lack of 
freedom (due to ignorance, error, or deceit), every attempt to penetrate into the depths of the souls will be 
immoral’.  Also cited is the Congregation for the Clergy’s letter to an American Bishop (1998): ‘It is the 
consistent teaching of the magisterium that investigation of the intimate psychological and moral status of the 
interior life of any member of the Christian faithful cannot be carried out except with the consent of the one to 
undergo such evaluation, as is clearly written about in the instruction of the Secretariat of State in their August 
6, 1976 letter to pontifical representatives’. 
276 Woestman, ‘Canons 241 and 1051, 1º’, p67. 
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Wall, however, considers that the requirement of some Superiors in religious institutes that 
members agree to psychological assessment and counselling ‘under obedience’ is a ‘coercive 
measure’; this is done, he says, ‘to gain access to the mind of the member who in essence is 
doing a modern manifestation of conscience with the therapist’.  He points out that the 
practice is contrary to current canon law and ‘violates a core right of the member to freedom 
of conscience’.277  Care must be taken, therefore, to ensure the candidate’s freedom of 
choice; any psychological assessment or counselling must be undergone voluntarily. 
 
Consent of the Individual to Disclosure of Confidential Reports to Third Parties:  
Few commentators deal directly with the subject’s consent to disclosure.  Those who do 
address the matter do so either from the perspective of the rights of the seminary or institute, 
or else from the perspective of the rights of the individual.  On the one hand, McDermott, on 
admission to the novitiate, implies that the institute has a right to access the reports; she 
simply considers that the decision-makers ‘should be privy to these records and know the 
recommendation of the religious responsible for the candidate during the probationary 
period’.278  Although not dealing with expert reports but addressing the respective Superior’s 
testimony, required for admission of those who have left another seminary or religious 
institute, McGrath says that this testimony ‘should be communicated directly to the bishop 
concerned and obviously must be kept confidential’.279  Whilst this implies that only the 
ordaining bishop should have access to it, he does not mention the candidate’s consent for its 
release.  Provost, too, on canon 220, simply notes that the only other reference to this right in 
CIC is in canon 642 on admission to the novitiate, where experts’ reports are subject to it; no 
mention is made of consent for disclosure.280   
 
On the other hand, Smith, commenting on admission to religious institutes, and 
acknowledging the problems posed by the obligation of confidentiality, holds that ‘signed 
release forms allow the results of such tests to be shared with the responsible superior in the 
institute’.281  This too, implies that only the responsible Superior has access to it.  Enquiries 
made by Superiors must be discreet; and candidates must not be required to manifest their 
277 Wall, Dissertation, p41. 
278 McDermott, Text&Comm, p490. 
279 McGrath, L&S, p138.  See also CIC, cc. 241§3; and 645§2.  See Appendix I. 
280 Provost, Text&Comm, p153. 
281 Smith, New Comm, p807. 
83 
 
                                                            
conscience.282  Likewise, Holland acknowledges members’ rights to privacy and 
confidentiality of experts reports, but she maintains that a member whose case is doubtful and 
who wishes to be admitted to further profession ‘will cooperate in releasing necessary 
information to the competent superior’.283 
 
By way of contrast, Breitenbeck addresses both the interests of the candidate and those of the 
institute.  She acknowledges that experts should be guided as to methodology and the 
candidate should be informed of ‘the types of test being utilized’ and who is to see the 
report.284  A prospective candidate should be informed that the results of these assessments 
will be forwarded to the Superiors of those institutes in which candidates are seeking 
admission; moreover, institutes ‘should assure the candidate of the confidentiality of the 
experts’ reports and should obtain from the candidate a signed release clearly stating the 
purpose of the examination’.285  However, she also acknowledges the need for decision-
makers to be informed: ‘If proper law requires that certain members within an institute, such 
as the council or formation director, are to be involved in responsible decision-making 
regarding admittance, … then they also should have access to the opinions of experts in order 
to render an informed decision’; she adds that they should be obliged to secrecy.286  This 
however, implies that whilst the candidate should be told that the assessments will be 
forwarded to the Superior, it may, in fact, be shared with others, albeit that they are obliged to 
secrecy.  Regarding exclusion from further profession because of physical or psychic illness, 
the action ‘should be taken with equity, justice and charity’ and the member should be given 
reasons for the decision.287  Breitenbeck and McDermott consider that periodic evaluations 
and counselling during the time of temporary profession, presumably keeping the member 
informed of progress, would serve as advance warning of the Superior’s decision.288  
 
Interestingly, the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops’ Programme of Priestly 
Formation insists that when a candidate leaves a seminary or religious institute and applies 
for admission to another, information on him will be shared: the purpose of expert reports is 
282 Ibid., pp807- 808. 
283 Holland, New Comm, p859. 
284 Breitenbeck, Jurist, p280.  Also Breitenbeck, Doctoral Thesis, p288.   
285 Breitenbeck, Jurist, p280.   
286 Ibid., p281. 
287 Ibid., p283.  Also Breitenbeck, Doctoral Thesis, p291. 
288 Breitenbeck, Jurist, p283 and McDermott, Text&Comm, pp516-517. 
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‘full disclosure of all relevant information’,289 to which the applicant must consent if the 
application is to be considered.290  Wall acknowledges the relevance of civil law in this 
field.291   
 
In short, although some commentators consider the individual’s consent to disclosure should 
be obtained, there are no canonical provisions requiring this.  Nor do norms or commentators 
address the issue of a candidate’s right to access confidential reports compiled about them.  
These matters, therefore, should be addressed, at least in the institute’s own law.  
 
Use of Expert Reports by Third Parties: Some commentators imply a more restricted use 
of experts’ reports than do others.  Woestman holds that expert reports should be seen by the 
minimum number of people necessary, implying restricted use.292  He notes that invasive 
methods of investigation are immoral, and warns that results ‘cannot be used in the external 
forum’.293  Kaslyn, on admission to Orders, implies that reports are used solely to ascertain 
an individual’s suitability.  He notes that the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops’ 
Programme of Priestly Formation ‘requires that throughout the admission process “the 
candidate’s rights to privacy should be respected and the careful management of confidential 
materials observed”; officials must carefully balance the rights of the institute or seminary to 
certain information in order to develop an educated judgment as to whether or not they 
289 USCCBPPF, Addendum A, Preamble para 1.   See also the Norms for Evaluation of Applications in these 
Cases [those previously enrolled in a formation program], 1: ‘At the departure from a seminary or diocesan 
formation program the diocesan bishops or seminary rector must inform the student by means of a written 
summary statement or letter of understanding that if he applies to a program of priestly formation in the future, 
relevant information will be communicated to the diocesan bishop, major superior, and, if necessary, the 
seminary rector, who is responsible for admission’. 
290 USCCBPPF, Addendum A, Norms 4: ‘At the time of application the applicant must permit the release of all 
relevant information concerning his departure from any previous program of priestly formation or institute of 
consecrated life or society of apostolic life to the diocesan bishop, and, if necessary, the seminary rector, to 
whom he is applying. … .  An applicant’s refusal to provide the release of all relevant information provides 
sufficient grounds to reject the application. …’. 
291 Wall, Dissertation, at p4, points out that under United States law, the Superior has a right to the results 
because he/she is paying for the service. 
292Woestman, ‘Canons  241 and 1051, 1º’, p67. 
293 Woestman, The Sacrament of Orders, p45-46, citing Gregory Ingles, ‘Protecting the Right to Privacy When 
Examining Issues Affecting the Life and Ministry of Clerics and Religious’, Studia Canonica, 34(2000), pp439-
466.  Woestman notes that if the person tested ‘has little or no control over the responses given’, he or she ‘may 
unwillingly reveal information of a most intimate and personal nature of his or her private psyche’.  He 
considers inappropriate also the use of ‘a polygraph, the penile plethysmograph, drug induced responses, or 
other techniques of this nature’, as they are invasive. 
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should admit a specific individual and that individual’s right to privacy’.294  He points out 
that, officials in seminaries and religious institutes ‘must provide adequate protection of 
material placed in the archives, including personnel files, in order to protect the privacy and 
good reputation of individuals’.295  Kelly, too, acknowledges that the evidence required by 
canon 1029, concerning the qualities needed for ordination, ‘must be treated with the utmost 
confidentiality and should not be used for any purpose other than that for which it was made’; 
the same applies to the documents and reports required by canon 1051, although he does not 
define those purposes.296  In similar vein, Geisinger, commenting on canon 1051 regarding 
documentation to be provided to establish personal qualities and physical and psychological 
fitness for Orders, states that ‘data regarding a candidate’s psychological and psychical health 
must be guarded carefully.  The information is confidential, whether it may justify his 
dismissal from formation or affirm his suitability’.297  Smith, acknowledging the problems 
posed by the obligation of confidentiality, maintains that test results should be used in a 
‘manner which fosters understanding and growth, whether or not the applicant is 
admitted’.298 
 
On the other hand, considering that the Church has initiated psychological testing as routine 
practice for admission to the seminary, Gilbert suggests that experts’ reports should be used 
not only for admission, but also throughout the course of formation.299  However, it appears 
clear that the sole purpose of obtaining experts’ reports is to assess suitability and fitness for 
Orders or religious life; it seems reasonable, therefore, that reports continue to be useful until 
Orders are received or perpetual vows are taken.  Interestingly, Breitenbeck addresses the 
experts’ duty to ‘instruct those who will read the report so they will be informed on the 
nature, uses, and limitations’ of its content.300  Hite considers that this would be ‘helpful’.301   
 
Destruction of Reports No Longer Required: Most commentators do not address this issue.  
Smith simply acknowledges the problem of destruction of test results when their use would 
294 Kaslyn, New Comm, p278, citing P Cogan (Ed), CLSA Advisory Opinions 1984-1993 (Washington, 
DC,1995), ‘Opinions on c. 241§1, p44-47; and ‘Opinions on cc. 241§1; 1029; and 1051, 1°’, pp47-52 in relation 
to HIV/AIDS testing. 
295 Kaslyn, New Comm, p278. 
296 Kelly, L&S, pp 557 and 570.  CIC, cc. 1029; and 1051.  See Appendix I. 
297 Geisinger, New Comm, pp1229-1230. 
298 Smith, New Comm, p807-808. 
299 Gilbert, Text&Comm, p725. 
300 Breitenbeck, Jurist, p280. 
301 Hite, Religious Institutes, p119. 
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no longer be valid.302  Breitenbeck notes that the candidate ‘should be informed about what 
happens to the report after its initial use’, implying that it might have a further purpose.303  In 
the United States, seminaries are encouraged to complete ‘exit’ evaluations for departing 
students and keep them on file, in case of a subsequent application, which implies that they 
are not destroyed when the candidate leaves.304  In the event of a subsequent application to 
another seminary or institute, a written request for information is to be sent to all former 
dioceses, seminaries, or religious institutes to which the applicant was affiliated, and an oral 
interview with personnel responsible for the applicant’s formation is recommended.305  This 
investigation is considered ‘an integral part of the internal discipline of the Church’; 
information gained must be added to the applicant’s ‘confidential, permanent file’.306  This 
implies that the data is not destroyed when the applicant is ordained or takes perpetual vows. 
 
Considerable personal and sensitive data, therefore, could be included in this file.  
Documentation required by the Circular Letter (1979) for the scrutiny at each of the four 
stages of priestly formation requires, inter alia: the detailed ‘personal report’ of the rector of 
the seminary, in line with the guidelines given in an accompanying enclosure;307 a collegial 
consultation of the priests entrusted with the formation in the seminary or the house of 
formation; a consultation of the candidate’s own pastor and a consultation of the priest in 
charge of the place where the candidate assists in pastoral work; the ‘opinion of the 
302 Smith, New Comm, p807-808. 
303 Breitenbeck, Jurist, p280.  Also Breitenbeck, Doctoral Thesis, p288.  
304 USCCBPPF, Addendum A.  Commentary following Norms for Evaluation of Applications in these Cases 
[those previously enrolled in a formation program]: ‘Accurate information on the previous departure from a 
seminary formation program or from an institute of consecrated life or a society of apostolic life is essential in 
evaluating a decision for subsequent admission to a seminary.  Diocesan formation programs and other 
seminaries are encouraged to complete a final ‘exit’ evaluation for departing students in order to have 
information on record regarding students at the time of leaving.  This information (positive or negative) could be 
most helpful at a time of subsequent application’. 
305 USCCBPPF, Addendum A, Norms, 5: ‘...  Those contacted should provide the pertinent information in a 
timely manner so as not to delay the process.  For the sake of an accurate account written notes should be taken 
and included in the applicant’s confidential, permanent file.  A record of calls or inquiries received by a diocese 
or seminary regarding a former student should be maintained.  If any such institution or person responsible is 
not contacted with respect to a given application but nevertheless learns of it, all relevant information should be 
disclosed to the proper ecclesiastical authority’. 
306 USCCBPPF, Addendum A, Norms, Commentary following Norm 8: ‘...Historically, this process has not 
been public; rather it has been entirely private and for that reason, confidential.  An applicant has a right to a 
good reputation and the protection of his privacy (c. 220), so any information gained through this procedure and 
any subsequent review will continue to be held with the highest degree of confidentiality.  The process by which 
the committee on Priestly Formation might offer fraternal advice to a bishop or major superior will likewise be 
internal and confidential’. 
307 Circular Letter (1997),  Enclosure II, N2 and Enclosure V entitled: Some Guidelines for the Preparation of 
Reports Concerning Promotion to Orders (can.1029). 
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candidate’s class companions’, given personally in secret, expressing either a positive or 
negative opinion concerning the suitability of the candidate, together with reasons for that 
opinion;308 and for the diaconate and the priesthood, the outcome of the canonical banns, 
‘proclaimed a sufficient length of time in advance in the parishes where the candidate has had 
extended residence’.309  Moreover, following dismissal from another seminary, according to 
this Circular Letter, a ‘written report’ from the rector of any previous house of formation in 
which the candidate spent time is required, although the relevant canon requires only the 
respective Superior’s ‘testimony ... especially concerning the reason for their dismissal or 
departure’.310  Given that teachers and previous employers could be asked for information 
regarding, amongst other topics, sickness absence, maturity, capacity for multi-tasking, and 
capacity for making and sustaining personal relationships, this information could be added to 
the file. 
 
As the candidate’s consent is necessary before any testing, for that consent to be informed, 
full and free, it seems reasonable that the candidate should be informed of: the need for 
testing; the method of testing; the report’s intended use; who will have access to it; how and 
for how long the information will be stored; and if, when, and how it will be destroyed. 
Assurance of confidentiality within those limits should be forthcoming.  Even if canon law 
has not specifically ‘canonized’ civil law in this respect, the faithful are morally bound by 
civil law, that is, civil law which promotes the common good, and is not contrary to either 
divine law or canon law.311  Consequently, the civil law (which will necessarily vary from 
State to State) relating to personal and sensitive data should be followed. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Training candidates for Orders and for religious life is an essential task for the Church.   
Although personal attributes and academic qualities are important, establishing the physical 
and psychological health of candidates is more problematic and the means used to establish 
these qualities positively are more controversial.  This is a particularly difficult area for the 
308 Circular Letter (1997), Enclosure II, NN3-5 and 7.  Emphases added.   Although appearing under the head 
‘Documentation’, a written report is not specified here.  With whom these priests are to consult is also unclear 
309 Ibid., Enclosure II, N8. 
310 Ibid., Enclosure I,citing CIC, c. 241§3.  See also CIC, c. 645§2 for Religious Institutes.  See Appendix I. 
311 CIC, cc. 22; and 1290.  See Appendix I.  Also CCC, p483, paras 2238-2242 in Appendix IV; Huels, New 
Comm, pp84-86 and p1255; and Kennedy in New Comm, pp1492-3 (in respect of contracts).   
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Church: she shoulders the responsibility to provide suitable clerics and religious, yet the 
examination and training of candidates involves particularly sensitive issues.  The enquiry to 
establish the required criteria for suitability for ministry in the broad sense must respect on 
the one hand, both the candidate’s right to privacy and the right of non-disclosure of matters 
of the internal forum of conscience; and on the other hand, the integrity of the priesthood and 
religious communities, and indeed, the wider community, must be safeguarded.  A fine 
balance must be reached; sometimes the assistance of experts is required to achieve this.   
 
Clearly, the condition causing irregularity for reception of Orders or an impediment to their 
exercise due to insanity or psychological infirmity is a serious one.  The risk to the Church 
appears to be too great to allow a man suffering from insanity or other grave psychological 
infirmity to receive Orders.  Once Orders have been validly received, however, the 
permanence of such a psychological condition is not presumed, but the cleric, the Church and 
the wider community must, nevertheless, be protected until the impediment ceases.  
Likewise, for religious life, psychological health must be established.  Therefore, testing in 
these circumstances, that is, in order to settle a doubt about psychological health, is justified. 
 
There is no canonical provision for routine testing in establishing suitability for Orders or 
admission to religious life.  Moreover, it is clear from Vatican documents that there are 
restrictions on psychological testing.  In fact, CCEO does not require any certificates of 
physical or psychological health for admission to Orders.  Nevertheless, the practice of 
routine psychological testing before ordination and admission to religious life appears 
widespread, at least in the Latin Church.  Indeed, some commentators hold that unless 
candidates agree to undergo testing, their application should not be considered.   
 
In assessing suitability for Orders, which must be established positively, unless one knows 
what to test for, the value of routine psychological testing is questionable.  Unless the 
characteristics and qualities which make the best clerics and members of religious life are 
known and candidates can be tested against these criteria, routine psychological testing 
would appear to have little relevance.  In fact, testing could be considered to have 
demonstrated its weakness in light of the Church’s more recent experience in discovering the 
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level of sexual abuse of children by clerics and religious.312  This inherent weakness seems to 
be acknowledged in the Circular Letter (1997) requiring a psychological report, ‘only if there 
exists a just reason’, implying an objective reason to doubt psychological health.313  This 
weakness is further reflected in Guidelines (2008), acknowledging not only the candidate’s 
right to refuse psychological testing, but the right not to have suitability judged solely on the 
basis of a refusal to undergo such testing.314  However, this latter document, demonstrates its 
own weakness: rather than requiring assessment by independent experts, it suggests that 
formators and psychologists should ‘compare notes’, which gives the rector overseeing the 
candidate’s training an opportunity for input, which could influence the tester’s opinion. 
 
Under CIC, although the required dimissorial letters cannot be granted until canonical 
requirements are met,  the bishop is only obliged to be satisfied that the documents referred 
to in canon 1050, ‘are at hand’ and that the candidate’s suitability ‘has been positively 
established’.315  Being ‘at hand’ does not necessarily mean that they are presented to the 
bishop; therefore, he might not see these documents and certificates.  Whilst the purpose of 
the rector’s testimony is to assist the bishop in decision-making, this process leaves the rector 
with considerable influence over the ordinand’s prospects, as he is in a position to make a 
further interpretation of the expert report.  Direct access, therefore, to these reports might be 
of more objective assistance to the bishop.  Geisinger’s statement that ‘testimonials ... are 
usually succinct’ supports the premise that the bishop does not receive a detailed report.  
Whilst the rector might be in good position to judge the candidate’s personal attributes and 
suitability, reliance on his recommendation places a filter between the person ultimately 
responsible for the decision to ordain (i.e. the bishop), and the ordinand.  As we have seen in 
Chapter 1 when discussing alienation, canon law requires that important decisions be made 
on the basis of detailed knowledge.   This principle is reiterated in canon 259§2, requiring the 
312 Psychology and Priestly Formation – How do they Coexist? Available at: 
http://clericalwhispers.blogspot.co.uk/2010/08/psychology-and-priestly-formation-how.html   This article drew 
attention to the limitations both of psychological testing of candidates for Orders to assess their potential for, 
and therapy in curbing, criminal behaviour, yet it says the Church still depends on the psychological sciences for 
screening and formation purposes.  It claims that a former Director of Formation stated that these sciences are 
‘an important tool’ but the Church is ‘still working on the issue of clarity; how, precisely to utilize this field in 
the assessment and formation of seminarians’. 
313 Circular Letter (1997), Enclosure III, N8.   
314 Gpsy, 12.  See Appendix VI. 
315 CIC, cc. 1020; and 1052.   See Appendix I. 
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bishop to have detailed knowledge of ordinands’ progress.316  The Circular Letter (1997) 
confirms that important decisions regarding suitability for Orders require prior consultation 
with ‘experts and those informed of the appropriate facts’.  The ordaining bishop, therefore, 
must base his decision whether to ordain on sound facts; it is clear that where doubt exists 
recourse to expert assistance is permitted.  However, the law does not clarify who these 
experts might be. 
 
A purely textual analysis of canon 1051 obliges the rector to provide a certificate of the 
qualities and fitness of a candidate, which might be based on supervision, continuous 
assessment, appraisals and observance of the candidate’s general health and demeanour over 
a period of at least six years.  However, the canon does not state who is responsible for the 
certificate of physical and psychological health.  A rector might, amongst others, be 
considered expert in his field of training candidates for ordination and capable of judging 
their suitability regarding academic achievement and personal attributes.  Moreover, he could 
state that he is unaware of any physical or psychological impairment.  But, he would not 
usually be qualified to provide a certificate of physical or psychological health.   
 
Therefore, the English language translations of CIC appear to require more than the Latin text 
or CCEO.  The requirement of a certificate of physical and psychological health implies 
referral to a physician, perhaps a general practitioner, and possibly also to a psychologist for 
testing, but a psychologist alone would not be qualified to assess physical health.  The 
question then arises as to whether these professionals constitute ‘experts’; if not, their 
suitability to assist in the decision-making process regarding irregularity for Orders or 
impediment of their exercise is questionable.  If, on the other hand, a general practitioner is 
regarded as an expert and doubt is raised regarding the psychological health of the candidate 
(in other words, the issue of irregularity due to psychological infirmity is raised), it would 
suffice that the competent authority consult one other expert, possibly even the rector, before 
lawfully making a judgment of irregularity for Orders or, indeed, of impediment to their 
exercise on psychological grounds.  Likewise, in cases of impediment to the exercise of 
Orders already received due to psychological infirmity, consultation with a general 
practitioner would suffice before returning the cleric to ministry.  Canonists do not clarify the 
316 CIC, c. 259§2: the bishop has a personal responsibility to get to know the candidates for ordination.   See 
Appendix I. 
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matter; many appear to interpret the term ‘expert’ to mean general medical, psychiatric or 
psychological practitioners, but they do not seem to require anything more than competence, 
rather than expertise, in their respective fields, despite the canonical requirements to consult 
‘experts’.  Breitenbeck agrees that canonists confuse the situation by this interpretation. 
 
Interestingly, and despite the practice of routine psychological testing before ordination or 
admission to religious life, once suitability had been established, the legal presumption is that 
one continues to be suitable; there is no specific requirement to monitor or to continue to 
prove suitability.  It is, therefore, important that the candidate is assessed correctly at the 
outset, and indeed as formation progresses.  Whilst a degree of expertise on the part of 
competent ecclesiastical authorities is recognised in this endeavour, the Church also accepts 
that, generally speaking, the ecclesiastical authorities involved in candidates’ training are not 
competent in the areas of physical and mental health.  Consequently, recourse to the 
assistance of experts in these areas is, in cases of doubt, required.  Given the Church’s serious 
responsibility in this area, it would appear that true ‘experts’ should be involved.  As we have 
seen, the level of proof required to establish suitability (or otherwise) is ‘moral certainty’. 
 
Given the Vatican guidelines (2008), emphasising the right of the individual to refuse 
psychological testing and the right not to have such refusal deemed sufficient reason to be 
considered unsuitable and the Vatican’s warning against the use of ‘experts trained in the 
psychoanalytic tradition’ (which implies that these methods have been used), it might seem 
remarkable that (as the guidelines put it) ‘law in the strict canonical sense of the term’ was 
not promulgated.  However, universal law could overburden dioceses which do not suffer 
from the problems these guidelines sought to address.  The use of experts in the areas 
discussed above is not highly regulated by universal law.  Bishops’ Conferences are charged 
with producing Programs for Priestly Formation in their own territories (albeit that they must 
be approved by the Holy See).  In practice, however, these seem to provide for routine 
psychological testing; moreover, this appears to be done, not independently, but in 
collaboration with the relevant seminary.  The choice of experts used and whether or not a 
candidate can influence that choice is left to individual seminaries.  Likewise, these issues are 
left to the law of the individual religious institutes.  There is, however, no universal 
requirement that the expert consulted must be Catholic.  Given the sensitive nature of the 
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enquiry and the requirements to hold information on file, the issue of confidentiality is also a 
serious one, which is not adequately addressed by the law or by commentators. 
 
New norms, therefore, by Bishops’ Conferences and religious institutes, should clarify: the 
precise circumstances when experts are to be consulted; who is obliged to appoint them; the 
professional disciplines from which they are to be drawn; the qualifications and experience 
required of them; their precise functions; whether they are to be consulted individually or 
collectively; the weight to be given to their opinions; the consequences of failure to consult 
them; whether candidates may choose them and whether the choice requires approval; how 
their reports are to be used and stored; and if, how and when they are to be destroyed.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
THE USE AND TRAINING OF EXPERTS 
IN THE TEACHING OFFICE OF THE CHURCH 
 
Vatican II emphasises the triple mission of the Church (teaching, sanctifying and governing) 
and the role of all the faithful in this mission.1  Book III of CIC is devoted to the teaching 
office of the Church, which is fulfilled through: Catholic universities, faculties, and schools; 
catechetical formation and missionary training; preaching; and social communication.  
Despite the importance the Church places on education, Book III of CIC does not use the 
term ‘expert’ in this endeavour.  Therefore, it does not contain any provisions for consultation 
with experts.  However, this Chapter seeks to demonstrate that the use of experts is, 
nevertheless, implied and sometimes necessary.  A distinction is also made between experts 
within Church and those without.  Moreover, the Chapter highlights the Church’s training of 
experts for teaching and for consultation in other matters (such as sacred art).  The Chapter 
exposes a lack of clarity in relation to several issues and it proposes new norms.  To underline 
the importance which the Church places on education, it is necessary to explain the 
background to the Church’s authority and duty to teach her faithful, the right of the faithful to 
education, and the duty and right of parents to educate their children.  In turn, the Chapter 
examines provisions for: Catholic universities and institutes of higher education; 
Ecclesiastical universities and faculties; Catholic schools; and catechesis, mission, preaching 
and social communication.  CIC, other Vatican documents and the writings of canonists will 
be explored.  Comparisons are also made with CIC 1917 and CCEO.   
 
The Church’s Authority and Duty to Teach 
 
The Church claims the inherent right to preach the Gospel throughout the world, and also to 
proclaim moral principles, not just for individuals, but in respect of the social order, so far as 
it affects human rights or the salvation of souls.2  This implies knowledge of fundamental 
human rights and matters relevant to the salvation of souls, making her ‘expert in humanity’.3 
 
1 LG, 10.  See Appendix VI. 
2 Matthew 28: 19-20. CIC, c. 747.  See Appendix I. 
3 ExCE, 3.  See Appendix VI. 
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The Church also claims, for the Supreme Pontiff, infallibility when teaching on matters of 
faith or morals; this may be shared with the College of Bishops, when, gathered in an 
Ecumenical Council, or when otherwise in agreement, they declare definitive doctrine for the 
universal Church.4  These doctrines, which require the assent of faith, may be distinguished 
from non-definitive doctrines which require ‘religious submission of mind’.5  The faithful are 
bound to abide by these doctrines, according to the ‘hierarchy of truths’.6  Sanctions may be 
applied for obstinately rejecting doctrines or for teaching condemned doctrines.7   
 
Moreover, CIC articulates the Church’s duty and right to educate and found schools of all 
kinds and grades.8  Reflecting the provisions of the Declaration on Christian Education 
(1965) requiring that education, which must be specifically Christian for the baptised, goes 
beyond Christian doctrine, CIC insists that education be holistic, taking account of age, sex, 
individual ability, and differing cultures and traditions; and that older children must be 
educated in matters pertaining to sex and be prepared for active participation in society.9  
This implies a degree of specialist training, knowledge and competence, if not experience and 
expertise, on the part of teachers. 
 
Furthermore, the Apostolic See and College of Bishops are responsible for directing the 
ecumenical movement, which by its nature involves dialogue with those outside the 
Church.10  Consultation with the competent authority of a non-Catholic community is 
required before any general norms for sacramental sharing are established.11  This implies 
consultation between those who have deep knowledge of the doctrines and disciplines of each 
4 CIC, cc. 336; and 749.  See Appendix I. 
5 CIC, cc. 750§1; 751; 753; and 768§1.  See Appendix I.  The Latin ‘obsequium’ is translated as: ‘religious 
submission of mind’ in L&S, p419 and in New Comm, p917 and as ‘religious respect’ in Text&Comm, p548.  
Robert Ombres, ‘The New Profession of Faith and Oath’, Priest and People (1989), pp339-343, at 341 
considers that these translations are not satisfactory, ‘submission’ being too strong and ‘respect’ too weak.  He 
suggests that the word ‘allegiance’ is more accurate, if, indeed a translation should be used.  See also Apostolic 
Letter ATF, which modified CIC, c. 750 and provided that definitive doctrines ‘must be firmly accepted and 
held’.  Appendix VI. 
6 CIC, cc. 750§2; 752; and 754.  See Appendix I.  Also UR, 11 in Appendix VI. 
7 CIC, c. 1371.  See Appendix I. 
8 CIC, cc. 794§1; and 800§1.  See Appendix I. 
9 CIC, c. 795.  See Appendix I.  Also GE, 1; and 3.  See Appendix VI. 
10 CIC, c. 755§1.  See Appendix I:  Also UR, 4.  See Appendix VI. 
11 CIC, c. 844§5.  See Appendix I.  See also Eithne D’Auria, ‘Sacramental Sharing in Roman Catholic Canon 
Law: A Comparison of Approaches in Great Britain, Ireland and Canada’, 9 Ecclesiastical Law Journal (2007), 
pp264-287, at 271. 
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community concerned.  Bishops’ Conferences and bishops must legislate at local level on 
ecumenism.12  
 
The Right to Education and the Duty to Educate 
 
CIC enshrines the faithful’s right to Christian education.13  It also recognises, for the laity, the 
right (and duty) to acquire knowledge of Christian teaching appropriate to their capacity, and 
the right to study and obtain academic degrees in the sacred sciences.14  Moreover, it 
recognises their capacity to receive a mandate to teach these subjects,15 and their right, albeit 
limited, to freedom of research and expression on subjects in which they are ‘expert’.16  This 
echoes the norm that laity may be experts and called upon to assist pastors.17 
 
Reflecting the provisions of the Declaration on Christian Education (1965), parents, as 
primary educators of their children, are obliged to send their children, not necessarily to 
Catholic schools, but to schools which provide for Catholic education, or failing this, to 
provide Catholic education outside school.18  Parents have both a duty and a right to choose 
the best means of catholic education for their children;19 they also have a right to assistance 
from civil society, oversight of which is the responsibility of all the faithful.20   
 
These provisions can be compared with those of CIC 1917 and CCEO, where the figure of 
‘the expert’ is also found.  CIC 1917 enshrined the Church’s authority to teach, and to found 
schools.21  It recognised the duty and right of parents to educate their children, and the 
community’s responsibility in this regard.22  CCEO makes similar claims for authentic 
teaching, and for founding schools.23  It makes similar provisions for adherence to doctrines 
according to the hierarchy of truths, and recognises the duty and right to Christian 
12 CIC, c. 755§2.  See Appendix I. 
13 CIC, c. 217.  See Appendix I. 
14 CIC, c. 229§§1, 2.  See Appendix I. 
15 CIC, c. 229§3.  See Appendix I. 
16 CIC, c. 218.  See Appendix I. 
17 CIC, c. 228.  See Introduction for the text of the canon. 
18 CIC, cc. 226§2; and 789.  See Appendix I.  Also GE, 3 in Appendix VI. 
19 CIC, c. 793§1.  See Appendix I.  Also TCS, 14 in Appendix VI. 
20 CIC, cc. 793§2; 797; and 799.  See Appendix I. 
21 CIC 1917, cc. 1322§2; and 1375.  See Appendix III. 
22 CIC 1917, cc. 1113; 1372§§1, 2; 1379§3; and 1335.  See Appendix III. 
23 CCEO, cc. 595-597; 629; and 631§2.  See Appendix II. 
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education.24  Interestingly, CCEO, like CIC recognises students’ freedom of inquiry and 
expression.25  However, whilst CIC limits this to ‘matters in which they are expert’, CCEO 
limits it to ‘matters in which they possess ‘expertise’’.26  It would appear, therefore, that the 
terms ‘expert’ and ‘possessing expertise’ are synonymous.  CCEO also provides for 
ecumenical activities; but unlike CIC it is explicit in requiring each church sui iuris to 
establish, ‘if circumstances so suggest’, a ‘commission of experts on ecumenism’.27  
Although it does not define ‘experts’, it is clear that the consultation with other communities 
is between experts; that is between experts on this commission within the Church and those 
from outside in other ecclesial communities.  CCEO makes similar provisions for 
sacramental sharing and consultation with the competent authority of another non-Catholic 
Church or ecclesial community before norms of particular law are enacted.28 
 
1. CATHOLIC UNIVERSITIES AND INSTITUTES OF HIGHER EDUCATION 
 
By claiming the right to establish schools of all kinds and grades, the Church implies 
specialist knowledge and expertise in various subjects and at various levels in her teaching 
staff.29  Whilst CIC encourages the establishment of Catholic universities, it does not define 
‘Catholic universities’ or ‘institutes of higher education’.30   However, the Apostolic 
Constitution, Ex Corde Ecclesiae (1990), regulating Catholic universities, describes them as: 
‘distinguished’ by the ‘free search for the whole truth about nature, man and God’; a 
‘community of scholars representing various branches of human knowledge’; an ‘academic 
institution in which Catholicism is vitally present and operative’; ‘dedicated to research, to 
teaching, and to various kinds of service in accordance with its cultural mission’; and ‘open 
to all human experience … ready to dialogue with and learn from any culture … enabling it 
to come to a better knowledge of diverse cultures’.31  By virtue of being Catholic, a 
university ‘informs and carries out its research, teaching, and all other activities with Catholic 
24 CCEO, cc. 10; 15; 20; 404§§1-3; 598-600; 627§§1, 3; and 628§1.  See Appendix II. 
25 CCEO, c. 21.  See Appendix II. 
26 The Latin text of CIC, c. 218 states: ‘Qui disciplinis sacris incumbent iusta libertate fruuntur inquirendi 
necnon mentem suam prudenter in iis aperiendi, in quibus peritia gaudent, servato debit erga Ecclesiae 
magisterium obsequio’.  The Latin text of CCEO, c. 21 states: ‘Qui in scientias sacras incumbunt, iusta libertate 
fruuntur inquirendi necnon mentem suam prudenter in eis aperiendi, in quibus peritam habent; servato debito 
erga magisterium Eccleaiae obsequio’. 
27 CCEO, cc. 902-908.  See Appendix II. 
28 CCEO, c. 671.  See Appendix II. 
29 CIC, cc. 807; and 815.  See Appendix I. 
30 CIC, c. 809.  See Appendix I. 
31 ExCE, 4; 14; 43-44; and Articles 2§1; and 3§1.  See Appendix VI. 
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ideals, principles and attitudes’.32  Although ‘institutes of higher education’ are not defined, 
both canon 814 and the Constitution (1990) provide that they are governed by the provisions 
for Catholic universities.33  The title ‘Catholic’ is restricted to those who have permission 
from the competent ecclesiastical authority.34  The Constitution (1990) acknowledges: the 
limited institutional autonomy of Catholic universities; the importance of laity therein; and 
their oversight by Bishops’ Conferences and bishops; however, the scope of this right and 
duty of vigilance is limited to the university’s ‘Catholic character’.35  The Constitution (1990) 
suggests pastoral measures to resolve problems with the university’s competent authority.36   
 
Canonical Classification of Teachers in Catholic Universities as Experts:  CIC classifies 
teachers in Catholic universities as experts - canon 810§1 provides: 
 
‘In catholic universities it is the duty of the authority which is competent in accordance with 
the statutes to ensure the appointment of teachers who are suitable both in scientific and 
pedagogical expertise and in integrity of doctrine and uprightness of life, and if these qualities 
are lacking, to ensure that they are removed from office, in accordance with the procedure 
determined in the statutes’. 
 
The requirement that teachers be experts is underscored by the requirement that teachers of 
‘theological subjects’ have a mandate from the relevant ecclesiastical authority in addition to 
‘scientific and pedagogical expertise’.  CIC canon 812 provides: 
 
‘Those who teach theological subjects in any institute of higher studies must have a mandate 
from the competent ecclesiastical authority’. 
 
Therefore, only those who, in addition to meeting the requirements of canon 810§1, satisfy 
the standards required by the relevant ecclesiastical authority, may receive a mandate to teach 
‘theological subjects’.  This strengthens the premise that ‘expert’ is synonymous with 
‘expertise’.  However, neither CIC nor the Constitution (1990) specify the disciplines from 
which these teachers are drawn nor their professional qualifications.  What ‘theological 
subjects’ require a mandate and who grants or obtains the mandate also lack clarity.  
 
32 ExCE, Article 2§2.  See Appendix VI. 
33 CIC, c. 814.  See Appendix I.  Also ExCE, Article 1.  See Appendix VI. 
34 CIC, c. 808.  See Appendix I. 
35 CIC, c. 810§2.  See Appendix I.  Also ExCE, 12; 25; and Article 2§5.  See Appendix VI. 
36 ExCE, Article 5§2.  See Appendix VI. 
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Appointment of Teachers: Canon 810§1 provides that the authority named in the statutes of 
each university or institute is to ensure the appointment of suitable teachers with ‘expertise’.  
Moreover, if this expertise or the required personal attributes are lacking, the same authority 
is responsible for their removal, in accord with the institution’s statutes. 
 
 Disciplines and Qualifications of Teachers: CIC requires teachers to be ‘suitable in 
scientific and pedagogical expertise’.  Vatican II’s Declaration on Christian Education 
Gravissimum Educationis (1965), requires educational standards to be ‘truly outstanding’.37  
Moreover, the Constitution on Catholic Universities and Institutes of Higher Studies, Ex 
Corde Ecclesiae (1990), recognises the competence of these educational institutions to: 
employ ‘adequate’ personnel, ‘who are both willing and able’ to ‘promote its Catholic 
identity’;38 instruct all new employees on the university’s Catholic identity;39 run courses in 
Catholic doctrine; combine ‘academic and professional development’, including ‘appropriate 
ethical formation in that profession’ and ‘formation in moral and religious principles and the 
social teaching of the Church’;40 employ a sufficient number of ‘qualified’ personnel,41 to 
promote the pastoral care of all members;42 engage in dialogue with other Catholic 
universities including Ecclesiastical Universities and Faculties (see below), other universities 
and research and educational institutions;43 and cooperate with programmes of government 
and other national and international organisation.44  The Constitution, therefore, does not 
identify the specific qualifications required of individual teachers or of those involved in 
dialogue and cooperation with other bodies.  But, it is clear that teachers in Catholic 
universities are expected to continue to improve their ‘competence’.45  The Constitution also 
demonstrates the broad range of expertise required.   
 
Moreover, given that CIC requires Catholic universities to have at least a ‘chair of theology’ 
and to provide lectures addressing the theological questions arising from each faculty, it is 
37 GE, 10.  See Appendix VI.  CIC does not describe the functions of teachers; however, their roleis described in 
TSC, 41 and 42 as doing more than conveying the sense of the subject taught (see ft 174 below) and in  LCS 
(1982), 16 as going ‘well beyond the transmission of knowledge’ (see ft 179 below). 
38 ExCE, Article 4§1. See Appendix VI.  Specific reference is made to CIC, c. 810 in respect of the qualities 
required of teachers.   
39 ExCE, Article 4§2.  See Appendix VI. 
40 ExCE, Article 4§5.  See Appendix VI. 
41 ExCE, Article 6§2.  See Appendix VI. 
42 ExCE, Article 6§1.  See Appendix VI. 
43 ExCE, Article 7§1.  See Appendix VI. 
44 ExCE, Article 7§2.  See Appendix VI. 
45 ExCE, 22.  See Appendix VI. 
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reasonable to assume that an appropriately qualified Professor of Theology must be 
appointed.46  There appears, however, no requirement that all teachers be Catholic; Coriden 
and Euart, dealing with the issue of a mandate, refer to teachers of theology who are not 
Catholics or not in the Latin Church.47  Curiously, Coriden considers that canonical 
provisions are only ‘very general guidelines’ on suitability of teachers, pointing to ‘the kind 
of scholarly excellence and personal example which should characterise Catholic college 
faculty members’, but ‘they cannot be applied to teachers employed because of their doctrinal 
divergence (e.g. for ecumenical reasons) or where the discipline is devoid of doctrinal 
implications’, although the provisions are intended to extend to administrators.48 
 
It seems, therefore, that the disciplines from which teachers are drawn and their specific 
qualifications must be defined by the proper statutes of the university or institute.  One would 
expect that teachers would be qualified in the disciplines (if not sub-disciplines) of the 
specific subjects which they are required to teach. 
 
Theological Subjects - Granting or Obtaining a Mandate: That teachers in Catholic 
universities are ‘experts’ is supported by the requirement for teachers of ‘theological 
subjects’ in any institute of higher education to have a mandate, from the competent 
‘ecclesiastical’ authority.  Morrisey does not address the granting authority.49  However, 
Coriden and Euart acknowledge the silence of CIC but do not wholly agree.  For Coriden, the 
Holy See and diocesan bishop are ‘surely capable’ of granting the mandate, but ‘probably’ 
other Ordinaries50 are competent and ‘it might be argued’ that major religious Superiors ‘of 
clerical communities which own and operate Catholic colleges could give mandates for their 
own members’; however, Coriden holds that Bishops’ Conferences are ‘probably not 
included’.51  Euart, on the other hand, includes Bishops’ Conferences as competent on the 
basis that canon 810 ‘assigns the duty and right of vigilance over Catholic doctrine in 
Catholic institutions of higher learning to conferences of bishops and diocesan bishops’.52  If 
the diocesan bishop, ‘other Ordinaries’ and major Superiors are competent to grant a 
46 CIC, c. 811§1.  See Appendix I. 
47 Coriden, Text&Comm, p576 and Euart, New Comm, p969. 
48 Coriden, Text&Comm, p574.   
49 Morrisey, L&S, p444. 
50 See CIC, c. 134, for a definition of ‘Ordinary’.  See Appendix I. 
51 Coriden, Text&Comm, p576. 
52 Euart, New Comm, p970. 
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mandate, there seems little justification for excluding the Bishops’ Conference, which is an 
assembly of all the bishops of a territory, exercising pastoral offices together for the greater 
good.53 
 
There is also some debate as to which subjects, and indeed, which educational institutions, 
require teachers to have a mandate.  Morrisey is silent.54  Regarding the subjects covered by 
the provision, for Coriden, the evolution of the canon through various drafts demonstrates 
that the original text has changed from ‘theology or courses related to theology’ to 
‘theological disciplines’,55 although this is also translated as ‘theological subjects’.56  
Moreover, Coriden understands that because ‘the law is clearly restrictive of “the free 
exercise of rights”, it is subject to strict interpretation’ under canon 18.57  Therefore, he holds 
that although not ‘strictly speaking “theology”, dogmatics, historical, moral and sacramental 
theology, Church history, liturgical studies, canon law and sacred scripture’ are ‘probably’ 
included.  However, ‘catechetics, many areas of pastoral studies, comparative religions, 
history or sociology of religion are not considered theological disciplines’, but they are 
‘courses related to theology’ and, therefore, are not covered by the requirement for a 
mandate.58  Euart relies on the Constitution for Ecclesiastical Universities and Faculties 
(1979), which lists ‘theological disciplines’ as: Sacred scripture, fundamental theology 
(including ecumenism, non-Christian religions and atheism); dogmatic theology; moral and 
spiritual theology; pastoral theology; liturgy; Church history; patrology; archaeology; and 
canon law.59  She concludes that the meaning of ‘theological disciplines’ should not be 
broadened ‘beyond the academic disciplines of Catholic60 theology or beyond the disciplines 
that are formally theological’; in her view, ‘pastoral ministry, methodology of religious 
education, comparative religion, and history and sociology of religion’ are excluded.61   
 
53 CIC, c. 447.  See Appendix I.  
54 Morrisey, L&S, p444, para 1598. 
55 Coriden, Text&Comm, p576. 
56 See L&S, p444. 
57 Coriden, Text&Comm, p576.  CIC, c. 18.  See Appendix I. 
58 Ibid.  
59 See General Norms for the Correct Implementation of SCh, Article 51 in Appendix VI. 
60 Emphasis added. 
61 Euart, New Comm, p969. 
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As to the institutions concerned, canon 812 requires a mandate for ‘those who teach 
theological subjects in any institute of higher studies’.62  However, the Constitution Ex Corde 
Ecclesiae (1990) explains that its provisions are ‘a further development’ of CIC and ‘are 
valid for all Catholic Universities and other Catholic Institutes of Higher Studies throughout 
the world’; but its norms are to be applied locally in conformity with CIC and other 
legislation, including the statutes of individual institutes, and ‘as far as possible’ with civil 
law.63  Although writing before the Constitution (1990), Coriden nevertheless understood 
‘any institute of higher studies’ to mean ‘all and only’ Catholic ‘colleges and universities’,64 
but not seminaries.65  Moreover, Coriden considers that the provision: is further limited to 
individuals employed on a full-time basis;66 does not apply to teachers of theology, ‘who are 
not Catholics or not in the Latin Church’;67 and is not retroactive.68   
 
Interestingly, Euart too sees canon 812 as restricting the ‘right’ of freedom of enquiry and 
expression.69  Consequently, it should be interpreted strictly; where there are differing 
interpretations ‘the stricter or narrower meaning should be given’.70  The American 
translation, on which Euart comments, despite the fact that it was published ten years after 
the Constitution Ex Corde Ecclesiae (1990), states that teachers of theological disciplines in 
‘any institute of higher studies whatsoever,71 must have’ a mandate.  Nevertheless, Euart, 
concludes that the requirement applies only to Roman Catholic teachers in Catholic colleges 
62 CIC, c. 812.  See Appendix I.  Emphasis added. 
63 ExCE, Article 1.  Emphases added.  See Appendix VI.   
64 Coriden, Text&Comm, p575, explains that there was no requirement for an ecclesiastical mandate under CIC 
1917, nor in the ‘teachings’ of Vatican II; it was introduced into concordats between the Vatican and Germany 
because of concerns about the teaching of religion due to the secularisation of schools.  The provision then 
found its way, in 1931, into regulations for ‘pontifical faculties’ and was retained in the Constitution for 
Ecclesiastical Universities and Faculties (1979).  Now, it is ‘extended to all teachers of theology in all Catholic 
colleges and universities’.  
65 Ibid., p576: ‘All and only Catholic colleges and universities are included, that is, all Catholic institutions of 
post-secondary education, including academies, institutes, etc, but excluding seminaries because they are 
specifically regulated by another section of the Code, namely canons 232-264’.   However, the Constitution 
states that its norms ‘are valid for all Catholic Universities and other Catholic Institutes of Higher Studies 
throughout the world’, which would exclude the junior seminaries referred to in CIC, c. 234§1. 
66 Ibid.: ‘Those who will be added to faculties to teach theology on a full-time basis as their chief faculty 
responsibility [are covered by the regulation]’.  ‘One-time, part-time, or occasional theology teachers are 
probably not included because the canon is concerned with ongoing, long-term instruction’.  
67 Coriden relies on CIC, cc. 1 and 11.  See Appendix I.  However, it seems that his exclusion of Catholics who 
do not belong to the Latin Church is a moot point as CCEO also requires a mandate.  
68 Coriden maintains that the provision does not apply to those who already held appointments at the time the 
provision became effective.  He relies on CIC, c. 9.  See Appendix I.   
69 CIC, cc. 18; and 218.  See Appendix I. 
70 Euart, New Comm, p969.   
71 New Comm, p966.  Emphasis added.  The earlier translation by the CLSA, Text&Comm, p575 and the 
translation by the CLSGB&I, L&S, p444, merely state ‘in any institute of higher studies’.  
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and universities.72  Therefore, Coriden and Euart hold that only teachers of ‘theological 
disciplines’, in the strict sense, who teach at Catholic institutions, need a mandate; teachers of 
subjects related to theology and those at non-Catholic institutions do not. 
 
Coriden reduces further the need for a mandate: he notes that earlier drafts of canon 812 
required a canonical ‘mission’, whereas the final text speaks only of a ‘mandate’.73  
Moreover, the draft text ‘required’ (egent) a mandate, but the wording was changed later (for 
the final version) to ‘should have’ (habeant oportet).74  Moreover, for Coriden, the provision 
for a mandate ‘is not directed to the institution’; the obligation ‘falls upon the individual 
teachers’.75  This implies that appointments would need to be offered conditionally, 
ultimately depending on the competent ecclesiastical authority’s decision whether not to 
grant the mandate.   It would seem logical however, that if the mandate is only required for 
those teaching in Catholic institutions, then the institution should be responsible for granting 
mandates to its own appointees; in other words that they would only appoint those to whom 
they could also grant a mandate.  Euart agrees that the opening words of the canon place the 
obligation on the individual to obtain the mandate.76 
 
However, canon 812 is unclear on this point.  It merely states that teachers of theological 
subjects ‘must have’, rather than ‘must obtain’ a mandate.  This does not oblige the teacher to 
apply for a mandate.  Moreover, whilst the right to freedom of enquiry and expression is 
already limited by the requirement to submit to the magisterium,77 there is no ‘right’ to an 
72 Euart, New Comm, p969, citing CIC, c. 11.  See Appendix I.  See also Appendix VI: ExCE, Article 4§3. 
73 For a discussion on the distinctions between ‘mission’, ‘canonical mission’ and ‘mandate’ see Euart, New 
Comm, p966-969.  At p968, Euart concludes: ‘Mission connotes entrusting to the laity certain tasks and certain 
offices which are considered to be proper to the hierarchy but which require neither the power of orders nor the 
power of jurisdiction for their lawful exercise.  Mandate refers to those apostolic activities which remain 
activities proper to the laity in virtue of baptism, but which, at times, are joined more closely to the apostolic 
responsibility of the bishop.  When acting pursuant to a mandate, a lay person acts, it would seem, on his or her 
own and in communion with the bishop, but not in the name of the bishop or the church hierarchy’.  Not all 
agree however.  Morrisey, L&S, p444 states: ‘This mandate is required because those who teach these subjects 
do so, not of their own authority, but in the name of the Church’, citing SCh, Article 27 (see Appendix VI), but 
this article refers to those with a ‘canonical mission’.  Coriden, Text&Comm, p576, noting the change from 
using ‘canonical mission’ to ‘mandate’, states; ‘the “mandate” is simply a recognition that the person is properly 
engaged in teaching the theological discipline.  It is not an empowerment, an appointment, or a formal 
commission.  It is disciplinary, not doctrinal. It does not grant approval of what is taught nor is it a formal 
association with the church’s mission or ministry of teaching.  There is no requirement [in canon 812] that the 
mandate be in writing or even explicit, nor that it be received more than once’. 
74 Coriden, Text&Comm, p576. 
75 Ibid.  
76Euart, New Comm, p969. 
77 CIC, c. 218.  See Appendix I. 
103 
 
                                                            
appointment as a teacher; nor is there a ‘right’ to a mandate.  There appears little justification, 
therefore, to apply a strict interpretation on the basis of the restriction of a right.  Moreover, 
whilst there is justification for limiting the educational institutions in which a mandate is 
required on the basis of the Constitution Ex Corde Ecclesiae (1990), given that the 
Constitution on Ecclesiastical Universities (1979), on which Euart relies, includes the 
teaching of ‘ecumenism, non-Christian religions, and atheism’ in the list of ‘theological 
subjects’, there seems little justification for such a strict interpretation of ‘theological 
disciplines’, which excludes, for example, comparative religions. 
 
Withdrawal of a Mandate: Neither canon 810 on removal of teachers at Catholic 
universities and institutes, nor canon 812 on mandates for teachers of theological subjects, 
deals with withdrawal of a mandate.  Morrisey holds that ‘in an appropriate situation, for a 
serious cause’ a mandate can be withdrawn, but does not elaborate.78  He acknowledges the 
limited scope of vigilance by Bishops’ Conferences and bishops; their authority does not 
extend to judging the ‘professional expertise’ of teachers.79  Coriden explains that the ‘ius 
invigilandi’ is distinct from other levels of authority, such as ‘ownership, governance, 
jurisdiction, control, intervention or even visitation’; it means a ‘pastoral watchfulness, a 
benign surveillance, a solicitous oversight’ and ‘implies information and communication, 
inquiry, advice, sharing of concerns, even perhaps friendly persuasion, but it is not an 
adversarial relationship; it is neither inquisitorial nor authoritarian’.80  Coriden notes the 
removal from earlier drafts of the canon of the bishop’s power to dismiss teachers ‘for 
reasons of faith or morals,’ because it was considered ‘unnecessary and inappropriate, an 
improper external intervention in the internal affairs of an institution’; the bishop’s scope is 
limited to ‘the basics of Catholic teaching and the way they are communicated and witnessed 
in the context of and in accord with the methods of an institution of higher education’.81  
Coriden questions whether the canons on higher education are applicable to the majority of 
Catholic universities and colleges in the United States, based on the fact that few are 
considered ‘canonically’ Catholic - that is, although Catholic in character and mission, they 
have no formal covenants with ecclesiastical authorities and receive no direct Church 
78 Morrisey, L&S, p444, para 1601. 
79 Ibid, para 1596. 
80 Coriden, Text&Comm, p574. 
81 Ibid.  
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support.82  Euart agrees.  Although she acknowledges that canon 812 provides neither 
procedures for granting or for withdrawing mandates, she understands that any application of 
the canon, should take into account the rights of all those involved and the legal protection 
provided for the vindication of those rights.83  It appears, therefore, that whilst the 
ecclesiastical authority which granted the mandate can remove it, only the authority named in 
the institute’s own statutes which is responsible for appointing teachers can remove a teacher 
in accordance with due process; the ecclesiastical authority has only persuasive powers.  
 
Comparisons with CIC 1917 and CCEO: These provisions can be compared with CIC 1917 
and CCEO.  Apart from seminaries, CIC 1917 dealt with all educational institutions under the 
heading ‘Schools’.84  The Holy See governed the establishment and statutes of Catholic 
universities and faculties, as well as their degrees.85  The law encouraged the establishment of 
Catholic universities in the absence of public universities ‘imbued with a Catholic doctrine 
and spirit’, and it encouraged Ordinaries to send their priests to such universities.86  
Preference was given in the appointment to ecclesiastical offices or benefices to those with 
doctorates or licentiates.87  Augustine included medicine and law as faculties to which the 
right to educate extended.88  CCEO defines a Catholic university as ‘an institute of higher 
studies’ which has been erected by the Holy See or by a competent ecclesiastical authority 
with ‘previous consultation’ with the Holy See.89  This falls short of requiring the Holy See’s 
approval; the patriarch of the Church sui iuris in which the university is established must 
have the consent of the Synod of Bishops.90  CCEO outlines the aims of Catholic universities 
and other institutes of higher education.91  It requires a Catholic university, which does not 
have a faculty of theology, to run courses in theology.92  CCEO does not specify the 
qualifications required of university teachers generally, but teachers of subjects ‘regarding 
faith and morals’ must possess scientific and pedagogical skills and have a mandate; unlike 
CIC, CCEO is explicit that the competent authority can withdraw the mandate, for a grave 
82 Ibid., 571. 
83 Euart, New Comm, p970. 
84 CIC 1917, cc. 1372-1383.  See Appendix III. 
85 CIC 1917, cc. 1376; and 1377.  See Appendix III. 
86 CIC 1917, cc. 1379§2; and 1380.  See Appendix III. 
87 CIC 1917, c. 1378.  See Appendix III. 
88 Augustine, Vol VI, pp416 and 420.  This is based on the understanding of the time that the ‘studium generale’ 
of a university consisted of four faculties: theology, philosophy, medicine, and law.  
89 CCEO, c. 642§1.  See Appendix II. 
90 CCEO, c. 642§2.  See Appendix II. 
91 CCEO, c. 640.  See Appendix II. 
92 CCEO, c. 643.  See Appendix II. 
105 
 
                                                            
cause, especially if the teacher lacks scientific or pedagogical suitability, experience or 
integrity of doctrine.93  Therefore, within a patriarchal Church, the patriarch has this 
authority.  This implies closer control by the patriarch than by the bishop under CIC.  CCEO 
refers to the Church’s teaching function as belonging ‘only’ to bishops, but ‘shared’ by 
clerics, and laity with a mandate to teach.94  Theologians get special mention because of their 
‘expertise’ and their obligation to collaborate with those ‘well-versed’ in other fields.95 
 
Both the CIC and the commentators classify teachers at Catholic universities and institutes as 
people with ‘expertise’.  However, curiously, neither refers to them as ‘experts’.  It is left to 
each individual institution to provide for the appointment of suitable teachers (in accordance 
with its own statutes).  It is also for the individual institution to determine the professional 
disciplines and qualifications needed.  The relevant ecclesiastical authority is responsible for 
granting the mandate to enable the teaching of theological subjects but the law is unclear as to 
whether the onus is on the teacher to obtain the mandate.  There is also a lack of clarity in 
CIC as to whether the mandate is required only for teaching in Catholic institutions.  Whilst 
in principle the ecclesiastical authority granting the mandate may withdraw it, only the 
institution is competent to remove the teacher.  Tighter universal or particular legislation 
could clarify: precisely what qualifications and expertise are required of teachers; what 
institutions and subjects require the teacher to have a mandate; who is responsible for 
granting or obtaining the mandate; and what constitutes a cause for removal of the mandate.  
 
2. ECCLESIASTICAL UNIVERSITIES AND FACULTIES 
 
CIC does not define ‘ecclesiastical universities and faculties’, but their purposes are 
described in CIC canon 815:   
 
‘By virtue of its mission to proclaim revealed truth, the Church has the right to have its own 
ecclesiastical universities and faculties to study the sacred sciences and subjects related to 
them, and to teach these disciplines to students in a scientific manner’. 
 
Morrisey, however, defines ecclesiastical universities as ‘institutes in which the sacred 
sciences - principally theology, sacred Scripture, liturgy, church history and canon law, and 
93 CCEO, c. 644.  See Appendix II. 
94 CCEO, c. 596.  See Appendix II. 
95 CCEO, c. 606§1.  See Appendix II. 
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ancillary subjects such as philosophy, patristics, archaeology and languages - are studied and 
taught scientifically’.96  The Constitution on Ecclesiastical Universities and Faculties, 
Sapientia Christiana (1979), describes Ecclesiastical universities as those Catholic 
universities ‘concerned particularly with Christian revelation and questions connected 
therewith and which are therefore more closely connected with her mission of 
evangelization’.97 
 
CIC provides that ecclesiastical universities and faculties must be directed and approved by 
the Holy See; their statutes and program of studies must also have the Holy See’s approval.98  
Only these institutions may award degrees which have canonical effect.99  CIC provides that 
the canons applicable to Catholic universities - governing the appointment of suitable 
teachers and their removal, the mandates required to teach theological subjects, and the 
provision for pastoral care of students - are applicable also to ecclesiastical universities and 
faculties.100  Bishops and religious superiors are obliged, insofar as the Church requires it, to 
send clerics and members of religious institutes who are ‘outstanding in character, 
intelligence and virtue’ to ecclesiastical universities or faculties.101  The law infers here that 
those who attend these educational institutions belong in this category, and, moreover, 
implies that those who teach them must have appropriate expertise.  Indeed a commentator on 
CCEO recognises the ‘expertise’ of students of the sacred sciences, which implies that 
students are, at least, being trained by the Church to be future experts.102  Moreover, CIC 
canon 821 encourages bishops to establish other institutes for ‘higher religious studies’:  
 
‘Where it is possible, the Bishops’ Conference and the diocesan Bishop are to provide for the 
establishment of institutes for higher religious studies, in which are taught theological and 
other subjects pertaining to Christian culture’. 
 
A duty is placed, therefore, on Bishops’ Conferences and diocesan bishops to provide for the 
establishment of these institutions, where possible, and to ensure that theology and ‘other 
subjects pertaining to Christian culture’ are taught.  The canons on Ecclesiastical universities 
96 Morrisey, L&S, p445, para 1601.   
97 SCh, Forward III.  See Appendix VI. 
98 CIC, c. 816.  See Appendix I. 
99 CIC, c. 817.  See Appendix I. 
100 CIC, c. 818.  See Appendix I. 
101 CIC, c. 819.  See Appendix I. 
102 Pospishil, p367. 
107 
 
                                                            
provide for the establishment of institutes for higher religious studies, but do not clarify what 
canons govern those institutes. 
 
Appointment of Teachers: Apart from CIC norms governing Catholic universities, the 
Constitution on Ecclesiastical Universities and Faculties (1979), promulgated following 
consultation with ‘experts’,103 requires the statutes for each ecclesiastical university or faculty 
to: provide for different ranks of teachers (which implies different levels of expertise);104 
define the authorities responsible for hiring, naming and promoting them;105 and set out 
procedures for their suspension or dismissal,106 especially in matters concerning doctrine.107  
Disputes are to be resolved internally, but failing this ‘experts’ are to be consulted.108  Whilst, 
neither the experts nor their functions are defined, consultation with experts from outside the 
institution is implied. 
 
Disciplines and Qualifications of Teachers: CIC provides that Ecclesiastical universities 
and faculties are bound by norms on the qualities required of teachers at Catholic 
universities.109  Moreover, CIC requires close cooperation with other universities, even non-
ecclesiastical ones, so that through scientific research a greater knowledge is acquired.110   
This is another example of consultation with outside bodies.  The Declaration on Christian 
Education (1965) spoke of the role of the ecclesiastical universities and faculties in preparing 
students not only for the priesthood, but for teaching higher education (which is an example 
of the Church training future experts) and also for the ‘more rigorous intellectual 
apostolate’.111  The objectives of ecclesiastical universities and faculties were to: ‘make more 
penetrating inquiry into the various aspects of the sacred sciences’; deepen the ‘understanding 
of sacred Revelation’; hand down and clarify the legacy of Christian wisdom; create and 
continue dialogue with non-Catholics and non-Christians; and ‘answer questions arising from 
the development of doctrine’, all of which imply a degree of expertise in various fields.112 
 
103 SCh, Forward VI.  ‘Experts’ are not described, but legal experts are implied.  See Appendix VI. 
104 SCh, Article 23.  See Appendix VI. 
105 SCh, Article 24.  See Appendix VI. 
106 See Appendix VI: SCh, Article 30. 
107 Norms for the correct implementation of SCh, Article 22, N1.  See Appendix VI.  
108 Ibid., Article 22, N2, N3.   
109 CIC, c. 818.  See Appendix I. 
110 CIC, c. 820.  See Appendix I.  Non-Catholic universities are not mentioned; they are not explicitly excluded. 
111 GE, 11.  See Appendix VI. 
112 Ibid.  
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The Constitution Sapientia Christiana (1979), although abrogating previous law,113 reiterated 
the objectives of the Declaration on Christian Education (1965), by describing the role of 
ecclesiastical universities and faculties in similar vein.114  The Constitution refers to 
Ecclesiastical faculties of ‘other sciences’, which, although lacking ‘the special link with 
Christian revelation’, are still of assistance to the Church in its mission, have a ‘particular 
relationship with the Church's Hierarchy’, and are ‘destined for the education of both 
ecclesiastical and lay students’.115  The Constitution (1979) acknowledges teachers’ ‘weighty 
responsibility’ to meet the needs of students.116  It requires all teachers to ‘be marked by an 
upright life, integrity of doctrine and devotion to duty’.117  However, those who teach 
‘matters touching on faith and morals’ must do so in full communion with the Roman Pontiff 
and the Magisterium and those who teach ‘disciplines concerning faith or morals’, must make 
a profession of faith and possess a canonical mission from the Chancellor or his delegate.118 
This implies the requirement for teachers of these particular subjects to be a Catholic in full 
communion with the Church.119  ‘Other teachers’ require ‘permission’.120  However, all 
‘permanent’ teachers or those promoted to the ‘highest ranks’, must receive a nihil obstat 
from the Holy See.121  The Constitution (1979) also provides that permanent teachers are 
required: to be distinguished by their wealth of knowledge, witness of life and sense of 
responsibility; to have a ‘suitable’ doctorate, or equivalent ‘title’ or ‘exceptional and singular 
scientific accomplishment’; to demonstrate proof of suitability for scientific research, 
especially by published material; and to demonstrate teaching ability.  These provisions are to 
be applied ‘in proportionate measure’ to non-permanent teachers.122  On-going training is 
implied, but these requirements did not find their way into CIC.123  The Constitution’s 
‘special norms’, detailing the subjects, aims, objectives, and method of teaching for each 
113 SCh, Forward VI.  See Appendix VI. 
114 SCh, Forward III.  See Appendix VI. 
115 SCh, Forward III.  See Appendix VI. 
116 SCh, Forward IV.  See Appendix VI. 
117 SCh, Article 26, N1.  See Appendix VI.    
118 SCh, Article 26, N2.  See Appendix VI.  See ft 73 above for the distinction between a mandate and a mission. 
119 Strictly, the wording requires those who teach matters ‘touching’ on faith and morals to do so (that is the 
teaching is to be done) in full communion with the Magisterium, whereas the profession of faith required from 
those who teach disciplines ‘concerning’ faith or morals would be required to be (that is, the teacher must be) in 
full communion. 
120 SCh, Article 27, N1.  See Appendix VI. 
121 See Norms for the correct implementation of SCh, Article 16 for a definition of ‘permanent’ teachers; Article 
19, N1 for the requirement that the Statutes establish when a permanent status is conferred and Article 19, N2 
for a description of the nihil obstat.  See also SCh, Articles 20; 27, N2; and 28.  See Appendix VI. 
122 SCh, Article 25, N1 and N2.  See Appendix VI. 
123 SCh, Forward V.  See Appendix VI. 
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discipline, emphasise the ‘particular nature and importance’ of, for example, theology, canon 
law and philosophy.124  Provision is made for many and various subjects, indicating the range 
of expertise required.125  These requirements, even more rigorous than those for Catholic 
universities, emphasise the Church’s vigilance over the standard of teaching required in 
Ecclesiastical universities and faculties and implies expertise on the part of teachers. 
 
Moreover, the Constitution (1979) requires assistance from ‘experts’ in the future 
establishment and planning of universities and faculties.  The experts involved are not 
defined, but there is a suggestion that bishops, academics, canonists and other university 
personnel are included.126  
 
Although CIC provides that the same qualities are required of teachers in Ecclesiastical 
universities as are of teachers in Catholic universities, there is no explicit requirement that the 
more stringent norms for teachers in seminaries apply, even though candidates for the 
priesthood study at ecclesiastical universities and faculties.127  Whilst outside the seminary, 
candidates require special care, but within seminaries, specific expertise is required in 
training candidates for ordination.128  Seminarians must be educated in: sacred sciences; 
languages; philosophy; theology; scripture; canon law; liturgy; and ecclesiastical history.129  
In addition, the Constitution on the Sacred Liturgy (1963) provides that candidates be 
educated in sacred art, implying that they can become experts in this subject for the purpose 
of protecting the Church’s patrimony.130  Seminarians must receive pastoral formation, have 
pastoral practice, and be prepared for all that ministry entails.131  Therefore, teachers in 
seminaries must not only be adequately trained, but must have obtained canonical doctorates 
or licentiates; there is no provision for an ‘equivalent’ title.132  That different teachers are 
124 SCh, Article 65.  See Appendix VI. 
125 Provision is made under Article 85 of the special norms for subjects such as: Christian archaeology; Biblical 
studies and ancient Eastern studies; Church history; Christian and classical literature; Liturgy; Missiology; 
Sacred Music; Psychology; Educational science or Pedagogy; Religious science; Social sciences; Arabic studies 
and Islamology; Mediaeval studies; Oriental Ecclesiastical studies; “Utriusque Iuris” (both canon law and civil 
law).  See also Article 86, which entrusts responsibility to the Sacred Congregation for Catholic Education for 
special norms relating to these subjects. 
126 SCh, Articles 60; and 61.  See Appendix VI. 
127 CIC, c. 253§1.  See Appendix I. 
128 CIC, c. 235.  See c. 236 for similar provisions for candidates for the permanent diaconate.  See Appendix I. 
129 CIC, cc. 248; 249; 250; 252§§2, 3; and 257§2.  See Appendix I. 
130 SC, 129.  This was reiterated later in PCCCAHPC, 27.  See Appendix VI. 
131 CIC, cc. 245, 246§2, 247§1; 255; 256; and 258.  See Appendix I. 
132 CIC, cc. 239§1; and 253§§1 and 2.  See Appendix I. 
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required for different subjects implies that the expertise required is of such a standard that 
they are not expected to reach this doctorate standard in more than one subject.  Moreover, 
the whole program of teaching is to be coordinated.133 
 
As one of the guiding principles for the revision of CIC 1917 was that of subsidiarity, it 
might not, on the one hand, be surprising that the universal law says little about specific 
requirements for university teachers, leaving individual institutions to produce their own 
Statutes, albeit in accord with the Apostolic Constitutions and other legislation.134  On the 
other hand, lack of specific provisions leads to lack of clarity.  Apart from the controversy 
which we have seen above, as to which subjects require the teachers to hold a mandate, there 
is also ambiguity as to precisely what institutes are covered by the universal law on 
Ecclesiastical Universities and Faculties and what constitutes an ‘equivalent title’ to a 
canonical doctorate required for permanent teachers under the Constitution (1979).   
 
Institutes of Higher Religious Studies: Commentators differ as to which canons govern 
these institutes.  As we have seen, according to Morrisey, the sacred sciences taught in 
Ecclesiastical universities are principally theology, sacred Scripture, liturgy, church history 
and canon law, and the ancillary subjects are philosophy, patristics, archaeology and 
languages.135  Morrisey considers that because the institutes for higher religious studies, 
envisaged by canon 821 are not universities (despite the subjects taught) they are not bound 
strictly by, but ‘could well be guided by’ the principles contained in the canons on 
Ecclesiastical universities and faculties.136  Coriden, on the other hand, acknowledges that 
canon 821 was moved from the chapter on Catholic universities to that on Ecclesiastical 
universities and faculties, precisely because the Commission revising the Code considered 
that these institutes ‘ought to depend entirely on ecclesiastical authority, otherwise they 
inevitably produce serious disagreements’.137  He implies here that the provisions on 
Ecclesiastical universities apply to these institutes.  McManus, although acknowledging this 
reasoning, disagrees: he holds that as these institutes of higher religious studies do not have 
133 CIC, c. 254.  See Appendix I. 
134 For the principles guiding the revision of CIC 1917, see James A Coriden, An Introduction to Canon Law 
(New York, 1991), p36, 
135 Morrisey, L&S, p445, para 1601. 
136 Morrisey, L&S, p446, para 1607.  Morrisey considers these institutions include ‘institutes of religious 
studies, pastoral, missionary, catechetical institutes, and the like’. 
137 Coriden, Text&Comm, p578. 
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ecclesiastical status, they are not governed by the Constitution on Ecclesiastical Universities 
(1979) or by CIC canons 815-820 on Ecclesiastical Universities and Faculties, but by CIC 
canons 807-814 on Catholic Universities and Other Institutes of Higher Studies.138   
 
However, canon 821 refers to institutes for higher religious studies and is placed in the 
chapter on Ecclesiastical Universities and Faculties, whereas CIC canon 814 refers simply to 
‘institutes of higher studies’ and is placed in the chapter on Catholic Universities and Other 
Institutes of Higher Studies.139  Therefore, albeit that canon 821 was moved from the chapter 
on Catholic universities to that of Ecclesiastical universities, it must have been so for a 
purpose; one might, therefore, expect the more stringent provisions of the Constitution and 
canons on Ecclesiastical Universities and Faculties (relating to the disciplines, qualifications, 
and mandates) to apply to these institutes of higher religious studies.   
 
Doctorates and Equivalent Titles: Again, commentators differ on this issue.  Coriden 
considers that although only Ecclesiastical universities and faculties can award degrees with 
canonical effect, ‘it has been a frequent practice to accept equivalent degrees in teaching 
positions and equivalent expertise in other church offices’.140  However, McManus implies 
that non-canonical and equivalent degrees are acceptable as qualifications only ‘in cases 
where an equivalent expertise is mentioned in a canon’ or when ‘the requirement of a 
canonical degree may be readily satisfied, for example, by suitable experience’.141  The 
Constitution (1979) explains that the required ‘suitable’ doctorate is one corresponding to the 
subject taught, but merely states that in the absence of a canonical doctorate at least a 
canonical licentiate is required.142  Lack of clarity, therefore, remains. 
 
The lack of clarity in the canons leads commentators to disagree on further issues.  Canon 
819 obliges the competent Superior to send outstanding young people to ecclesiastical 
universities and faculties when the good of the Church requires this.143  McManus, in line 
with this text, considers that Superiors have a ‘duty’ to send ‘qualified’ students to these 
138 Frederick R McManus, New Comm, p976.  
139 CIC, c. 814.  See Appendix I. 
140 Coriden,Text&Comm, p577, citing the Ordinationes, AAS 71 (1979), p500, n17], which implements SCh. 
141 McManus, New Comm, p974, citing the Norms for the Correct Implementation of SCh, Article 17.  See 
Appendix V. 
142 Norms for the Correct Implementation of SCh, Article 17.  See Appendix VI. 
143 CIC, c. 819.  See Appendix I. 
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institutions; that is, those students who fulfil the requirements.144  Coriden, however, 
considers that the canon ‘warmly encourages’ Superiors to do so, citing the decree of Priestly 
Training (1965), and the Decree on Christian Education (1965) in support.145  He says these 
documents ‘simply encourage higher studies in the sacred sciences and other areas’, and the 
canon ‘directs attention to the ecclesiastical universities and faculties as places to pursue 
them’.146  However, he makes no reference to the fact that CIC post-dates these documents.  
Moreover, it would be difficult to establish that the Church did not require such people to be 
educated although the canon is ambiguous as to whether or not the Church’s need must be 
established positively.   
 
The provisions for Ecclesiastical universities and faculties can be compared with those of 
CIC 1917 and CCEO.  CIC 1917 dealt only with Catholic universities and faculties (under the 
title ‘schools), not Ecclesiastical universities and faculties.  However, like under CIC: the 
Church claimed the right to found schools of any kind; the canonical Constitutions of 
Catholic Universities were reserved to the Holy See and their statutes required the Holy See’s 
approval; and the granting of canonical degrees required a faculty from the Holy See.147   
Unlike CIC, however, CIC 1917 made provision for those with a canonical doctorate to wear 
a ring and biretta.148  CCEO defines ‘ecclesiastical’ universities and faculties as those 
canonically erected or approved by the competent ecclesiastical authority, which teach the 
sacred sciences and related subjects and have the right to confer academic degrees which 
have canonical effect.149  CCEO further defines their purpose, but makes no specific 
provision for the appointment or suitability of teachers.150  Statutes must conform to the 
norms of the Apostolic See, including those governing the appointment and dismissal of 
teachers.151  CCEO has no specific requirement for teachers to take a profession of faith or an 
oath of fidelity, nor for the applicability of norms for Catholic universities to Ecclesiastical 
universities and faculties. 
 
144 McManus, New Comm, p976. 
145 Coriden, Text&Comm, p578.  OT, 18 and GE, 10.  See Appendix VI. 
146 Coriden, Text&Comm, p578. 
147 CIC 1917, cc. 1375- 1377.  See Appendix III. 
148 CIC 1917, c. 1378.  See Appendix III. 
149 CCEO, c. 648.  See also CCEO, c. 649 for a definition of the competent ecclesiastical authority.  See 
Appendix II. 
150 CCEO, c. 647.  See Appendix II. 
151 CCEO, c. 650.  See Appendix II. 
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Although the statutes of individual Ecclesiastical universities and faculties are required to  
make provision for: different ranks of teachers; defining the competent authority for 
appointing and removing teachers; and the processes involved, the Bishops’ Conference 
could do much to remove or reduce the ambiguities in universal law.  For example, new 
legislation could clarify: which experts are to be consulted both if difficulties arise but cannot 
be resolved within these institutions and when planning the future establishment of 
universities and faculties and their specific role; the disciplines, and sub-disciplines, from 
which these experts, and indeed teachers, are to be drawn and the qualification required of 
them; what subjects and institutions require teachers to have a mandate; who is responsible 
for granting or obtaining the mandate; what conditions warrant removal of the mandate; what 
constitutes a ‘suitable’ doctorate and ‘equivalent title’; and (given disagreement between 
canonists) that the Superior is obliged to send outstanding young people to ecclesiastical 
universities or faculties.   
 
3. CATHOLIC SCHOOLS: THE EXPERTISE OF TEACHERS 
 
CIC defines a ‘Catholic’ school as one under the control of, or acknowledged as such in a 
written document by, the competent ecclesiastical authority.152  The use of the title ‘Catholic’ 
is reserved to those schools which have the consent of this authority.153  The diocesan bishop 
is responsible for establishing schools if those with a Christian ethos, including those catering 
for special needs, do not already exist.154  All instruction and education in Catholic schools 
must be based on the principles of Catholic doctrine.155  Formation and instruction in the 
Catholic religion, wherever given, including through media of social communication, are 
subject to Church authority; the Bishops’ Conference is responsible for regulating Catholic 
formation and education, and the diocesan bishop for overseeing the implementation of this 
regulation.156  Also, the diocesan bishop has a right to oversee and inspect Catholic schools in 
his diocese and a right to issue directives concerning their general administration.157  The 
documents The Catholic School (1977) and The Catholic School on the Threshold of the 
Third Millennium (1997), described the Catholic school as a means of ‘constructive dialogue 
152 CIC, c. 803§1.  See Appendix I. 
153 CIC, c. 803§3.  See Appendix I. 
154 CIC, c. 802§§1and 2.  See Appendix I. 
155 CIC, c. 803§2.  See Appendix I. 
156 CIC, c. 804§1.  See Appendix I. 
157 CIC, c. 806§1.  Schools established by religious institutes are included.  See Appendix I. 
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with the world’ and of training children to take an active part in the community.158  The latter 
document stated that this purpose requires ‘outstanding educators’.159  Whilst the document 
does not explicitly use the word ‘experts’ or ‘expertise’ (unlike the norms on university 
teachers), to be ‘outstanding educators’ clearly requires more than competence. 
 
Appointment of Teachers:  The local Ordinary has the right to appoint or approve teachers 
of religion and has the right to remove them or demand that they be removed; this authority is 
limited to ‘religious or moral’ considerations.160  Therefore, professional incompetence is 
excluded as such a cause, but an immoral lifestyle is not.  This emphasises the need to 
include specific canonical requirements in contracts of employment, which must accord with 
civil law.161  Morrisey holds that in order to reflect the ‘character of a catholic school’ the 
lifestyle of a teacher of religion must be ‘not out of harmony with Christian living’.  
However, in dismissing teachers, Morrisey warns of the need to follow principles of natural 
justice, including the protection of the right of defence.162  Coriden considers that the right of 
the local Ordinary to appoint and remove teachers of religion extends to all schools in his 
territory, but it does not extend to ‘teachers of other faiths or of comparative religions’.163 
This not only implies the possibility of appointing teachers from outside the Church, but that 
these non-Catholic teachers are not subject to the provisions of canon 803§2, which requires 
all teachers in Catholic schools to be ‘outstanding in true doctrine and uprightness of life’.  
For Coriden, dismissal on the ground of ‘religion or morals’ must be related ‘to the function 
of teaching the Catholic religion’.164   The bishop’s right of visitation extends only to primary 
and secondary schools and not to universities and institutes of higher education within his 
diocese.165  Moreover, his responsibility of vigilance is restricted to the ‘quality of 
education’; ‘the scope of visitation does not extend to all of the matters mentioned in Christus 
158 TCS, 10; 13; 15 and TCSTTM, 17.  See Appendix VI. 
159 TCSTTM, 18.  See Appendix VI. 
160 CIC, c. 805.  See Appendix I. 
161 CIC, c. 1290.  See Appendix I. 
162 Morrisey, L&S, p441, para 1587.  
163 Coriden, Text&Comm, p569.  This includes Catholic schools and others, whether public or private. He bases 
this opinion on the provisions of CIC 1917, which referred to ‘schools of whatever kind’, but he acknowledges 
the difficulties in practice unless the power was delegated to the school administrators. 
164 Ibid. However, this ignores the requirement to live exemplary lives and differs from Morrisey’s opinion that 
a teacher’s lifestyle should not be ‘out of harmony with Christian living’ and ‘in some places civil courts have 
upheld the dismissal of a teacher living in an irregular marital union’.  See Morrisey in L&S p441, para 1587. 
165 Ibid., p570.   
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Dominus (1965), because some of them are unrelated to the educational task’.166  Euart 
agrees that the bishop’s right of visitation does not extend to higher educational 
institutions.167     
 
Disciplines and Qualifications of Teachers: CIC requires teachers in Catholic schools to be 
‘outstanding in true doctrine’ (implying expertise) and lead exemplary lives.168  Teachers of 
religion, even those in non-Catholic schools, must, in addition to possessing these qualities, 
be ‘outstanding’ in their teaching ability (again implying expertise).169  The academic 
standard of teaching in Catholic schools and junior seminaries is to be at least comparable 
with other schools in the locality.170  Furthermore, the necessity for the assistance of 
professionals in the education of children is recognised.171  These requirements reflect those 
of the Declaration on Christian Education (1965), for: holistic education; teachers to work 
with parents; teachers to have ‘suitable qualifications’ in both secular and religious subjects; 
and teachers to have ‘pedagogical skill’.172  The Catholic School (1977), addressing problems 
facing Catholic schools, acknowledges the part the laity plays in cooperating in the apostolate 
of the bishops, but also implies expertise on the part of teachers as ‘individual subjects must 
be taught according to their own particular methods’.173  Teachers do ‘more than convey the 
sense’ of the subject taught; they guide pupils ‘to the heart of total Truth’ and ‘eternal 
realities’, thus emphasising the personal qualities required of teachers.174  Teachers are 
required to be aware of ‘developments in the fields of child psychology, pedagogy and 
particularly catechetics, and should keep abreast of directives from competent ecclesiastical 
authorities’; Catholic schools require ‘the best possible qualified teachers of religion’.175  
 
166 Coriden, Text&Comm, p570.  A Decree Concerning the Pastoral Office of Bishops in the Church, Christus 
Dominus (1965), at 35§4, states that religious are subject to the diocesan bishop ‘in those things which pertain to 
… public worship, … the care of souls, … preaching (to the people), … religious and moral education … 
catechetical instructions and liturgical formation …’ etc.  However, schools run by religious are subject to the 
local Ordinaries ‘for purposes of general policy-making’ and ‘vigilance’, but the autonomy of the religious in 
directing the schools remains intact.  See Appendix VI. 
167 Euart, New Comm, p960.  
168 CIC, c. 803§2.  See Appendix I. 
169 CIC, c. 804§2.  See Appendix I. 
170 CIC, cc. 234§2; and 806§2.  See Appendix I. 
171 CIC, c. 796.  See Appendix I. 
172 GE, 5; and 8. See also TCS, 4; 8; 16; 19; 29; 35; and 45.  See Appendix VI. 
173 TCS, 39; and 71.  See Appendix VI. 
174 TCS, 41; and 42.  See Appendix VI. 
175 TCS, 52.  See Appendix VI. 
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Their need for ‘continuing formation’ and support through national and international 
organisations is also recognised.176  Lay Catholics in Schools (1982) clarifies that teachers of 
doctrine require ‘religious knowledge guaranteed by appropriate certification’.  It ‘highly 
recommends …that all Catholics who work in schools, and most especially those who are 
educators, obtain the necessary qualifications by pursuing programs of religious formation in 
Ecclesiastical Faculties or in Institutes of Religious Science … wherever this is possible’.177  
Degrees and pedagogical preparation provided in these institutes are considered ‘basic 
training’.  Bishops are charged with: promoting, and providing for, training for teachers of 
religion and catechists; and for engaging in dialogue with them during their training.178  This 
document describes a teacher as ‘not simply a professional who systematically transmits a 
body of knowledge’, but ‘an educator, one who helps to form human persons’, whose task 
goes ‘well beyond the transmission of knowledge’.  Moreover, ‘adequate,’ but 
‘indispensable’, ‘professional preparation’ is required ‘not only for imparting knowledge’, 
but also to fulfil ‘the role of a genuine teacher’.179  Whilst acknowledging the vocational 
aspect of teaching, ‘professionalism’ is ‘one of the most important characteristics in the 
identity of every lay Catholic’; lay educators are required to have a ‘solid professional 
formation’, including ‘competency in a wide range of cultural, psychological, and 
pedagogical areas’.180  The Catholic School on the Threshold of the Third Millennium (1997) 
provides that whilst Catholic schools are ‘for all’, ‘special attention’ is to be given to the 
weakest.181   Ethics in Internet (2002) charges schools with teaching children not just the 
technology involved, but also about the responsible use of the Internet.182  Although the 
language in the document is of ‘competency’, much of the foregoing implies expertise in a 
wide range of subjects, but specific qualifications are not mentioned. 
 
Canonists agree that ‘expertise’ is required for teachers in Catholic schools.  Morrisey uses 
the terms ‘expert’ and ‘expertise’ when referring to those who assist parents to fulfil their 
duty to educate children.183  The ‘general administration’ of schools for which the bishop has 
the right to issue directives, includes, for Morrisey, approving catechetical texts and 
176 TCS, 78; and79.  See Appendix VI. 
177 LCS, 55.  See Appendix VI. 
178 LCS, 66.  See Appendix VI. 
179 LCS, 16.  See Appendix VI. 
180 LCS, 27.  See Appendix VI. 
181 TCSTTM, 15.  See Appendix VI. 
182 EI, 15.  See Appendix VI. 
183 Morrisey, L&S, p438, para 1573. 
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examinations, and assuring compliance with civil law on health, safety, insurance and 
suchlike.184  That Catholic schools must at least match the standard of other local schools 
demonstrates the importance placed on all aspects of education.185  In acknowledging that 
schools must reflect the needs of the community, including ‘professional and technical 
schools, … adult education, … social service education, … schools for the handicapped, … 
[schools] for preparing religious educators’,186 Coriden demonstrates the width of expertise 
required in all these areas.   
 
These provisions can be compared with those under CIC 1917 and CCEO.  Religious 
instruction, suitable to the age of the child, was compulsory in schools under CIC 1917; 
‘youths’ were to be taught by ‘priests outstanding for their doctrine and zeal’.187  Parents 
were obliged to send their children to Catholic schools if possible; local Ordinaries decided, 
in accord with instructions from the Holy See, which schools were suitable, thus limiting 
circumstances in which attendance at non-Catholic schools was permitted.188  In the absence 
of Catholic schools local Ordinaries were obliged to establish them.189  The law implied that 
Ordinaries had expertise in Catholic education as it entrusted them with oversight of schools 
within their territory, teachers of religion, and the materials used.190 
 
CCEO also restricts the use of the title ‘Catholic’ to those schools which are either 
established by the eparchial bishop or higher ecclesiastical authority or have been recognised 
as such by them.191  It emphasises the obligation on the community towards schools, and the 
bishop’s role in establishing and overseeing them, as well as providing for the religious 
education of Catholic students where it is lacking.192  A holistic approach to education is also 
184 Morrisey, L&S, p441, para 1588.  
185 Ibid., para 1589. 
186 Coriden, Text&Comm, p567. 
187 CIC 1917, c. 1373§§1 and 2.  See Appendix III. 
188 CIC 1917, c. 1374.  See Appendix III.  Augustine, Vol VI, p415, citing Instruction from the Holy Office, 24 
November 1875 to the bishops of the US, at n1449, justified sending children to non-Catholic schools if there 
was no Catholic school, or if the Catholic school ‘cannot be considered suitable’.  Negligent parents or those 
who permitted their children to attend public schools, in which ‘the ruin of their souls is inevitable’ or to attend 
‘without sufficient cause’, and ‘without taking the necessary precautions’, when there was a suitable Catholic 
school and when they had the means to send their children to it, ‘cannot be absolved, as is evident from the 
moral teaching of the Church’. 
189 CIC 1917, c. 1379§1.  See Appendix III. 
190 CIC 1917, cc. 1381; and 1382.  See Appendix III. 
191 CCEO, c. 632.  See Appendix II. 
192 CCEO, cc. 631§1; 635; 636§1; and 637.  See Appendix II. 
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envisaged.193  The eparchial bishop is afforded similar authority as in CIC with regard to 
visitation; it is the eparchial bishop’s responsibility to appoint, approve and dismiss teachers 
of religion.194  CCEO explicitly extends his competence to forbidding attendance at a 
particular school for a ‘grave cause’.195  Teachers, at least those in Catholic schools, are also 
required to be ‘outstanding in doctrine’ and live exemplary lives.196 
 
The Church, therefore, requires teaching of the highest standards in its schools.  Catholic 
schools must cater for a wide range of ages and abilities and provide holistic education in a 
variety of subjects.  Consequently, it follows that the teachers employed in these institutions 
must be well trained and qualified to meet these needs.  However, it appears that if schools 
are not entirely privately owned and run as Catholic Schools (for example, if the State 
provides financial assistance), the authority of the Church is limited to overseeing the 
teaching of religion.  The Church’s authority to approve, appoint and dismiss teachers must 
accord with civil law.  The canon law on Catholic schools does not explicitly use the term 
‘expert’ or ‘expertise’ to describe teachers or the standard required of them.  However, the 
norms studied here require teachers to be ‘outstanding educators’ and the commentators 
speak of professionals assisting parents in education as ‘experts’ and as having ‘expertise’.  A 
point of difference between Catholic teachers as experts, and the use of experts in property 
and finance, and admission to orders and religious life, is that here the Church itself assumes 
a responsibility to ensure expertise through the training of teachers for Catholic schools.  
 
4. CATECHESIS, MISSION, PREACHING 
AND SOCIAL COMMUNICATION 
 
CIC does not refer to those involved in catechesis, missionary activity, preaching or social 
communication as ‘experts’.  However, as we shall see, both from CIC and other documents, 
the Church considers their role as of even greater importance than that of teachers (who as we 
have seen are classified canonically as ‘experts’), and their training as rigorous.  
 
 
193 CCEO, c. 634§3.  See Appendix II. 
194 CCEO, cc. 638§1; and 636§2.  See Appendix II: 
195 CCEO, c. 633.  See Appendix II. 
196 CCEO, c. 639.  See Appendix II. 
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Catechesis 
 
Ministry of Catechists: Catechists are defined as ‘lay members of Christ’s faithful’ who 
have received ‘proper formation’ and live exemplary ‘Christian’ lives.197  CIC recognises 
diocesan bishops’ authority to issue norms governing catechesis and to provide a 
catechism.198  It also recognises Bishops’ Conferences’ authority to prepare catechisms, and 
to set up catechetical offices.199  Religious superiors and superiors of societies of apostolic 
life are charged with providing catechesis in their churches, schools and elsewhere.200  Parish 
priests, too, are entrusted with teaching the faithful, adults and children, including those with 
special needs, albeit with the help of others.201  Responsibility for catechesis extends, 
although under the Church’s direction, to all the faithful, but particularly to parents and 
guardians of children, who teach by ‘word and example’.202  Local Ordinaries must ensure 
that catechists are trained and must oversee their work and ongoing formation.203 
 
Training and Qualification of Catechists: Whilst CIC does not deal directly with these 
issues, what is required of catechists can be gleaned from the canons generally and other 
Vatican documents.  CIC requires catechists to be familiar with the methods best suited to the 
capacity and needs of individuals; therefore, this requires considerable specialist subject 
knowledge and pedagogical skills, particularly in relation to those with special needs.204  
Legislative instruments, apostolic exhortations, encyclicals, letters and other documents 
addressed to various bodies such as Bishops’ Conferences, give insight into the legislator’s 
mind on the training of catechists.  The development of these matters is as follows. 
 
The Declaration on Christian Education, Gravissimum Educationis (1965), claims that 
‘catechetical instruction’ is the Church’s own and, ‘foremost’, method of teaching.205  
197 CIC, c. 785§1.  See Appendix I. 
198 CIC, c. 775§1.  See Appendix I. 
199 CIC, c. 775§§2 and 3.  See Appendix I. 
200 CIC, c. 778.  See Appendix I. 
201 CIC, cc. 773; 776; and 777.  See Appendix I. 
202 CIC, c. 774§§1 and 2.  See Appendix I. 
203 CIC, c. 780.  See Appendix I. 
204 CIC, c. 779.  See Appendix I. 
205 GE, 4.  See Appendix VI. 
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Christus Dominus (1965), calls for the instruction of catechists ‘so that they will be 
thoroughly acquainted with the doctrine of the Church and will have both a theoretical and a 
practical knowledge of the laws of psychology and of pedagogical methods’.206  It requires 
bishops to ensure that individuals’ educational capacity be respected.207  Another Decree, on 
the apostolate of the laity, Apostolicam Actuositatem (1965), acknowledges that responsibility 
for catechesis is shared by families and priests but emphasises the importance of catechists, 
without whom ‘the apostolate of the pastors is often unable to achieve its full 
effectiveness’.208  A Decree on the Missionary Activity of the Church, Ad Gentes, (1965), 
speaks of the need, due to the shortage of priests, for the ‘ministry’ and ‘office’ of 
catechists.209  Catechists’ training ‘must be so accomplished and so adapted to advances on 
the cultural level that as reliable co-workers of the priestly order, they may perform their task 
well’.210  This Decree calls for the establishment of schools for training catechists in doctrine, 
Scripture, and liturgy, as well as catechetical method and pastoral practice.  Within these 
schools, in which catechists themselves could develop their own Christian character, courses 
are to be run for on-going training; full-time catechists are to receive a just wage, a decent 
standard of living and social security.211  This Decree encourages the Sacred Congregation 
for the Propagation of the Faith to ‘provide special funds for the due training and support of 
catechists’; the hope is that those properly trained would receive a ‘canonical mission’ during 
a liturgical celebration, ‘so that in the eyes of the people they may serve the Faith with greater 
authority’.212 
 
An Apostolic letter, Ecclesiae Sanctae (1966),213 implementing, inter alia, two of the 
foregoing Decrees of Vatican II,214 urges bishops and Bishops’ Conferences to appoint priest 
moderators of studies to facilitate on-going ‘scientific and pastoral training’ of priests, 
including training in catechetics.215  Catechetical instruction is to be given in all churches and 
oratories belonging to religious and which are open to the public.216  This letter encourages 
206 CD, 14.  See Appendix VI. 
207 Ibid. 
208 AA, 10; and 30.  See Appendix VI. 
209 AG, 15.  See Appendix VI. 
210 AG, 17.  See Appendix VI. 
211 Ibid. 
212 Ibid. 
213 This letter was issued motu proprio indicating a juridical text. 
214 CD and AG. 
215 ES, Fostering Pastoral Study and Science: 7.  See Appendix VI. 
216 ES, Religious: 37.  See Appendix VI. 
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the Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith to promote close cooperation among the 
higher institutes of pastoral studies to perfect methods of catechesis.217   The General 
Catechetical Directory (1971), states that the Decree Provida Sane (1935) ‘established’ the 
Diocesan Catechetical Office for the supervision of catechetics in the diocese.218  The 
Directory provided that the diocesan catechetical office, ‘should have a staff of persons who 
have special competence’, including ‘a number of truly skilled people’.219  It foresaw: an 
‘Episcopal Commission for Catechesis’, comprised, inter alia, of ex officio members and 
‘experts’; and the establishment of various levels of schools, including those of university 
standard, for the initial, and ongoing training of catechists.220   
 
The Apostolic Exhortation Evangelii Nuntiandi (1975) emphasises the need for good 
instructors and refers to catechesis as a ‘superior art’, which is ‘indispensable’.221  The 
Catholic School (1977) reiterates these sentiments.  A later Apostolic Exhortation Catechesi 
Tradendae (1979) emphasises the pastor’s ‘primary responsibility’ and ‘leading role in 
catechesis’, albeit that this is shared by parents, teachers, catechists and others.222  This 
Exhortation describes catechesis as: the ‘education of children, young people and adults in 
the faith’; ‘especially the teaching of Christian doctrine imparted, generally speaking, in an 
organic and systematic way, with a view to initiating the hearers into the fullness of Christian 
life’; and ‘it is a sacred duty and an inalienable right’.223  The Exhortation also recognises the 
‘right’ of the faithful to receive ‘the word of faith’ in its entirety.224  It acknowledges the 
importance of: the personal attributes of catechists; the art of pedagogy; the use of suitable 
methods of teaching; the incorporation of an ecumenical dimension, requiring respect for 
other ecclesial communities; and specialist centres for training.225  
 
217 ES III, Norms for the implementation of the Decree, Ad Gentes: 18.  See Appendix VI. 
218 Emphasis added.  CIC speaks only of the Bishops’ Conference’s authority to establish a catechetical office to 
assist individual diocese.  See Appendix I: CIC, c. 775§3. 
219 GCD, 126.  GCD (1971) was mainly intended for those who have responsibility for organizing catechesis. Its 
purpose was to provide assistance in the production of catechetical directories and catechisms.  Since it applied 
to the universal Church where conditions differ greatly, it states that only average conditions are considered; 
therefore, it deals in general with a plan which is to be promoted, rather than imposed.  See Appendix VI. 
220 GCD, 98; 109; 110 and 126.  See Appendix VI. 
221 EN, 44.  See Appendix VI. 
222 CT, 16; and 22.  See Appendix VI. 
223 CT, 14; 18; and 45.  See Appendix VI. 
224 CT, 30.  See Appendix VI. 
225 CT, 29; 31; 32; 51; 58; and 71.  See Appendix VI. 
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Lay Catholics in Schools (1982) distinguishes the teaching of religion and catechesis, but 
acknowledges their complementary role; both should form ‘part of the curriculum of every 
school’.226  It charges Bishops with training both teachers and catechists.227  An Encyclical 
Redemptoris Missio (1990) refers to catechists as ‘specialists’, implying something more than 
competence, and to the need for training, culminating in academic qualifications.228  A papal 
letter to families Gratissimam Sane (1994) stresses the complementary role of spouses, who 
learn through their own experience and that of other couples.  As a consequence ‘one could 
say that “experts” learn in a certain sense from “spouses”, so that they in turn will then be in a 
better position to teach married couples’.229  This letter refers to ‘an increasing number of 
experts, physicians and educators who are authentic lay apostles for whom the promotion of 
the dignity of marriage and the family has become an important task in their lives’.230  The 
General Catechetical Directory (GCD, 1971) was revised and entitled The General Directory 
for Catechesis (GDC 1997), by bishops and by ‘experts in theology and catechesis’.  This 
revised version, speaks of ‘schools’ for catechists having two levels: one for those catechists 
who are ‘ordinary’; and one for those ‘who have responsibility for catechesis’, for example, 
‘in parishes and vicariates as well as full time catechists’.231  In addition, for ‘experts’ in 
catechesis, it provides that a ‘higher level of catechetical formation to which priests, religious 
and laity might have access is of vital importance’; the hope is that such higher institutes 
should be founded to train catechists to direct catechesis at diocesan level.232  These institutes 
‘ought to function as a university so far as curriculum, length of course and requisites for 
admission are concerned’; these institutes should also train ‘those who teach catechesis in 
seminaries, houses of formation and in the catechetical schools’ and should carry out 
research.233 
 
There is, therefore, much evidence that catechists require not only a depth of knowledge but 
specialist training and expertise.  Commentators, although not using the term ‘expert’, appear 
to agree on this.  Morrisey, commenting on canon 777 on the responsibility of parish priests 
for catechesis, does not use the term ‘expert’, but he highlights the varying needs of different 
226 LCS, 56.  See Appendix VI. 
227 LCS, 66.  See Appendix VI. 
228 RM, 73.  See Appendix VI. 
229 GrS, 16.  See Appendix VI. 
230 GrS, 12.  See Appendix VI. 
231 GDC (1997), 248; and 250.  See Appendix VI. 
232 GDC (1997), 251.  See Appendix VI. 
233 Ibid. 
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age-groups amongst the faithful, and those with special needs, who ‘may not be relegated to a 
secondary or subsidiary place’.234  Morrisey recognizes that the means and methods used may 
have to be adapted to local conditions and circumstances.235  Coriden holds that the aim of 
catechesis is ‘to render … faith lively, conscious, and effective’.236  Again, not referring to 
‘experts’ or ‘expertise’, he refers to: the need for ‘different kinds of instructional programs’ 
for different age-groups and abilities; the requirement to take into account the ‘natural talent, 
aptitude, strength of faith, knowledge, training and ability’ even of ‘potential helpers’; the 
specialist nature of the ongoing catechesis required at parish level, including that for the 
handicapped; and the importance of initial and ongoing training for catechists themselves.237 
He later describes catechetics as one of the ‘paramount forms of ministry’, which goes 
beyond teaching to making faith ‘living, explicit and operative’; catechists are required to 
reach a ‘crucial level of formation’.238    
 
These provisions, which reflect the ecclesiology of Vatican II, can be compared with the 
provisions of CIC 1917 and CCEO.   CIC 1917, with its emphasis on clerics, considered 
catechetical instruction ‘a proper and most grave office’ amongst clerical functions.239  The 
pastor’s responsibility extended to teaching children and adults.240  However, this focussed 
on: preparation of children for the sacraments including post-first communion instruction; 
children’s instruction during Lent; and adult instruction on Sundays and Holy Days and 
during Lent.241  A pastor could enlist the help of other priests and ‘if necessary, pious 
laymen’.242   ‘Holy Missions’ for the local flock were to be held at least every ten years.243    
The local Ordinary decided if the help of religious was required.244  The burden, therefore, 
fell on clergy and religious, by virtue of their training for priesthood or religious life.  
Nevertheless, CIC 1917 also recognised parents’ obligation to catechise children.245  No 
234 Morrisey, L&S, p430, paras 1548 and 1549, citing GCD, 91. 
235 Ibid., para 1551. 
236 Coriden, Text&Comm, p555. 
237 Ibid., p557-559.   
238 Coriden, New Comm, pp933 and 937. 
239 CIC 1917, c. 1329.  See Appendix III. 
240 CIC 1917, cc. 1330; 1331; and1332.  See Appendix III. 
241 CIC 1917, cc. 1330-1332.  See Appendix III. 
242 CIC 1917, c. 1333.  See Appendix III. 
243 CIC 1917, c. 1349.  See Appendix III. 
244 CIC 1917, c. 1334.  See Appendix III. 
245 CIC 1917, c. 1335.  See Appendix III. 
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provision was made, however, for the training of lay catechists.  CIC 1917, therefore, 
demonstrates the less well-developed systems of catechetics of the time.246 
 
CCEO, post-dating CIC, recognises the obligation of each Church sui iuris, particularly 
bishops, but also parishes, to provide catechesis taking the special character of the Eastern 
Churches into account.247  Like CIC, CCEO obliges parents/guardians to teach children ‘by 
word and example’.248  CCEO too, requires catechists to have special formation and on-going 
training.249  Pedagogical skills are also necessary.250  However, when ‘properly formed’ 
catechists are obliged to assist the Church,251 particular law provides for their 
remuneration.252  Unlike CIC, which permits, CCEO mandates the establishment of a 
catechetical commission.253  Catechesis should be ecumenically orientated.254  Extensive 
knowledge of both Catholic doctrine and that of other churches is, therefore, required.  It is 
clear that like CIC, CCEO also requires that catechists are trained and have expertise. 
 
Mission 
 
Ministry of Missionaries: CIC acknowledges the obligation of all the faithful to cooperate in 
missionary activity.255  However, overall responsibility rests with the Supreme Pontiff, the 
College of Bishops, and, at local level, with bishops.256  Because of their dedication to the 
Church, religious institutes, too, shoulder responsibility appropriate to their way of life.257  
CIC is not explicit regarding who appoints missionaries nor the training and qualifications 
required, but like catechists, this can be gleaned from the canons generally and from other 
Vatican documents.  Ecclesiastical authorities ‘choose’ and ‘send’ missionaries, both cleric 
and lay; this implies competence to appoint them and to make judgments regarding their 
suitability for the task.258 
246 CIC 1917, cc. 1350§1; and 1351.  See Appendix III. 
247 CCEO, cc. 617; 619; and 621.  See Appendix II. 
248 CCEO, c. 618.  See Appendix II. 
249 CCEO, c. 622§2.  See Appendix II. 
250 CCEO, c. 626.  See Appendix II. 
251 CCEO, c. 624§3.  See Appendix II. 
252 CCEO, c. 591§2.  See Appendix II. 
253 CCEO, c. 622§1.  See Appendix II. 
254 CCEO, c. 625.  See Appendix II. 
255 CIC, c. 781.  See Appendix I. 
256 CIC, c. 782§§1 and 2.  See Appendix I. 
257 CIC, c. 783.  See Appendix I. 
258 CIC, c. 784.  See Appendix I. 
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 Training and Qualifications of Missionaries: CIC considers that because of their 
dedication to the service of the Church, members of institutes of consecrated life are obliged 
‘to play a zealous and special part’ in missionary activity, implying that they have also an 
obligation to acquire the necessary skills.259  Missionaries are ‘heralds of the Gospel’ sent to 
places where the Church ‘has not yet taken root’ until new structures enable the work of 
evangelisation.260  Catechists for mission require ‘proper formation’, in ‘schools founded for 
this purpose’; this implies specialist training and expertise in teaching and in the formation of 
missionaries on the part of the trainers.261  Missionaries, in turn, are required to judge a 
person’s readiness to receive both the message of the Gospel and the sacrament of baptism.262  
Although each diocese is to have a designated priest to promote missionary activities, laity 
are obliged to ‘acquire the appropriate formation which their role demands’.263  
 
As with catechesis, legislative documents refer to the obligation of all the faithful to engage 
in missionary activity.  The Dogmatic Constitution on the Church Lumen Gentium (1964) 
urges bishops to encourage the faithful to participate in mission.264  A Decree on Missionary 
Activity, Ad Gentes (1965), emphasises the importance of schools to train catechists for 
missionary work.265  Moreover, missionaries are required to have a ‘suitable natural 
temperament’, ‘talent’, ‘other qualities’, and to ‘have been trained to undertake mission 
work’.266  More recently, the Encyclical Redemptoris Missio (1990) called for a renewal of 
missionary activity, which has ‘but one purpose: to serve man by revealing to him the love of 
God made manifest in Jesus Christ’.267  One of the roles of missionaries is to engage in 
dialogue between ‘experts’ of different religions, and those of other disciplines.268 
 
Morrisey distinguishes the general obligation of the faithful to engage in the missionary 
activity of the Church and ‘professional’ missionaries, implying different levels of training 
259 CIC, c. 783.  See Appendix I. 
260 CIC, c. 786.  See Appendix I. 
261 CIC, c. 785§§1 and 2.  See Appendix I. 
262 CIC, c. 787§2.  See Appendix I. 
263 CIC, cc. 791; and 231§1.  See Appendix I. 
264 LG, 17; and 27.  See Appendix VI. 
265 AG, 17.  See also: AG, 30.  See Appendix VI. 
266 AG, 23.  See Appendix VI. 
267 RM, 2.  See Appendix VI. 
268 RM, 57; and 82.  See Appendix VI. 
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and expertise.269  He notes that many religious institutes and societies were, throughout the 
ages, founded specifically with missionary activity as their raison d’etre.270  He defines 
missionaries as those ‘who are endowed with the proper natural temperament, have the 
necessary qualities and outlook, and are ready to undertake missionary work’.271  He 
describes missionary catechists as those, ‘where there is a shortage of clergy and religious’, 
who are ‘lay people of exemplary Christian life who have received special training’ and are 
‘of the highest importance’.272  Moreover, catechists must be ‘very carefully prepared’ and 
their training ‘in keeping with cultural progress’.273  In line with canon 786, missionary work 
includes ‘building up newly founded churches until they are fully established and can stand 
on their own’; ‘special care and formation’ is required for the newly baptized.274  Coriden 
explains that lay missionary catechists are to be ‘suitably instructed’, but their work is 
nevertheless to be carried out ‘under the direction of a missionary; lay catechists are to be the 
assistants or associates of missionaries’.275  This implies that missionaries themselves are 
more highly trained and experienced.  In recruiting laity for missionary activity, O’Reilly 
warns of the importance of ‘suitable preparation, professional specialization, as it is 
called’.276  He acknowledges the ‘very important role’ of catechists in assisting missionaries, 
including ‘organizing liturgical functions’ in the absence of the missionary priest, such as 
prayer services, liturgy of the word on holy days of obligation, distributing Holy 
Communion, baptizing, and assisting at marriages; he refers to the necessity for them to be 
‘properly instructed for the office which they are to fulfil’.277  There is no doubt, therefore, 
that special training and expertise is required of missionaries and missionary catechists. 
 
The foregoing contrasts with the lack of any provision for missionary training under CIC 
1917, although mission territories were recognised and distinguished from local 
‘missions’.278 Unlike the Latin Church, the Eastern Churches do not have a history of foreign 
missionary activity.  Nevertheless, CCEO recognises these Churches now as ‘totally 
269 Morrisey, L&S, p431, para 1553. 
270 Ibid., p432, para 1555. 
271 Ibid., para 1556, citing Ad Gentes, 23. 
272 Ibid., para 1556-1557, citing Ad Gentes, 17; and 23. 
273 Ibid., p433, para 1558. 
274 Ibid., para 1559 and p434, para 1565.  See Appendix I: CIC, c. 786. 
275 Coriden, Text&Comm, p561. 
276 Michael A O’Reilly, New Comm, p943. 
277 Ibid. 
278 CIC 1917, c. 1350§2.  See Appendix III. 
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missionary’; ‘mission territories’ being those recognised as such by the Holy See.279  CCEO 
requires missionaries to be ‘suitably trained preachers’.280  Missionaries, whether native or 
not, are required to be ‘qualified’ in the necessary skills and ability; they require formation in 
missiology and missionary spirituality as well as education in the history and culture of the 
people they serve.281  They are required to be prudent in their dialogue and cooperation with 
non-Christians.282  CCEO specifically refers to the establishment of schools in mission 
territories, and each eparchy is to have a priest designated to missionary work.283  Also, a 
commission for missionary activity in the synod of bishops or the council of hierarchs is 
recommended.284  Therefore, the need for special training for missionary work is clear.  
 
Preaching 
 
Ministry of Preachers: Preaching, too, is recognised as fundamental to the Church’s mission 
to teach and spread the word of God.  CIC, reflecting the provisions of the Constitution on 
the Sacred Liturgy (1963), recognises the expertise of preachers, particularly in relation to: 
the Roman Pontiff and the College of Bishops, who are the principal preachers, and who 
individually have the right to preach everywhere.285  It also recognises diocesan bishops’ 
authority to preach and their duty to oversee preaching in their dioceses.286  All clergy, 
because of the faithful’s right to hear the word of God, have a correlative duty to preach to 
those in their care.287  However, when preaching to others, they must have at least the 
presumed consent of the rector of the church, and when preaching to religious that of the 
Superior.288  Members of institutes of consecrated life, when ‘called upon’ by the bishop, 
assist in this mission.289  Laity can be invited to assist clergy in the ministry of the word.290   
They are permitted to preach in a church or oratory when ‘necessary’ or ‘advantageous’, but, 
like everyone, they are obliged to observe the provisions of the Bishops’ Conference.291  
279 CCEO, cc. 584; and 594.  See Appendix II. 
280 CCEO, c. 585§1.  See Appendix II. 
281 CCEO, c. 589.  See Appendix II. 
282 CCEO, c. 592§2.  See Appendix II. 
283 CCEO, cc. 592§1; and 585§3.  See Appendix II. 
284 CCEO, c. 585§2.  See Appendix II. 
285 CIC, cc. 756§1; and 763.  See Appendix I. 
286 CIC, c. 386§1.  See Appendix I.    
287 CIC, cc. 757; 528§1; 762; and 767.  See Appendix I. 
288 CIC, cc. 764; and 765.  See Appendix I. 
289 CIC, c. 758.  See Appendix I. 
290 CIC, c. 759.  See Appendix I. 
291 CIC, cc. 772§1; and 766.  See Appendix I. 
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However, the homily is reserved to a priest or deacon.292  It appears, therefore, that a parish 
priest could, in line with these provisions, appoint a lay person to preach. 
 
Training and Qualifications of Preachers:  The Decree on Priestly Formation (1965) 
recognises the need for training candidates for Orders in preaching techniques.293  Preachers 
must adapt their method of preaching to the condition of the listeners and the circumstances 
of the times.294  This would, at least at times, include children and those with special needs.  
The strict regulation of preaching by laity implies the need for particular expertise.295    
 
Commentators acknowledge the importance of preaching, but appear to afford different levels 
of strictness to their interpretation of law.  For Morrisey, employing a strict interpretation, the 
obligation of a ‘serious and sustained study, based on the Scriptures and on the official 
teaching of the Church, with an accordingly critical analysis of what is daily portrayed by 
many newspaper, radio and television outputs’ is imposed on those who preach.296  Preachers 
are obliged to bring the word of God to all, including migrants, exiles, refugees, sailors, 
airmen, itinerants, holidaymakers, those who have given up the practice of religion and 
unbelievers.297  The diocesan bishop is responsible for setting the required standard and the 
programme for preaching.298  Permission for laity to preach ‘in church’, extends to preaching 
at Mass, provided such preaching does not constitute the homily, which, ‘because of its ritual 
nature and its intimate connection with the Eucharist is reserved to a priest or deacon’.299 
 
Coriden, on the other hand, applies a broader interpretation.  For him, the present need for 
more preachers has led to the dropping of the prohibition on lay preaching in favour of 
‘people who are committed to the ministry of the word, trained in the scriptures and theology, 
and skilled in communication’.300  Despite reservation of the homily to clerics, Coriden states 
292 CIC, c. 767§1.  See Appendix I. 
293 OT, 19.  See Appendix VI. 
294 CIC, c. 769.  See Appendix I. 
295 For example, knowledge of languages or experience in teaching children or those with special needs. 
296 Morrisey, L&S, p426, para 1534. 
297 Ibid., p426-427, para 1536. 
298 Ibid., p427, para 1536. 
299 Ibid., p425, para 1529.  
300 Coriden, Text&Comm, p552. 
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that the homily should ‘ordinarily’ be given by the celebrant.301  He later explains that ‘[a]n 
occasional exception for good reasons does not constitute a violation for one who usually 
observes the rule conscientiously, i.e., the principle of substantial observance can be 
applied’.302  Although the law permits laity to preach in a church if ‘necessary’ or 
‘advantageous’, Coriden holds that ‘it is not a substitute for clerical ministry, nor does it 
require that other ministers be lacking’; this ministerial role should not be described as 
‘exceptional, abnormal, or extraordinary’, because it is a ‘fully legitimate lay function which 
has now become commonplace in the Catholic Church’.303  Although under canon law, there 
is no specific provision for training, Coriden holds that ‘the ability and preparation to preach 
must naturally be considered’ and ‘qualified lay persons may be called upon to preach 
wherever preaching takes place’.304  The required permission ‘could be presumed or implicit 
in an appointment to pastoral office’.305  Coriden acknowledges that preaching is ‘demanding 
and difficult.  It requires: thorough learning, especially in scripture and theology; Christian 
maturity and experience; communication and language skills; familiarity with the 
community; imagination; and time to prepare well’.306  This broad interpretation does not 
appear to comply with an Instruction (1997), which clarifies that preaching by laity is not a 
right, but of an ‘exceptional nature’.307  Moreover, this Instruction abrogates any norms 
previously permitting laity to preach the homily, and states that provisions of the Bishops’ 
Conference permitting laity to preach must receive approval of the Holy See.308   
 
Comparisons can be made with CIC 1917 and CCEO.  Under CIC 1917, primary 
responsibility for preaching rested with the Pope and bishops.309  Bishops could enlist the 
help of pastors and ‘suitable men’, provided they received a ‘mission’ by faculty or office.310  
301 Ibid., p553, citing GIRM (1969), 42.  However, CIC post-dates this document and CIC, c. 767§4 provides 
that the pastor or rector of a church is to see to it that the prescriptions of the canon are ‘conscientiously 
observed’. 
302 Coriden, New Comm, p930.  Coriden gives, at p929, as an examples of ‘good reason’, a lay person preaching 
at Masses for children, citing SCDWDS, Directory for Masses with Children, (1 November 1972); and at p930, 
as examples of ‘necessity’: infirmity, exhaustion, and old-age on the part of the presiding priest. 
303 Ibid., p927. 
304 Ibid. 
305 Ibid. 
306 Ibid., pp927-928. 
307 See Appendix VI: CNOFSMP, Article 2. This Instruction was prepared by six Sacred Congregations and two 
Pontifical Councils and moreover, was approved in forma specifica.  It is, therefore, a weighty document. 
308 CNOFSMP, Articles 2§3; and 3.  See Appendix VI. 
309 CIC 1917, cc. 1327§1; and 1336.  See Appendix III. 
310 CIC 1917, cc. 1327§2; and 1328.  See Appendix III. 
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The preaching of ‘sermons’ was governed by specific canons.311  A faculty, available only to 
priests and deacons having undergone examination, and which could be revoked, was 
required from the local Ordinary.312  Lay people were forbidden to preach in churches; this 
included lay religious.313  Stringent provisions were in place for preaching in clerical, 
religious, and lay religious institutes, and for priests from outside the diocese.314 
 
Like CIC, CCEO acknowledges the primary role of clergy as leaders and preachers, and the 
bishops’ responsibility to regulate preaching.315  The role of the ‘Christian’ laity in the 
ministry of the word is recognised, albeit that, unlike CIC, both a mandate, and ‘extraordinary 
circumstances’, are required.316  Like under CIC, the homily is reserved to a cleric.317  A ‘just 
cause’ approved by the hierarch is required before a pastor can pass the obligation of 
preaching a homily to another on a regular basis.318  CCEO explicitly requires preachers to 
teach the faithful about human rights and social justice.319  Although stringent provisions are 
in place for lay preaching, it appears that it is becoming more common.320  Delivering a 
sermon prepared by a priest, however, is not considered ‘true preaching’.321  There is no 
doubt therefore, that here also, skill, training and expertise are required. 
 
Social Communication 
 
Ministry of Social Communication: As to methods of social communication, the Church 
claims the right to use these to fulfil her mission.322  However, the norms in CIC focus 
largely on writings.323  All the faithful, especially those ‘in any way’ involved in the 
311 CIC 1917, cc. 1337-1348.  See Appendix III. 
312 CIC 1917, cc. 1337; 1340§§1 and 2; and 1342.  See Appendix III. 
313 CIC 1917, c. 1342§2.  See Appendix III. 
314 CIC 1917, cc. 1338; and 1341§1.  See Appendix III. 
315 CCEO, cc. 289§1; 610; 609; 614§1; and 615.  See Appendix II. 
316 CCEO, cc. 608; and 610§4.  See Appendix II. 
317 CCEO, c. 614§4.  See Appendix II. 
318 CCEO, c. 614§3.  See Appendix II. 
319 CCEO; c. 616§2.  See Appendix II. 
320 Pospishil, p368. 
321 Ibid., citing J Huels, ‘The Ministry of the Divine Word (Canons 756-761)’, Studia Canonica, 23 (1989), 
pp325-344; and J Provost, ‘Brought Together by the Word of the Living God (Canons 762-772)’, Studia 
Canonica, 23 (1989), pp345-372. 
322 CIC, c. 822§1.  See Appendix I. 
323 The norms are placed in Book III on The Teaching Office of the Church, under Title IV, ‘The Means of 
Social Communication and Books in Particular’.  Morrisey, L&S, p449, points out that ‘audio or visual 
recordings’ are unlikely to be covered by the provisions on ‘writings intended for publication’, envisaged by 
canon 824§2.  Coriden, too, in Text&Comm, p579 reckons that: ‘oral or electronic communication’, ‘secular or 
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management or use of the media, have a duty to work together to ensure that all forms of 
social communication are ‘imbued with a human and Christian spirit’.324  Everyone is obliged 
to observe the norms of the Bishops’ Conference if speaking about Christian teaching on 
radio or television.325  Writing in publications which are accustomed to attacking the catholic 
religion or good morals is forbidden without ‘just and reasonable cause’, although clerics and 
religious may do so with the permission of the local Ordinary.326  Pastors have a threefold 
right and duty to: be vigilant so that the media do not adversely affect the faith and morals of 
the faithful; give approval or permission for publication;327 and condemn writings which are 
harmful to faith or morals.328  All writings, ‘which touch on matters faith or morals’, must be 
submitted to the appropriate ecclesiastical authority, for permission or approval, before 
publication.329  This implies expertise, on the part of the ecclesiastical authority, in all matters 
which ‘touch on faith and morals’, in relation to the publication of: catechisms; textbooks on 
various related subjects; books on Sacred Scripture prepared with non-Catholics; prayer 
books; collections of ecclesiastical decrees; further editions or translations of works already 
published; and republication of liturgical books.330   
 
broadly religious topics’, and publications for private circulation are not covered; nor do the provisions apply to 
non-Catholics.   See also Coriden, New Comm, p980. 
324 CIC, c. 822§§2, 3.  See Appendix I. 
325 CIC, c. 772§2.  See Appendix I. 
326 CIC, cc. 831§1; and 832.  See Appendix I. 
327 Morrisey, L&S, p448, at para 1611 explains: ‘[P]ermission (licentia) is usually expressed by the word 
imprimatur’, which ‘carries with it an implicit declaration that the work contains no doctrinal or moral ‘error’, 
whereas approval (approbatio) ‘seems to involve more than permission’, implying ‘acknowledgement … of the 
positive worth of the work’.  However, Coriden, disagrees: Text&Comm, p580: ‘[P]ermission is required by 
persons; approbatio ‘does not really mean approval’, but signifies that the writing contains nothing which the 
Ordinary ‘perceives to be harmful to faith or morals’ and is a ‘negative judgement of non-offensiveness; it is 
‘not an endorsement or recommendation of the book’.  Approbatio therefore, only ‘permits the author to 
publish’. This stance changes somewhat, however, in his later writing when he considers that the words are 
‘virtually indistinguishable’; the canons, he claims ‘use them interchangeably’.  See Coriden, New Comm, p980.  
He cites an Instruction from the CDF (1992), n 7.2 as indicating that ‘the two have exactly the same effects.  It 
is a distinction without a difference’.  However, this document refers first to the writings which require 
‘approval’ and then states: ‘Prior permission is required, on the other hand …’ and goes on to list those relevant 
writings, which implies a difference in their nature although the effects are the same.  It appears, therefore, that 
Coriden’s original explanation is closer to the correct one; the person requires the permission and the 
approbation refers to the content of the writing.  However, the Instruction states that approval or permission 
‘presupposes’ that nothing objectionable has been found; ‘guarantees that the writing … contains nothing 
contrary to doctrine; ‘attests that all the pertinent prescriptions of canon law have been fulfilled’, and 
ecclesiastical permission ‘constitutes both a juridical and a moral guarantee’.  This is more than a ‘negative 
judgement’ referred to by Coriden, who considers the claim ‘hyperbole’ (at p984).  See Appendix VI: UISC, 
7§1, (a) (b); 7§2; and 10§1.    
328 CIC, c. 823.  See Appendix I. 
329 CIC, c. 824§§1 and 2.  See Appendix I. 
330 CIC, cc. 825; 826§§1 - 3; 827; 828; and 829.  See Appendix I. 
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Appointment of Censors: CIC permits the local Ordinary to appoint censors and by 
permitting the Bishops’ Conference to establish a commission or to draw up a list of suitable 
people who might assist the local Ordinary in making a judgment regarding suitability for 
publication, the law implies the Bishops’ Conference’s authority also to appoint these 
censors.331  Morrisey holds that the diocesan bishop may appoint censors ‘on a permanent or 
on an ad hoc basis’, but he may also have recourse to the list approved by the Bishops’ 
Conference, which might  give him access to ‘a degree of knowledge on a wider range of 
subjects than might otherwise be available to him’.332  Coriden considers that the Bishops’ 
Conference may ‘compile a list’ of people to be employed individually or collectively (the 
latter enabling ‘some form of collegiate action and corporate responsibility’) or the local 
Ordinary may appoint his own censors.333 
 
Discipline and Qualification of Censors: CIC requires censors to be ‘outstanding for their 
knowledge, right doctrine and prudence’; apart from these personal qualities, they are 
required to be objective, and to be capable of writing a reasoned report, on which the local 
Ordinary can base his decision, implying certain knowledge and expertise.334  Moreover, 
given their role to judge whether or not the writing is harmful to faith or morals, censors 
would be required to have a deep knowledge of ‘the hierarchy of truths’.335 
 
Expertise in Social Communication: Vatican II issued a Decree on Social Communication 
(1963) which recognises that while means of social communication could serve the Church, 
regulation is required to curb abuses.336  This Decree, recognising the Church’s duty to 
instruct the faithful in the use of the media, encouraged the diocesan bishop to put aside a 
special day, annually, for this purpose.337  It also obliged the laity to imbue the media with a 
Christian spirit, and to contribute to the Church’s endeavour by prayer and funding.338  
Moreover, it provides that: the proper exercise of the right to information demands that true 
and complete information is communicated in a ‘proper and decent’ manner, respecting 
human dignity; all forms of art should respect the moral order; and particular responsibility 
331 CIC, c. 830§1.  See Appendix I. 
332 Morrisey, L&S, pp451- 452. 
333 Coriden, Text&Comm, p583. 
334 CIC, c. 830.  See Appendix I. 
335 Coriden, New Comm, p984. 
336 IM, 2; and 3.  See Appendix VI. 
337 Ibid., 3; and 18. 
338 Ibid.  
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falls on all those who communicate information, including public authorities, but parents 
have particular responsibility.339  Interestingly, the decree recognises the use of experts in 
assisting the faithful, particularly the young, to understand new technology and to use it 
wisely, but this provision did not find its way into CIC.340  Skilled people are to be appointed 
in order that all media can serve the apostolate.341  Laity and clerics require training, 
according to their needs, in faculties, institutes, seminaries, schools, and lay apostolate 
groups.342  National media offices are foreseen, under the direction of a committee of bishops 
or at least one bishop, with lay experts playing a role.343  The diocesan bishop is charged with 
overseeing this endeavour.344  A later Instruction Communio et Progressio (1971) charges 
bishops with the task of consulting experts to assist the Church in its use of the media.345  
These professionals and experts require knowledge and social communication skills, obtained 
from specialist training, so that they are competent when called upon.346  The establishment 
of professional associations is encouraged, as is the appointment of official spokespeople.347  
Training in this field is considered a ‘most urgent task’, even for recipients of information.348  
The National Episcopal Commission for Social Communication is responsible for providing 
guidelines for the development of the apostolate of social communication and for 
collaborating with the Pontifical Commission.349  The need for special training for priests, not 
only in their personal use of media, but also for the purposes of training the faithful and 
‘specialist training’ for those who work in the mass media or train those who do, is 
recognized in other documents.350  On the twentieth anniversary of the aforementioned 
Instruction (1971), another Instruction Aetatis Novae (1992) recognised the advances in 
technology affecting, positively and negatively, people’s ‘psychological, moral and social 
development’ and set out guidelines for diocesan pastoral plans for social communication 
programs.  Whilst the value of modern media in the task of evangelisation was recognised, so 
was the need for: education on the use of the media; ‘professional’ skills for those actively 
engaged in media work for the Church, including doctrinal and spiritual formation; 
339 Ibid., 5-7; and 10-12. 
340 Ibid.  
341 Ibid., 15.   
342 Ibid., 15-16. 
343 Ibid., 21. 
344 Ibid., 20. 
345 CP, 4; and 5.  See Appendix VI. 
346 Ibid., 15; 38; and 71. 
347 Ibid., 79; and 174. 
348 Ibid., 64; and 65. 
349 Ibid., 172. 
350 GTFP, 4-7.  Also RFIS (1985), 68.  See Appendix VI. 
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recognition of the psychological pressures experienced and ethical dilemmas faced by media 
workers; and dialogue between the Church and the secular media.351 
 
With regard to publishing written material, another Instruction (1992) explained that 
ecclesiastical approval or permission presupposes that the censor found nothing objectionable 
and confirms that the provisions of canon law have been fulfilled.352  It follows therefore, that 
censors must have extensive knowledge of doctrine and law.  It confirmed that reprinting is 
not considered to be a new edition; reprinting and translations of an original nevertheless, 
require further approval or permission to publish.353  Catholic publishers are required not to 
publish material which has not received the prescribed permission.354  Religious institutes 
with a special charism355 for publishing have particular responsibility in this regard.356   
 
A later document on ethics (2000) emphasises the need for training for all, clerics and laity, 
who are involved in Church activities.357  A further document The Church and the Internet, 
(2002) addressed the use of the internet as a means of social communication.  The internet 
was addressed again in an Apostolic Letter (2005); this acknowledged its usefulness, but it 
also emphasised the need for training in its use and the need for pastoral support for 
professionals who experience psychological pressures because of their internet work.358  It 
reiterates the particular responsibility of religious institutes with a special charism for using 
the mass media.359 
 
It is clear, therefore, that when using the different means of communication, detailed 
knowledge is required in areas such as scripture, theology, canon law, and catechetics and 
diverse skills are required in the use of the means of social communication available. 
 
351 AN, 4; 8; 11; 17; and18.  See Appendix VI. 
352 UISC, 7§2.  See Appendix VI. 
353 Ibid., 9.  
354 Ibid., 15§1.  
355 Rhidian Jones, The Canon Law of the Roman Catholic Church and the Church of England: A Handbook 
(Edinburgh, 2000), p25: ‘Charism’ is defined as: ‘God-given gifts or graces which give rise to obligations and 
rights.  Such gifts are given primarily for the benefit of the Church and the world rather than of the individual 
who is bestowed with them’.  See also CCC, p186, para 799; and p435, para 2003 in Appendix IV; and AA, 30 
in Appendix VI. 
356 Ibid., 18. 
357 EC, 26.  See Appendix VI. 
358 RD (unofficial translation), 9.  See Appendix VI. 
359 Ibid., 8. 
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Morrisey points out that republishing original texts or publishing official translations of them 
‘requires a comparison with the approved text’,360 which implies a particular skill.  Moreover, 
in the case of scriptural texts, approval must come from the Holy See.361  An Ordinary is not 
bound by the censor’s opinion; the decision to grant or refuse approval remains that of the 
Ordinary.362  Coriden agrees.363  However, for Coriden, the provisions of canon 823 do not 
extend to prohibition on publication or use but to ‘expressing disapproval … offering a 
critique, and pointing out errors or inadequacies’;364 freedom of expression must be 
honoured,365 and restrictions are subject to strict interpretation.366   Coriden speaks of the 
‘expertise’ of censors, in ‘scripture, theology, canon law, catechesis etc’ with ‘considerable 
diversity of background and viewpoint’,367 although he later speaks only of ‘competence’ and 
a ‘fair and balanced outlook’.368  For Coriden, the censor’s role is limited to ‘doctrinal 
evaluation’;369 and ‘only the narrow categories of publications’, provided in canons 825-828 
are covered by the provisions; ‘[t]he vast majority of writings, even those on theology and 
morality are not subject to censorship in virtue of this canon’.370 
 
These provisions can be compared with those under CIC 1917 and CCEO.  CIC 1917 was 
more stringent and concentrated on the censorship and prohibition of books, which included 
daily publications, periodicals and other published writings.371  The Church claimed the right: 
to require the approval of the competent authority before publication by any of the faithful; 
and to prohibit books published by anyone, whether Catholic or not.372  Specifically, books 
referring to religious matters required prior censorship.373  Clerics and religious were 
forbidden to edit profane material and to write for newspapers and periodicals, without their 
Superiors’ consent.374  Laity required approval of the local Ordinary to write for publications 
360 Morrisey, L&S, p449. 
361 Ibid., p450. 
362 Ibid., p452. 
363 Coriden, Text&Comm, p584. 
364 Ibid., p580. 
365 Ibid., p584.   
366 Coriden, New Comm, p979. 
367 Coriden, Text&Comm, p583. 
368 Coriden, New Comm, p983. 
369 Coriden, Text&Comm, p584. 
370 Coriden, New Comm, p979. 
371 CIC 1917, cc. 1384-1405.  See Appendix III. 
372 CIC 1917, c. 1384§1.  See Appendix III. 
373 CIC 1917, cc. 1385; and 1388§1.  See Appendix III. 
374 CIC 1917, c. 1386§1.  See Appendix III. 
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that attacked the Church or good morals.375  Translations of texts of sacred Scripture required 
the consent of the Holy See.376  Translation of already approved texts and new editions 
required further permission.377  Permission was to be granted in writing; the name of the 
person granting permission and time and place of the grant were to be printed in the 
publication.378  Censors were appointed at diocesan level, implying a stable post, rather than 
ad hoc appointment.379  As censors were bound to adhere to doctrine, law, prescriptions and 
the thinking of the doctors of the church, their knowledge needed to be extensive.380  
Although no specific qualifications were stated, they were clergy ‘commended by age, 
erudition, and prudence’.381  There was, therefore, no recognition of expertise in the laity. 
 
Like CIC, CCEO acknowledges the church’s right, and her need, to use appropriate forms of 
social communication.382  Provisions on the publication of writings are similar to those in 
CIC.383  However, CCEO is explicit on the duty to make access to sacred Scripture easier for 
non-Christians.384  Approval of writings by one hierarch is insufficient for their use in 
another eparchy.385  Whilst the norms on censors are similar to those under CIC,386 those 
relating to liturgical texts are somewhat more complex.387  CCEO obliges all ‘to collaborate’ 
in the church’s mission, but, interestingly and reflecting the advances in technology since 
CIC was promulgated, it refers specifically to those who are ‘expert’ in the production and 
transmission of communications and calls them to offer their assistance to the bishops.388  In 
turn, it calls on bishops, albeit with the help of institutes of social communication, to teach 
the faithful to use the media advantageously; and to provide for the training of experts in this 
field; moreover CCEO explicitly states that the policy of ‘praising and blessing good books’ 
can be more effective than the censure and condemnation of evil’.389  Nevertheless, eparchial 
bishops, the synod of bishops of the patriarchal Church, the council of hierarchs and the 
375 CIC 1917, c, 1386§2.  See Appendix III. 
376 CIC 1917, c. 1391.  See Appendix III. 
377 CIC 1917, c. 1392§§1, 2.  See Appendix III. 
378 CIC 1917, c. 1394§1.  See Appendix III. 
379 CIC 1917, c. 1393§1.  See Appendix III. 
380 CIC 1917, c. 1393§2.  See Appendix III. 
381 CIC 1917, c. 1393§3.  See Appendix III. 
382 CCEO, c. 651§1.  See Appendix II. 
383 CCEO, cc. 654; 658; 659; 660; and 662§2.  See Appendix II. 
384 CCEO, c. 655.  See Appendix II. 
385 CCEO, c. 663§2.  See Appendix II. 
386 CCEO, c. 664.  See Appendix II. 
387 CCEO, cc. 656; and 657.  See Appendix II. 
388 CCEO, c. 651§2.  See Appendix II. 
389 CCEO, c. 652§1.  See Appendix II. 
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Apostolic See all have competence to forbid the faithful to use, or pass on to others, 
instruments of social communication detrimental to the integrity of faith and morals.390  
Moreover, CCEO requires detailed legislation at local level, for the use of radio, cinema, and 
television when dealing with faith or morals;391 intellectual property must be protected in 
accordance with civil law.392  CCEO emphasises that the canons extend to icons and images, 
to the display and sale of goods, and to the productions of shows in schools.393  
 
Conclusion 
 
It is clear that whilst all the faithful have a role to play in the teaching mission of the Church, 
the Supreme authority and the bishops are responsible for oversight of Catholic teaching.   
Teachers, even those in ecclesiastical universities and faculties, are not referred to either in 
the CIC or in Vatican documents as ‘experts’.  Nevertheless, they, and catechists, are required 
to have: extensive knowledge of Catholic doctrine and pedagogical skills (including 
psychology), relative to their specific roles.  The Church is required to provide for this 
knowledge and skill by establishing educational institutions of different kinds and levels.  
Whilst no specific academic qualifications are required for teachers in Catholic universities, 
they are nevertheless required to reach high standards in teaching, live exemplary lives, and 
have a valid mandate if they teach ‘theological subjects’.   The Constitution on Ecclesiastical 
Universities (1979) requires teachers to: hold a canonically valid degree or equivalent title; 
have proof of research skills; and demonstrate their teaching ability.   Given that a ‘doctorate’ 
in the specific discipline taught is required for teachers in Ecclesiastical universities and 
faculties, a high degree of expertise is implied.  In addition, teaching methods are to be 
continually revised and updated, which implies on-going professional or specialist training.  
Likewise, catechists, and missionaries require special formation in particular schools.  
Censors too are required to be people ‘outstanding for their knowledge, right doctrine and 
prudence’.  A comprehensive knowledge of Catholic doctrine is, therefore, required in 
addition to the capacity to make objective judgments based on Church doctrine, faith and 
morals, and the ability to submit a written report to the bishop.  The ‘experts’ referred to in 
the Vatican documents are people to be consulted for advice before decision-making.  These 
390 CCEO, c. 652§2.  See Appendix II. 
391 CCEO, c. 653.  See Appendix II. 
392 CCEO, c. 666.  See Appendix II. 
393 CCEO, c. 665.  See Appendix II. 
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‘experts’ may have similar qualifications and expertise to those seeking advice, but are out-
with the body requesting that advice.  For example, those consulted when matters cannot be 
settled internally or when an ecclesiastical authority is planning to establish a new university.   
 
The provisions of CCEO are more detailed.  For example, they require: a council for the 
promotion of the ecumenical movement; a catechetical commission and centre; catechesis to 
be ecumenically orientated; a designated priest and a commission for missionary activity; and 
a commission of ‘experts on ecumenism’ in each church sui iuris.  Furthermore, it specifies 
the bishop’s authority to forbid attendance at a particular school and gives competence to the 
ecclesiastical authority to dismiss teachers for professional incompetence.  Reflecting 
advances in technology since the promulgation of CIC, CCEO calls on the assistance of 
‘experts’ to assist the bishops in relation to the media, but also obliges the bishops to train the 
experts and to legislate at local level.  It is clear, therefore, that although teachers are not 
referred to but are classed canonically as ‘experts’, CIC and Vatican documents leave no 
doubt that the highest standards are required in all Catholic educational institutions. New 
norms, however, could clarify: precisely what professional qualifications are required and 
what constitutes equivalent experience or expertise; which teachers require a mandate; whose 
responsibility it is to obtain or grant it; and whose responsibility it is to remove it.   
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 CHAPTER 4 
 
THE LAW OF MARRIAGE AND ITS TREATMENT OF EXPERTS 
 
This Chapter examines the canon law of the Catholic Church on matrimony and the role of 
experts under it in determining the capacity of the parties to marriage.  Capacity, including 
psychological capacity for marriage, is fundamental to a valid marriage; incapacity renders a 
marriage invalid.  Moreover, establishing psychological incapacity is equally vital before a failed 
marriage can be declared invalid under this head.  The law requires experts to play a key role in 
marriage nullity cases concerning psychological incapacity.  By way of contrast, however, there 
are some circumstances in which the decision-maker who declares a marriage invalid (usually a 
tribunal) is qualified to make the decision alone, and so the role of experts in establishing 
incapacity is minimal or not required, or has discretion as to whether or not to consult experts.   
 
What follows examines: (1) the substantive law of marriage (as it expresses the doctrine of the 
Church); (2) the structure, competence and procedure of the marriage tribunals; (3) the law on 
the use of experts in marriage cases generally; and (4) the use of experts in the process of 
declarations of marriage nullity with particular reference to their use in the special case of 
psychological incapacity.  These matters are explored by analysis of materials including, the 
Catechism of the Catholic Church, CIC (particularly canon 1095 on psychological incapacity), 
jurisprudence of the papal tribunals, papal speeches to tribunal personnel (namely, Papal 
Allocutions), other Vatican documents and the writings of canonists.  Comparisons will also be 
made with the use of experts in CIC 1917 and CCEO.  This examination is needed in order to 
establish the framework for the case studies (treated in Chapters 5 and 6) and whether the 
judicial processes used in these cases comply with the relevant law.  
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1. THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW OF MARRIAGE 
 
The substantive law of the Church deals with what constitutes marriage - that is, its nature and 
formation; what prevents formation; and how the Church deals with ‘terminating’ these unions.1   
 
The Nature of Marriage: Formation and Validity: In Roman Catholic doctrine, the consent of 
the parties makes a marriage; and consummation makes a ratified marriage absolutely 
indissoluble.2  Marriage was established by the Creator, and is an irrevocable covenant,3 entered 
into by mutual and free consent, exchanged between one man and one woman.4  Parties consent 
to indissolubility, fidelity and a union open to fertility.5  The vocation to marriage ‘is written in 
the very nature of man and woman as they came from the hand of the Creator’.6  To marry, 
therefore, is a right of natural law.7  Although marriage can be threatened with disorder by evil, 
this can be overcome with God’s grace.8  The law of the Church is built around these doctrinal 
tenets.  
 
1 If formation is prevented a true marriage fails to come into existence and therefore it can be declared null, ab initio, 
that is, from the outset, as distinct from terminated. 
2 CCC, p364, para 1626.  See Appendix IV.  In 12C the school of Bologna (represented essentially by the canonist 
Gratian) held that the exchange of solemn promises and consummation made marriage, whilst the school of Paris 
(represented by the theologian, Peter Lombard) held that consent alone made marriage.  Alexander III ended the 
debate by decreeing, in 1181 that marriage came into being through consent alone, but the bond could not be 
dissolved if the marriage was consummated.  Therefore, consummation made sacramental marriage (that is, 
between two Christians) absolutely indissoluble.  The principle of consensual contracts was already established in 
Roman law, but it was not until the 12C that canonists classified marriage in the context of a consensual contract.  
See Beal, New Comm, p1236 and Ladislas Örsy, Marriage in Canon Law: Texts and Comments; Reflections and 
Questions, (Dublin, 1988) (hereafter Örsy, Marriage in Canon Law), p26.  At p61, Örsy explains that the exchange 
of consent was akin to the Roman idea of a consensual contract, which was informal rather than formal. 
3 Although CIC uses the word ‘contract’ more frequently, it sometimes refers to a ‘covenant’.  E.g., CIC, cc. 
1055§1; 1057§2; and 1063, 4º.  See Appendix I.  Kelly, L&S, p572, para 2057 explains: ‘The term [covenant], 
which is used to translate the Latin foedus, … serves to broaden and enrich the concept of Christian marriage, by 
linking it (a) to the covenant between God and his chosen people and (b) to the Pauline model of the Church as the 
spouse of Christ, although the terms “covenant” and “contract” refer to the same reality’.  For doctrinal sources see 
CCC, p361, para 1612 in Appendix IV and GS, 48 in Appendix VI.   
4 CCC, p359, para 1605; and p364, paras 1625 and 1628.  See Appendix IV.   ‘Freedom’ has two aspects: freedom 
from canonical impediment; and psychological freedom. 
5 CCC, p361, para 1614; p368, para 1643; and p370, para 1652.  See Appendix IV. 
6 CCC, p359, para 1603.  See Appendix IV.  Marriage is, therefore, a divinely created but natural institution. 
7 GS, 26.  See Appendix VI. 
8 CCC, p360, paras 1606 -1608.  See Appendix IV. 
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CIC 1917 described, but did not define, this doctrinal concept of marriage.9  Between the 
baptized, it was a sacrament; its primary end was the procreation and education of children; its 
secondary end was the mutual support of the spouses; and its essential properties were unity and 
indissolubility.10  CIC, too, describes rather than defines marriage.11  Marriage is a permanent 
and exclusive, irrevocable covenant between one man and one woman’; it is ordered to the well-
being of the spouses and to the procreation and upbringing of children; its essential properties are 
unity and indissolubility; and it results from the legally manifested and free exchange of consent 
between parties who are legally capable of it.12  CIC does not define the rights and duties of the 
spouses either, but these, too, can be deduced largely from various canons.13   As we have seen, 
the parties’ consent obliges them to permanence, fidelity and openness to children; and each 
party assumes, at the exchange of the marital consent, equal obligations and rights within 
marriage and towards the community.14  Moreover, parents have a duty to care for, and educate, 
their children.15     
 
As to validity, under CIC, every marriage, once celebrated according to the law applicable to the 
parties at the time, is presumed to be valid; if validity is challenged by one of the parties, this 
presumption can cede to proof of the contrary.16  CIC canon 1060 provides: 
 
‘Marriage enjoys the favour of the law.  Consequently, in doubt, the validity of a marriage must 
be upheld until the contrary is proven’. 
 
9 Doyle, Text&Comm, p738. 
10 CIC 1917, cc. 1012§1; and 1013§§1 and 2.  See Appendix III. 
11 Several canons are theological statements giving canonical effect to the doctrine of marriage. 
12 CIC, cc. 1055§1; 1056; 1057§§1 and 2; and 1134.  See Appendix I.  The emphasis placed in CIC 1917 on the 
primary and secondary ends of marriage has been abolished. 
13 CCC, p365, para 1631.  See Appendix IV.  See also: Cormac Burke, ‘The Essential Obligations of Matrimony’, 
Studia Canonica, 26 (1992), pp379-399.  Burke notes that the ‘essential’ rights and duties are not listed in canon 
1095, but, citing John Paul II, Allocution to the Roman Rota (1984), in which the Pope acknowledged that the canon 
has been ‘formulated in a generic way’, and awaits ‘further determination’, suggests that the lacuna ‘is evidently 
meant to be filled in by doctrine and in particular by jurisprudence’.   
14 CIC, cc. 226§1; and 1135.  See Appendix I. 
15 CIC, cc. 226§2; 793; 797; 798; and 1136.  See Appendix I.  For Christian parents, this extends to Christian 
education; and for Catholic parents, to Catholic education.  
16 CIC, c. 1674.  See Appendix I.  Kelly, L&S, p576, para 2071 explains: Marriage is presumed to be valid even 
when proof of a ceremony is lacking but marriage is ‘in possession’, that is, ‘where the parties and others genuinely 
believe’ the couple was actually married.  See also DC, Articles 2§1; and 4§1 in Appendix V.  The juridical status of 
this document is discussed below.  Also Michelle Flood, ‘Presumption in Canon Law and its Application to 
Marriage Legislation’, Studia Canonica, 41 (2007), pp401-440, at p407: ‘To overturn a presumption, either the 
presumption itself is challenged or the fact it is established on is challenged’. 
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Although baptism of both parties is required for capacity to receive the sacrament of marriage, 
Roman Catholic canon law admits of different types of marriages: (a) a natural law marriage, 
that is, one between two non-baptised persons or between a baptised person and a non-baptised 
person; (b) a sacramental marriage, that is, one between two baptised persons;17 and (c) a 
ratified and consummated marriage.18  However, all marriages are considered intrinsically 
indissoluble; the continuation of a validly contracted marriage does not depend on the will or 
conduct of the parties.19 
 
CCEO describes marriage, matrimonial consent, and form, similarly to CIC.20  Essential to valid 
marriage, therefore, is the legally manifested and free consent of a man and a woman who are 
legally capable.  This consent must be ordered to: unity; indissolubility; the well-being of the 
spouses; and the procreation, upbringing and education of children. 
 
Termination of a Valid Marriage: Only death of a spouse terminates valid, sacramental and 
consummated marriages.21  Natural law marriages can be dissolved by virtue of the Pauline 
privilege if neither party was baptised and under certain conditions.22  Dissolution by virtue of 
the Petrine privilege is possible if only one party was baptised.23  In these cases, the 
17 CIC, cc. 842§1; 849; and 1055.  See Appendix I.  Baptism is a sacrament of initiation; therefore, a party who is 
not baptised can neither receive nor administer the sacrament of matrimony.  In Roman Catholic theology, parties to 
marriage administer the sacrament to one another;  the minister or official witness ‘assists’ by receiving the parties’ 
matrimonial consent on behalf of the Church (see CCC, p365, para 1630, in Appendix IV).  In Eastern Catholic 
Churches the minister of the sacrament is the priest or bishop who, having received the parties’ consent, ‘crowns’ 
the parties (see CCC, p364, para 1623, Appendix IV).  Marriage is ipso facto a sacrament between baptised parties. 
18 CIC, c. 1061§1.   See Appendix I. 
19 GS, 48.  See Appendix VI.  Also John Paul II, Allocution to the Roman Rota (1997); and Benedict XVI, 
Allocution to the Roman Rota (2009).  See Appendix VII. 
20 CCEO, cc. 776 - 780.  See Appendix II.  With regard to form, because the Eastern Churches are Churches sui 
iuris, some variation occurs.  Also because of the close relationship between the Eastern Catholic and Eastern non-
Catholic (Orthodox) Churches, some variation occurs in the law governing the celebration of marriages between an 
Eastern Catholic and an Eastern non-Catholic (see CCEO, cc. 828-842 in Appendix II). 
21 CIC, c. 1141.  See Appendix I. 
22 See CIC, cc. 1143-1150 for norms governing dissolution by virtue of the Pauline Privilege (when neither party 
was baptised throughout the marriage and one seeks baptism but the other departs).  If one party receives baptism 
during the marriage, the Petrine privilege applies.  See Appendix I. 
23 Petrine privilege cases (when only one party was baptised throughout the marriage and a party seeks a new 
marriage) are governed by their own norms.  If the unbaptised party receives baptism during the marriage, the 
marriage automatically becomes sacramental.  See SCDF, Instruction, Ut notum est (6 December 1973), cited by 
Kelly, L&S, p650, para 2321.  Interestingly, according to Kelly, these norms were not promulgated but an English 
translation can be found in Canon Law Digest, 8, pp1177-1184.   
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ecclesiastical authorities alone are usually competent but they could consult experts, for example 
to authenticate documents.   
 
A party to a valid sacramental but non-consummated marriage can, for a just reason, seek 
dissolution and dispensation from the obligations of marriage from the Roman Pontiff.24  Under 
CIC 1917, in these cases in which non-consummation was claimed, the use of experts for 
corporal inspection was mandated, unless this would serve no purpose.25  Whilst this is not 
required under CIC, provision is made for expert assistance in difficult cases or if the Apostolic 
See considers that the fact of non-consummation has not been proven.26 
 
Termination of an Invalid ‘Marriage’: Although all celebrated marriages are presumed valid, 
canon law recognises that by virtue of a serious flaw, some are not true marriages as understood 
by the Church.27  Canon law does not treat of ‘voidable’ marriages; consequently, any marriage 
declared null is considered null ab initio.  Whilst canon law enshrines the principle of freedom to 
marry, it also recognises that the natural right to marry is not absolute.28  Formation of marriage 
is prevented by: the existence of an impediment; lack or defect of form; or invalid consent.   
 
Impediments to marriage: CIC 1917 distinguished impedient impediments, which simply 
forbade marriages and therefore rendered them unlawful, from diriment impediments, which 
were invalidating.29  CIC makes no such distinction: a diriment impediment renders a person 
24 CIC, c. 1142.  See Appendix I.  The process for dispensation from non-consummated marriage is governed by 
CIC, cc. 1697-1706.   
25 CIC 1917, c. 1976.  See Appendix III. 
26 CIC, cc. 1701§2; and 1705§3.  See Appendix I. 
27 They are, however, considered putative marriages and children born of these unions are legitimate.  See CIC, cc. 
1061§3 and 1137 in Appendix I.  Kelly in L&S, p578, para 2075, citing CComm, rep 26.I.1949; and CLD 3 405 
explains: ‘“celebrated” in this context means celebrated before the Church’ and cases of total lack of form, such as 
occurs when a Catholic marries outside the Church without dispensation,  are not considered putative marriages.  In 
order to be considered ‘putative’ and therefore subject to judicial process, a marriage ‘must be invalid by reason of 
an impediment, a defect of consent, or a defect of canonical form which was not total, e.g., where the person 
assisting at the marriage was not authorised to do so in accordance with Cann.1108-1112, or where there were not 
two witnesses’.  However, if the parties were unaware of the lack of authorisation, or a party became aware at a later 
date, a sanatio in radice (retroactive validation) is possible.  Although CIC does not repeat the negative implications 
of illegitimacy of CIC 1917, Kelly, L&S, p641, para 2294, citing Comm, 10 (1978) 106 at Can 333; 15 (1983) 240 at 
Can 1091-1094 explains that the notion of illegitimacy was retained ‘since it might have consequences in particular 
law and in order to highlight the sanctity of marriage’.  
28 CIC, cc. 843§1; and 1058.  See Appendix I. 
29 CIC 1917, c. 1036§§1 and 2.  See Appendix III. 
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incapable of marriage.30  CIC contains an exhaustive list of impediments; namely: lack of the 
requisite age; antecedent and perpetual impotence; prior bond; non-baptism of one party; sacred 
orders; public perpetual vow of chastity taken in a religious institute; abduction for the purpose 
of marriage; murder for the purpose of marriage; prohibited degrees of kinship (consanguinity); 
affinity; public propriety; and legal relationship arising from adoption.31  CCEO lists similar, 
invalidating, impediments.32 
 
It is worth noting at this stage of our discussion that ecclesiastical authorities (typically clergy) 
have discretion as to the use of experts to establish the existence of impediments (either by 
approaching experts during the investigation for freedom to marry prior to marriage, or when the 
validity of a marriage is challenged on the basis of an impediment).33  However, in the case of 
the impediment of impotence, which, whether due to a physical or psychological cause, is a 
medical condition, consulting at least one expert is mandatory (unless the authority decides that 
this would serve no purpose).34  Consequently its true existence, and its antecedent and perpetual 
30 CIC, c. 1073.  See Appendix I.  Kelly, L&S, p589, para 2110, commenting on this canon, explains that a diriment 
impediment ‘is an objective circumstance attaching to a person which, in virtue of either divine or human law, 
makes that person incapable of validly contracting marriage.  … [It] is not to be interpreted as a restriction on the 
natural right to marry enjoyed by all; it is, rather to be seen as a necessary regulation of the exercise of that right, in 
the specific interest of the spouses themselves, of the family and of the common good of society (see Can. 1058).  
Thus understood, this canon is a clear example of an incapacitating law (see can 10 and commentary thereon), 
which operates independently of the person’s knowledge or will; in other words, it renders invalid even a marriage 
which is contracted in good faith by one or both of the parties (see Can 15§1).  This is so even if the impediment 
directly affects only one of the parties, as e.g., in the case of the impediment of age (see Can 1083§1): a marriage 
cannot be invalid for one party and valid for the other’.  Emphases in original.  See also CIC, c. 1073.  Impediments 
are governed by cc. 1073-1094.   Some are of divine law, which bind Catholics and non-Catholics alike and cannot 
be dispensed; for example the impediment of consanguinity in the direct line and in the second degree of the 
collateral line (CIC, cc. 1091§1; and 1078§3).  Others, of merely ecclesiastical law, binding only Catholics, can be 
dispensed, but some require that certain conditions are met (see for example, CIC, c. 1129).   Dispensation is 
sometimes reserved to the Holy See (see CIC, c. 1078§2).  In some cases, ecclesiastical law is an extension of divine 
law: for example divine law prohibits marriage in the direct line of consanguinity and up to the second degree of the 
collateral line; ecclesiastical law extends this to the fourth degree (see CIC, c. 1091§1).  See Appendix I. 
31 CIC, cc. 109§1; 1075§1; 1083§1; 1084§1; and 1085-1094.  See Appendix I.  Kelly, L&S, p609 explains: ‘The 
impediment of affinity is based upon a relationship through a valid marriage. It exists between the man and the 
blood relations of the woman, and between the woman and the blood relations of the man’. 
32 CCEO, cc. 790§1; and 800-812.  However, these are not identical to CIC: for example, CCEO, c. 811 retains the 
CIC 1917 (c. 1079) impediment of spiritual relationship, that is between the person being baptised and the sponsor 
or the minister, which is no longer retained in CIC.  See Appendix II. 
33 CIC, cc. 1066; and 1574.  See Appendix I. 
34 CIC, c. 1680.  See Appendix I. 
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nature, must be established; where doubt exists, marriage is neither to be forbidden, nor declared 
null.35 
 
Lack/Defect of Form: There is some tension between the doctrine that consent alone makes 
marriage and canon law, which adds other associated formal criteria for validity; CIC stipulates 
that Roman Catholics are incapable of valid marriage unless they manifest that consent 
according to the norms laid down for ritual.36  An authorised or delegated person must assist by 
receiving consent in the name of the Church.37  The marriage must take place ordinarily in the 
parish church of one of the parties; otherwise permission is required.38  Liturgical norms must be 
followed, and records kept.39  This tension between doctrine and law is highlighted in CIC canon 
1107, which presumes valid consent despite the existence of an impediment or defect of form.40  
Nevertheless, when at least one party to a marriage is Catholic, capacity for valid marriage 
involves conformity with canon law governing ritual.  However, when only one party is 
35 CIC, c. 1084§2.  See Appendix I.  Kelly L&S, p599, para 2142 explains: ‘[Impotence] involves three essential 
elements: (a) erection of the male member; (b) penetration, at least partial, by it of the female vagina; (c) ejaculation 
within the vagina.  If any of these is impossible - for whatever reason, whether on the part of the male or on that of 
the female - there is impotence.  This impotence will, however, invalidate a marriage only if it is antecedent, 
perpetual and certain’. 
36 CIC, c. 1.  See Appendix I.  Also Kelly, L&S, p622, para 2229, citing Fourth Lateran Council Constitution 51: 
Conciliorum Oecumenicorum Decreta, Bologna 1991 258, 755-757 and Denzinger & Schönmetzer Enchiridion 
Symbolorum 1813-1816, explains that the Council of Trent issued a decree Tametsi  in 1563, which, for validity, 
required a marriage to be celebrated before an authorised priest and at least two witnesses, a record of which was to 
be kept in the parish register.  Beal, New Comm, p1238, ft 30, citing AAS, 40 (2 August 1907) pp525-530, explains 
that because of the upheaval caused by the Reformation, Tametsi was not universally promulgated, particularly in 
Protestant countries.  It was not until the Sacred Congregation for the Council promulgated the decree Ne Temere in 
1907 that the law requiring the observance of the ‘form’ of marriage  for validity, was promulgated universally.  See 
also CCC, p365, paras 1630 and 1631.  See also James A Brundage, Law, Sex and Christian Society in Medieval 
Europe (Chicago and London, 1987) pp552-561.      
37 CIC, cc. 1108 - 1123 for norms governing the form of marriage.  See Appendix I.  The term ‘lack of form’ is used 
when there is a total lack, that is, when, for example a Catholic marries totally outside the Church without 
dispensation.  The term ‘defect of form’ is used when, for example, the assisting minister is not properly delegated.  
See ft 27 above.  The requirements of c. 1112§2, that a delegated lay person be: ‘suitable’; ‘capable of giving 
instruction to those who are getting married’; and ‘fitted to conduct the marriage liturgy properly’; does not, 
however, go to the validity of the marriage.  Kelly, L&S, p626, para 2243, citing Comm, 15 (1983), 236 at Can. 
1066, explains that the lay person acts as a ‘qualified witness’ and is ‘in no way exercising the power of governance’ 
and ‘may not do anything reserved to a priest or deacon’.  
38 CIC, c. 1115; and 1118.  Permission is also required for a marriage between a Catholic and a non-Catholic 
Christian  (see CIC, c. 1124).  CIC, cc. 1125- 1128 provide for the conditions under which permission can be 
granted.   However, failure to obtain permission goes to lawfulness rather than validity (see MM, 1 in Appendix VI).  
CIC, cc. 1116; and 1130-1133, make provision for exceptional circumstances in the absence of a delegated minister 
and for marriages celebrated in secret.  See Appendix I. 
39 CIC, cc. 1119-1123.  See Appendix I. 
40 CIC, cc. 1107; and 1161§1.  See Appendix I.  This is significant in cases of the retroactive validation of an invalid 
marriage due to cessation of the invalidating impediment, when consent can be assumed to endure. 
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Catholic, a dispensation can be granted; no experts are involved as the local Ordinary is 
competent to grant the dispensation.41  When non-Catholic Christians marry, the Catholic 
Church applies the law governing marriage in their own church or ecclesial community.42  
Likewise, in the case of non-Christians, the law by which the parties were bound at the time of 
the marriage is applied by the Catholic Church.43  
 
Invalid consent: The law recognises certain circumstances invalidating marital consent:  
psychological incapacity; ignorance; error of person; error concerning a quality of person, which 
was directly and principally intended; deceit; error determining the will concerning the unity, 
indissolubility, or sacramental dignity of marriage; a positive act of the will excluding marriage, 
or ‘any essential element’ or ‘any essential property’ of marriage; the unlawful imposition by one 
party of a condition upon the other; force or grave fear; or absence of a party from the ceremony, 
or absence of a valid proxy.44  CCEO lists similar circumstances.45 
 
2. THE STRUCTURE, COMPETENCE AND PROCEDURE OF THE TRIBUNALS 
 
This section begins with the hierarchical structure of tribunals and the personnel who function 
within them.  The law concerning the competence of tribunals generally and with regard to 
marriage cases will then be outlined, followed by the law governing administrative and judicial 
procedures in marriage cases. 
 
Structure of Tribunals: Roman Catholic ecclesiastical courts, referred to as tribunals, are 
hierarchically structured.46  The Pope is the supreme judge in the Church.47  The diocesan bishop 
41 CIC, c. 1127§2.  See Appendix I. 
42 Dignitas Connubii (DC), Article 4§1.  See Appendix V. 
43 DC, Article 4§2.  See Appendix V. 
44 CIC, cc. 1095-1099; 1101-1105.  See Appendix I.  Canon law governing the intention of the mind required to 
receive sacraments is based on sacramental theology; the intention must be to do what the Church intends.  See 
Ladislas Örsy, Marriage in Canon Law: Texts and Comments; Reflections and Questions (Dublin, 1988) (hereafter, 
Örsy, Marriage in Canon Law), p127.  Kelly, L&S, p617, para 2210, defines a condition placed on a marriage thus: 
‘a stipulation by which an agreement is made contingent upon the verification or fulfilment of some circumstance or 
event which is not yet certain’. 
45 CCEO, cc. 818- 827.  See Appendix II. 
46 Because Eastern Churches are churches sui iuris, there are some differences between CIC and CCEO in the 
provisions for church tribunals.   See CCEO, cc. 1055-1085 in Appendix II. 
47 CIC, c. 1442.  See Appendix I. 
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is the judge of a local (diocesan) tribunal of First Instance.48  Appeals from First Instance are 
usually heard by the Appellate Metropolitan Tribunal of Second Instance.49  Further appeals to 
higher instances are usually heard at the Papal Tribunal, called the Roman Rota.50  The Church’s 
supreme tribunal is the Apostolic Signatura.51  The purposes of a trial are: (1) to pursue or 
vindicate rights; (2) to declare juridical facts; or (3) to impose or declare penalties.52  Marriage 
cases concern (1) and (2).53 
 
The diocesan bishop is obliged to appoint a Judicial Vicar, who is his principal judge, but may 
also appoint assistants, called ‘associate Judicial Vicars’.54  The diocesan bishop is also obliged 
to appoint clerical judges, but may, with approval of the Bishops’ Conference, also appoint lay 
judges; all these personnel must have a doctorate or licentiate in canon law and be ‘of good 
repute’.55    
 
The diocesan bishop must also appoint a promoter of justice and a defender of the bond, who can 
be clerics or lay people, but must also have a doctorate or licentiate in canon law and be ‘of good 
repute’ and ‘of proven prudence and zeal for justice’.56  The former must participate in penal 
cases and is bound to protect the public good; the latter must intervene in cases involving nullity 
of sacred orders or nullity or dissolution of marriage and must highlight everything which can be 
argued reasonably against nullity or dissolution.57  When the law mandates the participation of 
these tribunal officials, their absence renders the Acts of the case null.58  
 
48 CIC, c. 1419.  See Appendix I. 
49 CIC, c. 1438.  See Appendix I.  See c. 435 for a definition of Metropolitan. 
50 CIC, cc. 1443; and 1444§1.  See Appendix I. 
51 CIC, c. 1445§1.  See Appendix I.  The Apostolic Signatura, the Church’s Supreme Tribunal sometimes grants 
competence to Second Instance Tribunals to hear cases in the third grade. 
52 CIC, c. 1440.  See Appendix I. 
53 The imposition of a vetitum (a prohibition on future marriage) is not a penalty; it is a pastoral tool to ensure that a 
new marriage is not contracted until the invalidating cause no longer exists.  See ft 98 below. 
54 CIC, c. 1420§§1, 2 and 3.  See Appendix I. 
55 CIC, cc. 1420§4; and 1421§§1, 2 and 3.  See Appendix I. 
56 CIC, c. 1435.  See Appendix I. 
57 CIC, cc. 1430; 1431§1; 1432; 1696; and 1721.  See Appendix I. 
58 CIC, c. 1433.  See Appendix I.  ‘Acts’ refer to the entire bundle of papers put before the judges.  As will become 
clear in Chapters 5 and 6, validity of the procedural Acts is of particular importance in marriage nullity cases, the 
purpose of which is to pronounce on the personal status of the parties, that is, whether or not they are free to marry. 
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A party may appoint an advocate and procurator; but in penal cases, the appointment of an 
advocate is mandatory.59  Advocates and procurators must be adults of good reputation and must 
present an authentic mandate to the tribunal; the advocate, however, must be Catholic, unless the 
diocesan bishop permits otherwise, and must hold a doctorate in canon law or be ‘truly skilled’ 
and approved by the same bishop.60  It can be argued, therefore, that personnel who must have 
specific qualities, academic qualifications and experience are themselves ‘experts’ in their field.  
CCEO makes similar provisions to CIC.61 
 
Competence of Tribunals: The Church claims exclusive competence to judge, not only 
disciplinary cases, but those ‘linked with the spiritual’, which include marriage cases.62  Canon 
law governs the competent forum for judicial cases generally; for example, some cases are 
reserved to the Roman Pontiff, or to the Roman Rota.63  Otherwise, the competent forum can be: 
one’s domicile or quasi-domicile; the place where the relevant subject matter is located; the place 
of contract; or the place where the offence was committed.64  Canon law also governs the 
competence of judges.65  Nevertheless, the faithful retain the right to approach the Holy See 
directly.66   
 
With regard to marriage nullity cases, although the Church recognises the power of the civil 
authority over the merely civil effects of marriage,67 her claim to competence over the marriages 
of the baptised, even if only one party is baptised, is comprehensive.68  The Church, however, 
only hears marriage nullity cases of non-Catholics when there is a Catholic interest, that is, in 
order to establish a party’s freedom to marry a Catholic.69  The competent forum for marriage 
59 CIC, c. 1481.  See Appendix I. 
60 CIC, cc. 1483; and 1484.  See Appendix I. 
61 CCEO, c. 1086-1101.  See Appendix II. 
62 CIC, cc. 1401; and 1671.  See Appendix I.  Kelly, L&S, p572, para 2059 explains that even before marriage was 
formally defined as a sacrament in the thirteenth century, it was traditionally held, since earliest times, that marriage 
had ‘a sacred dimension’.  
63 CIC, cc. 1404-1416.  See Appendix I. 
64 CIC, cc. 102 (for acquisition of domicile and quasi-domicile); and 1408-1413.  See Appendix I.  See also DC, 
Article 10 in Appendix V, for competence for marriage nullity cases. 
65 CIC, cc. 1406; and 1407.  See Appendix I.  See also DC, Articles 8; and 9 in Appendix V. 
66 CIC, c. 1417.  See Appendix I. 
67 CIC, cc. 1672.  In cases of separation of spouses, see CIC, c. 692§§2, 3.  See Appendix I.  See also CIC 1917, c. 
1016 in Appendix III and CCEO, cc. 780; and 1358 in Appendix II, for this recognition. 
68 CIC, cc. 1059; and 1671.  See Appendix I. 
69 DC, Article 3.  See Appendix V. 
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nullity cases is the tribunal of: the place of marriage; the respondent’s domicile; the plaintiff’s 
domicile if certain conditions are met; or the place where most of the proofs are to be gathered, if 
certain conditions are met.70 
 
Procedural Law: Administrative and Judicial: This sub-section contains a brief outline of: (a) 
the types of marriage cases which can be dealt with administratively and the relevant process; 
and (b) the judicial procedure for marriage nullity cases.   
 
Administrative Cases 
 
Dissolution of valid marriage, involving Pauline or Petrine privileges, are processed 
administratively:71 the former by the diocesan bishop provided all canonical requirements are 
met; the latter, investigated and prepared locally, are forwarded, with the diocesan bishop’s 
recommendation, to the Holy See for decision.72  These ecclesiastical authorities are competent 
in these cases; the involvement of experts is not mandated.  Although not strictly judicial, 
dispensation from ratified but non-consummated marriage cases are prepared locally under 
judicial procedural norms, and are then forwarded, with the bishop’s recommendation, to the 
Roman Rota, for decision.73  Although their use is not mandated, experts may be required in 
these cases to verify the fact of non-consummation.74 
 
Cases involving separation of spouses, when the sacred bond of marriage remains intact, can be 
decided either by the diocesan bishop’s decree or by a judgment of a judge; when canon law has 
70 CIC, c. 1673.  See Appendix I. 
71 See fts 22 and 23 above.  The canons governing Pauline privilege cases are placed in Book IV of the Code, on The 
Sanctifying Office of the Church, not in Book VII on Judicial Procedures.   
72 CIC, cc. 1143-1150.  See Appendix I.  The SCDF is the competent body to process Petrine Privilege cases. 
73 CIC, c. 1142 on non-consummation is also found in Book IV, on The Sanctifying Office of the Church, but the 
process is governed by cc 1697-1706 under judicial processes, but the process differs somewhat from other marriage 
cases – eg, no advocate is involved (c.1701§2) and the Acts are not published (c. 1703§1).  See CIC, c. 85 for 
dispensation as an exercise of ‘executive power’.  See Appendix I.  See also QR, Article 2 in Appendix VI, for 
transfer of competence from the CDWDS to the Roman Rota. This provision came into force on 1 October 2011. 
74 Kelly, L&S, p947, para 3319 explains: ‘Where there is no physical evidence of non-consummation and the basis 
for proving it is what is called the “moral argument”, it will be important to have witnesses as to the moral character 
and credibility of the parties (see Can. 1679).  If the principal evidence of non-consummation is physical, medical 
experts will obviously have to be called to attest to this fact’.  
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no civil effect, a civil judgment can suffice.75  However, spouses retain the right to the ordinary 
contentious process and to appeal.76  Nullity cases due to lack of form are processed 
administratively, similarly to pre-nuptial investigation establishing freedom to marry.77  The 
involvement of experts is not mandated in these cases.  All other nullity cases are subject to the 
judicial process. 
 
Judicial Cases 
 
When the validity of a marriage is challenged, the object of the tribunal is to decide, by a search 
for objective truth, whether the (presumed) validity of marriage is upheld or can be overturned 
by proof of the contrary, in which case the couple is free to exercise their right to marry.78  There 
are two types of judicial procedure for marriage nullity cases: the Ordinary Contentious Process 
and the Documentary Process.  This section also deals with the level of proof required. 
 
Ordinary Contentious Process: Because marriage enjoys the favour of the law and involves the 
public good, any challenge to its validity is contentious, even if a party does not contest the 
allegation.79  Hence, marriage nullity cases are subject to the canons governing:  trials in general; 
the contentious trial; the matrimonial process; and personal status.  These procedural norms have 
been collated in the Instruction Dignitas Connubii (2005).80  Only the spouses, or in exceptional 
cases the promoter of justice, can challenge the validity of marriage.81  Before a judge accepts a 
marriage nullity case, he is obliged, whenever there is hope, to try to persuade the spouses to 
75 CIC, c. 1692.  See Appendix I.  Kelly, L&S, p944, para 3305, citing CCom, rep 25.IV.1932: AAS  24 (1932); CLD 
I 554, explains that the Ordinary, either ex officio or at the request of the parties, can decide whether an 
administrative or judicial process is used.  
76 CIC, c. 1693.  See Appendix I. 
77 As previously explained, lack of form is distinguished from defect of form (see fts 27 and 37 above).  Lack of 
form for a Catholic could be verified by a baptismal certificate confirming baptism into the Catholic Church and a 
subsequent marriage certificate confirming the marriage in a non-Catholic Church or register office in addition to a 
search of the relevant chancellery records to establish whether or not a dispensation had been granted.  In the event 
that a dispensation was granted, the presumption of validity prevails, in which case the judicial process would be 
required to investigate invalidity on a different ground. 
78 DC, Article 65§2.  See Appendix V.  Also Pius XII, Allocution to the Roman Rota (1944); and John Paul II, 
Allocution to the Roman Rota (1989); Appendix VII.   
79 Marriage is not a private contract.  The legal (civil and canonical) requirement to have witnesses and to register 
the  marriage reflects the public, communitarian nature of marriage.   See Benedict XVI, Allocution to the Roman 
Rota (2006); Appendix VII.   
80 Hereafter DC. 
81 DC, Article 92§1.  See Appendix V. 
152 
 
                                                            
resume their conjugal life.82  A party must petition the competent tribunal and the plaintiff bears 
the burden of proof.83  The competent judge must accept or reject the petition.84  The Judicial 
Vicar must constitute the tribunal and inform the plaintiff of the names of the appointed 
personnel.85  The respondent must be cited, after which the case is pending.86  The grounds on 
which the case is to be heard are decided.87  The proofs are gathered: parties and their witnesses 
are questioned and documents can be submitted.88  The judge, too, can provide proofs.89  When 
this process is complete, the parties must have access to accrued evidence and may comment 
further.90  No additional evidence is permitted thereafter, but all evidence gathered must be 
submitted.91  The discussion phase then begins: if an advocate has been involved, pleadings are 
submitted; the defender of the bond then submits observations.92  The parties may respond.93  
The tribunal convenes.94  The judges, having studied and weighed the evidence, bring their own 
written, reasoned opinion on the merits of the case.95  A discussion follows.96  Judges are 
permitted to change their opinions and may send a dissenting judgment secretly to the Appeal 
tribunal.97  Judgment is by majority vote and it is pronounced; and a vetitum is imposed if 
necessary.98  Denial of the right of defence invalidates the judgment.99 
82 DC, Article 65.  See Appendix V.  See also John Paul II, Allocution to the Roman Rota (1990), stating that this 
provision was not to be understood as a mere formality.  See Appendix VII.    
83 DC, Article s 114; 115§1; and 156§1.  See Appendix V. 
84 DC, Articles 119; and 121.  See Appendix V. 
85 DC, Article 118.  See Appendix V. 
86 DC, Articles 126-134; and 138-142.  See also Articles 143- 152 governing suspension, abatement and 
renunciation of the instance and Articles 153-154 governing suspension in cases of doubtful consummation.  See 
Appendix V. 
87 DC, Articles 135-137, govern this procedure.  See Appendix V.  The parties can have recourse against these 
grounds.   
88 DC, Articles 155-202.  See Appendix V. 
89 DC, Article 7§2.  See Appendix V. 
90 DC, Articles 229-236.  See Appendix V. 
91 DC, Articles 237-239; and 241.  See Appendix V. 
92 DC, Article 240.  See Appendix V. 
93 DC, Articles 242; and 243§1.  See Appendix V. 
94 DC, Articles 246-262.  See Appendix V. 
95 DC, Articles 48§1 (for norms on assigning judges); and 248 for the convening of the tribunal for judgment.   See 
Appendix V.  Also CIC, c. 1425 for cases reserved to a collegiate tribunal of three judges: these include contentious 
cases concerning the bond of marriage.  See Appendix I. 
96 DC, Article 248§3.  See Appendix V. 
97 DC, Article 248§4.  See Appendix V. 
98 Articles 31; 250§1; and 254§1.  See Appendix V.  A vetitum is a prohibition on future marriage.   See Jack Hopka, 
‘The Vetitum and Monitum in Matrimonial Proceedings’, in Studia Canonica, 19 (1985), pp357-399 (hereafter 
Hopka, ‘The Vetitum and Monitum’), p357.  A vetitum can be administrative, for example, when it is applied to 
postpone a marriage in accordance with canon 1066, or judicial, when added to a judicial sentence.  See also CIC, 
cc. 1684§1; and 1070, in Appendix I, providing for a prohibition on future marriage, but only the supreme authority 
in the Church can attach an invalidating clause to a prohibition.  See also DC, Article 251, in Appendix V, for cases 
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 Documentary Process: Marriage nullity cases involving impediments or defect of form can be 
decided by a single judge, following the (mandatory) intervention of the defender of the bond, 
using an abbreviated, so called, ‘documentary process’, on the basis of an authentic and 
incontrovertible document establishing the allegation and it is certain that no dispensation was 
granted.100  If witness evidence is required, the ordinary contentious process is applicable.101  
That the defender of the bond is obliged to lodge an appeal, if there is doubt about the facts, 
implies that, unlike the ordinary contentious process, there is no automatic appeal.102  The 
parties, however, retain the right of appeal.103  If the judge fails to reach moral certainty of 
nullity he remits the case to the ordinary contentious process at First Instance.104 
 
Level of Proof Required to Declare Marriage Invalid: Following the provisions of law regarding 
the efficacy of proofs, and having weighed those proofs in accordance with his conscience, the 
judge must reach ‘moral certainty’ of nullity, based on the acts and the proofs, before declaring a 
in which a prohibition is mandatory and those in which consideration of an imposition is mandatory.   See also Kelly 
in L&S, p940, para 2393:  Kelly holds that the importance of this pastoral tool is disregarded or at least considered 
of little importance, usually on the ‘simplistic grounds’ that it does not invalidate a future marriage; however, he 
makes the point that ‘the purpose of a vetitum is twofold: (a) to protect the sacrament of marriage; and (b) to alert a 
future possibly unsuspecting spouse or perhaps even a deceived spouse to the problems which occasioned the 
breakdown of the previous union’. 
99 CIC, c. 1620.  See Appendix I. 
100 CIC, cc. 1686; and 1688. See Appendix I.   Also DC, Articles 295-299; Appendix V.   
101 Robert Bourgon, L&S, p880, para 3069, holds that documentary cases are an exception to the norm of CIC, c. 
1547, permitting witness evidence in all cases under the discretion of the judge.  However, this interpretation is not 
universally held.  Craig A Cox, New Comm, p1781, acknowledges Bourgon’s view, but holds, that witness evidence 
is permitted.  DC Article 296§2, however, obliges the judge to ensure that all the requirements of the canon are met 
before embarking on the documentary process and Article 297§1obliges him, in cases of impotence or defect of 
form, to carry out a preliminary investigation ‘lest a cause be admitted lightly and with temerity to the documentary 
process’.  See Appendix V, for full text.   Moreover, William Daniel, ‘Motives in Decernendo for Admitting a 
Cause of Marriage Nullity to an Ordinary Examination’, Studia Canonica, 26 (2011), pp67-120, at p69-70, criticises 
Craig and others’ interpretation of law, as ‘highly objectionable’, albeit on the issue of the role of the Second 
Instance Tribunal.  Moreover, the ECtHR Pellegrini -v- Italy, 20 July 2001 (Application No: 30882/96), was highly 
critical of the ecclesiastical tribunals when, although witness evidence was submitted, they used the documentary 
process. 
102 CIC, c. 1687.  See Appendix I.  Kelly in L&S, p942, para 3298, however, appears to understand that if the 
defender is in doubt, there is no obligation to appeal: ‘[T]he defender can appeal against the sentence if he prudently 
considers that the defects mentioned in Can. 1686 are not established or that there is some doubt about the lack of a 
dispensation (§1)’.  Emphasis added. 
103 CIC, c. 1687§2.  See Appendix I.  
104 CIC, c. 1686 permits the judge to omit the formalities of the ordinary contentious process if uncontroverted 
documents prove nullity of the marriage.  See also CIC, c. 1688 in Appendix I and Kelly, L&S, p942, para 3297.  
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marriage null; otherwise, he is obliged to find the case not proven.105   Strict norms govern the 
content of the judgment, and the method of communication to the parties.106  Compliance is 
crucial, going to efficacy and legitimacy of the transmission of the case to Second Instance.107  
Parties must be advised as to how the decision can be challenged.108   
 
A decision for nullity is subject to automatic appeal.109  Provision is made for challenging the 
judgment, either by a plaint of nullity, or by appeal.110  Two conforming sentences are required 
before a declaration of nullity can be issued.111  First Instance decisions for nullity can be ratified 
by an abbreviated process, or, if the judges cannot reach moral certainty of nullity by this 
abbreviated process, the First Instance decision can be confirmed after a Second Instance hearing 
following the ordinary contentious process, even with the possibility of submitting further 
evidence.112  First Instance decisions against nullity, if appealed, are always subject to the 
ordinary contentious process at Second Instance, as are those cases appealed to higher grades of 
trial.113  Marriage cases never become an adjudged matter; they remain open to challenge at a 
new examination on the basis of new and serious proofs.114  
105 DC, Article 247§§2-5.  See Appendix V.   See also Pius XII, Allocution to the Roman Rota (1942) for a 
definition of ‘moral certainty’; Appendix VII.  It is akin to the concept of ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ in secular 
criminal law.     
106 DC, Articles 250-256; and 258.  See Appendix V.  Although the term ‘publication’ is used, it refers only to the 
principle parties (or their procurators) and the defender of the bond.  See also John Paul II, Allocution to the Roman 
Rota (1989) in Appendix VII. 
107 DC, Article 257§1.  See Appendix V.  See also John Paul II, Allocution to the Roman Rota (1989) in Appendix 
VII.  Grzegorz Erlebach (Judge of the Roman Rota), ‘The Challenge of the Sentence and the Transmission of the 
Cause Ex Officio’, in Dugan, 117-140 at pp126-128, insists that the full reasoned judgment (not just the dispositive 
part), must be given or sent to the parties as the ‘most fundamental prerequisite’ to legitimate transmission of a 
cause to the appeal tribunal.  At p127, ft 28, Erlebach criticises tribunals for practices which are ‘incongruous with 
the law’, by which tribunals send ‘only the dispositive part of the sentence with a note that the party may request a 
complete copy of the sentence at the tribunal offices’.  
108 CIC, c. 1614.  See Appendix I.  Also DC, Article 257§2; Appendix V. 
109 DC, Article 263-268.  See Appendix V. 
110 DC, Articles 269-278 (governing a plaint of nullity); and Articles 279-289 (governing appeal).  See Appendix V. 
111 DC, Article 291.  See Appendix V. 
112 DC, Article 265; and 267§1.   See Appendix V. 
113 DC, Articles 266; and 268.  See Appendix V.  A Third Instance judgment is required if the judgments at First and 
Second Instance are not in conformity.  The grade of tribunal does not always coincide with the grade of trial.  See 
CIC, cc. 1417; 1632§2; and 1683 in Appendix I. 
114 DC, Articles 289§1; and 290§1.  See Appendix V.  There are many examples of this occurring; for example, see 
Augustine Mendonça (Ed), Rotal Anthology: An Annotated Index of Rotal Decisions from 1971 to 1988 (CLSA, 
1992) (hereafter Mendonça, Anthology): Case No: 83-097, coram Pinto, 27 May 1983, ME 110 (1985) 328-337, 
pp64-65 and Case No: 75-050, coram Raad, 14 April 1975, Dec 67 (1986) 238-272, p89.  Although there had been 
two conforming decisions for nullity in these cases, the respondent in the former case and the respondent and 
defender in the latter, appealed to the Roman Rota, which admitted the case to a new hearing on the basis of ‘serious 
violations of procedural law by the first instance tribunal’ in the former and ‘approaches and opinions’ which were 
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 3. THE LAW ON THE USE OF EXPERTS IN MARRIAGE CASES GENERALLY 
 
CIC is more attentive to marriage preparation than was CIC 1917.  It outlines the responsibility 
of the faithful for sacramental preparation, including marriage.115 Although the term ‘expert’ is 
not used, the local ordinary has responsibility to provide for pre- and post-marital assistance, 
having, ‘if opportune’, consulted men and women ‘of proven experience and expertise’.116  But 
the law is silent on what is required to fulfill these criteria.  Nevertheless, canon law requires that 
it be positively established, with the help of the community, that no obstacle to valid or lawful 
celebration of marriage exists; this requires moral certainty to be reached.117  Although marriage 
can be postponed, allowing time for resolution of doubt, there is no mandatory requirement to 
consult experts, at this stage, about the capacity of the parties to marry.118   
 
As was the case under CIC 1917, the current canons governing the use of experts are placed 
amongst those governing trials.119  CCEO does likewise and makes similar provisions to CIC.120  
CIC 1917, like CIC provided for consultation with experts whenever the law or the judge 
required it to establish some fact or to discern the true nature of something.121  Without defining 
the word ‘expert’, it is, and was under CIC 1917, acknowledged that nevertheless, dialogue with 
experts was required, not just in judicial cases, but in other areas of decision-making and in other 
types of cases, as we have seen in previous chapters.122  The provisions of these codes will be 
‘not in line with current doctrine and jurisprudence’ in the latter.  The Rota unheld the validity of the marriage in 
both cases. 
115 CIC, cc. 843§2; and 1063.  See Appendix I. 
116 CIC, c. 1064.  See Appendix I.  The American translations use the words ‘proven experience and skill’. 
117 CIC, cc. 1066 - 1070.  See Appendix I.  Kelly in L&S, p583, para 2094 explains that this obligation is not 
restricted to reporting listed impediments, but includes ‘other possible invalidating factors’ such as, ‘serious 
psychiatric illness’, ‘gross personal immaturity’, a ‘manifestly serious alcohol problem’,  or the existence of duress 
or a condition.  Doyle, Text&Comm, p581, para 2087 explains that ‘positive proof’ of the legal freedom to marry is 
required and ‘the person responsible for the preparation of the couple must be morally certain about their 
freedom…’.   
118 CIC, c. 1077.  See Appendix I.  As this canon restricts the free exercise of rights, it must, according to c. 18 be 
interpreted strictly.  
119 CIC 1917, Chapter III of Volume VII, Book IV on Ecclesiastical Trials, cc. cc 1792-1805.  CIC Book VII: 
Judicial Procedures, cc. 1574-1581. 
120 CCEO, Title XXV, cc. 1255-1262. 
121 CIC 1917, c. 1792.  See Appendix III.  CIC, cc. 1574-1581.  See Appendix I. 
122 Breitenbeck, Doctoral Thesis, p6 acknowledges the lack of definition  despite the requirement to consult experts 
in ‘several key areas of decision-making’.  Bourgon, L&S, p891, para 3108 refers to consulting ‘the psychological or 
psychiatric expert’ in marriage-nullity cases, but other situations could call for ‘theological, medical, legal, artistic’, 
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compared here as it is important to distinguish: (a) the roles that experts play in marriage nullity 
cases; and (b) discretionary and mandatory use of experts. 
 
Experts under CIC 1917: Under CIC 1917, the ecclesiastical judge: 
 
• Selected the expert: in private cases, he did so at the request of at least one party, with the 
consent of the other; in cases involving the public good, he was obliged to consult the 
promoter of justice and defender of the bond;123  
• Had discretion to consult an expert in certain circumstances, or to recall an expert for 
clarification; 124 
• Defined the issues to be addressed by the expert;125 
• Decided on the number of experts if not stipulated by law;126   
• Had discretion as to whether or not parties could be present while the expert fulfilled his 
task;127 
• Had discretion to set the time-limit for the expert’s submission of his report, and to 
extend this having first consulted the parties;128 
• Had discretion to consult additional experts if the original experts disagreed or were 
unsuitable;129 
• Was obliged to weigh, in addition to the experts’ opinions, the circumstances of the 
case;130 and: 
• Was obliged to explain, when he gave his decision, why he accepted or rejected the 
experts’ opinions.131 
or ‘financial experts’.  Wrenn, Text&Comm, p986, refers to ‘psychiatrists, psychologists’ and ‘gynaecologists, 
urologists, and even handwriting analysts’.  Cox, New Comm, p1693, refers to experts in ‘psychology, anthropology, 
sociology, theology, finance’ and ‘authentication of documents etc’.  Boccafola, in ExComm, Vol IV, 2, p1328, 
refers to experts in: the restoration of ‘fine art’; ‘architecture or building repair; ‘the value of real estate’; or the 
fields of ‘economics, civil law, or even canon law itself’; and ‘the medical doctor and/or psychiatrist’. 
123 CIC 1917, c. 1793.  See Appendix III.   
124 CIC 1917, cc. 1801§2; 1806; and 1808.  See Appendix III. 
125 CIC 1917, c. 1799§1.  See Appendix III. 
126 CIC 1917, c. 1793§3.  See Appendix III. 
127 CIC 1917, c. 1797§2.  See Appendix III. 
128 CIC 1917, c. 1799§2.  See Appendix III. 
129 CIC 1917, c. 1803.  See Appendix III. 
130 CIC 1917, c. 1804§1.  See Appendix III. 
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 However, CIC 1917, canon 1976 provided:  
 
‘An inspection of the body of either or both spouses to be conducted by experts is required in 
cases of impotence or non-consummation, unless this appears evidently useless under the 
circumstances’. 
 
Moreover, canon 1982 provided:  
 
‘Also in cases of defect of consent from amentia [insanity], there is required the vote of experts 
who, if there is cause shall examine the infirm one, according to the precepts of the art, [as well 
as] the actions that led to the suspicion of amentia; moreover, the experts must hear as witnesses 
those who visited the infirm one before’. 
 
Therefore, the mandatory requirement to consult experts referred only to: (a) cases concerning 
impotence or non-consummation of marriage ‘unless this appears evidently useless’; and (b) to 
cases concerning ‘amentia’, ‘if there is cause’.132   
 
Under CIC 1917, experts were: 
 
• Obliged to tell the whole truth; failure resulted in mandatory punishment;133   
• Required to be found suitable by a competent body;134  
• Considered, once they had taken the required oath, to have accepted their function;135  
• Responsible for damages if they failed to complete their task in time;136  
• Required to submit their opinions either orally or in writing; if orally, a written record 
was to be made and signed;137 
• Required to explain their methodology, argumentation and basis for their decision;138 
131 CIC 1917, c. 1804§2.  See Appendix III.  Augustine, Vol VII, p248, interestingly, interprets the provision ‘when 
he gives his decision’, as not being obliged to give reasons for his decision, but if he does, he should explain why he 
admitted or rejected the conclusions of the experts’. 
132 Doyle, Text&Comm, at p775 explains: ‘Traditionally, this ground of nullity [canon 1095] was known as amentia 
or insanity.  This is a legal rather than medical term having no precise diagnostic meaning in either discipline’.  
133 CIC 1917, c. 1794.  This seems to suggest that experts were chosen from among the faithful.  See Appendix III. 
134 CIC 1917, c. 1795§1.  See Appendix III. 
135 CIC 1917, c. 1797§1.  See Appendix III. 
136 CIC 1917, c. 1798.  See Appendix III. 
137 CIC 1917, c. 1801§1.  See Appendix III. 
138 CIC 1917, c. 1801§3.  See Appendix III. 
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• Required to submit individual reports unless the judge requested one to be signed by all; 
any individual disagreements were to be noted;139 
• Subject to the same norms as witnesses in respect of objections and exclusion;140 and: 
• Entitled to remuneration.141 
 
In marriage cases, relatives could act as witnesses to the investigation.142  In cases of impotence 
or non-consummation, character references as to the veracity of the parties were required.143  
Two ‘medical’ experts were required to examine the man; two midwives were required to 
examine the woman unless she requested two physicians or the Ordinary considered this 
necessary.144  Inspection of the woman required the presence of an approved chaperone.145  Each 
expert was required to examine the woman individually and to submit individual reports within 
the prescribed time limit.146  The judge had discretion to have mid-midwives’ reports 
scrutinised.147  Having submitted their reports, all experts and the chaperone involved were 
interviewed individually under oath.148  Those who examined the parties previously could not act 
as experts; they could however, give evidence as witnesses.149 
139 CIC 1917, c. 1802.  See Appendix III. 
140 CIC 1917, cc. 1795§2; and 1796.  See Appendix III. 
141 CIC 1917, c. 1805.  See Appendix III. 
142 CIC 1917, c. 1974.  See Appendix III.  Augustine, Vol V, at p422, explains that close relatives were allowed to 
give testimony in marriage cases because they ‘know their genealogy or pedigree better than strangers’. 
143 CIC 1917, cc.1975.  See Appendix III.  Augustine, Vol V, at p423, explains that the ‘seven-hand’ (septima 
manus) proof is of Germanic origin, adopted by Gratian and by the Decretals.  Husband and wife each bring forward 
seven relatives, friends or acquaintances, of either sex, of any age or condition, preferably of their own kin, who are 
acquainted with their character, actions and conduct to testify to their trustworthiness.  Whilst they could not testify 
to the non-consummation, they could be ‘asked whether the couple lived together affectionately, whether there were 
quarrels, whether medicine was used to cure impotency or a physician was consulted’.  At p424 he suggests that an 
example of this exception ‘unless this appears evidently useless’, would be a case of a woman who lived as a 
prostitute following civil divorce, when bodily inspection ‘could hardly bring results’.   He also considers that the 
judge chose the experts ‘after consultation with the defensor vinculi’ [defender of the bond]. 
144 CIC 1917, c. 1979§§1 and 2.  See Appendix III.  Augustine, Vol V, at p425, explains: that two physicians were 
required for the man and, for the woman, two midwives, of good reputation, who were ‘legally approved (by a state 
diploma or county or city certificate) were required; all were to be appointed ex officio’.  See CIC 1917, c. 1980§2, 
for reference to these doctors as ‘physicians or obstetricians’.   
145 CIC 1917, c. 1979§3.  See Appendix III. 
146 CIC 1917, c. 1980§§1 and 2.  See Appendix III. 
147 CIC 1917, c. 1980§3.  See Appendix III.  Augustine, Vol V, at p426 explains that this would ensure that mid-
wives’ reports were ‘made along scientific lines’. 
148 CIC 1917, c. 1981.  See Appendix III.  Augustine, Vol V, at p426, points out that these professionals were also 
bound by their professional obligation to secrecy. 
149 CIC 1917, cc. 1977; and 1978.  See Appendix III. 
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Although ‘amentia’ was interpreted narrowly under CIC 1917, its effect on marital consent was 
understood and consequently, such cases required the vote of experts, who, if there was cause, 
were to examine, according to their expertise, the affected person and the alleged behaviour.150  
Augustine explains that these experts were psychiatrists.151  In addition, experts who had 
attended the party previously ‘should’ be heard as witnesses.152  
 
Although CIC 1917 required that experts were found suitable by a ‘competent’ body, implying 
fitness to practice, it was silent on specific professional qualifications.  Augustine held:   
 
‘[S]cientific equipment is the first qualification of an expert.  From a physician, e.g., we demand 
above all medical knowledge and experience.  This, however, does not exclude, but rather 
implies, honesty and conscientiousness … [Experts should] hold a certificate or diploma as to 
their fitness from a competent public authority, … but no exception [taken against the expert] is 
admissible on the sole plea that a man has no public certificate’.153  
 
Breitenbeck holds that the ‘general consensus of commentators’ was that experts were used 
because they had ‘some type of specialized or technical training or art’.154  She consideres that 
Augustine held the ‘strongest’ view, requiring experts to be able to apply ‘their skill or science to 
the subject in dispute’, whilst others held that an uneducated, uncultured person, including one 
who lacked basic reading skills, could, in certain circumstances be considered ‘expert’, even in 
preference to a qualified expert, particularly if they possessed practical experience.155 
 
 
150 See Appendix III: CIC 1917, c. 1982.  Augustine, Vol V, p427, discussing c. 1982 on amentia,  uses the term 
‘verdict’, rather than ‘vote’ (Latin: suffragium peritorum); there is no suggestion that the experts cast a vote with 
regard to the tribunal’s decision for nullity or otherwise.  Collins Latin-English Dictionary (Glasgow, 1989) gives 
additional meanings for ‘suffragium’: i.e., ‘judgment’ or ‘approval’.  
151 Augustine, Vol V, at p427.   
152 Ibid.   
153 Augustine, Vol VII, at p243. 
154 Breitenbeck, Doctoral Thesis, p30. 
155 Breitenbeck, Doctoral Thesis, p31, cites Moran, in Sabio Moran and Marcelino Cabreros De Anta, Comentarios 
al Código de Derecho Canónico (Madrid, Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos, 1964), 3: 568, as holding that 
uneducated people, even those who could not read, could nevertheless have the required ‘expertise’ and only if, after 
all circumstances were weighed and found equal, could preference be given to someone holding an academic degree 
or official title.  Breitenbeck states, citing Regatillo, in Eduardus Regaltillo, Interpretatio et Iurispredentia Codicis 
Iuris Canonici, (Sanrander: Sal Terrae, 1949), p329, that there were those who held that ‘uncultured, unlearned 
persons are to be admitted [as experts] provided that they have a practical knowledge of the matter in question, such 
as a farmer in a matter relating to the land’. 
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Experts under CIC: The leading canon on experts under CIC  is canon 1574, which states the 
general principle:  
 
‘The services of experts are to be used whenever, by a provision of the law or of the judge, their 
study and opinion, based upon their art or science, are required to establish some fact or to 
ascertain the true nature of some matter’. 
 
Under CIC, the ecclesiastical judge: 
 
• Appoints the expert, at the request of the parties or having consulted them, or he accepts 
expert reports already made; he can also approve private experts;156 
• Defines, having listened to the parties’ suggestions, the points to be addressed by the 
expert;157 
• Sets the time-limit for the submission of expert opinions or reports;158 
• Has discretion to recall an expert for clarification; 159 and: 
• Is obliged both to weigh, in addition to the experts’ opinions, all the circumstances of the 
case, and to explain why he accepts or rejects expert evidence.160  
 
These canons are silent on the obligation to consult the promoter of justice and the defender of 
the bond.161   
 
Experts (which, as we shall see, may be either court-appointed or ‘private’ and party-nominated 
but court-approved) are: 
 
• Entitled to receive accrued evidence and any documents required for the fulfillment of 
the task; private experts, although permitted to submit their own reports are only allowed 
access to documents ‘in so far as they are required for the discharge of their duty’;162 
156 CIC, cc. 1575 requires at least consultation with the parties; it is silent regarding consent.  Also c. 1581§1.  See 
Appendix I. 
157 CIC, c. 1577§1.  See Appendix I. 
158 CIC, c. 1577§3.  See Appendix I. 
159 CIC, c. 1578§3.  See Appendix I. 
160 CIC, cc. 1579§§1 and 2.  See Appendix I. 
161 DC, Article 204§2 requires the parties and the defender of the bond to be notified of the appointment.  See 
Appendix V. 
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• Required to explain: (a) how they identified people, places or things, (b) their 
methodology; (c) their argumentation; and (d) the basis for their conclusions;163 
• Required to submit individual reports unless the judge requests one to be signed by all; 
differences of opinion are to be noted;164 
• Subject to the same norms as are witnesses in respect of objections and exclusion;165 and: 
• Entitled to remuneration.166 
 
Unlike CIC 1917, these canons are silent on: the requirement to be truthful;167 the requirement to 
take an oath;168 punishment in case of failure and responsibility for damages; and suitability to 
be confirmed by a competent body.169  As experts would be, at least generally speaking, 
professionals, one would expect the provisions of CIC 1917 to be equally applicable and 
pertinent today.  However, in some countries, such as in the United Kingdom, decisions of 
Catholic tribunals are not recognized at civil law; therefore, punishment in cases of failure and 
responsibility for damages are more appropriately dealt with by the civil courts.  
 
In marriage nullity cases CIC, in canon 1680, is quite specific: 
 
‘In cases concerning impotence or defect of consent by reason of mental illness, the judge is to 
use the services of one or more experts, unless from the circumstances this would obviously serve 
no purpose.  In other cases, the provision of Can. 1574 is to be observed’.170 
162 CIC, cc. 1577§2; and 1581§2.  See Appendix I.  See also Chapter 1 fts 147 - 148, regarding the right of the expert 
to information which could influence his decision.  
163 CIC, c. 1578§2.  See Appendix I. 
164 CIC, c. 1578§1.  See Appendix I. 
165 CIC, cc. 1576; and 1555.  See Appendix I. 
166 CIC, c. 1580.  See Appendix I. 
167 CIC, c. 1577§2, which, however, requires ‘proper and faithful discharge’ of duty.  See Appendix I.  See also, DC, 
Article 205, which requires that experts be chosen because of, inter alia, their ‘religiosity and honesty’ and, for 
marriage nullity cases under CIC, c. 1095, their adherence ‘to the principles of Christian anthropology’.  See also, 
Article 207§2, requiring experts to carry out their task ‘properly and faithfully’.  See Appendix V.  Moreover, as 
they are subject to the norms governing witnesses, they are also obliged to tell the truth.   
168 Although CIC, c. 1562§1 requires the judge to remind ‘the witness’ of ‘the grave obligation to tell the truth and 
nothing but the truth’ and §2 requires the judge to administer an oath ‘to the witness’ but makes provision for a 
witness to be heard unsworn.  C. 1532 gives the judge discretion regarding whether or not an oath is to be 
administered, but only in cases which do not involve the public good.    
169 DC, Article 205§1, which, however, requires a testimonial for experts.  See Appendix V. 
170 This canon is placed in Book VII, Judicial Procedures, Part III, Certain Special Processes, Title I Matrimonial 
Process, Article 4, Proofs.  The American translations use slightly different words.  For example, Text&Comm, 
p1013 uses ‘unless it is obvious from the circumstances that this would be useless’, and New Comm, p1773 uses 
‘unless it is clear from the circumstances that it would be useless to do so’. 
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 This is an example, therefore, of the law mandating the use of at least one expert, as stipulated in 
CIC canon 1574.  This is the only specific requirement for the use of experts as a means of proof 
in a canonical trial.171  So, by general principle, like CIC 1917, CIC requires the use of experts in 
cases of impotence and defect of consent by mental illness, albeit that CIC is silent in respect of 
non-consummation and on the need for bodily inspection in cases of impotence.172  The caveat in 
CIC canon 1680, ‘unless … this would serve no purpose’, is akin to that of CIC 1917 canon 1976 
regarding impotence and non-consummation (i.e. ‘unless this appears evidently useless under the 
circumstances’).  Likewise, the requirement in CIC canon 1574 mandating the use of experts to 
‘establish some fact or to ascertain the true nature of some matter’ is similar to that in CIC 1917 
canons 1792 and 1982 concerning amentia which required examination by experts ‘if there is 
cause’.  It is clear, therefore, that CIC, like CIC 1917, mandates the use of experts whenever a 
pertinent fact falling outside the judges’ competence needs to be established; in such cases, the 
judge therefore has no discretion.  
 
Whilst judges can decide on the number of experts, if they invoke the exception, they must, 
nevertheless, reach moral certainty of nullity on the basis of the acts and the proofs; otherwise 
the legal presumption of validity prevails.  Therefore, in order to find for nullity of marriage, the 
tribunal must be in possession of sufficient evidence to prove: the fact of antecedent and 
perpetual impotence; or the fact of an antecedent mental condition, the nature, severity and 
adverse effect of which caused incapacity to marry.  As such matters are usually beyond the 
competence of the ecclesiastical judge, the law recognises the need for expert opinion. 
 
Experts under CCEO: The wording of the canons here governing experts is similar to CIC.173  
In marriage nullity cases involving impotence or defect of consent because of ‘mental illness’, 
CCEO also requires the intervention of at least one expert, unless this would be useless.174  
171 Kenneth Boccafola, ExComm, Vol IV, 2, p1329. 
172 Nowadays, it is more difficult to establish non-consummation by bodily inspection; see ft74 above for reliance on 
the ‘moral argument’ in these cases.  However, in cases of impotence, when the validity of marriage is challenged, it 
is still likely that an expert opinion would be required to verify its presence (whether the cause be physical or 
psychological), at the material time.  As we have seen, the presumption is that one possesses capacity for marriage 
and consequently, marriage is not denied; impotence is, therefore, usually investigated post-hoc. 
173 CCEO, cc. 1255-1262.  See Appendix II. 
174 CCEO, c. 1366.  See Appendix II. 
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 4. EXPERTS AND THE SPECIAL CASE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY 
 
The leading canon on invalid consent explicitly deals with people who are inherently incapable 
of exchanging marital consent; this consensual incapacity is based on the principle that nobody is 
bound to the impossible.175   CIC canon 1095 provides:  
 
‘The following are incapable of contracting marriage:  
1° those who lack sufficient use of reason;  2° those who suffer from a grave lack of 
discretion of judgement concerning the essential matrimonial rights and obligations to be 
mutually given and accepted; 3° those who because of causes of a psychological nature, 
are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage’.176 
 
Establishing the nature of incapacity outlined in this canon, requires an understanding of the 
evolution of the canon.  CIC 1917 had no equivalent canon, although the concept of invalidity 
due to amentia or insanity existed.177  Shortly after the promulgation of CIC 1917, a Rotal 
tribunal held that true insanity was not necessarily required to be psychologically incapable of 
contracting marriage; due to the advances in psychology and psychiatry, the concept of 
psychological incapacity broadened.178  Later Rotal decisions reflected the understanding that 
lesser degrees of impairment could be incapacitating.179  These advances were welcomed by 
175 Beal, New Comm, p1302, ft 114, cites as authority, Regulae Iuris, 6, Boniface VIII, Liber sextus (1298) in 
Corpus Iuris Canonici, and A Stankiewicz, De accommodation regulae ‘impossibilium nulla obligation est’ ad 
incapacitatem adimplendi matrimonii obligationes’, p68, (1979) 643-672, albeit when commenting on paragraph 3° 
of canon 1095.  
176 CCEO, c. 818 has similar wording.  See Appendix II.  Text&Comm, p775 and New Comm, p1297 use the words 
‘psychic’ instead of ‘psychological’.  
177 CIC 1917, c. 1982.  See Appendix III.  Beal, New Comm, p1297 explains that the Church and society knew little 
about mental illness and it was thought that a person, suffering severe illness could contract marriage validity during 
a ‘lucid interval’.  At p1298, he explains that the test for capacity was ‘the degree of the use of reason required for 
someone to commit a mortal sin’, which usually occurred at about the age of seven.  Later, acknowledging the need 
to understand the nature of marriage, the age was raised to that of puberty (twelve for women and fourteen for men).   
It was thought necessary to keep the bar low in order ‘not to prevent simple folk from being judged incapable for 
marriage’.  See CIC, c. 1083 in Appendix I for the canonical age for marriage (men -16 yrs; women - 14 yrs)  
178 Augustine Mendonça, ‘Incapacity to Contract Marriage: Canon 1095’, Studia Canonica, 19 (1985), pp259-325 
(hereafter Mendonça, ‘Incapacity to Contract Marriage’), at p267, citing coram Prior, 11 December 1919, SRR, 
explains: ‘[T]he simple use of reason is no longer a criterion of ability to place a naturally sufficient marital 
consent… . [Based on the teaching of St Thomas]: “Maior autem rationis discretio requiritur in futuram quam ad 
consentiendum in unum praesentem actum” [S.T. IV, 2,2,2], greater discretion of reason is required to bind oneself 
to future obligations than to consent to a present act’. 
179 Mendonça, ‘Incapacity to Contract Marriage’, p269, citing coram Wynen, 23 February 1941: Wynen held that a 
simple use of reason and a simple choice of free will was insufficient for matrimonial consent; an ‘estimative or 
evaluative knowledge’ was required.  Coram Felici (3 December 1957), cited in the same article at p269 and by CJ 
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Pope Pius XII in his Allocution to the Roman Rota in 1941.180  Interestingly, civil law also 
embraced the concept of diminished responsibility.181  Rotal jurisprudence and Papal Allocutions 
continued to contribute towards broadening even further the concept of psychological incapacity 
in canon law to include incapacity to evaluate knowledge and to apply this to the prevailing 
practical circumstances proportionate to the important decision to marry (grave lack of discretion 
of judgment) and inability to assume the essential obligations of marriage - now both enshrined 
in CIC canon 1095.   
 
As we have seen, provision is made elsewhere in CIC for other types of incapacity such as 
impediments, lack or defect of form, and other types of consensual defects.  However, canon 
1095 evolved from the concept of amentia, and, consequently deals with people who are 
inherently incapable of marriage; therefore, it involves psychological incapacity.  This is clear 
from the Latin text.182  It concerns, therefore, a fact of human nature which is defined by science, 
although canon law categorises those affected; the ecclesiastical judge decides whether or not the 
affected person belongs in a specific category.  Ecclesiastical jurisprudence, rightly, has relied on 
the findings of the behavioural sciences, which recognise a variety of disturbances affecting, in 
various degrees, the capacity of the person both to make decisions concerning the essentials of 
marriage and to assume essential obligations. 
 
Hettinger in ‘Matrimonial Jurisprudence: The Second Postconciliar Decade?’, The Jurist, 37 (1977), pp358-375 at 
p367, required not only the ‘cognitive’ faculty, which was responsible for the ‘apprehension of truth, abstracting the 
universal from the particular’, but also capacity for exercising the ‘critical faculty’, which is the ‘power of judging 
and reasoning and of bringing judgments together so that new judgments can be deduced from them’.  This critical 
faculty, according to another Rotal judge, Felici, appears in man later than the cognitive faculty.  Mendonça, op. cit., 
p270, citing a Rotal judgment of Sabatanni (24 February 1961), explains that capacity to exercise this ‘critical 
faculty’ could not be attributed to a particular chronological age; puberty was not necessarily adequate, but 
discretion of judgment proportionate to marriage was required. 
180  Annual Papal speeches to the officials of the Roman Rota are called ‘allocutions’.  See Pius XII, Allocution to 
the Roman Rota (1941) in Appendix VII.   
181 Eithne D’Auria, ‘Grave Lack of Discretion of Judgement in Roman Catholic Canon Law of Marriage’, LLM 
Dissertation (University of Wales, College of Cardiff, 1996), Chapter IV, Grave Lack of Discretion of Judgement, 
Development of Jurisprudence, pp40-53, citing Durham v United States 214, F2d 862, 870 (D. Cir. 1954), which 
held that a criminal is not responsible if the unlawful act was the product of mental illness or disease.   
182 ‘Sunt incapaces matrimonii contrahendi ...’.   Incapaces is used, denoting inherent personal incapacity, rather 
than inhabiles, which denotes legal incapacity.  See e.g., CIC c 171§1, 1° where both terms are used: ‘Inhabiles sunt 
ad suffragium ferendum: 1° incapax actus humani; …’.  See also William L Daniel, ‘Juridic Acts in Book VII of the 
1983 Codex Iuris Canonici’, Studia Canonica, 40 (2006), pp433-486. 
165 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
Given the Church’s understanding that the right to marry is of natural law, it follows that she 
acknowledges the capacity of most people to marry and found a family.  Hence, there is no 
specific canonical requirement to establish psychological capacity positively before the 
celebration of marriage.183  Most marriages are celebrated without prior consultation with 
experts, but when a marriage fails a canonical judicial investigation can establish whether or not 
a true marriage ever existed. 
 
The question then arises as to whether or not canon 1680, mandating the use of at least one 
expert in cases involving ‘a defect of consent by reason of mental illness’, is to be invoked when 
a defect of consent due to incapacity is alleged under canon 1095.  An analysis of the views of 
commentators will demonstrate that they appear to agree both on their understanding of the 
differences between the three paragraphs of the canon and on the psychological basis for the 
defect of consent due to the incapacities described in canon 1095.  They agree that the first and 
second paragraphs deal with the formation of the act of consent and the third paragraph concerns 
inability to assume the object of consent.  However, despite acknowledging the psychological 
basis for incapacity, there is no consensus regarding: the tests and methods to be used to assess 
personal incapacity; or the need to consult experts to establish the existence, severity and effect 
of the psychological condition which allegedly caused the incapacity.   
 
Insufficient Use of Reason: An act of will is required for valid marriage.184  Therefore, a person 
who lacks sufficient use of reason is incapable of contracting marriage.  Canonists agree on the 
serious nature of this psychological incapacity.  The use of the adjective ‘sufficient’ indicates 
that for marriage ‘a proportionally developed capacity is necessary’.185  As the right to marry is 
one of natural law, historically, defects of consent were considered to be rooted in the natural 
law.186  The whole of canon 1095 concerns ‘difficulties of a psychological nature’; marital 
capacity ‘can be substantially undermined by disturbances, both transient and permanent, that are 
183 Carreras, ExComm, Vol IV, 2, p1825: ‘Because we are dealing with “incapacities”, when any doubt exists 
(whether it be of fact or of law) … not only the judge but also whoever is assisting at the celebration of the marriage 
must always presume … capacity’. 
184 CIC, c. 1057§2.  See Appendix I. 
185 Örsy, Marriage in Canon Law, p131. 
186 Beal, New Comm, p1296. 
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psychic or psycho-somatic in nature’.187  Lack of sufficient use of reason means, in canonical 
terms, ‘a permanent or temporary state of mind attributed to a variety of causes’, such as ‘mental 
illness’, which Rotal jurisprudence understands as: ‘psychotic disorder’; ‘psychopathies’, 
commonly known as ‘personality or character trait disorders’; or ‘psychoneuroses’.188   
 
Positively, to marry a person must have the capacity to: think rationally;189 know;190 and make a 
responsible human act.191  Negatively, causes of incapacity must be ‘so severe as to impede the 
use of reason; more important than the determination of the correct clinical classification is 
whether the person knew right from wrong’.192  Permanent causes include severe mental 
handicap, psychotic mental illness or brain damage; temporary causes include drunkenness or 
drug abuse.193  These can affect judgments and decisions ‘even if their symptoms may not be 
immediately manifest’.194  When judging cases on this ground, ‘careful attention must be paid to 
the mental competence of the person at the time consent was elicited’.195  Therefore, the 
psychological basis for this ground and the need to establish its severity and effect is not in 
doubt. 
 
Grave Lack of Discretion of Judgment: Grave lack of discretion of judgment also renders a 
person incapable of marriage.  Both Mendonça and McGrath agree that the difference between 
paragraphs 1° and 2° of canon 1095 is one of degree of impairment.196  For Kelly, the concept is 
187 Ibid., p1297, citing Rotal judge, Ragni, 26 November 1985, SRRDec 77 (1985), p554.  This affirmative decision 
actually involved alcoholism.  See Mendonça, Anthology, p77: Case No: 85-019. 
188 Doyle, Text&Comm, p775. 
189 Örsy, Marriage in Canon Law, p130. 
190 Kelly, L&S, p610, para 2183: ‘It is not the content of the intellect that is in question here - that is considered 
under Can 1096 - but the fundamental ability to know.  If this is lacking entirely or seriously inadequate, the person 
simply cannot consent’.  Emphasis in original.  Doyle, Text&Comm, p775: ‘If a person lacks sufficient use of reason 
so as not to know what he or she is doing at the time consent is exchanged, then there is no consent’. 
191 Beal, New Comm, p1298: ‘When a disruption of the “psychological process involved in forming the human act 
… seriously impeded the rational function of the mind and deprived a person of any meaningful deliberation 
concerning personal capacity for marital commitment and the choice of the object of consent”, he or she may be 
judged to lack sufficient use of reason’, citing Augustine Mendonça, ‘Consensual Incapacity for Marriage’, The 
Jurist, 54 (1994), pp482-486 (hereafter Mendonça, ‘Consensual Incapacity’), p409 (sic). 
192 Doyle, Text&Comm, p776. 
193 Kelly, L&S, p610, para 2183.  
194 Örsy, Marriage in Canon Law, p131. 
195 Beal, New Comm, p1298. 
196 Mendonça, ‘Incapacity to Contract Marriage’, p275 and Aidan McGrath, ‘Moral Certainty and Cases of Nullity 
Based on Canon 1095: Some Reflections’, CLSGB&I Newsletter, No 169 (March 2012), pp50-72 (hereafter 
McGrath, ‘Moral Certainty’), at p64.  However, Pedro Juan Viladrich, ‘Is a Reform of Canon 1095 Needed?’, 
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concerned ‘not so much with intellectual or cognitive ability, as with being able to use such 
intellectual ability in a practical way’.197  Positively, a person must have the capacity: to ‘decide 
responsibly’.198  One must be capable of evaluating sufficiently the nature of marriage and 
consequently, choosing it freely.199  Therefore, one must be capable of forming judgments by 
drawing conclusions from the material acquired by experience.200  The critical faculty required 
depends on: ‘the mature ability to grasp what the marital relationship entails’; the ability to 
‘relate marriage as an abstract reality … to [the] concrete situation’, which requires insight; and 
‘freedom from mental confusion, undue pressure or fear’.201  Capacity must be proportionate to 
the consequences of the decision, which in the case of marriage involves the capacity ‘to create 
and sustain the community of the whole of life’.202  Abstract knowledge of marriage is 
insufficient; capacity for ‘critical deliberation’ is also required; this must be proportionate to the 
‘serious and perpetual obligations of marriage’.203  ‘In short, the critical faculty is the capacity to 
make a prudent judgment about this marriage with this person at this time’.204  Freedom in 
choosing marriage means that the decision is based on ‘reasonable’, not ‘pathological’, 
motives.205 
 
Kelly acknowledges the presumption that capacity for marriage must ‘be … within the compass 
of most people’.206  Örsy and Doyle hold that the issues involved in canon 1095 ‘are not 
canonical’,207 and agree with Kelly that the defect must be serious.208  Causes are ‘usually due to 
Patricia Dugan and Luis Navarro (Eds), Matrimonial Law and Canonical Procedure (Montreal, 2013), pp73-96, at 
p77, holds that all three paragraphs ‘are frequently viewed as three steps in the gravity of a contracting party’s 
psychic pathology’.  
197 Kelly, L&S, p611, para 2185.  Emphasis in original. 
198 Örsy, Marriage in Canon Law, p130. 
199 Doyle, Text&Comm, p775. 
200 Ibid., p776. 
201 Ibid.  
202 Ibid.  
203 Beal, New Comm, p1299.  It is important to distinguish capacity for critical deliberation from de facto 
deliberation as we shall see later in the case studies in Chapters 5 and 6. 
204 Ibid., p1300.  Emphasis in original. 
205 Ibid., citing coram Pinto, 18 December 1979 SRRDec 71 (1979), pp587-588. 
206 Kelly, L&S, p611, para 2186.   
207 Örsy, Marriage in Canon Law, p130.  Örsy recognises the incompetence of canon law to define psychological 
incapacity for marriage; the science of empirical psychology and medical psychiatry must ‘fill the gap and provide 
the necessary information’.  At p131, he acknowledges that ‘the deviation of judgment from what is considered 
normal must be significant’.  See also Doyle in Text&Comm, p778, who considers that any diagnosis of a disorder, 
‘even a tentative one, is a clinical and not a juridical issue’.   At p776 he acknowledges that the condition must result 
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some form of psychopathy or personality disorder’.209  Although not mutually exclusive, 
permanent causes include, for Kelly, ‘very low intelligence, brain damage, mental illness, 
personality disorder’, whilst transitory causes can include the ‘influence of alcohol or other 
drugs, or serious psychological pressure’; but the cause ‘must be operative at the time of 
marriage’.210  According to Beal, in addition to disorders such as psychoses, neuroses and 
personality disorders, which can ‘impair critical deliberation’ or ‘restrict internal freedom’, 
‘inveterate attitudes contrary to the Christian understanding of marriage’ and deep seated 
‘attitudes that pervade the socio-cultural milieu’ can, even in the absence of external coercion, 
cause the person to feel compelled to marry and thus remove their freedom: 
 
‘Despite the firm assertion of John Paul II that “the hypothesis of a real incapacity is to be 
considered only when an anomaly of a serious nature is present”, Rotal jurisprudence has 
continued to issue affirmative decisions in cases where lack of due discretion is alleged, not only 
when the basis for the defect is a serious habitual mental disorder, but also when the defect is 
rooted in a serious but transitory disturbance of the mind’. 
 
Beal cites no Rotal cases to substantiate this claim, which he attributes to Mendonça.211  For 
Doyle, poor judgment can result not only from a total impairment, but also from a significant 
impairment of the intellect, or from lack of internal freedom due to causes ‘rooted in 
psychological or emotional problems which do not impede the intellect but have a significant 
influence of the will’ thus, ‘marriage is chosen in a true state of mental confusion’.  Although 
one’s emotional and psychological state is critical, the test is vague: since people differ, the 
‘intangible factors’ of understanding, evaluation, decision-making and responsibilities of 
marriage, ‘cannot be objectively measured for all persons of all background and cultures.  The 
responsibility of being a marriage partner and a parent must be evaluated in the context of one’s 
emotional and psychological state as well as that of the other party’.212   For Kelly, the gravity of 
the defect will ‘be measured by evaluating the person’s personality and abilities as derived from 
in a ‘serious inability to evaluate critically the decision to marry in light of the consequent obligations and 
responsibilities’. 
208 Kelly, L&S, p611, para 2186: ‘[M[inor defects of judgement will not suffice to invalidate matrimonial consent, 
[the condition must] remove the person’s powers of judgement completely or at least so cloud them that he or she is 
incapable of consenting to marriage’.   
209 Doyle, Text&Comm, p776, citing coram Fagiolo, 23 January 1970, EIC 27 (1971), pp147-151; and coram 
Pompedda, 28 April, 1971, ME 97 (1972), pp787-796. 
210 Kelly, L&S, p611, para 2187.   
211 Beal, New Comm, p1300, citing Mendonça, ‘Consensual Incapacity’, pp500-504 (sic).  
212 Doyle, Text&Comm, p776, citing M Ahern, ‘Psychological Incapacities for Marriage’, Studia Canonica, 7 
(1973), pp230-231. 
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a range of evidence of behaviour and usually also from reports of psychological or psychiatric 
experts’.213  Rotal judge Burke, (writing extra-judicially), is clear about the psychic nature and 
extraordinary occurrence of incapacity.214  Therefore, this ground must also have a psychological 
base, the severity and effect of which must be established.     
 
Inability to Assume the Essential Obligations of Marriage because of Causes of a 
Psychological Nature: The essential obligations of marriage constitute the object of consent; the 
canon explicitly states the psychological basis for this ground of nullity.  Örsy acknowledges that 
‘psychological’ causes ‘defy a precise definition, but can be of an infinite variety’; positively, a 
person must be capable of carrying out their decision to marry by action.215   For Doyle, parties 
must be capable of assuming essential [marital] obligations’.216  To prove invalidity, it is 
insufficient to demonstrate unwillingness or failure to fulfill essential obligations - rather, a party 
must suffer from ‘a debilitating psychological condition to such an extent that it is impossible to 
begin and sustain a marital relationship’.217  Causes are no longer limited to ‘sexual anomalies’ 
but include a ‘psychotic disorder’ or ‘personality disorder’; however, it must be ‘a true 
constitutional impairment which prevents the person from improving his or her situation’.218  In 
the absence of a comprehensive list of causes, the phrase ‘of a psychic nature’ covers ‘a wide 
range of possibilities’ including personality disorders, which are ‘very complex’ and ‘elusive’ 
phenomena, which resist ‘easy analysis’.219  ‘Scientific advances in understanding the nature and 
effects of the personality disorders’ have influenced jurisprudence; whilst Rotal jurisprudence 
‘generally demanded a clearly diagnosed disorder in incapacity cases’, ‘emotional immaturity’ 
suffices.220  The canonical meaning of ‘immaturity’ is not simply chronological, but ‘a 
213 Kelly, L&S, p611, para 2186. 
214 Cormac Burke, ‘The Distinction Between no. 2 and no. 3 of Canon 1095’, The Jurist, 54 (1994), pp228-233.    
Also Cormac Burke, ‘Some Reflections on Canon 1095’, Monitor Ecclesiasticus, 117 (1992-I), pp133-150: ‘If one 
considers marriage as one of the most natural of institutions, then consensual incapacity, for an adult endowed with 
sufficient use of reason, is a most unnatural phenomenon’.  Emphasis in original.  Burke served as a Rotal judge 
from 1986 to 1999.   
215 Örsy, Marriage in Canon Law, p131. 
216 Doyle, Text&Comm, p775. 
217 Ibid., p778. 
218 Ibid., citing Comm, 7 (1975), p50. 
219 Ibid., citing E Egan, ‘Psychopathy and the Positing of an Act of Matrimonial Consent’, Studia Canonica, 10 
(1976), p313. 
220 Ibid., pp777-778, citing coram Lefebvre, 31 January 1976, Monitor Ecclesiasticus 102 (1977), p285.  Doyle also 
refers to DSM III, 90-92 on ‘Childhood Onset Pervasive Development Disorder’, where he says that the clinical 
description of the disorder on which Lefebvre relied, included criteria such as ‘gross and sustained impairment in 
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psychological condition which affects the ability to make judgments, to control one’s actions, 
and to relate to another; as such, it is not a temporary condition, but a permanent one’.221  For 
Doyle: ‘Continuing research developments, changing terminology and the elusive nature of the 
disorders themselves make exact diagnosis difficult’; although classification and nomenclature 
vary, the essential finding must be that a person ‘gravely afflicted has a severely weakened or 
non-existent freedom of choice and of control over his or her affective-impulsive life’; ‘[a]t the 
core … is the mind of husband and wife …’.222  A psychotic disorder ‘may’ incapacitate 
someone from ‘marriage to anyone at any time’, but this is not so easily demonstrated with a 
personality disorder; what is required is that incapacity for the specific marriage under 
investigation be demonstrated.223  For Beal, ‘the psychic defect that gives rise to the incapacity 
must be present at the moment of consent and not something that emerges during common life;’ 
it is always intrinsic, but the cause is not necessarily ‘an identifiable mental illness’, but can be 
‘any disorder or disturbance of the human mind, if it is sufficiently severe’.224  The cause, 
however, must have existed antecedent to marriage and must have made the assumption of 
obligations impossible, not just difficult.225  Agreeing with Doyle, traditionally these cases were 
limited to sexual disorders, but jurisprudence now embraces Vatican II’s teaching of ‘essential 
obligations of marriage’.226  Beal disagrees with Doyle, however, on the necessity of permanence 
of the condition, but he acknowledges differing views on this matter.227   
social relationships, e.g., lack of appropriate affective responsivity, inappropriate clinging, asociality, lack of 
empathy’.  Lefebvre’s affirmative decision on inability to assume the essential obligations of marriage, however, 
involved a party who suffered from affective immaturity and passive-dependent personality.  Lefebvre explained 
that incapacity can result from an illness or from some other psychic abnormality (see Mendonça, Anthology p90: 
Case No: 76-017).  
221 Ibid., p778.   
222 Ibid., p777-778, citing coram Anné, 4 December 1975, EIC 33 (1977), 176-177, translation from D Felhauer, 
‘The Consortium Omnis Vitae as a Juridical Element of Marriage’ in Studia Canonica, 13 (1979), pp7-171 at 139-
140. 
223 Ibid., citing coram Serrano, 5 April 1973, in CLD 8, p718: ‘It is not necessary to maintain that this man is 
incapable of any possible marriage.  Whatever may be the case for other interpersonal relationships which he could 
have or would have formed … it is sufficiently clear that we must judge that this concrete marriage was null from 
the beginning’. 
224 Beal, New Comm, p1302-1303. 
225 Ibid., p1303. 
226 Ibid., p1302: This includes ‘the capacity … to establish and sustain the partnership of the whole of life that is 
perpetual and exclusive and ordered to the good of the spouses and to the procreation of offspring’. 
227 Ibid., p1303, citing J Pinto Gomez, ‘L’immaturità affettiva nella giurisprudenza rotale’,  in P Bonnet and C 
Gulio (Eds), L’immaturità psico-affettiva nella giurisprudenza della Rota Romana (Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 
1990), pp50-51, holding the view that it must be permanent.  Beal explains that this was based on a comparison with 
impotence, but he cites Rotal jurisprudence, coram Bruno 19 July 1991 ME 117(1992), p171, Mario Pompedda, 
‘Annotazioni circa la “incapacitas adsumendi onera coniugalia”’ in, Studi di diritto matrimoniale canonico (Milan, 
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 Although distinguished from physical incapacity associated with the impediment of impotence, 
the understanding of ‘psychological causes’, for Kelly, is still developing in jurisprudence; 
however, apart from ‘nymphomania’ and ‘satyriasis’, the causes of incapacity for a ‘true 
conjugal relationship’ are ‘many and varied’, but must have been antecedent and be a ‘serious 
psychological defect’ and not ‘merely a diminished capacity’, ill-will or moral weakness.228   
  
Summary of the Three Grounds:  For Örsy, Kelly, Doyle and Beal, therefore, the incapacities 
hypothesised in all three paragraphs of the canon, concern a person’s psychological or 
psychiatric status at the time of exchanging consent.  The law recognises that while the right to 
marry is one of natural law, and consequently is within the capacity of the majority, the exercise 
of that right is impossible for those: (a) who are incapable of positing the valid juridical act of 
marital consent, whether the cause is permanent or temporary, because they lack sufficient use of 
reason; (b) whose powers of judgment are seriously impaired because, although not necessarily 
lacking basic knowledge or capacity to posit some responsible acts, they lack the psychological 
capacity to assess the practical, prevailing circumstances and the implications which flow from 
them, or they lack the fundamental psychological freedom required for valid matrimonial 
consent; and (c) who, although possibly capable of knowing what marriage involves and making 
a free decision, are, for psychological reasons beyond their control, incapable of assuming the 
object of consent, that is, the essential obligations of marriage. 
 
It is clear from the foregoing analysis that: (a) the ground of ‘lack of sufficient use of reason’ 
turns on a person’s incapacity to place the ‘responsible act’ of marital consent; (b) the ground of 
‘grave lack of discretion of judgment concerning the essential rights and duties of marriage’ 
turns, not on whether or not a person made or did not make a free and critical evaluation of the 
circumstances surrounding the marriage, but on incapacity to evaluate critically the decision to 
marry in light of the consequent rights and obligations; and (c) the ground of ‘inability to assume 
the essential obligations of marriage because of causes of a psychological nature’, turns, not on a 
Giuffré, 1993) pp97-100 and Mendonça, ‘Consensual Incapacity’, 531-534 (sic), as holding his view that it suffices 
to prove that person was incapable of assuming the obligations of marriage at the time of consent. 
228 Kelly, L&S, p612, para 2189 - 2192. 
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party’s willingness, or on whether or not a person fulfilled these obligations, but on inability to 
assume them at the material time. 
 
The latter two grounds explicitly limit the scope of incapacity to the essential rights and/or duties 
of marriage.  The more important the consequences, the greater the powers of judgment required 
to make a decision.  Marriage is life-long, involving another person intimately.  The possibility 
of caring for and educating children also arises.  Moreover, marriage is not merely a private 
contract; it involves the common good of society as evidenced in canon law and in civil law by 
the requirement to involve witnesses who represent the community.229 
 
The Applicability of Canon 1680 to Canon 1095: As we have seen, there is consensus that the 
basis for the incapacities outlined in canon 1095 is the existence of a severe and debilitating 
psychiatric or psychological cause, and canonists acknowledge the difficulty in establishing the 
existence, severity and effect of such a cause.  They are nevertheless divided on whether or not 
the use of experts is mandatory in cases involving this canon.  Some emphasise the principle 
enunciated in canon 1680 (which mandates the use of experts); others emphasise the exception 
(unless their use serves no purpose).  They are also divided on precisely when the principle and 
exception apply and whether or not judges can exercise discretion in these cases. 
 
Emphasis on Principle: McGrath holds that CIC canons 1574 and 1680 are two canons 
indicating when experts are to be used.230  The use of experts ‘appears to be mandatory in all 
nullity cases involving impotence or any part of canon 1095’.231  Experts are required: (a) ‘where 
the nature and severity of the psychopathology cannot easily be determined on the basis of other 
evidence’; (b) ‘where it is difficult to distinguish psychological factors from organic factors’; (c) 
229 In Roman Catholic doctrine, ‘marriage establishes the couple in a public state of life in the Church’ and the 
family home ‘is rightly called “the domestic church, a community of grace and prayer, a school of human virtues 
and of Christian charity”’.  CCC, p372, paras 1663 and 1666.  See Appendix IV. 
230 Aidan McGrath, ‘At the Service of Truth: Psychological Sciences and their Relation to the Canon Law of Nullity 
of Marriage’, 27 Studia Canonica (1993), pp 379-400, (hereafter McGrath, ‘At the Service of Truth’), at p381.  
Emphases added.  Also Aidan McGrath, ‘Assisting Judges in Their Arduous Task: Dignitas Connubii and the 
Assistance it Offers in Cases Based on Canon 1095’, Studies in Church Law, Vol IV, (Bangalore, 2008), pp109-142: 
at p120: ‘The intervention of experts in cases of nullity being considered under canon 1095 is mandatory, not 
optional’.  Speaking of the exception at p121: ‘[T]he exception must not become the norm’.  Also at p121, citing P 
Bianchi: ‘[T]he judge is not required to have or exercise clinical expertise - that belongs to the expert’. 
231 McGrath, ‘At the Service of Truth’, p381, citing G Versaldi, ‘Animadversiones quaedam relate ad allocutionem 
Ioannis Pauli II ad Romanam Rotam diei 25 ianuarii 1988’ in Periodica, 78 (1989), p254. 
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where the imposition of a vetitum is foreseen; and (d) where a new hearing of a case is being 
sought after two conforming sentences.232  The judge may deem it necessary to consult experts in 
other cases with a psychological dimension, for example when the level of susceptibility to 
deceit or threats, or that of ignorance, is to be established.233  For McGrath, the benefit to the 
jurisprudence of tribunals of the advances in psychiatry and psychology depends on ‘proper 
respect’ being shown to expertise in those disciplines; in cases involving canon 1095, ‘the 
intervention of an expert or experts should constitute part of the standard procedure’.234  He 
concludes that, if this appears excessive, one only has to refer to Morrisey’s warning:   
 
‘Without the assistance of experts … there is a risk of identifying as a personality disorder any 
personality trait which is irritating to others’.235  
 
McGrath insists that ‘judges must remember that they must not play at being amateur 
psychologists’:236  
 
‘[O]nly in truly exceptional cases, where there is ample evidence from other sources, should the 
services of an expert not be sought.  And, where it proves impossible to find an expert, the judges, 
in reading and researching, must be very careful that they retain their own role in the process: 
they are not to attempt to make a diagnosis or an analysis of behavior which lies beyond their 
competence. … [An expert] provides the judges with elements of information from his own 
sphere of competence, i.e., information concerning the nature and extent of particular psychic or 
psychiatric conditions upon which the nullity of the marriage is alleged’.237 
 
McGrath acknowledges the possibility that expertise might be sought from fields other than 
psychology and psychiatry, such as from a counsellor, a social worker, therapist, neurologist or 
sexologist,238 whereas others appear to limit the experts’ role to cases involving claims of 
psychopathology or mental disorder ‘since the illness does not always manifest itself at the actual 
232 Ibid., citing Augustine Mendonça, ‘The Role of Experts in “Incapacity to Contract” Cases (c. 1095)’, in Studia 
Canonica, 25 (1991) (hereafter Mendonça, ‘The Role of Experts’), p417-450. 
233 Ibid., p380-381. 
234 Ibid., p398. 
235 Ibid., p398, citing Francis Morrisey, ‘Revising Church Legislation on Marriage’, in Origins, 9 (1979-1980), 
p216. 
236 Ibid., p396. 
237 Ibid., p398-399. 
238 Ibid., p382, citing Marie Breitenbeck, ‘The Use of the Psychological Expert in Formal Cases’, in T P Doyle (Ed), 
Marriage Studies: Reflections in Canon Law and Theology, Vol 2 (Washington DC, CLSA, 1982), p90; 
Breitenbeck, ‘The Use of Experts in Marriage Nullity Cases’, in Proceedings of the Annual Convention of the Canon 
Law Society of America, 51 (1989), p32, note 14, and Mendonça, ‘The Role of Experts’, pp433-434.   
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time of the marriage’.239  McGrath notes the caveat, ‘unless from the circumstances [the 
involvement of experts] would obviously serve no purpose’ - but given the principle, ‘such 
circumstances would have to be regarded as exceptional’ and would require the court to be in 
possession of ‘sufficient evidence to place the gravity and effects of the disturbance at the time 
of marriage beyond doubt’.240  Any decision by a judge not to use an expert ‘must be an act of 
prudence … and not an act of capriciousness’.241 
 
Although not specifying what would constitute ‘unavailability’ of experts, McGrath warns that 
‘creative imagination’ on the part of tribunals, however sincere, is ‘fraught with danger’ and does 
‘not inspire confidence in an objective evaluation of the nature, origin and effects of the 
particular psychic difficulty’.242  He stresses the need to respect the autonomy of the two 
sciences: 
 
‘… [I]f an expert opinion or report is to be of real value in any marriage nullity case, then the 
judge and the expert must participate in a proper dialogue between the two sciences: that of the 
psychological expert on the one hand, and that of the canonist on the other. … Each science must 
preserve its proper autonomy and the relationship of one to the other must always be kept in 
mind; psychological science is a means by which the judge may arrive at the truth in a particular 
case; it is not the source of all the answers to all the questions before the judges’.243 
239 Breitenbeck, Doctoral Thesis, p233, citing Pedro Lombardia and Juan Ignacio Arrieta (Eds) Códico de Derecho 
Canónico, edición anotada (EUNSA, 1883), p871at p1005 and Wrenn, Text&Comm, p1013.  However, although 
Wrenn does not hold that experts must always be used, he does require the use of experts ‘whenever a marriage case 
[on grounds of incapacity] seems to involve a psychopathology or mental disorder’.  See also William J Doheny, 
Canonical Procedure in Matrimonial Cases, Vol I, Formal Judicial Procedure, Second Edition, Revised and 
enlarged (Milwaukee, 1948), p382-383: ‘[T]he [experts] most frequently employed by matrimonial tribunals are: 
first, handwriting experts, and secondly, doctors of medicine who are particularly proficient in questions of insanity 
or impotency’. 
240 McGrath, ‘At the Service of Truth’, p395-396, citing Papal Allocutions of 1987 and 1988. 
241 Ibid., p396, citing Mario F Pompedda, ‘Incapacity to Assume the Essential Obligations of Marriage’, in R M 
Sable (Ed), Incapacity for Marriage, Jurisprudence and Interpretation: Acts of the III Gregorian Colloquium, 1-6 
September 1986, St John’s Provincial Seminary, Plymouth, Michigan, USA (Rome, 1987), pp208-210.  See also 
Gerard T Jorgensen, ‘The Role of the Expert in Tribunal Proceedings’, CLSGB&I Newsletter, 142 (2005), pp62-73.  
Jorgensen also cites Pompedda and the Apostolic Signatura, Prot. No: N 28259/97 and concludes at p66: ‘It would 
be reasonable to conclude that the intervention of experts in cases of nullity considered under canons 1084 and 1095 
is mandatory ... the exception cannot be and must not become an alternative norm’.  Also Boccafola, Ex Comm, 
p1329: ‘In accord with the provisions of c 1680, then, it would seem that a judge should make use of the help of 
experts in any case whose caput nullitatis would be based on c 1095, for all of the three clauses of c 1095 are 
concerned with a psychic incapacity for matrimonial consent, and the supreme legislator has recently made clear that 
such a pychic incapacity can truly be envisioned only in the presence of a serious anomaly affecting the ability to 
know and to will’.   
242 Ibid., p397.  McGrath cites as examples of ‘creative imagination’: (a) the use of the civil maxim of ‘the common 
estimation of the ordinary man’; (b) the incorporation of the writings and analysis of H Nouven in Intimacy; and (c) 
the use of a civil divorce decree stating that a party suffered from a specific psychiatric condition. 
243 Ibid., p382-383. 
175 
 
                                                            
 Cox, too, sees canon 1680 as an example of circumstances where the use of experts is required 
by law, albeit that ‘psychic causes’ might be relevant in marriage cases beyond consensual 
incapacity; consequently the range of experts required might go beyond the discipline of 
psychology.  For example, an expert in the teaching of another religion might assist in 
establishing ‘an error determining the will’, or handwriting experts might be required to 
authenticate documents.244  Cox cites McGrath and Mendonça as stating that the phrase ‘because 
of mental illness’, ‘at least implicitly covers all of the psychic causes involved in the three parts 
of canon 1095’.245  Örsy is of like mind, acknowledging the incompetency of law to define 
precisely what is required for valid marital consent; psychology and psychiatry must ‘fill the 
gap’.246  Canons from the field of psychology or psychiatry should be interpreted ‘according to 
scientific criteria, taking into account the evolutionary nature of these sciences’ and ‘if a canon 
speaks of the effect of mental diseases, it should be interpreted according to the latest advances 
in medicine and not according to the state of information of the legislator at the time of the 
promulgation of the law’.247  The law should be understood in terms of its function, that is, the 
value which it intends to serve.248  The hierarchy of values must be taken into account and where 
conflict exists, the greater value prevails.249  If the defects described in canon 1095 are judged 
from the horizon of scientific psychology, canon law ‘receives the verdict based on medical 
evidence’, otherwise ‘it tries to decide a medical issue which is beyond its competence’, but it 
must ensure that correct vision of authentic Christian anthropology is not violated.250  If 
interpreted as merely legal terms, medical science would not influence their meaning and 
‘legalism would reign supreme’.251  For Örsy, therefore, the role of the expert complements that 
of the judge; their expertise differs, but dialogue between them is essential in order that the 
expert establishes the psychological status of the party at the material time and that his findings 
are correctly interpreted, in light of Christian anthropology, by the ecclesiastical judge. 
244 Cox, New Comm, p1773-1774, citing McGrath, ‘At the Service of Truth’, p381.  See Appendix I: CIC, c. 1099 
for error determining the will. 
245 Ibid., p1773, citing Mendonça, ‘The Role of Experts’, pp420-424 and McGrath, ‘At the Service of Truth’, p381. 
246 Örsy, Marriage in Canon Law, p130. 
247 Ladislas Örsy, Theology and Canon Law: New Horizons for Legislation and Interpretation (Collegeville,1992), 
p56. 
248 Ibid., p28. 
249 Ibid., p58. 
250 Ibid., p31.  Emphasis in original. 
251 Ibid., p58. 
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 Doyle hints at the incompetence of ecclesiastical judges when he says that the diagnosis of a 
disorder is a ‘clinical’ rather than a ‘juridical’ issue; he acknowledges the complexity of the field 
when he explains that classifications can vary leading to experts having differing opinions.252  
He implies the need for the intervention of a psychiatrist, specifically in cases involving 
allegations of grave lack of discretion of judgment, when he acknowledges that the ‘psychiatrist 
and the jurist’ must establish the party’s ability to form judgments.253  For Doyle, it is insufficient 
to establish the mere fact of a personality or nervous disorder; ‘what must be determined is the 
gravity of the condition and its actual effect on the intellectual capacity to evaluate the decision 
or the ability of the will to choose freely’.254  When discussing the issue of absolute and relative 
incapacity, Doyle refers to the reluctance of ‘psychiatrists and psychologists’ to pronounce on 
absolute incapacity, preferring to ‘limit their opinions to the case before them’.255  His inference 
that expert opinion is required in these cases is strengthened by his statement that the primary 
concern is not the ‘psychic disorder’, but ‘its effects upon the interpersonal relationship’.256  He 
emphasises that ‘occasional acts of irresponsibility, be they grave or light do not in themselves 
constitute proof either of incapacity or of the existence of a psychological disorder’; 
nevertheless, he says that a ‘pattern of such behavior can and usually does provide evidence of 
such a disorder’.257  Taken out of context, this latter statement could imply that evidence of a 
consistent pattern of behaviour, without establishing its true cause, is sufficient to prove 
incapacity, but this would ignore his earlier statements that antecedence and severity of the 
condition need to be established, and more particularly, the effect of the existing condition on the 
party’s capacity to consent.  Establishing these criteria would normally be beyond the 
competence of the ecclesiastical judge. 
 
252 Doyle, Text&Comm, p778, citing M Pompedda, ‘Neuroses and psychopathic personalities in relation to consent’, 
Lecture Notes from the Cursus Renovationis, given in Rome at the Gregorian University, 1973, in H McMahon, 
‘The Role of Psychiatric and Psychological Experts in Nullity Cases’, Studia Canonica, 9 (1975), p66. 
253 Ibid., p776, citing L Hinslie and R Campbell, Psychiatric Dictionary (New York: Oxford University, 1970), 
p419. 
254 Ibid. 
255 Doyle, Text&Comm, p778-779, citing J Higgins, ‘Psychological Influences on the Matrimonial Bond’, in W 
Bassett (Ed), The Bond of Marriage (Notre Dame, Ind, 1968), p208.  Absolute incapacity means incapacity for any 
marriage; relative incapacity means incapacity for marriage to a particular person. 
256 Ibid., p779. 
257 Ibid.  
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Like McGrath and Cox, Kelly notes that in any marriage nullity case the judge can decide, under 
CIC canon 1574, that the use of an expert is required.  However, he acknowledges that due to the 
ambiguity of the term ‘mental illness’ there is controversy as to whether or not canon 1680 is 
applicable to cases heard under canon 1095; some writers arguing that because some ‘transitory 
personality disorders’ can cause nullity but are not ‘mental illnesses in the strict sense’, experts 
are not required, but his own view is:  
 
‘… [I]t would be at least rash for a judge to decide in advance that in a particular case he is not 
faced with a mental illness, however that is to be defined.  Moreover, he needs the services of the 
expert to decide what effect the person’s condition … has had on … consent.  To prejudge either 
of these issues is to trespass on the expert’s field and to risk making inadequately based 
decisions’.258   
 
Moreover, cases of inability to assume the essential obligations of marriage: 
 
‘will usually involve … expert evidence about the nature and effects of the alleged psychological 
defect.  Evidence of mere behavior, no matter how depraved, is not of itself evidence of inability.  
It must be shown that the behavior was the result of a serious psychological defect and was not 
caused by ill-will or moral weakness’.259    
 
Use of the word ‘usually’ implies that experts are not always required; nevertheless Kelly warns 
against focusing on behaviour and acknowledges the danger imposed by proceeding without 
expert opinion in cases involving psychological matters, precisely because they fall beyond the 
competence of the ecclesiastical judge. 
 
Ortiz emphasizes the rarity of cases which could proceed in the absence of expert evidence: 
 
‘…[C]ompletely unfound are the situations of incapacity not demonstrable in the external forum 
or the causes of incapacity which the unique means of proof at the deposition of the judge might 
be the declarations of the parties.  In these cases, there are necessarily external manifestations of 
the anomaly, confirmable in other means of proof, of documents and witnesses, as well as 
experts.  Except in the rarest cases of impossibility of hearing relatives or friends, or of procuring 
any clinical history of the subject (perhaps possible in situations of forced emigration or of 
persecution) causes of consensual incapacity are not introduced with the sole proof of the 
declarations of the party or parties’.260 
258 Kelly, L&S, p938, paras 3286-3287. 
259 Ibid., p612, para 2192, citing John Paul II, Allocution to the Roman Rota (1987).  Emphasis in original. 
260 Miguel Ángel Ortiz ,‘The Declarations of the Parties and Moral Certitude’, in Dugan, pp53-89, at p68.  Ortiz is 
Professor of Canon Law, Pontifical University of Santa Croce. 
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 Commenting on the equivalent canon to CIC 1680, in CCEO,261 Grocholewski, considers it 
would be a ‘serious mistake’ to consider circumstances ‘obviously useless’ if they were not; 
specifically regarding marital incapacity, Grocholewski refers simply to the Papal Allocutions to 
the Roman Rota of 1987 and 1988, in which he considers ‘the right approach concerning 
dialogue between the psychologist and the psychiatrist and the ecclesiastical judge’ was 
explained.262 
 
Emphasis on Exception: Under CIC 1917 the services of an expert were required: ‘unless this 
would appear evidently useless’ in cases which were then confined to impotence and non-
consummation; and ‘if there is cause’ in cases of amentia.263 According to Wrenn:  
 
‘The 1976 draft of procedural law (c 345), referring to impotence and defect of consent due to a 
mental disorder dropped the “unless” clause, (perhaps because CIC [1917] canon 1982 on 
“amentia” had not contained such a clause), but it was reinstated in the 1980 draft (c1632), 
“either because experts are not always necessary or because they are not available in some 
places”’.264 
 
First, Wrenn does not mention that CIC 1917 canon 1982 required an expert ‘if there is cause’, 
that is, if the fact, severity or effect of the illness needed clarification.  Second, by saying 
‘perhaps’ he appears to speculate.  Third, he does not explain how the unqualified ecclesiastical 
judges could supply for such expert evidence, or how experts could be deemed unavailable in 
places where tribunals exist.  He acknowledges that all three paragraphs of CIC canon 1095 
involve a ‘defect of consent’; consequently, ‘whenever’ such a case ‘seems to involve a 
psychopathology or mental disorder (mentis morbis), the services of an expert are in order’.265  
This clearly implies that the defects of consent referred to in CIC canon 1095 need not involve 
psychopathology or mental disorder and consequently the use of experts is not always 
261 CCEO, c. 1366.  See Appendix II. 
262 Zenon Grocholewski, in Nedungatt, p775-776.  Cardinal Zenon Grocholewski is a curial member of the 
Congregations of the Doctrine of the Faith and of Bishops and is a member of the Pontifical Council for Legislative 
Texts.  He also taught at the Faculty of Canon Law of the Pontifical Gregorian University in Rome (1975-1999), and 
at the Faculty of Canon Law of the Pontifical Lateran University in Rome (1980-1984).  In addition, he gave 
lectures on Administrative Justice at the Studio Rotale of the Roman Rota (1986-1998).  He currently serves as 
Prefect of the Congregation for Catholic Education and as Grand Chancellor of the Pontifical Gregorian University.  
The juridical states of Papal allocutions is discussed below. 
263 CIC 1917, cc. 1976; and 1982.  Emphasis added.  See Appendix III. 
264 Wrenn, Text&Comm, p1013, citing Comm, 11 (1979), p264.  Emphasis added. 
265 Ibid., p1013.  Emphases added. 
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mandatory.  However, he does not explain what causes, other than psychopathology or mental 
disorder, could give rise to these defects, or what circumstances would render it unnecessary for 
the judge to consult an expert.  In a later publication, he claims:  
 
‘A lack of due discretion … does not always involve a mental disorder.  Sometimes the 
indiscretion is caused by predominantly extrinsic causes coupled with immaturity.  In such cases 
the services of an expert would be at the discretion of the judge.  It is only when a true disorder is 
present that a perital report is required’.266   
 
This implies that ecclesiastical judges are, without the benefit of any expert evidence, competent 
to determine: (a) whether or not a ‘true disorder’, latent or operative, existed at the material time; 
(b) the party’s level of psychological maturity at the material time; (c) the nature of any 
‘extrinsic cause’; (d) the severity of such a cause; and (e) the effect of such a cause when 
combined with ‘immaturity’ on the person’s capacity to consent.  Wrenn does not explain the 
method to be used in assessing the party’s psychological capacity, which is pertinent given both 
the canonical presumption of capacity and the requirement to consult experts to establish 
otherwise. 
 
Breitenbeck, citing others in support, sees the exception as empowering a judge ‘to forego’ 
consulting an expert, albeit ‘if circumstances would render it useless’.  She points out that the 
original schema of this canon made no reference to the possibility of omitting the use of experts, 
but the consultors foresaw the possibility that in some cases it would not be necessary and in 
others experts ‘would not be available’; consequently the exception was suggested, introduced 
and retained.  She does not explain how, if a tribunal exists in a particular place, experts could be 
deemed unavailable.  Nor does she cite authority to support her opinion that the unavailability of 
experts permits the judge to proceed to a definitive judgment on psychological incapacity 
grounds.  Nevertheless, the judge would ‘frequently consider it unnecessary [to consult an 
expert] and therefore useless’. 267  However, she acknowledges that the circumstances in which 
the exception is permitted are restrictive, namely, when: (a) the judge is sufficiently convinced 
266 Lawrence Wrenn, The Invalid Marriage (CLSA, 1998), p30. 
267 Breitenbeck, Doctoral Thesis, p231, citing Juan José Garcia Failde, Nueve Derecho Procesal Canónico: Estudio 
sistematico-analitico comparado (Salamanca: Universidad Pontificia de Salamanca, 1984), p147 and Aldo Stella, 
Le Prueba Pericial en las Causas Matrimoniales por Incapacidad Psiquica: Innovationes del Códico Reformado 
(Universitas Canonica, 4, 1984), p93.  Emphasis added. 
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by documents and testimony already presented; (b) expert opinion already submitted is accepted; 
(c) expert opinion from a prior civil or ecclesiastical case is pertinent; and (d) the judge has 
decided to approve experts proposed by the parties.268   However, these circumstances, although 
not involving a court appointed expert, nevertheless involve the submission of expert opinion.  
Breitenbeck cites De las Heras, who holds that expert opinion would be useless in two 
circumstances: where it is clear that the psychological anomaly exists; or ‘when there is no 
indication whatsoever of the alleged anomaly’.269  But, the former implies that it is sufficient to 
establish the existence of a psychological anomaly, without reference to antecedence, its 
severity, or its effect on the party’s capacity to consent; the latter implies that a case could still 
proceed under the heading of incapacity in the absence of any anomaly.  Breitenbeck 
understands De las Heras’ interpretation of the exception as expressing ‘a wish to avoid expert 
opinion as a mere formality and … to prescribe it as necessary only when expert information 
could complete or explain something which does not enjoy sufficient clarity’.270  However, this 
appears to emphasise the exception rather than the rule; it emphasizes avoidance of consultation 
without explaining the judge’s competence to replace the expert. 
 
Although Cox warns that the exception, like any exception, must be interpreted strictly: the 
canonical presumption, ‘which should not be overturned lightly’, is that the service of an expert 
is required.271  However, he concludes that if the evidence has certainly: (a) established the 
relevant facts; (b) clarified the nature and meaning of those facts in light of jurisprudential issues, 
such as antecedence and severity; the judge ‘has the authority to proceed to a decision without 
involving an expert’.272  He does not explain how these relevant facts can be established and 
clarified, particularly the effect on a party’s psychological status at the material time which 
clearly involves complex issues belonging to a field of science generally beyond the 
ecclesiastical judge’s competence, without any expert input. 
 
268 Ibid. 
269 Ibid., p232, citing Feliciano Gil de las Heras, Organización judicial de la Iglesia en el Nuevo Códico (Ius 
Canonicum, 24, 1984), p184. 
270 Ibid., citing de las Heras, op. cit., p184. 
271 Cox, New Comm, p1773, citing CIC, c. 18. 
272 Ibid., citing McGrath, ‘At the Service of Truth’, pp359-398. 
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Whilst accepting that the canon is an example of the law mandating the use of an expert, Kelly 
argues that the exception involves situations where ‘there is manifestly nothing for the expert to 
investigate, or … the matter is already fully … or adequately proven without the expert evidence, 
especially where the disorder in question is florid and obviously manifest’.273  However, he does 
not explain how the absence of anything to investigate is relevant in cases of either impotence, 
for which he acknowledges ‘medical testimony is needed’, or mental illness, which is also a 
medical issue and usually beyond the competence of an ecclesiastical judge.  He does not focus 
on establishing the existence, severity or effect of a psychological condition on a person’s 
capacity at the material time, either to elicit marital consent or to assume its object. 
 
Beal, acknowledging that proof of a ‘serious and habitual mental disorder’ causing lack of 
sufficient use of reason, ‘usually’ requires the services of psychological experts, considers that 
they ‘may shed little light’ on the critical issues in cases involving ‘serious but transient 
disturbances such as intoxication’.274  He does not explain how unqualified ecclesiastical judges 
can do better.  Moreover, in grave lack of discretion of judgment cases, Beal states: 
 
‘[J]udges must reconstruct the marital decision-making process, as investigators reconstruct the 
scenes of traffic incidents, to attempt to identify critical faults or omissions in the reasoning 
process that may have rendered it fatally flawed’.275 
 
For Beal, this involves ‘a two-step process’: the identification of an underlying disorder or 
disturbance ‘that has impaired a person’s psychic functioning’; and the weighing of ‘the 
seriousness of the impact of this impairment on the faculties involved in the decision-making 
process against the seriousness of marital rights and obligations’.276  Moreover, he acknowledges 
that ‘psychological experts can provide invaluable assistance to judges in identifying the nature, 
seriousness and impact of psychic disorders and disturbances and in reconstructing the dynamics 
of the process that led to the choice of marriage’.277  It is clear, therefore, that this is a specialist 
task, but Beal mentions neither the ecclesiastical judges’ competence to proceed without expert 
opinion, nor appropriate methodology.    Regarding inability to assume the essential obligations 
273 Kelly, L&S, p938, paras 3285- 3286. 
274 Beal, New Comm, pp1298-1299. 
275 Ibid., p1301. 
276 Ibid. 
277 Ibid.  Emphasis added. 
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of marriage, Beal acknowledges that ‘identifying the nature of the disorder and assessing its 
severity usually require the services of a psychological expert’ and that Rotal sentences ‘speak of 
the necessity of using experts in cases of consensual incapacity’.278  This implies that expert 
consultation is not mandated and that Rotal jurisprudence need not be followed. 
 
Some canonists, therefore, emphasise the principle enshrined in canon 1680 and warn against the 
dangers of ecclesiastical judges overstepping their competence, while others emphasise the 
exception.  Although incapacity must be due to an antecedent and severe cause, there is no real 
consensus regarding whether or not consultation and dialogue with experts is mandated in 
psychological incapacity cases; consequently, it is not surprising that there is also a lack of 
consensus as to how the main requirement of proof, that is, establishing the effect of the cause on 
the party’s capacity to consent, is met.  Given that, generally speaking, ecclesiastical judges lack 
competence in this area, it is unclear how obstacles to reaching moral certainty are overcome 
without the use of experts.  Any argument that because paragraph 2° of the canon does not 
include the term ‘psychological’, such a cause is not required, is not a valid one when 
interpreting canon law, which takes account of context, including the development of the 
wording of canons throughout the various schema during the revision of CIC 1917.279  The 
history of this canon demonstrates clearly its origin in the concept of amentia. 
 
CIC canon 1680 makes no explicit reference to physical examination; although that might prove 
necessary in order to establish the fact or nature of something.   Interestingly, neither CIC 1917 
nor CIC provide for the possibility of expert unavailability.  It is likely therefore, that the 
legislator intended experts to be consulted but recognised that in some cases the information 
might already be in the tribunal’s possession, thereby making further consultation with experts 
unnecessary; hence provision for the exception to the general rule.  Nevertheless, some authors 
clearly hold, not only that experts need not be consulted, but that the unavailability of experts 
provides a sufficiently valid reason to proceed with a marriage nullity case on grounds of 
incapacity without any expert evidence whatsoever, without explaining precisely what 
278 Ibid., p1303, citing Mendonça, ‘Consensual Incapacity’, p541 (sic).  Emphases added. 
279 CIC, c. 17.  See Appendix I.  Also, Mary McAleese, Quo vadis?: Collegiality in the Code of Canon Law (The 
Columba Press, 2012), p35: ‘In Canon Law, the research pathway has some but not always exact parallels with civil 
law.  It has noteworthy differences especially the significance attached, by canonists, to the textual changes made 
over the course of the drafting process’. 
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constitutes ‘unavailability’ or explaining how an ecclesiastical judge can supply for the expertise 
required to establish the existence and effect of a serious condition on a party’s capacity for 
marriage.  In incapacity cases, an expert’s role is to assist the judge to reach moral certainty 
regarding: (a) the existence of a serious psychological cause; (b) its antecedence; (c) its severity; 
and (d) most particularly, its adverse effect on a party’s capacity to consent; when the tribunal 
does not already have this information.  None of these authors explains how judges can reach 
moral certainty of these facts, when the experts who are required to establish them are 
‘unavailable’; nor do they provide authority for their stance that judges can proceed in these 
circumstances. 
 
Documents Supporting the Mandatory Use of Experts: Some of these opinions on whether or 
not experts are mandated, however, pre-date several weighty documents which support the 
premise that experts must be used in cases in which CIC canon 1095 is invoked.280  Although not 
strictly legislative, these include:  
 
1. Some Papal Allocutions, given by the Church‘s supreme legislator, and judge; these 
are issued to officials of the papal tribunals, but are intended for all tribunal officials; 
and they give insight into the supreme legislator’s mind.  Their content is to be 
considered binding when it concerns the context of law, because law and doctrine are 
inseparable;281   
2. A declaration made by the Church’s Supreme Tribunal, the Apostolic Signatura, 
(1998) in response to a specific question posed by a judicial vicar regarding the 
possibility of reaching moral certainty of nullity of marriage on the basis of a judge’s 
personal knowledge, when expert evidence was unavailable;282  and:  
280 See Huels, ‘Assessing the Weight of Documents’, pp119-133.   Although addressing liturgical issues, Huels 
considers that four questions must be answered to assess the weight of an ecclesiastical document: 1) Is the 
document theological or juridical in nature?  2) Who is the authority that has issued the document? 3) To whom is 
the document addressed? and 4) Is the document juridically binding? 
281 CIC, cc. 17; 331; and 1442.  See Appendix I.  See also John Paul II, Allocutions to the Roman Rota (1989), in 
which the Pope explained that in these speeches he addresses ‘all engaged in the administration of justice in the 
ecclesiastical tribunals ...’; and (2005): 6, in which he explains the juridical nature of the content of these speeches. 
See Appendix VII.  See also Robert Ombres, ‘Canon Law and Theology’, 14 Ecclesiastical Law Journal (2012), 
pp164-194, in which he addresses the juridical nature of Papal Allocutions. 
282 Supreme Tribunal of the Apostolic Signatura, Prot. N. 28252/97, Questions regarding the use of the expert in 
marriage nullity cases (16 June 1998).  English translation in CLSGB&I Newsletter, No 150, (June 2007), pp11-13.  
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3. The Instruction, Dignitas Connubii (2005) (DC), which explains extant law and is 
binding on those who execute it; this is published by the Pontifical Council for 
Legislative Texts, by mandate of the supreme legislator, and with the close 
cooperation of two other major Pontifical Congregations, and that of the Supreme 
Tribunal whose moral and juridic authority is unquestionable.283   
 
These documents will be explored in turn. 
 
Papal Allocutions to the Sacred Roman Rota: Allocutions have not defined the term ‘expert’ 
but Popes have described members of the Rota as people: whose most serious obligation in 
marriage cases is that of protecting conjugal society; possessing personal qualities of 
‘outstanding character and learning … outstanding virtue and integrity of life’; who are experts 
in their own field; and capable of wise judgment and teaching.284  Popes have described the Rota 
itself as: possessing ‘the highest prestige and greatest expertise’; and being an ‘unequalled expert 
body’, whose jurisprudence is considered ‘expert’.285  Papal judges have legal qualifications, 
experience, knowledge of language and local custom, and knowledge of theology and Christian 
anthropology.286  The subject matter of Papal Allocutions by successive Popes varies, but they 
have been consistent in their treatment of doctrine, law, and the need for unity of jurisprudence 
throughout the ecclesiastical tribunals.287 
 
Although, not having the force of law (see Appendix I: CIC, c. 16), this declaration was given by the Apostolic 
Signatura, following consultation with its own experts, and having discussed the matter in the presence of the 
Prefect.  See also Morrisey, ‘Papal and Curial Pronouncements: Their Canonical Significance in Light of the 1983 
Code of Canon Law’, The Jurist 50 (1990), pp102-125, in which he explains, at p121, that private replies ‘enable 
canonists to make good and practical applications of the existing legislation’.  
283 CIC, cc. 6§2; 16§1; 17; and 34§1.  See Appendix I.  The SCDF and SCDWDS were involved in the preparation 
of this Instruction.  See also Joaquín Llobell, ‘The Juridical Nature of the Instruction Dignitas Connubii and 
Reaction to it in the Church’, in Dugan, pp3-31 (hereafter Llobell, in Dugan), at p6-9 for the sources of 
interpretation of the law relevant to DC.  Also: DC, Proemium; Appendix V; OM, for relevant amendments of CIC 
in Appendix VI; and John Paul II, Allocutions to the Roman Rota (1981, 1983, and 1999) in Appendix VII.    
284 John XXIII, Allocution to the Roman Rota (1959); Paul VI, Allocution to the Roman Rota (1968, 1974); and John 
Paul II, Allocution to the Roman Rota (1984).  See Appendix VII. 
285 John XIII, Allocution to the Roman Rota (1959); Paul VI, Allocution to the Roman Rota (1968); and John Paul II, 
Allocution to the Roman Rota (1984).  See Appendix VII. 
286 Paul VI, Allocution to the Roman Rota (1974); John Paul II, Allocution to the Roman Rota (1984 and 1987).  See 
Appendix VII. 
287 Including the protection of rights. 
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Church Doctrine:  Papal Allocutions reiterate Church doctrine, the basis for law.  The 
Allocutions repeat the Christian anthropological principles that human person is capable of 
loving God, his creator, but experiences internal difficulties in this life.288  These can be 
overcome by uniting with God, albeit that this involves effort and sacrifice.289  Difficulties 
within marriage are no exception.290  This neither means, pessimistically, that man is destined to 
follow his impulses or social conditioning, nor optimistically, that he can attain fulfillment on his 
own.291  Marriage, created by God, is a source of sanctification.292  This concept of marriage as 
‘an intimate sharing of life and love’ in which the spouses ‘give themselves to each other and 
accept each other’, must be considered when assessing capacity for marital consent.293  Marriage, 
as a natural institution, cannot demand, for validity, more than the capacity of the majority.294  
Papal Allocutions have sought consistently to emphasise, not only the importance of marriage 
and the family in society,295 but the role of the Rota in protecting: doctrine, specifically the 
doctrine of the indissolubility of marriage;296 the natural right to marry;297 and the requirement 
and sufficiency for the judge to reach ‘moral certainty’ of nullity of marriage, based on the acts 
and proofs, before making such a declaration.298   
 
Law and Jurisprudence: The Allocutions stress repeatedly, not only the inherent pastoral nature 
of canon law, of which procedural law is a component,299 but the role of the Roman Rota in 
safeguarding: the truth;300 rights301 (which are not unlimited);302 the administration of justice;303 
288 John Paul II, Allocution to the Roman Rota (1987).  See Appendix VII.  
289 John Paul II, Allocution to the Roman Rota (1995).  See Appendix VII. 
290 John Paul II, Allocution to the Roman Rota (1987).  See Appendix VII. 
291 Ibid.  
292 Ibid. 
293 Ibid.  
294 John Paul II, Allocutions to the Roman Rota (1997 and 2001).  See Appendix VII. 
295 Pius XII, Allocution to the Roman Rota (1940); John XXIII, Allocution to the Roman Rota (1959); Paul VI, 
Allocutions to the Roman Rota (1975, 1976, and 1978); and John Paul II, Allocutions to the Roman Rota (1981, 
2003, and 2004).  See Appendix VII. 
296 Pius XII, Allocutions to the Roman Rota (1940 and 1941); John XXIII, Allocution to the Roman Rota (1959); 
John Paul II, Allocutions to the Roman Rota (2000 and 2002); and Benedict XVI, Allocutions to the Roman Rota 
(2006 and 2010).  See Appendix VII. 
297 Pius XII, Allocution to the Roman Rota (1941); and Benedict XVI, Allocutions to the Roman Rota (2009 and 
2011).  See Appendix VII. 
298 John Paul II, Allocution to the Roman Rota (1980).  See Appendix VII. 
299 John Paul II, Allocutions to the Roman Rota (1979 and 1990: 2, 6).  In these allocution John Paul II spoke of a 
fair trial being a right of the faithful.  See Appendix VII. 
300 Pius XII, Allocution to the Roman Rota (1944); Paul VI, Allocutions to the Roman Rota (1963, 1973 and 1978); 
John Paul II, Allocutions to the Roman Rota (1979, 1980, 1981, 1984, 1987, 1988, 1994 (3), 1999, 2002 (5), 2004 
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uniformity of ministry and doctrine,304 and judicial decisions.305  Although there is no canonical 
doctrine of precedent regarding judicial decisions,306 in order to achieve uniformity of decisions, 
inferior tribunals are charged with following the substantive and procedural law of Rotal 
jurisprudence,307 exclusively.308  Correct interpretation of law requires knowledge of the whole 
body of Church teaching.309   
 
Expert Evidence: Papal Allocutions acknowledge the value of advances in empirical sciences,310 
which have influenced not only the revision of law,311 but also judicial decisions by the provision 
of expert evidence,312 particularly in incapacity for marriage cases.313  However, tribunals must 
be ‘on guard against the temptation to exploit the proofs and procedural norms in order to 
achieve what is perhaps a “practical” goal, which might be considered “pastoral,” but is to the 
(6), and 2005 (1, 5); and Benedict XVI, Allocutions to the Roman Rota (2006, 2007, 2009 and 2010).  See Appendix 
VII. 
301 John XXIII, Allocution to the Roman Rota (1959); Paul VI, Allocution to the Roman Rota (1967 and 1977); John 
Paul II, Allocution to the Roman Rota (1979 and 1996 (3)); and Benedict XVI, Allocution to the Roman Rota (2008).  
See Appendix VII. 
302 CIC, c. 223§2.   See Appendix I.  Also Paul VI, Allocution to the Roman Rota (1977); and John Paul II, 
Allocution to the Roman Rota (1994 (3)).  See Appendix VII. 
303 Paul VI, Allocution to the Roman Rota (1978); John Paul II, Allocutions to the Roman Rota (1981, 1984, 1993, 
1998, and 2002 (1)); and Benedict XVI, Allocutions to the Roman Rota (2008 and 2010).  See Appendix VII. 
304 Paul VI, Allocution to the Roman Rota (1977); and John Paul II, Allocution to the Roman Rota (1986).  See 
Appendix VII. 
305 John Paul II, Allocution to the Roman Rota (1993 (3)); and Benedict XVI, Allocutions to the Roman Rota (2008 
and 2011).  See Appendix VII.   See also McGrath, ‘Moral Certainty’, p58: ‘…[I]t is not sufficient simply to quote 
local jurisprudence, no matter how well presented or published - it might well be mistaken, and an error remains an 
error no matter how often it is quoted!’  See also Appendix VIII, Case No: 82-172, p102, coram Egan. 
306 CIC, cc. 16§3; and 19.   See Appendix I.  See also Norman Doe, ‘Canonical Doctrines of Judicial Precedent: A 
comparative study’, The Jurist 54 (1994), pp205-215.  Doe, quoting c. 16§3 argues: (a) ‘judicial decisions do not 
have the force of law … the only binding effect of a judicial decision is upon those involved in the litigation and it 
affects only the matter for which it was given’; (b) quoting c. 1400, ‘The object of a judicial decision is not to create 
law or to impose prospectively an obligation on courts to follow that decision in subsequent similar cases’; (c) 
‘judicial interpretation does not proprio vigore bind other courts … the only authentic and binding interpretation of a 
law … is that of the legislator or his delegatee – and … [it] must be promulgated’; (d) ‘[rather than] judges being 
obliged to follow earlier judicial decision … [they are] obliged to consult other judicial decisions’; and (e) ‘if the law 
is silent on a point “the case is to be decided in light of … the jurisprudence and praxis of the Roman Curia”’.  
Emphases in original,  
307 John Paul II, Allocution to the Roman Rota (1998), and Benedict XVI, Allocution to the Roman Rota (2008).   
See Appendix VII. 
308 John Paul II, Allocutions to the Roman Rota (1992 (4) and 1998); and Benedict XVI, Allocution to the Roman 
Rota (2008).  See Appendix VII. 
309 John Paul II, Allocution to the Roman Rota (2005 (6)).  See Appendix VII. 
310 Pius XII, Allocution to the Roman Rota (1940); and John Paul II, Allocution to the Roman Rota (1987 (2), 1996 
(3) and 1998 (6)). See Appendix VII. 
311 Paul VI, Allocution to the Roman Rota (1968).  See Appendix VII. 
312 Pius XII, Allocution to the Roman Rota (1941).  See Appendix VII. 
313 Paul VI, Allocution to the Roman Rota (1976).  See Appendix VII. 
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detriment of truth and justice’.314  Expert evidence has inherent dangers.315  Unless experts 
consider the Church’s holistic, doctrinal, and Christian anthropological stance, including a 
correct view of human normality,316 their findings can be misleading.317  Consequently, experts 
who ignore this vision should be avoided;318 dialogue is easier if judge and expert share a 
common understanding of anthropology.319  Judges have responsibility to interpret expert reports 
critically in light of acceptable anthropology.320  A correct understanding of human normality is 
essential; parties to an unsuccessful marriage may have: (a) failed to use available natural and 
supernatural resources; (b) suffered slight pathological disturbances, which caused a reduction, 
but not deprivation of freedom; or (c) behaved immorally.321  Consequently, a failed marriage is 
not proof of incapacity.322  Canonical (that is, minimal) maturity for marriage must not be 
confused with full maturity, the goal of human development.323  A serious anomaly must exist to 
prevent the formation of marriage due to psychological incapacity.324  Pope John Paul II stated:  
 
‘[O]nly the most severe forms of psychopathology impair substantially the freedom of the 
individual…[and]…it is of fundamental importance that, on the one hand, the identification of the 
more serious forms and their distinction from the slight, be carried out by means of a method that 
is scientifically sure; and on the other hand it is important that the categories that belong to 
psychiatry or psychology are not automatically transferred to the field of canon law without 
making the necessary adjustments which take account of the specific competence of each 
science’.325   
 
Moreover, a validly contracted marriage does not rely, for its continued existence, on the 
subsequent conduct of the parties.326  Canonical maturity, difficulty and normality must be 
distinguished, respectively, from full maturity, incapacity and abnormality.327 
314 John Paul II, Allocutions to the Roman Rota (1979; and 1994: 4).  See Appendix VII. 
315 Paul VI, Allocution to the Roman Rota (1976); and John Paul II, Allocutions to the Roman Rota (1980; and 
1982).   See Appendix VII. 
316 John Paul II, Allocution to the Roman Rota (1988); and Benedict XVI, Allocution to the Roman Rota (2009).  See 
Appendix VII. 
317 John Paul II, Allocutions to the Roman Rota. (1987, 1988, 1995 and 2004).  See Appendix VII. 
318 John Paul II, Allocution to the Roman Rota (1995).  See Appendix VII. 
319 John Paul II, Allocution to the Roman Rota (1987 (3)).  See Appendix VII. 
320 John Paul II, Allocution to the Roman Rota (1987 (2)).  See Appendix VII. 
321 John Paul II, Allocution to the Roman Rota (1987 (5)).  See Appendix VII. 
322 John Paul II, Allocution to the Roman Rota (1987 (7)).  See Appendix VII. 
323 John Paul II, Allocution to the Roman Rota (1987 (6)).  See Appendix VII. 
324 John Paul II, Allocution to the Roman Rota (1987 (7)).  See Appendix VII. 
325 John Paul II, Allocution to the Roman Rota (1988).  See Appendix VII. 
326 Benedict XVI, Allocution to the Roman Rota (2009).  See Appendix VII. 
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 The Role of the Expert:  In psychological incapacity cases, which are ‘exceptional’, the 
intervention of an expert is required as a matter of principle, to establish the existence, severity 
and effect of an antecedent mental anomaly on the party’s capacity for consent.328  Behaviour or 
imprudent decisions do not suffice to prove nullity.329  Areas of competence are to be mutually 
respected.330  The expert must establish causes of behaviour by scientific means, and distinguish 
mild, moderate and severe forms of psychopathology.331  Although CIC is silent on a mandatory 
oath specifically for experts, they can be required to take one and they can be sworn to 
secrecy.332  Defenders of the bond, themselves ‘expert’, have a duty to: evaluate expert reports in 
light of Christian anthropology, highlighting unscientific, incorrect, or exaggerated conclusions; 
ensure that all possible causes for marriage failure are considered; and lodge an appeal when 
necessary.333  Judges are responsible for correct interpretation of expert reports, avoiding 
misleading conclusions, and for deciding on the nullity or otherwise of marriage, thus 
safeguarding the ministry of truth and charity.334 
 
Commentary on the 1987 and 1988 Allocutions: Grocholewski clarified that the 1987 Allocution 
concerned all three grounds of nullity hypothesised in canon 1095; mild and moderate forms of 
psychic difficulties, encountered in ordinary life are insufficient to cause nullity - it is not how 
people act, but their potential to act which is at issue.335  Moreover, CIC was not intended to 
introduce either a totally new interpretation or a break with the former law; the new law, 
including that applicable to marriage, was to be interpreted in light of tradition.336  The 
327 Benedict XVI, Allocution to the Roman Rota (2009), in which he revisited the principles annunciated by John 
Paul II, in his Allocutions of 1987 and 1988.  See Appendix VII. 
328 John Paul II, Allocution to the Roman Rota (1987 (2)); and Benedict XVI, Allocution to the Roman Rota (2009).  
See Appendix VII. 
329 John Paul II, Allocution to the Roman Rota (1988); and Benedict XVI, Allocution to the Roman Rota (2011).  See 
Appendix VII. 
330 John Paul II, Allocution to the Roman Rota (1987 (8) and 1988).  See Appendix VII. 
331 John Paul II, Allocution to the Roman Rota (1988).  See Appendix VII. 
332 Norms governing witnesses apply.  DC, Article 167.  See Appendix V.  Pius XII Allocution to the Roman Rota 
(1944); and John Paul II, Allocutions to the Roman Rota (1980 and 1989).  See Appendix VII. 
333 John Paul II, Allocution to the Roman Rota (1988).  See Appendix VII. 
334 John Paul II, Allocution to the Roman Rota (1987).  See also Allocution to the Roman Rota (1997), in which the 
Pope repeated much of the content of this Allocution, and 2009 in which Benedict XVI spoke of the ‘principle’ of 
consulting experts.  See Appendix VII. 
335 Zenon Grocholewski, ‘The Ecclesiastical Judge and the Findings of Psychiatric and Psychological Experts’, The 
Jurist, 47 (1987), pp449-470.   
336 John Paul II, Allocution to the Roman Rota (1993).  See Appendix VII.  
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Allocutions of 1987 and 1988, therefore, focusing on marital incapacity and the use of experts, 
clarify that: the existence of a ‘grave anomaly’ at the time of the exchange of consent must be 
established and its severity and effect on the party’s capacity to consent demonstrated.  This 
anomaly must have been sufficiently severe, not just to have caused difficulties, but to have 
prevented the party from eliciting matrimonial consent. 
 
Following these Allocutions, Mendonça addressed the question as to whether or not the use of 
experts was mandated in cases involving canon 1095.  Having discussed the evolution of canons 
1095 and 1680, Mendonça poses the question as to whether, following the allocution of 1987, 
‘the expressions: “causes of a psychic nature” of canon 1095; “mental illness” of canon 1680; 
and “anomaly of a serious nature”, mentioned in the papal allocution [are] to be considered 
identical’ and he answers in the affirmative, but holds ‘the necessity of employing an expert or 
experts is not absolute but only relative (or facultative), i.e., relative to each case to be 
determined by the judge in the concrete circumstances …’.  Acknowledging the Holy Father’s 
words that these cases demand the help of experts, Mendonça considered that these must be 
interpreted in light of canon 1680, ‘which grants discretionary faculty to the judge of employing 
expert help’; the principle is ‘muted by the exception’, albeit that it is subject to strict 
interpretation.337  However, he quotes Pompedda:  
 
‘When one says that the perita is a facultative means of proof, one is not saying that such a choice 
is purely “arbitrary” or “optional”, or a choice left to the capriciousness of a judge.  We are 
speaking of a discretionality which is dependent upon and connected with the procedural 
exigencies in a specific case.  This is particularly true in matrimonial cases which concern grave 
psychic defect or for causes of impotence.  What distinguishes mere arbitrariness or 
capriciousness from a facultative choice of the judge is the procedural need in a specific case. … 
Certainly, to lack any psychological or medical documentation in a case, to lack any qualified 
testimony (that of doctor, psychologist/psychiatrists) - even if these testimonies are not based on a 
specific role to which they were assigned in a case - to lack all this, and then for a judge to say 
that because of his own competence in psychological/psychiatric matters he can do without these, 
337 Mendonça, ‘The Role of Experts’, pp424-425, citing G Versaldi, Animadversines quaedam relate ad 
allocutionem Ioannis Pauli II ad Romanun Rotam diei 25 ianuarii 1988, p254-255.  In this article, Mendonça 
acknowledged that a survey of several tribunals in Canada showed that in 1989, a total of 3,200 cases were heard.  
94.5% of these were judged on the basis of canon 1095, 2º and 3º.  In 35% of these experts had been involved.  
However, practice differed between tribunals, some employing experts in 98% of cases while in others it was in less 
than 2% of cases.  95% of experts used were psychiatrists; 5% were psychologists.  
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the legitimacy of such a judge’s behavior must be called into question.  I would question the 
legitimacy of the omission of perita under such circumstances’.338 
 
Mendonça proceeds: ‘A judge cannot say that all those who suffer from “personality disorders” 
are incapable of contracting marriage because almost 95% of marriage cases dealt with in local 
tribunals involve personality disorders’.  He criticises the ‘faulty logic’ of other writers who hold 
that ‘incapacity can be established by the “common estimations of man”’ without the help of 
experts, as being contrary to the requirements of law and praxis.339  Mendonça concedes that 
there may be situations in which the exception can be invoked, for example, if ‘medical records 
or psychiatric reports on previous treatment or examination may be available and in the light of 
other testimonies’.  However, he also says: ‘the testimonies of witnesses alone may provide an 
abundance of facts and indications which clearly identify the factors impeding a mature decision 
or the capacity to implement the object of that decision’, but does not explain how this is 
sufficient to evaluate the party’s capacity at the material time.  Moreover, he says that experts are 
not required if ‘the judge [finds] no trace of psychopathology or psychological disturbance which 
could have deprived the person of the capacity to contract’.340  He does not explain how these 
cases can proceed on incapacity grounds, but presumably, the judge would have to find the case 
not proven. 
 
Declaration from the Apostolic Signatura: A Judicial Vicar of an un-named diocese claimed 
that the civil law of his country prohibited psychiatrists and psychologists from assisting in the 
ecclesiastical tribunals.  This presented difficulties when dealing with marriage nullity cases 
under CIC canon 1095.  He asked the Apostolic Signatura:  
 
‘Whether in such circumstances judges are allowed to pronounce in favour of nullity, if they 
arrive at the moral certitude which is required in favour of nullity, through their own non-
professional knowledge, without the services of experts’. 
 
The Apostolic Signatura responded:  
338 Ibid., p425, citing Mario Pompedda, ‘Incapacity to Assume the Essential Obligations of Marriage’, in Incapacity 
for Marriage, p210.  (No further reference is given). 
339 Ibid., p426, citing Lawrence Wrenn, ‘Marriage Tribunals and the Expert’, in The Bulletin of the National Guild of 
Catholic Psychiatrists, 25 (1979), p54 and H McMahon, ‘The Role of Psychiatric and Psychological Experts in 
Nullity Cases’ in Studia Canonica, 9 (1979), p73. 
340 Ibid.  
191 
 
                                                            
 
‘Indeed an affirmative response - as the same Judicial vicar points out - would bring about that 
the services of experts can be omitted not only if it is obvious from the circumstances that it 
would be useless (canon 1680), but also if circumstances render these services morally 
impossible’.341 
 
Some pertinent basic principles, such as moral certainty, were addressed, citing the Papal 
Allocution of 1942.342  The declaration then stated, citing canon 1680 and the Papal Allocutions 
of 1987 and 1988:  
 
‘In cases based on grounds which are dealt with in Canon 1095, unless it is obvious from the 
circumstances that this would be useless, the services of experts are required.  Therefore, in such 
cases the services of a psychiatrist or psychologist are mostly required to distinguish the psychic 
condition of the party or parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage.343  In cases based 
on incapacities, which are dealt with in Canon 1095, considering their complex nature, it is hardly 
possible that in a case, in which the services of an expert appear necessary, the judge can arrive 
through his own non-professional knowledge, at the moral certitude which is to be derived from 
the acts and the proofs and which is required in order to pronounce an affirmative sentence (Cf. 
canon 1608§§1, 2, 4).344  The services of experts in such cases are to be employed not only 
because they have been prescribed by law, but especially because such services are an instrument 
of proof, which, as happens in most cases, the Judge cannot ignore in order to achieve moral 
certainty “from the acts and the proofs” so as to be able to pronounce sentence in favour of nullity 
of a marriage’.345   
 
The Declaration, focusing on the exception, states:  
 
‘An expert report about the psychic state of a party can seem to be “evidently useless” in order to 
prove the nullity of a marriage: (a) when, even if the matter in hand is not an expert report in the 
technical sense, in the acts there exists a document or testimonial, which is so qualified, that it 
provides sufficient relevant proof to the Judge; (b) when from proven facts and circumstances, 
without any doubt, there appears either a lack of sufficient use of reason or a serious lack of 
discretion of judgement or an incapacity to assume the essential obligations of marriage.  The 
reason is that in this case the nullity of the marriage can be declared on account of an evident lack 
of consent, without the need of a carefully drawn up diagnosis of the psychic cause due to which 
there exists that defect.  However, in such cases the Judge can ask the expert to explain some 
document or fact, which exists or is alleged in the acts.  But, we are dealing with two cases which 
should not be considered except as exceptions from the general rule.346 
 
341 Supreme Tribunal of the Apostolic Signatura, Prot. N. 28252/97, Questions regarding the use of the expert in 
marriage nullity cases (16 June 1998).  English translation in CLSGB&I Newsletter, No 150 (June 2007), pp11-13. 
342 Ibid., para 1, p11. 
343 Ibid., para 2, p11-12. 
344 Ibid., para 3, p12. 
345 Ibid., para 4, p12. 
346 Ibid., para 5, p12. 
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If a party refuses to subject himself to an examination by an expert, it is usual for the judge to ask 
the expert for a ‘report’ (votum) based on the acts alone.  If such is “an expert report” (peritia) in 
the technical sense (sic).  Evidently, in this case one can ask the same expert to explain the 
importance of such a “votum” in order to distinguish the true nature of the psychic defect.  It is 
clear that this same “votum” should not be assessed in psychiatry of psychology in the same way 
as a “peritia” in the technical sense.347   
 
A judge, who asks for a “peritia” or, if such is the case, a “votum”, should observe assiduously 
the regulations of the relevant canonical procedural law... .  On his part, the expert is bound to 
observe diligently not only the precepts and ethical norms of his art or science, but also the 
regulations of both canonical and civil law in fulfilling duly and faithfully his own duty (cf. 
Canons 1574, 1577§2 and 1578§2)’.348 
 
The Declaration concludes:  
 
‘Since the services of experts, who are distinguished for their knowledge and experience and who 
adhere to the principles of Christian anthropology, are to be considered of great importance in 
settling marriage cases of nullity based on the grounds dealt with in Canon 1095, one must 
absolutely see to it that the principles indicated above are duly explained to those whom it 
concerns’.349 
 
Commentary on the Declaration: Commenting on this Declaration, Mendonça appears to 
downplay its canonical significance initially by stating that, although the Apostolic Signatura 
cites Pastor Bonus as authority, the document is, nevertheless, a ‘simple’ declaration, which is 
‘neither a general executory decree nor a singular administrative act (decree)’.350  Having 
analysed this declaration in detail, Mendonça answers the Judicial Vicar’s question in the 
affirmative, based on the premise that ‘numerous affirmative sentences’ were pronounced on 
such grounds at Rotal level, their legitimacy never being questioned.351  However, it is clear 
347 Ibid., para 6, p12. 
348 Ibid., para 8, p13. 
349 Ibid., para 9, p13. 
350 Augustine Mendonça, ‘The Apostolic Signatura’s Recent Declaration on the Necessity of Using Experts in 
Marriage Nullity Cases’, Studia Canonica, 35 (2001), pp33-58, (hereafter Mendonça, ‘Declaration’) at p43-44, 
citing Francis Morrisey, Papal and Curial Prouncements: Their Canonical Significance in Light of the Code of 
Canon Law, Second Edition, Revised and Updated by Michael Thériault (Ottawa, 1995), pp30-32.  See also PB, Art 
124, 1°: ‘The Signatura also has the responsibility: 1. to exercise vigilance over the correct administration of justice, 
and, if need be, to censure advocates and procurators; 2. to deal with petitions presented to the Apostolic See for 
obtaining the commission of a case to the Roman Rota or some other favour relative to the administration of justice; 
3. to extend the competence of lower tribunals; 4. to grant its approval to tribunals for appeals reserved to the Holy 
See, and to promote and approve the erection of interdiocesan tribunals’.  
351 Mendonça, ‘Declaration’, p57. 
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from the Papal Allocutions of 1987 and 1988 that the Pope had serious concerns about the 
interpretation of the law on incapacity for marriage.352  Moreover, McGrath points out:  
 
‘[While this allocution of 1987 was] interpreted by many as an attack on the practice of local 
tribunals … commentators have been quick to point out that, while the contents of the allocution 
are directed to all tribunals, they were presented immediately to the judges of the Roman Rota’. 
 
McGrath also cites Rotal cases which have been subsequently criticised both for non-use of 
experts and for the manner in which expert reports were interpreted and used.353   More recently, 
the Pope was still not content with the interpretation of the law on incapacity for marriage.354  
Moreover, the ‘common and constant praxis’ of the Roman Rota, both before and after the 
promulgation of CIC, is to use experts in cases of consensual incapacity.355 
 
Mendonça nevertheless acknowledges the general principles: a judge must reach moral certainty; 
the only sources for moral certainty are the acts and the proofs; the proofs must be evaluated in 
accord with conscience and with due regard for the legal provisions about the efficacy of certain 
proofs; and in the absence of moral certainty the judge must pronounce in favour of the bond of 
marriage.356  He further acknowledges: ‘as a general rule’ when canon 1095 is invoked, ‘the 
services of expert(s) are mandatory’, but this is not ‘an absolute requirement’, as the law 
provides an exception.  He concedes that the Signatura has identified only two circumstances in 
which the exception applies: (1) when there is ‘a document, such as a clinic report by a 
competent expert’, or ‘a hospital record’, or ‘testimony (either of an expert called in to testify as 
a witness in the case or by someone who provides a clear description of the person’s psychic 
352 William H Woestman, ‘Judges and the Incapacity to Assume the Essential Obligations of Marriage’, Studia 
Canonica, 21 (1987), pp315-323 (hereafter Woestman, ‘Judges and Incapacity’), at p316: ‘Putting aside the 
sensationalism of the public press, [following the Papal Allocution of 1987], one hears a serious voice raising a 
question that is in urgent need of thoughtful consideration and an adequate response’.  
353 McGrath, ‘At the Service of Truth’, at 393-394, citing Versaldi, ‘Momentum et consectaria allocutionis Ioannis 
Pauli II ad auditors Romanae Rotae diei 5 Februarii 1987’, p110, and Z Grocholewski, ‘The Ecclesiastical Judge 
and the Findings of Psychiatric and Psychological Experts’, in The Jurist, 47 (1987), p449. 
354 Benedict XVI, Allocution to the Roman Rota (2009).  See Appendix VII. 
355 Antoni Stankiewicz, ‘Some Indications About Canon 1095 in the Instruction Dignitas Connubii’, in Dugan, 35-
49 (hereafter Stankiewicz, ‘Some Indications: Canon 1095’), at p43, citing coram Huot, dec 26 June 1984, RRDec, 
Vol. LXXVII, p636, n 12; and coram Jarawan, dec, 10 March 1989, RRDec., Vol LXXXI, p 195, n 7b, etc.  
Stankiewicz was Dean of the Roman Rota from 2004-2012. 
356 Mendonça, ‘Declaration’, p57, citing Urbano Navarrete in Commentarium, in Per, 87 (1998), p626. 
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condition)’; or (2) when the psychological condition is so clear from the proofs that the judge has 
sufficient evidence of the alleged incapacity’.357   
 
Furthermore, Mendonça concedes:  
 
(a) ‘unless a judge is a also a psychiatrist or psychologist’ he is ‘not to play an expert’s role by 
diagnosing [the person’s] mental state or psychological condition’;  
(b) ‘without professional formation in behavioural sciences a judge cannot and should not try to 
indulge in evaluating the clinical data or information found in the acts … without help from 
experts in psychology or psychiatry’; and: 
(c) ‘[although a judge’s insights acquired from dealing with cases] would certainly be very 
helpful in understanding better the mental state or psychological condition of a person, [those 
insights would not qualify him] to diagnose and to establish prognosis in a given case’.358  
 
So, although Mendonça appears to emphasise the exception, nevertheless, he acknowledges both 
the principle and the limited circumstances, outlined by the Apostolic Signatura, in which the 
exception can be invoked.   
 
The Instruction Dignitas Connubii: A decade after the famous Papal Allocutions of 1987 and 
1988, the Pope announced his intention to provide an Instruction to guide those involved in 
processing marriage nullity cases.359  This Instruction sought to simplify procedures in marriage 
cases, the norms governing which were to be found under three different headings in CIC 
1983.360  While seeming at times to extend the law, an Instruction cannot modify it, but gives it 
‘more precise definition’.361  In its preamble, DC acknowledges advances in medical sciences.362  
DC contains eleven articles governing experts.363  Article 203§1 repeats the provisions of CIC 
canon 1680, but adds the qualification ‘or because of the incapacities described in canon 1095’, 
clarifying that the principle enunciated in canon 1680 applies to all three grounds hypothesised in 
CIC canon 1095.  DC retains the exception in canon 1680, that is, ‘unless from the circumstances 
357 Ibid., p58. 
358 Ibid., pp57- 58. 
359 See Appendix VII: John Paul II, Allocution to the Roman Rota (1998). 
360 CIC, cc. 1400-1500 on trials in general; cc. 1500-1670 on the contentious trial; and cc. 1671-1707 on special 
matrimonial processes. 
361 Llobell, in Dugan, pp3-31, at p4, citing numerous authors including Bianchi, Hilbert, Kowal, Lüdocke, 
Rodríguez-Ocaňa, and Morrisey.  
362 DC, Proemium. See Appendix V. 
363 DC, Articles 203-213. 
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[expert opinion] would appear evidently useless’.364  It appears, therefore, that the legislator 
intended that at least one expert be consulted in cases involving canon 1095, unless the tribunal 
was already in possession of the necessary information, but never intended to limit the scope of 
the canon to cases of diagnosed ‘mental illness’.365 
 
DC reiterates the judge’s responsibility to appoint the expert in these cases;366 but instead of the 
obligation to consult the parties as in CIC canon 1575, it merely requires parties to be informed 
of the appointment.367  Whilst CIC is silent regarding the suitability of experts, DC clarifies that 
they must: ‘have obtained a testimonial of their suitability’; be ‘outstanding for their knowledge 
and experience’; and ‘be commended for their religiosity and honesty’.368  DC further requires 
‘special care’ to be taken so that experts in psychological incapacity cases ‘who adhere to 
Christian anthropological principles’ be appointed.369  The judge’s obligation to define, by 
decree, the points the expert is to address is repeated in DC, but the obligation to include specific 
questions in cases of incapacity, and impotence, is clarified.370  Other provisions of DC reiterate 
the provisions of CIC.371   
 
DC requires the expert to respond to the questions posed by the judge, but only within his own 
field of knowledge and expertise.372  If more than one expert is consulted, the provisions of CIC 
are repeated.373  In addition to the expert’s duties outlined in CIC, DC requires that the degree of 
certainty the experts’ conclusions enjoy be specified.374  Moreover, following the 1988 
Allocution, in which the importance of the office of the defender of the bond was highlighted, 
DC specifically charges the defender with assisting the judges by ensuring that: questions put to 
the expert are clear and relevant to an incapacitating condition and do not go beyond his 
364 DC, Article 203§1.  See Appendix V. 
365 DC, Article 203§2, which repeats CIC, c. 1574, but omits the words ‘by a provision of the law’, (presumably, 
because DC, is limited to judicial procedures in marriage nullity cases) and adds the example of experts required to 
authenticate documents.  See Appendix V. 
366 DC, Article 204§1.  This repeats CIC, c. 1575.  See Appendix V. 
367 DC, Article 204§2.  See Appendix V. 
368 DC, Article 205§1.  This provision reflects the continuity of law from CIC 1917, even when not expressly stated 
in CIC.  See Appendix V. 
369 DC, Article 205§2.  See Appendix V. 
370 DC, Articles 207-209.  See Appendix V. 
371 For example, see DC, Articles 206; 207§§2 and 3; and 211-213.  See Appendix V. 
372 DC, Article 209§3.  See Appendix V. 
373 DC, Article 210§1.  See Appendix V. 
374 DC, Article 210§2.  See Appendix V. 
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competence; any expert’s views which do not correspond to the principles of Christian 
anthropology are highlighted; and any incorrect evaluation of expert reports by the judges of 
First Instance is brought to the attention of the Appeal Tribunal.375 
 
Commentary on DC: Stankiewicz, commenting on DC, highlights the importance of following 
procedural norms, which govern ‘the form, the value and the timing of procedural acts and the 
order in which they are carried out’; they ‘principally safeguard, in the procedural context, the 
substantive law’.  Through procedural norms ‘the normative substantive law is activated, carried 
out and becomes the concrete and real case’.376  Acknowledging the difficulty of interpretation, 
he applies the procedural norms of DC to the substantive norm of canon 1095; identifying five 
‘perceptive norms’: 
 
(a) Article 56§4, on the duties of the Defender of the Bond regarding canon 1095;  
(b) Article 203§1, on the necessity to engage one or more experts unless this would be 
evidently useless;  
(c) Article 205§2, on choosing experts who adhere to the principles of Christian 
anthropology;  
(d) Article 209§§1-3, on the object of the expert’s investigation, formed by the questions 
proposed by the judge, with specific reference to the three forms of incapacity 
hypothesised in canon 1095nn 1°-3°; and:  
(e) Article 251, although not specifically mentioning canon 1095 mandating an 
imposition of a prohibition on a further marriage (a vetitum) on a party found to have 
been incapable of marriage due to a permanent cause.377   
 
According to Stankiewicz, these five norms reflect both the concern over the quantitative 
increase in cases pleaded under canon 1095, 2° and 3° and the complexity of the substantive 
norm of canon 1095, which is based on the natural law, but which appears not always to be 
375 DC, Article 56§§1; and 4.  See Appendix V. 
376 Stankiewicz, ‘Some Indications: Canon 1095’, pp35-36.  
377 Ibid., p45, ft 43, citing L M Rulla, in  Anthropology of the Christian Vocation, Vol. 1, Interdisciplinary Bases 
(Rome, 1986), pp71-77, ft 31.  See Appendix V, for the text of the relevant articles of DC.  See also ft 98 above. 
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understood correctly.378  He refutes arguments put forward by authors in favour of using experts 
at the discretion of the judge, citing, apart from CIC and DC, the ‘common and constant Rotal 
jurisprudence’, and the Church’s Magisterium, as authority for the mandatory involvement of 
experts in cases in which either impotence or canon 1095 is pleaded, except where it would be 
evidently useless.  In other cases, expert evidence is left to the discretion of the judge.  For 
Stankiewicz, the ‘knowledge and experience’ required of experts clearly implies formal 
specialist qualifications. 379 
 
Therefore, Papal allocutions (particularly those of 1987 and 1988), the Declaration of the 
Apostolic Signatura (1998) and DC (2005) are clear that experts are required in psychological 
incapacity cases, except in very limited circumstances. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The Church teaches that marriage is an irrevocable covenant, by mutual and free consent 
exchanged between a man and a woman.  It is a lifelong, indissoluble and faithful union, open to 
the procreation of children.  To marry is a right of the natural law.  Therefore, the Church 
recognises that marriage is within the capacity of most people.  However, valid marriage can be 
prevented by impediments, lack or defect of form, or invalid consent caused by defects, 
including psychological incapacity.  When a marriage fails, the ecclesiastical tribunals, whose 
structure and operation is governed by canon law, are competent to investigate pleas of nullity 
(including those based on psychological incapacity), submitted by either party in order to 
establish whether or not a true marriage came into existence, and consequently, the parties’ status 
378 Ibid., p37.  Stankiewitcz cites Rotal statistics: ‘[D]uring the year 2005, of the 126 definitive decisions, 57 (50 
sentences, 7 decrees of ratification) concerned canon 1095, 2°, and 44 (39 sentences and 5 decrees of ratification) 
concerned canon 1095, 3°’.  At p38 Stankiewicz states: ‘… [O]ne does not encounter the feared jurisprudential 
rigidity but rather laxism in the application of the law.  This is found in the accustomed reasoning of ecclesiastical 
sentences which not unfrequently (sic) indentify a minimal preparation for sacramental marriage, insufficient human 
maturity understood in a general way or imprudence in behavior, with the lack of the necessary discretion of 
judgment or of the desired fitness for the essential obligations of marriage’. 
379 Ibid., pp43-45.  Stankiewicz is critical of Lawrenece Wrenn, who, in The Invalid Marriage, p30, holds that the 
judge has discretion as to whether or not to consult an expert (see ft 266 above).  Stankiewicz also cites John Paul II, 
Allocution to the Roman Rota, 1987, and the Supreme Tribunal of the Apostolic Signatura’s declaration of 16 June 
1998. 
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in the Church regarding freedom to enter a new marriage.  CIC canon 1095, evolving as it did 
from the CIC 1917 concept of amentia, involves psychological incapacity; when this is alleged 
the law mandates the use of experts, except in very limited circumstances (namely, when the 
required information is already available to the tribunal (canon 1680)).  Since the promulgation 
of CIC, Papal Allocutions (especially those from 1987 and 1988), reflecting on, and usually 
endorsing, the common and constant praxis of the Roman Rota, have reiterated the obligation to 
consult experts when any of the incapacities enshrined in CIC canon 1095 is pleaded.  In 1998, 
the Apostolic Signatura clarified the need to engage experts in psychological incapacity cases 
and the limited circumstances in which the exception permitted in CIC canon 1680 (i.e. when the 
tribunal already has the information) can be invoked.  To clarify matters still further, the 
Instruction DC (2005) repeats and further clarifies the provisions of CIC.  This Instruction 
incorporates the provisions of the Papal Allocutions and reflects the common and constant praxis 
of the two Papal tribunals.  It sets out in detail the mandatory requirements to appoint and consult 
experts in incapacity cases and to pose specific, relevant questions to them.   
 
The norms governing experts are found in CIC under ‘Judicial Procedures’; consequently, they 
focus on the use of experts in the judicial forum.  There is, therefore, considerable dissonance 
between the clarity of provisions for the use of experts in the administrative governance of the 
Church (as we have seen in Chapters 1 to 3) and those in the judicial forum.  The Church has 
always safeguarded marriage and the doctrine of indissolubility.  Therefore, marriage nullity 
cases, forming the major workload of ecclesiastical tribunals, should benefit from the more 
detailed and clearer provisions outlined here, most particularly in DC.  Some canonists 
acknowledge the requirement to engage experts in psychological incapacity cases as well as the 
limited circumstances in which the permitted exception applies.  Others, however, instead of 
embracing the clearly presented law, which is facilitative and inherently pastoral, find innovative 
ways of circumventing these provisions.  For example, they cite, but without clear authority, the 
unavailability of experts as justification for invoking the exception to the general principle, 
although no law provides for this circumstance.  It would seem reasonable to expect that 
wherever tribunals exist, experts can be found.  Some canonists, therefore, appear to understand 
that the judge has wide discretion as to the involvement of experts, even in these cases of 
psychological incapacity to exercise a right of the natural law.  Moreover, these canonists do not 
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explain how the canonical requirements - to establish the existence of an ‘anomaly’ based on 
psychopathology and its severity, and to demonstrate its effect on a party’s psychological 
capacity at the material time of exchanging consent - can be satisfied without expert input.  Nor 
do they explain the ecclesiastical judge’s competence in this field, or the methodology to be used 
to establish the party’s psychological status.  It is not surprising therefore, that, as we shall see in 
the forthcoming chapters, experts are not used uniformly in practice.  Coincidence between 
orthodoxy and orthopraxy, therefore, is of critical importance to uniformity of jurisprudence, to 
the value of certainty in upholding the rule of law in the Church and to the universal salvific 
mission of the Church.380   
 
380 CIC, c. 1752.  See Appendix I. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
THE USE OF EXPERTS IN PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY 
FOR MARRIAGE IN PRACTICE: CASE STUDIES 
 
Marriage, as an institution of the natural law, is within the capacity of most people.  We have 
seen that, under canon law, incapacity to marry can be caused by impediments, lack or defect 
of form, or invalid consent.  Invalid consent due to psychological causes requires a 
‘scientifically sure’ assessment of the party in whom the incapacity is alleged; the use of 
experts is mandated, except in very limited circumstances.  Canon law presumes: capacity for 
marriage at canonical age, and the validity of marriage once celebrated; therefore, the 
contrary must be proven to the degree of moral certainty before a declaration of nullity can 
be issued.  Moreover, the law requires the ecclesiastical judge to be qualified in canon law, 
and it is reasonable, therefore, to assume his competence to exercise his office and to 
interpret and apply the law correctly.  However, this is a requirement of law, not a legal 
presumption.1 A judge’s role in marriage nullity cases is to decide whether or not the 
evidence presented leads to the judges’ moral certainty of the fact of nullity.     
 
This Chapter identifies cases in Southwark and Dublin in which incapacity to consent was 
alleged and experts were consulted.  These cases have been anonymized to protect the 
identity of those involved.  A brief statistical survey gives an overall view of the number of 
cases involved and the number of cases heard under the different heads of incapacity.  Whilst 
the intention is not to suggest that the substantive decisions reached on nullity are incorrect, 
the cases in which expert opinion was sought are studied in an attempt to establish: (a) the 
rationale for seeking expert opinion; (b) whether or not the expert was tribunal-appointed; (c) 
whether or not procedural law was followed; and (d) whether or not expert opinion 
influenced the tribunal.  A comparison will be made between the use of experts in Southwark 
cases and those from another jurisdiction (Dublin) as well as those in a sample of cases from 
the Roman Rota.   
 
 
1 William L Daniel, ‘Motives in Decernendo for Admitting a Cause of Marriage Nullity to an Ordinary 
Examination’, Studia Canonica, 45 (2011), pp67-120, at p70.  See Appendix IX for full quotation. 
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1. THE SOUTHWARK PROVINCE: 
JURISDICTION AND DOCUMENTS EXAMINED 
  
The Interdiocesan Tribunal of Second Instance of Southwark (ITSIS) accepts cases on appeal 
from four diocesan First Instance tribunals.2  The cases appealed in 2009 are studied here.3  
Ninety-five cases were received by ITSIS.  Files were available for seventy-seven of these.4  
Of the 18 unavailable files,5 no information was available regarding the use of experts.  
However, the ITSIS register reveals the following information about them:6 
 
• The First Instance reached affirmative (proven) decisions on grounds of incapacity in 
seventeen cases,7 all of which involved the ground of grave lack of discretion of 
judgment concerning the essential matrimonial rights and obligations to be mutually 
given and accepted;8 
• In eight cases this incapacity was found proven in both parties;9 and in nine cases it 
was found proven in one party.10 Therefore, a total of twenty-five people were found 
to be legally incapable on this ground; 
• ITSIS agreed with all these affirmative decisions; it was unclear whether ITSIS 
ratified these decisions following the abbreviated process or following a full (ordinary 
contentious) hearing;11 
2 The dioceses are: Plymouth, Portsmouth, Arundel and Brighton, and Southwark (which, although it is one 
tribunal has two First Instance offices, which operate independently).  
3 2009 was the most recent year in which almost all cases which had been submitted to Second Instance were 
completed.  Cases have been given Arabic numbers 1-95 corresponding to the number of cases received by 
ITSIS, with ‘09’ referring to 2009.   
4 The unavailable files had been returned to the individual dioceses.  
5 09/9; 09/12; 09/13; 09/14; 09/18; 09/24; 09/25; 09/26; 09/27; 09/29; 09/40; 09/41; 09/46; 09/47; 09/58; 09/59; 
09/68; 09/93. 
6 CIC, c. 1637§4 provides that unless it is established otherwise, an appeal is presumed to be against all the 
grounds of the judgment.  See Appendix I.  However, the Second Instance register records only the grounds on 
which an affirmative decision had been reached at First Instance; it is unclear therefore, whether all grounds 
alleged at First Instance, or only those on which an affirmative decision was reached, were considered at Second 
Instance.  However, DC Article 265§6 permits confirmation on one ground only as this is sufficient to declare 
the marriage invalid.  See Appendix V. 
7 09/9; 09/12; 09/13; 09/14; 09/18; 09/24; 09/25; 09/26;09/29; 09/40; 09/41;  09/46; 09/47; 09/58; 09/59; 09/68; 
09/93.  Incapacity was not recorded at Second Instance in 09/27 but it is unclear whether or not it was alleged 
and found not-proven at First Instance. 
8 CIC, c. 1095, 2º.  See Appendix I.  Although important to bear in mind, hereafter, the qualification ‘concerning 
the essential matrimonial rights and obligations to be mutually given and accepted,’ will be omitted unless 
specifically required.  
9 09/13; 09/14; 09/25; 09/26; 09/41; 09/46; 09/47; 09/93. 
10 09/9; 09/12; 09/18; 09/24; 09/29; 09/40; 09/58; 09/59; 09/68. 
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• None of these cases involved either incapacity due to lack of sufficient use of 
reason,12 or incapacity due to inability to assume the essential obligations of marriage, 
because of causes of a psychological nature;13 and:  
• No vetita were imposed.14 
 
Of the seventy-seven available files, two cases were returned to First Instance.15  Incapacity 
was not pleaded in seven cases.16  Another contained a plea of incapacity in the original 
petition, but without explanation this ground was not included in the joinder of the issue.17 
This left sixty-seven cases pleading, inter alia, grounds of incapacity.18  No pleas of lack of 
sufficient use of reason were received.   
 
Sixty-four cases involved grave lack of discretion of judgment: twenty-seven of these 
concerned both parties;19 thirty-seven concerned one party.20  Therefore, ninety-one pleas 
11 CIC, c. 1682§2.  See Appendix I.  There is an automatic appeal against an affirmative First Instance decision.  
The procedure at Second Instance is the same as that at First Instance.  However, after an affirmative decision, 
the law provides for a simple ratification process at Second Instance, but if the judges cannot reach moral 
certainty with this process, the case is subject to a full hearing following the ordinary process.  In case of a 
negative (not-proven) decision, the parties retain the right of appeal.  These not-proven judgments are always 
subject to the ordinary process at Second Instance.  See Appendix I CIC cc 1628 and 1640 and Appendix V: DC 
Article 266. 
12 CIC, c. 1095, 1°.  See Appendix I. 
13 CIC, c. 1095, 3°.  See Appendix I.  Hereafter, the qualification ‘because of causes of a psychological nature’ 
will be omitted, unless specifically required. 
14 The imposition of a vetitum is mandated if the incapacity is considered permanent.  See Appendix V: DC, 
Article 251.  
15 In 09/2 the civil divorce decree absolute referred to the religious marriage which had taken place a year after 
the civil marriage; its validity therefore, was in question as the civil authorities should have been concerned only 
with the first (civil) marriage.  The civil authorities subsequently amended the decree absolute to refer to the 
original marriage which had legal effect.  In 09/10 there was no valid plea.  CIC, c. 1501; See Appendix I.  See 
also Paulo Moneta (Professor of Canon Law at the University of Pisa), ‘Determination of the Formulation of the 
Doubt and Conformity of the Sentence’, in Dugan, pp93-113, p97.  Moneta explains the ‘basic rule’ that only 
the parties may challenge the validity of marriage; hence the requirement for a valid petition from one of them.  
The judge may not, therefore, determine the grounds, even if that ‘could better meet their interests’.  At p98, he 
acknowledges the party’s vested interest, but the judge must not supersede the party’s wishes or ‘apply a 
broader ground including the one originally formulated’.   
16 09/63; 09/64; 09/71; 09/73; 09/74; 09/91; and 09/95. 
17 09/53.  The ‘joinder of the issue’ is sometimes called the ‘formulation of the doubt’.  See Appendix I: CIC, c. 
1513§1.  First, under CIC, c. 1611, 1º the judge is obliged to address all the issues admitted in the joinder of the 
issue.  Second, hearing the case on grounds other than those in the petition raises questions about the plaintiff’s 
understanding of the basis for the plea.  See ft 15 above regarding the right of the parties to make their plea. 
18 The other grounds pleaded were: an intention against the good of the spouses (09/15; 09/22; 09/34; 09/54; 
09/75); an intention against the good of children (09/28; 09/36; 09/42; 09/48; 09/49; 09/55; 09/80; 09/86; 09/88; 
09/89; 09/92); an intention against the good of fidelity (09/30; 09/66; 09/82); total simulation (09/33; 09/35; 
09/38; 09/39; 09/89); and error concerning a quality of person directly and principally intended (09/37; 09/77). 
19 09/1; 09/6; 09/11; 09/21; 09/23; 09/30; 09/39; 09/42; 09/45; 09/48; 09/51; 09/55; 09/56; 09/60; 09/61; 09/65; 
09/66; 09/72; 09/75; 09/80; 09/81; 09/82; 09/83; 09/86; 09/87; 09/88; 09/90. 
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were heard on this ground at First Instance.  Sixty-nine affirmative decisions on this ground 
were ratified at ITSIS, but contrary to law, the Second Instance reasoning at ITSIS is not 
recorded;21 a further two affirmative decisions were confirmed following the ordinary 
contentious process.   Twenty pleas received negative (not-proven) decisions on this ground 
at First Instance, but this ground was found proven in the other party in ten cases,22 which 
was sufficient to declare the marriage invalid.  Of the remaining negative decisions on this 
ground,23 an affirmative decision was reached on another ground in all but one case.24   
Therefore, in only one case was there a totally negative decision; that was on grave lack of 
discretion of judgment pleaded in either or both parties when no other ground was pleaded.25  
This negative decision was confirmed by ITSIS; the legal presumption of validity was 
therefore upheld in this one case. 
 
Pleas of inability to assume the essential obligations of marriage were heard in thirteen cases 
at First Instance.  Twelve concerned one party;26 one concerned both parties.27  Therefore, 
fourteen pleas were heard on this ground.   Affirmative decisions were reached in eleven;28 
negative decisions were reached in three.29  In the cases involving these three negative 
decisions, an affirmative decision was reached on: grounds of grave lack of discretion of 
judgment in both parties in one case;30 inability to assume the essential obligations of 
marriage in the other party in the second case;31 and error on the part of the other party in the 
third case.  Consequently, these three marriages were declared invalid; two on grounds of 
incapacity. 
 
In sum, seventy-one pleas of grave lack of discretion of judgment and eleven pleas of 
inability to assume the essential obligations of marriage succeeded.  In all, seventy-nine 
20 09/3; 09/4; 09/5; 09/7; 09/8; 09/15; 09/16; 09/17; 09/19; 09/20; 09/22; 09/28; 09/31; 09/32; 09/33; 09/34; 
09/35; 09/36; 09/38; 09/43; 09/44; 09/49; 09/50; 09/54; 09/57; 09/62; 09/67; 09/69; 09/70; 09/76; 09/78; 09/79; 
09/84; 09/85; 09/89; 09/92; 09/94. 
21 DC, Article 265§4.  See Appendix V. 
22 09/11; 09/21; 09/23; 09/39; 09/42; 09/56; 09/61; 09/82; 09/86; 09/90. 
23 Two of these involved a negative decision on this ground in respect of both parties: 09/48 and 09/72. 
24 An intention against the good of children (09/48; 09/49; 09/67; 09/89); an intention against the good of 
spouses (09/54); and inability to assume the essential obligations of marriage (09/72). 
25 09/1. 
26 09/8; 09/16; 09/37; 09/44; 09/52; 09/55; 09/65; 09/76; 09/77; 09/78; 09/80; 09/87. 
27 09/72. 
28 09/8; 09/16; 09/37; 09/44; 09/52; 09/65; 09/72; 09/76; 09/78; 09/80; 09/87. 
29 09/55; 09/72; 09/77.  (09/72 involved both parties). 
30 09/55. 
31 09/72. 
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people were found legally incapable.32  If one adds to this the twenty-five people declared 
incapable of marriage from the unavailable files, the total number amounts to one hundred 
and four.  A vetitum was suggested by First Instance and confirmed by ITSIS in five cases.33  
In addition, a vetitum was added by ITSIS in two further cases.34  A monitum, or warning,35 
was confirmed in one case.36 
 
2. THE SOUTHWARK CASE STUDIES: 
FACTS, EXPERTS, JUDGMENTS AND ANALYSES 
 
Despite the high number of incapacity pleas, an expert report was obtained in only six cases.    
An analysis of the Acts of these six cases involving experts follows.37  This begins with a 
brief outline of the facts of each case and pertinent evidence provided by the party or parties 
and their witnesses (if there were any).  If an advocate was involved, pertinent 
animadversions are recorded.  The observations of the defender of the bond are then 
highlighted.  The procedure for appointing the expert will then be outlined followed by an 
account of expert findings.  Pertinent issues from the law section of the judgment will then be 
set out followed by the tribunal’s application of law to the case.  A brief discussion concludes 
each case. 
 
It is worth noting at the outset that it was impossible to distinguish any of the six cases from 
other cases in which expert evidence was not sought; therefore, the rationale for seeking 
expert opinion was unclear in all six cases.  Psychiatric illness or psychological impairment 
cannot account for expert involvement because these conditions were alleged in other cases 
32 The apparent discrepancy is resolved by the fact that three people were found to be incapable on both grounds 
(grave lack of discretion of judgment and inability to assume the essential obligations of marriage): the plaintiff 
in 09/80 and the respondents in 09/65 and 09/87. 
33 In 09/19 a vetitum was imposed on the plaintiff and in 09/45 on the respondent, both of whom were found to 
have suffered from a grave lack of discretion of judgment.  In 09/44 and 09/87, a vetitum was imposed on 
respondents who were found to have been incapable of assuming the essential obligations of marriage.  In 09/80 
a vetitum was imposed on the plaintiff who was found both to have suffered from a grave lack of discretion of 
judgment and to have been incapable of assuming the essential obligations of marriage.   
34 In 09/8, a vetitum was imposed on the respondent, and in 09/72 on the plaintiff; they were found to have been 
incapable assuming the essential obligations of marriage.     
35 Hopka, ‘The Vetitum and Monitum’, p357: ‘A close cousin of the vetitum is an even more enigmatic figure: 
the monitum.  The monitum is a warning that an impending marriage should take place only after the greatest 
caution has been exercised to make sure that the parties are able to marry’. 
36 In 09/36 a monitum was imposed on the plaintiff who was found to have suffered from a grave lack of 
discretion of judgment.   
37 ‘Acts’ refer to the entire bundle of papers put before the judges. 
205 
 
                                                            
when expert opinion was not sought.38  Nor can the policy of any particular diocese account 
for their input.39 
 
Case 1:40 
 
This case demonstrates that the tribunal pursued grounds of incapacity when no ground was 
pleaded by the plaintiff in the petition itself and when the tribunal sought expert opinion in 
relation only to one of the parties when incapacity was alleged in both parties. 
 
Facts: This marriage was a sacramental marriage celebrated before 1983.  The plaintiff 
(husband) and respondent (wife) married when they were twenty-six and twenty-two years 
old respectively.  Three children were born.  The husband alleged the wife’s infidelity and 
desertion (to live with another woman) after almost thirty years of marriage.  The husband 
did not plead an established ground for nullity in his petition.  Although there was no 
evidence of objection from either party, the grounds tested by the tribunal were grave lack of 
discretion of judgment on the part of either or both parties (on the basis that whilst pre-dating 
CIC, canon 1095 applies to this marriage as natural law affects all marriages).41  Both parties 
testified.  Their accounts of the relationship differed - both accused each other of infidelity; 
witness evidence about their relationship was largely hearsay - the witnesses offered no 
evidence on capacity.  The parties did not report any difficulties in their courtship.  The 
marriage suffered from extraneous pressures: both parties had stressful jobs; the plaintiff 
developed illness and sought early retirement, consulting an occupational health physician 
and a psychiatrist.  The tribunal approached this psychiatrist for an expert report on the 
plaintiff.  The Acts included the plaintiff’s signed consent for release of his medical records. 
 
Expert Report: The expert indicated that his report was requested by the tribunal secretary.  
The expert was a consultant psychiatrist, a clinical tutor, a Fellow of the Royal College of 
38 There were many examples, as we shall see in Chapter 6.  But, for example: in 09/8, the respondent allegedly 
used illicit drugs; in 09/16, the respondent allegedly was aggressive before marriage and imprisoned after 
marriage; in 09/20, the respondent was alleged to be aggressive and violent after marriage; in 09/35, the plaintiff 
admitted heavy drinking; in 09/45, the respondent, allegedly suffered psychological trauma following active 
military service; and in 09/55, the respondent allegedly got into debt, which led to ‘hospital treatment’; yet no 
expert was consulted in these cases. 
39 Of the five tribunal offices: two cases came from one; one came from each of two more; and none came from 
the remaining two. 
40 09/1.  
41 See Kelly, L&S, p615, para 1099.  
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Physicians and of the Royal College of Psychiatrists, and held a Diploma in Psychological 
Medicine.  The expert listed documents used in the preparation of his report, namely: the 
plaintiff husband’s out-patient records; referral letters from his general practitioner; a letter 
from his Occupational Health Physician; and ‘various documents and letters from the State 
Benefits Agency’.  The expert also interviewed the respondent wife on two occasions.  The 
expert report addressed the plaintiff’s condition under the headings: presenting history; 
previous health record; early life history; family history; marital history to 1997; current 
circumstances in 1997; diagnosis; treatment and progress 1997-2006; and comment.  The 
expert confirmed the plaintiff’s referral to him twenty-nine years after marriage, and reported 
that he had no prior disorder of mental health.  His symptoms were anxiety, lack of sleep, loss 
of confidence, loss of energy, loss of concentration and forgetfulness.  These symptoms 
amounted to clinical depression but also fitted the category of ‘mixed anxiety and depressive 
disorder’.  This, reported the expert, is the ‘commonest disorder seen in general practice 
settings’ and is ‘derived from stressful life events’ such as applied in this case due to 
increasing work pressure and family circumstances.  In short, the expert found no 
psychological disorder antecedent to the marriage in the plaintiff husband. 
 
Advocates: The respondent wife, opposing the grounds, appointed an advocate who argued 
against nullity.  The advocate argued that neither party misunderstood the nature of marriage.  
The plaintiff husband then appointed an advocate who argued that both parties’ lack of 
marriage preparation and the respondent’s lack of Catholic upbringing resulted in an 
immature understanding of marriage.  The respondent’s advocate refuted this argument, 
saying that neither marriage preparation nor Catholic upbringing was an impediment to 
marriage, which is a natural right that can, and is, exercised by many people without the 
benefit of either.42 
 
Defender of the Bond: The defender of the bond highlighted evidence of the parties’: pre-
marital discussions of important issues (including discussions with their priest about 
marriage); capacity; initial happiness within marriage; and difficulties occurring later in 
marriage.  He noted that the medical report did not demonstrate any psychological problems 
antecedent to the marriage. 
42 Whilst pre-marriage preparation is encouraged, the overriding natural right to marry prevails.  Pastors, 
however, have a general canonical duty to instruct their flock.   See Appendix I: CIC, c. 1063.  
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 The Tribunal’s Understanding of the Law: The tribunal described the concept of ‘due 
discretion’ or ‘discretion of judgment’, articulated in canon 1095, as a ‘mature decision’.  It 
discussed the requirements of: adequate knowledge regarding the nature of marriage; the 
ability to deliberate critically; and the freedom to do so.  It acknowledged that ‘it is not 
unreasonable’ for judges to presume that this capacity ‘exists in all people who have attained 
adulthood’.  The tribunal had to be satisfied that at least one party did not have this capacity. 
 
The Law Applied: Neither ground was found proven; the legal presumption of validity was 
upheld.  The judgment acknowledged the parties’: uneventful upbringing; capacity to reach 
senior positions in their respective professions; understanding of the nature of marriage; 
honourable intentions; and success as parents.  It held that: the couple experienced difficulties 
within the marriage; the plaintiff developed illness late in marriage; the respondent could no 
longer live with him; she left the marital home to live with her female friend; and there was 
no evidence of lesbianism.  The tribunal gave weight to the expert report: it held that 
although concentrating on the plaintiff’s ill-health from his pre-retirement period, the report 
confirmed that there was no prior record of psychiatric ill-heath.  Therefore, the parties’ 
incapacity to marry had not been proven.   
 
Second Instance Judgment:  The Second Instance judgment was available in this case.  Its 
law section referred to the 2001 Papal Allocution confirming the doctrine of marriage and the 
requirement for minimum capacity.  It also cited a Rotal judge’s judicial reference to freedom 
from coercion,43 and three Rotal decisions.  The first of these described three essential 
elements of discretion of judgment: sufficient knowledge of the object of marital consent; 
sufficient evaluation of the value of the object; and sufficient internal freedom of choice.44  
The second referred to minimal marital capacity, which does not require perfect mental 
43 This judgment was published later: Coram Faltin, 11 November 1988, L’immmaturita psico-affettiva nella 
giurisprudenza della Rota Romana, 169: ‘Since all Christian faithful enjoy the right to be free from every form 
of coercion, it necessarily follows that they be free not only from external but also from internal coercion in the 
exercise of their freedom: otherwise there is no human act, that is, one flowing from the intellect and will’.  
Faltin was a Rotal judge from 1987-2001. 
44 Two of the three cases cited were from Mendonça, Anthology.  These cases are given the numbers assigned to 
them in that publication.  The first case cited in the judgment, Case No: 84-079, coram Pompedda, received an 
affirmative decision at the Rota, but concerned a plaintiff who was ‘diagnosed as suffering from a “neurotic-
dysthymic” and “psycho-sexual” disorder’.  Cardinal Mario Pompedda was Dean of the Roman Rota from 1993 
until he became Prefect of the Apostolic Signatura in 1999.  He resigned, as is customary at the age of seventy-
five, in 2004. 
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health; the clinical gravity of psychological disturbance should not be equated with juridic 
gravity which accounts for lack of discretion of judgment’.45  The third referred to the 
limitation on the scope of CIC canon 1095 2° to the essential rights and duties of marriage.46 
 
The Second Instance agreed with the plaintiff’s advocate that ‘proper catechesis’ is ‘essential’ 
before marriage, but conceded that ‘defective preparation’ was not an established ground for 
nullity; non-Catholic Christians with no knowledge of marriage as a sacrament nevertheless 
establish the sacrament when they validly exchange consent, even in a civil ceremony.  There 
was nothing to suggest that either party in this case did not understand marriage or was 
incapable of it.  Therefore, the First Instance negative decision was confirmed; the legal 
presumption of validity prevailed. 
 
Discussion: This case is a good illustration of the tribunal relying on expert opinion - on the 
basis of the expert report the tribunal found no antecedent causal link to account for the 
plaintiff husband’s alleged incapacity to marry.  However, the case also demonstrates flaws 
in the tribunal’s compliance with marriage cases procedure as well as the law on experts, and 
also in its understanding of the grounds for psychological incapacity for marriage. 
 
First, procedure: the plaintiff petition referred to no ground for nullity; it should have, as 
provided in canon law which requires a valid plea to be included in the petition.47  It is, 
therefore, unclear why psychological incapacity was pursued, particularly in the respondent. 
However, the plaintiff’s allegation that the respondent left the marital home to live with 
‘another woman’ could infer a lesbian relationship, in which case incapacity could be alleged, 
but this would require the appointment of an expert which the tribunal failed to do.  However, 
the tribunal conceded that there was no evidence to substantiate any allegation of lesbianism. 
 
Second, when the tribunal did appoint an expert for the plaintiff it did not follow the relevant 
procedure.  The tribunal secretary, not the judge, requested the expert report, breaching DC 
Article 204§1.  Neither the expert’s religious affiliation nor his views on Christian 
anthropology were known, contrary to DC Article 205§§1, 2.  There is no indication of: 
45 The judgment cited Mendonça, Anthology, Case No: 84-080, coram  Di Felice.  Di Felice was a Rotal judge 
until 1986. 
46 Coram Burke, 11 November 1994, Studia Canonica, 30 (1996), pp221-238.   
47 CIC, c. 1504, 2°.  See Appendix I.  DC, Article 116§2.  Appendix V. 
209 
 
                                                            
notification of the expert’s appointment to the respondent or to the defender of the bond, 
contrary to DC Article 204§2; the Acts being given to the expert, contrary to DC Article 
207§2; any time-limit on the submission of his opinion, contrary to DC Article 207§3; a 
decree outlining the points to be addressed, contrary to DC Article 207§1; or specific 
questions for the expert to address, contrary to DC Article 209.  As there were no copies of 
correspondence to the expert in the Acts, it was impossible to establish what was requested of 
him.  The expert recorded neither methodology nor his degree of certainty, contrary to DC 
Article 210§2.  Moreover, the plaintiff was, allegedly, suffering from early dementia, but 
neither the expert nor the tribunal dealt with the issue of reliability of his evidence.  
Nevertheless, had procedures been followed the outcome should not have been different 
because there was no evidence of any antecedent ‘grave anomaly’ which might have given 
rise to incapacity. 
 
Third, the tribunal equated ‘discretion of judgment’ with a ‘mature decision’, focusing on 
whether or not the parties made a mature decision, rather than whether or not they were 
incapable of it.  This approach fails to distinguish incapacity from difficulty or imprudence, 
or even negligence.  The judges, however, did take all the circumstances of the case into 
account and focused on establishing an antecedent causal link. 
 
Case 2:48 
 
This case highlights the tribunal’s willingness to pursue grounds of incapacity without expert 
opinion on the respondent husband in whom the plaintiff wife alleges incapacity, namely that 
he was incapable of marriage because he was homosexual or bisexual.  The plaintiff claims to 
have sought to marry a person with specific qualities which (under canon 1097§2) she 
‘directly and principally intended’.  She petitioned for nullity also on the basis that she was in 
error about such qualities in the respondent.  The tribunal appointed an expert for the plaintiff 
- yet her incapacity was not alleged - and it failed to identify the quality in the respondent of 
which the plaintiff claimed to be in error at the time of the marriage. 
 
Facts:  This was a natural law marriage; the plaintiff wife was not baptised.  She claimed that 
unknown to her at the time of the marriage the respondent husband was homosexual or 
48 09/37. 
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bisexual, therefore he was incapable of assuming the essential obligations of marriage.  They 
married when they were nineteen and twenty-three years old respectively.  The marriage 
lasted thirty-five years; two children were born.  Both parties testified.  The plaintiff alleged: 
an unhappy childhood; no means of independent financial support; a short courtship; and 
marriage within six months of meeting the respondent.  She further alleged that the 
respondent had not sought a pre-marital sexual relationship.  He had male friends, but was 
always affectionate with the plaintiff and he wanted children.  The plaintiff loved him and 
understood marriage as a permanent, faithful union.  Immediately after marriage, she alleges 
that ‘it became perfectly obvious’ that the respondent was homosexual; he admitted not liking 
women.  She alleged late consummation of marriage because he wanted to ‘legitimise’ their 
relationship as heterosexual to deflect suspicion.  The marriage suffered extraneous pressures; 
their first child was disabled and needed special care.  The plaintiff alleged that the sexual 
relationship ceased, due to the respondent’s sexual orientation.  She alleged that twenty years 
after marriage the respondent was convicted of homosexual behaviour, which was, for her, 
‘the last straw’.  Thirty-five years after marriage she suffered mental ill-health and retired 
from work.  Having made a full recovery she obtained a civil divorce.  She joined a dating 
agency and met another man.  The tribunal sought an expert report for the plaintiff.   
 
The respondent testified that he attended a psychiatrist when experiencing difficulty at 
boarding school, which he left but subsequently did ‘quite well’.  He claimed that his 
inexperience, fear and ‘confusion’ over his sexual orientation led to a late consummation of 
the marriage.  He acknowledged the possibility of bisexualism, but claimed never to have had 
a relationship with a male.  He admitted loving the plaintiff.  The only two witnesses gleaned 
their information solely from the plaintiff. 
 
Expert Report: The consultant psychiatrist provided a report consisting of thirteen lines on 
headed notepaper.  He confirmed seeing the plaintiff, as an out-patient, three times at 
intervals of several months over one year, thirty-five years after marriage.  His predecessor 
had seen her three months earlier.  She was diagnosed, by another doctor nine years 
previously as suffering from ‘depressive symptoms’.  He confirmed that the plaintiff’s 
statement to the tribunal ‘is consistent’ with her account to him and ‘fits in quite well with the 
psychiatric difficulties she has experienced in the past’.  Not doubting her veracity, he 
considered her a ‘genuine person who has been through very difficult times’; the nature of 
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her marital relationship was ‘one of [her] more bitter complaints and a very important factor 
in triggering her depression’.   
 
Defender of the Bond: The Defender of the Bond, probably confused by the expert report on 
the plaintiff, dealt with the ground of her grave lack of discretion of judgment (which was not 
alleged).  Considering there was no evidence supporting her incapacity the defender 
highlighted: the parties’ canonical age at the material time; strong evidence suggesting they 
both understood the nature of marriage; lack of pressure to marry; their expectation of a 
normal married life with children; their prior discussions regarding marriage (including 
openness to children); lack of corroboratory witness evidence; scant information from the 
plaintiff’s psychiatrist, which relied on her own account; the duration of the marriage; and the 
possibility that the plaintiff’s evidence was influenced by the prism of failure.49  The 
defender raised no objection to the ground of the respondent husband’s incapacity on the 
basis of his admission of confusion over his sexual orientation and the absence of doubt about 
the plaintiff’s account. 
 
The Tribunal’s Understanding of the Law: Quoting canon 1095, 3° and outlining the 
doctrine of marriage, the judgment’s law section concluded: if ‘it is clear that disorders [of a 
psychic nature which gravely injure consent] were already present, at least in a latent state, 
before marriage and at the moment of the manifestation of consent, even though they become 
openly destructive after marriage’, such disorders invalidate.  The tribunal acknowledged the 
wisdom of the law in ‘placing emphasis upon the involvement of an expert’.  
 
The Law Applied: The tribunal found both grounds proven - error in the plaintiff and 
incapacity in the respondent; as such, the marriage was invalid.  Although the plaintiff’s 
incapacity was not alleged, the tribunal considered that the plaintiff was ‘young and 
inexperienced in terms of relationships’.  It held: her admission that she was ‘madly in love’ 
with the plaintiff, whilst merely corresponding with him, ‘indicates a lack of maturity’; and 
she was ill-equipped to cope with the respondent’s ‘confused’ sexual orientation.  Regarding 
the respondent, the tribunal held that he was ‘consciously or unconsciously prepared to go 
through a wedding in order to be able to present himself to [his employers] as a heterosexual 
49 The defender also appeared to confuse the ground of ‘error about a quality of the person’ with the ground of 
‘deceit’, questioning whether or not the respondent ‘deliberately’ concealed his sexual ambiguity from the 
plaintiff.   
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man who could continue with his career. … To know oneself, as he freely admits, to be 
entering marriage being of a confused sexual identity is clearly proof of an inability to 
assume the obligations of marriage’.  Both affirmative decisions (that the marriage was null 
on both grounds) were ratified at Second Instance.     
 
Discussion: This case demonstrates procedural flaws throughout.  The tribunal accepted the 
plaintiff’s petition, allegedly signed by the respondent (whom she claimed refused to testify) 
and witnessed by a third party, whose position was not declared, and decreed the respondent 
absent, contrary to DC Articles 126-130 and 138§3.  However, the respondent testified later 
when the judge contacted the plaintiff because of the paucity of evidence.  The Defender of 
the Bond who intervened was not the defender named in the Constitution of the Court; no 
explanation was given for this change and no decree of substitution appeared in the Acts.50  
The following breaches of DC procedure also occurred.  Expert opinion was sought for the 
plaintiff, the wrong party because her incapacity was not alleged; no expert report was sought 
for the respondent, in whom incapacity was alleged.  The tribunal administrator, not the 
judge, wrote to the plaintiff’s psychiatrist, enclosing both the plaintiff’s letter permitting 
release of her statement to the tribunal and a copy of that statement, but not the Acts.  The 
expert was asked if he was willing to provide: ‘written confirmation of her statement’; and 
‘any other pertinent information concerning this person’, which are not the relevant questions 
required by DC. There is no indication of: any notification of the expert’s appointment either 
to the respondent or to the defender of the bond; a decree outlining the points to be addressed; 
or a timescale for submission of the report.  The expert’s religious affiliation or views on 
Christian anthropology were unknown.  He provided no testimonial.  Nor did he offer an 
explanation of methodology, or the degree of certainty he reached.       
 
The law section explained both of the alleged grounds; that is, of inability to assume the 
essential obligations of marriage and of error about a quality of a person, and discussed these 
grounds in relation to the correct parties, and, moreover, the tribunal found for nullity on both 
grounds.  Nevertheless, the final sentence of the judgment repeated the defender of the bond’s 
mistake and found for nullity on the plaintiff’s grave lack of discretion of judgment, which 
50 DC, Articles 55; and 118§2.  See Appendix V. 
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was not pleaded.  There was no mention of the ground of error here; the tribunal failed to 
identify any quality in the respondent about which she was allegedly in error.51   
 
Despite acknowledging the wisdom of the canonical requirement to engage an expert, the 
tribunal, without explanation, concluded, without expert opinion, that the ‘psychological 
basis required … is clearly shown in the testimonies to have its origins in the respondent’s 
confused sexual identity’.  In finding for nullity on grounds of his incapacity, the tribunal 
accepted the respondent’s admission of ‘confusion’ over his sexual orientation as proof of his 
incapacity.52  Although the respondent conceded the possibility of bisexualism, the judges did 
not distinguish the difficulties which this might pose, from incapacity.  Nor did they explain 
their path from a presumption of validity to a finding for the contrary.   It is well-settled that 
the judges’ conclusion that the respondent was prepared to go through marriage for an 
ulterior motive does not go to the heart of the ground of incapacity, but rather to his 
intention.53  There was no discussion about a vetitum, which implies capacity for future 
marriage. 
 
Case 3:54 
 
This case illustrates the tribunal’s willingness to set aside expert opinion, despite its correct 
focus and support for the party’s capacity for marriage and, nevertheless, to find for nullity.  
Moreover, the tribunal failed to give the defender of the bond access to the expert report. 
 
Facts:  Both parties are Catholic. The plaintiff wife and respondent husband married at 
twenty-two and twenty-one years old respectively.  The respondent husband allegedly 
suffered pre-marital psychiatric illness, causing sexual difficulties.  One natural child was 
born after eight years of marriage to the couple’s delight, and another was adopted twelve 
51 Moreover, given the plaintiff’s testimony that she would have been happy to marry even if she had known of 
the respondent’s sexual orientation prior to marriage, it is difficult to see how the tribunal could find that she 
‘directly and principally’ intended to marry a heterosexual man above the person of the respondent. 
52 Despite, as we shall see later, the Rota’s insistence that the severity of bisexualism or homosexualism be 
established. 
53 Had he entered marriage in order to conceal his sexual orientation, simulation, that is a positive act of will to 
exclude marriage or an essential element or an essential property of marriage, might have been an appropriate 
ground to allege, but this ground is governed by CIC, c. 1101§2, which was not pleaded.  Moreover, the Rota, as 
we shall see later, considers the ground of psychological incapacity to be internally incompatible with capacity 
for placing a positive act of will. 
54 09/52. 
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years later.  The marriage lasted twenty-seven years.  The plaintiff alleged the respondent 
husband’s inability to assume the essential obligations of marriage; the tribunal sought an 
expert report for him.  Both parties testified.  The plaintiff claimed that the respondent 
suffered an ‘incident’ of depression during the four-year courtship; this resolved 
spontaneously with her father’s support.  They were both in love and keen to marry.  Despite 
attending counselling, their sexual problems were never fully resolved, but they were happy.   
There were extraneous pressures on the marriage.  After nine years of marriage the 
respondent suffered another episode of depression; he was referred to a psychiatrist, was 
treated, and improved.  Infrequent episodes of depression followed, resulting in a diagnosis of 
manic depression.  During treatment for this, he consumed alcohol, which led to confusion 
and incoherence, but not to violence.  His career suffered.  He sought advice; as he was 
unable to pursue his desired career path, he chose another within the same discipline.  Work 
was time-demanding; the plaintiff wife’s career progressed and she took on additional 
responsibilities.  After twenty years of marriage the couple, considering their relationship 
strong, adopted a child.  After twenty-five years of marriage the respondent husband was 
diagnosed with a physical illness.  He found solace with a third party.  After twenty-six years 
of marriage he left the matrimonial home, returned after three months, but left permanently a 
year later.  They were divorced civilly after thirty-one years of marriage.  The respondent 
agreed largely with the plaintiff’s account of the marriage.  Witnesses had little contact with 
the couple at the material time, but testified that the respondent was a good husband and 
father.  Although one witness was aware of the plaintiff’s concerns about the respondent’s 
level of affection early in the relationship, witnesses knew only of late psychiatric illness. 
They opined that infidelity caused the failure of the marriage.  Data relating to specific 
pharmaceuticals was also submitted; the respondent claimed to have used these products, but 
it did not contain data about his prescribed medication.   
 
Expert Report:  The expert confirmed that the Associate Judicial Vicar of the relevant 
diocese requested the report.  The expert understood that both parties consented to disclosure 
‘of their personal details’ for the purposes of obtaining a medical report.  The expert 
identified himself as a qualified doctor, with post-graduate training in psychiatry.  He 
addressed specific questions put to him: ‘How would the respondent’s manic depression have 
affected his sexual functioning?; How would you describe the effect the sexual dysfunction 
would have had on the couple’s capacity to form a satisfactory marital relationship?; and:  
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What effect would the respondent’s manic depression have had on his capacity to form a 
satisfactory marital relationship with the plaintiff?’.  He described the features and 
characteristics of manic depression, giving statistics for outcomes with and without 
treatment,55 although he noted that the full spectrum of causes was still unclear because of 
their complexity; but, frequency of episodes depends on compliance with medication.56  He 
focused on the respondent’s alleged ‘sexual dysfunction’ in relation to his desires.57  The 
report states that paucity of evidence precluded the expert from discussing some causes of 
non-organic sexual dysfunction.  The expert noted the spontaneous resolution of the first 
(pre-marital) episode of illness; there were no significant episodes for another eight years.  
He concluded that: there was no clear relationship between the respondent’s condition and his 
‘sexual dysfunction’; and there was no causal link between his medication and ‘sexual 
dysfunction’.  He accepted the difficulties caused by the condition, and that it prevented the 
respondent from forming mature intimacy with the plaintiff, but noted the ‘many extensive 
periods of happy partnership’, both before and after the manifestation of disorder.  That it had 
a negative effect later in the marriage did not prevent the couple from enjoying most of their 
lives.  The effects of extraneous events, which added to the difficulties, were not so severe as 
to fulfil the official definition of ‘aversion’.  The expert cited many possible causes for the 
difficulties, but conceded these were ‘mere speculation’.  From the evidence, the expert could 
only ‘suspect’ that the couple did not give sufficient time to discussion about their problem 
prior to marriage; the respondent being unable to meet the frequency of intimacy that the 
plaintiff desired.  He concluded that this would not prevent the couple from having a 
‘satisfactory marital relationship in absolute terms’; and the evidence demonstrated that the 
marriage was ‘more enjoyed than not’ by the couple.  He opined that the respondent’s 
condition could be controlled with medication. 
 
55 The expert cited the World Health Organisation (WHO), International Classification of Diseases (IDC), 10 
(1992): ‘The International Classification of Diseases (ICD) is the standard diagnostic tool for epidemiology, 
health management and clinical purposes.  This includes the analysis of the general health situation of 
population groups.  It is used to monitor the incidence and prevalence of diseases and other health problems.  It 
is used to classify diseases and other health problems recorded on many types of health and vital records 
including death certificates and health records.  In addition to enabling the storage and retrieval of diagnostic 
information for clinical, epidemiological and quality purposes, these records also provide the basis for the 
compilation of national mortality and morbidity statistics by WHO Member States. It is used for reimbursement 
and resource allocation decision-making by countries.  ICD-10 was endorsed by the Forty-third World Health 
Assembly in May 1990 and came into use in WHO Member States as from 1994.  The 11th revision of the 
classification has already started and will continue until 2015’.   
56 He cited various medical publications. 
57 Sexual desire has no canonical significance. 
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Defender of the Bond: The defender highlighted: the witnesses’ lack of knowledge; the 
respondent’s capacity to assess the plaintiff’s family values at the material time, to learn and 
to benefit from them; lack of pressure or objection to marriage; the respondent’s desire to 
marry and have children; his admission that he made a life-long commitment; his lack of 
doubt; his preparation for marriage, including reception into full Communion with the 
Catholic Church; his capacity for a pre-marital sexual relationship with the possibility of 
conception; the spontaneous resolution of his pre-marital episode of depression; lack of any 
indication at the material time that the later diagnosed condition would arise; his capacity to 
consummate the marriage despite difficulties; his capacity to share marital responsibilities; 
the late onset of the first serious episode of illness, occurring after their child’s birth; the 
successful treatment with anti-depressants; the occurrence of only two major episodes of his 
illness several years apart; the periods when no medication was required; the unknown effect 
of his self-medication; the unknown effect of a later onset of physical illness; the many happy 
times, despite the sexual relationship failing to meet expectations; the twenty-seven year 
marriage; and the infidelity leading to the ultimate failure of the marriage.   
 
The Tribunal’s Understanding of the Law:  The judgment referred to Rotal jurisprudence 
stressing the psychological nature of consensual incapacity, which at the moment of consent 
must have been already there ‘in actu primo proximo, and not something which would not 
have arisen unless some other post-nuptial causes intervened’.58 A decree of the tribunal 
stated that the expert is to be asked about his ‘religious affiliation, professional qualifications 
and the methodology used in arriving at his conclusion’.  It also stated that the expert is to 
answer questions relating to the respondent’s ‘sexual dysfunction’ and the questions ‘are to 
be prepared in accordance with the provisions of DC Article 56§4’.59  The tribunal 
understood that ‘one of the essential elements of marriage is a sexual relationship. This must 
be conducted in a way that contributes to the well-being of both spouses’. 
 
58 The citation for the Rotal decision was coram Pinto, 30 May 1986, MDGB&I, Vol 25, p46.  The relevance of 
this Rotal case was not explained; the Rota found that incapacity was not proven because the severity of the 
party’s alcoholism and gambling was not established.  The relevant point of law was the principle that 
incapacity was of the natural law.  Furthermore, both grave lack of discretion of judgment and inability to 
assume the essential obligations of marriage had been found not-proven at First Instance; the Second Instance 
found the latter ground proven and petitioned the Apostolic Signatura to have the case heard at Third Instance in 
England; this request was denied.  The Rota returned a not-proven decision.  See Mendonça, Anthology, Case 
No: 86-012, coram Pinto, ME III (1986), pp389-396. 
59 DC, Articles 207§1; and 56§4.  See Appendix V.  The decree did not mention DC, Article 209.  
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The Law Applied: The tribunal found the ground proven.  The tribunal issued a decree stating 
that the expert’s report was set aside on the basis that the expert had denied the parties access 
to it.60  Consequently, it could only be used as ‘supporting’ evidence under canon 1679.61  
Nevertheless, it formed part of the Acts.62  The tribunal acknowledged: pre-marital 
intercourse occurred; the parties disagreed about the level of sexual difficulties;63 witnesses 
were unaware of difficulties; a sexual relationship occurred regularly in early marriage but 
declined later; a child was born; there was a ‘degree of affection and intimacy’ in the 
marriage; the plaintiff wife ‘probably’ had a higher libido and greater expectations than the 
respondent husband; the respondent’s illness deteriorated after marriage allowing a diagnosis 
to be made; 64 and the marriage lasted twenty-seven years.  Nevertheless, it held that the 
sexual relationship was ‘unsatisfactory’, particularly for the plaintiff.  It admitted focusing 
entirely on the respondent’s ability to meet the plaintiff’s needs and expectations in the 
sexual relationship.  It concluded that the respondent’s ‘mental health problems and drinking, 
which occurred later in the marriage, exacerbated an already existing difficulty.  His erectile 
dysfunction and the infrequency of intercourse meant that he was unable to satisfy the 
plaintiff’s physical needs, and he was thus incapable of undertaking this essential obligation 
of marriage’.  Furthermore, the judgment concludes: ‘having carefully considered the dubium 
proposed: namely, whether this marriage appears null and void …’, the tribunal found 
incapacity to be proven, vitiating the marriage.65 The decision was ratified at Second 
Instance. 
 
 
60  It was withheld from the parties under DC, Article 230.  See Appendix V.  
61 CIC, c. 1679.  See Appendix I.  John Beal, ‘The Substance of Things Hoped For: Proving Simulation of  
Matrimonial Consent’, The Jurist, 55 (1995), pp745-793 (hereafter Beal, ‘The Substance of Things Hope For’), 
p766, explains: ‘An adminiculum is: a prop or support; an accessory thing.  An aid or support to something else, 
whether a right or the evidence of one.  It is principally used to designate evidence adduced in aid or support of 
other evidence, which without it is imperfect (citing Black’s Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, s.v. 
“adminiculum”).  Strictly speaking an adminiculum is not a distinct category of proofs, but a particular use to 
which other types of proof are put.  Thus, an adminiculum can be a declaration of a party, an extrajudicial 
confession, a document, or a witness deposition that supports and lends to another proof probative weight that it 
does not have in itself.  An adminiculum, then, is not a proof that has to be evaluated, but rather the value given 
to determined proofs that by themselves lack perfect probatory force, but that in union with others serve them as 
auxiliaries, and, taken together, can form a composite proof with cumulative efficacy’, citing Leon del Amo, La 
clave probatoria en los procesos matrimoniales (indicios y circumstancias) (Pamplona: EUNSA, 1978), p150. 
62 DC, Article 21.  See Appendix V. 
63  For example, the respondent describes the honeymoon as a ‘disaster sexually’ but the plaintiff merely 
describes ‘difficulties’. 
64 The expert explained that in order to make a diagnosis of manic depression, two episodes were required. 
65 Emphasis added. 
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Discussion: The tribunal failed to adhere to both procedural and substantive law.  
 
First, the respondent’s psychiatrist was not consulted.  No reasons were given for choosing 
the particular expert consulted.  Whilst the expert was a doctor, with post-graduate training, 
he did not claim post-graduate specialist qualification.66  The following contravened the clear 
terms of DC.  The expert did not submit a testimonial.  Although a Catholic, he did not reveal 
his level of adherence to the faith nor his views on Christian anthropology.  It appears that he 
was given limited access to evidence.67  The expert did not explain his methodology or the 
level of certainty he reached.  There is no evidence of a time-limit on submission of his 
report.  Nor is it clear if the tribunal notified the defender of the bond of his appointment.  
There is no indication that the defender even saw the expert’s report; the defender made no 
mention of it.  In addition, there is no evidence from the documents, other than the decree, 
that the expert refused the parties access to his report which might have supported the 
tribunal’s decision to set it aside.68  Nor is there evidence that: the parties’ permission was 
sought, or given, for the release of their personal data; or the report, which supported the 
respondent’s capacity, was given any weight, even as ‘supporting’ evidence. 
 
66 He described his position as ‘staff-grade’, denoting an appointment to a permanent position as a middle-grade 
doctor.  This appointment can rely on experience alone and does not imply any postgraduate qualification.  
Staff-grade posts are non-consultant career posts, not training posts.  See 
http://www.bmj.com/cgi/content/full/315/7120/S2-7120: ‘The simple advice that should be given to a young 
doctor considering taking up a staff grade post is “Don't do it”.  The posts are not for training.  They are non-
consultant career posts.  ... Traditionally, the British medical profession has been hostile to the development of 
non-consultant career grade staff, expressing this through both the BMA and the royal colleges.  Grades such as 
the staff grade, or previously senior hospital medical officers, have been perceived as a threat to standards and a 
possible means of obtaining medical care on the cheap.  ... It should be clearly understood that the staff grade is 
not a route to becoming a consultant’.   The expert claims to be an inceptor member of the Royal College of 
Psychiatrists.  Inceptorship is open to qualified medical practitioners who intend to train for the Membership of 
the Royal College of Psychiatry examinations (see  
http://pb.rcpsych.org/cgi/issue_pdf/advertising_pdf/23/11.pdf).  It appears, therefore, that he has little chance of 
promotion.  On the one hand, staff-grade post-holders can be seen as failed consultants but on the other, it 
allows those who are unable or unwilling to climb the career ladder to work at a suitable level.  It is not clear, 
therefore, whether this expert took the Royal College examinations and failed to reach the required standard, or 
never sat them at all.  
67 As a decree states that answers are to be ‘based on his reading of the testimony of the parties’, it is unlikely 
that the expert was given witness evidence.  Moreover, the expert declared that he read the plaintiff’s statement 
and both parties’ answers to the tribunal’s questions, implying that he based his opinion on this information 
alone. 
68 ‘Very serious dangers’ are required to withhold evidence from publication, but these are not identified in this 
case.  DC, Article 230.  See Appendix V.  CIC, c. 1598§1.  Appendix I.  One might expect a medical 
practitioner to refuse to compile or at least to release a medical report until he had sight of the parties’ signature 
of consent. 
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Second, despite evidence only of the respondent’s sexual difficulties and a lack of medical 
evidence confirming the diagnosis of manic depression, the questions which the tribunal put 
to the expert presupposed this diagnosis and sexual dysfunction.  Moreover, instead of 
focusing on minimal capacity, the tribunal’s questions referred to the effect of the 
respondent’s ‘dysfunction’ on his capacity for a ‘satisfactory relationship’, not for entering 
the natural state of marriage.69  The tribunal did not discuss the severity of the respondent’s 
condition at the material time; there was no evidence that he ever took sick leave from work. 
 
Third, apart from accepting uncorroborated assertions as facts,70 the tribunal based its 
judgment on an incorrect understanding of the law.  Validity of marriage does not depend on: 
sexual activity;71 desires and expectations;72 or on how it is conducted.73  The tribunal also 
failed to address the observations of the defender of the bond.74  The tribunal did not consider 
the possibility that the marriage failed because of infidelity.75  Therefore, the tribunal does 
not explain its path from the legal presumption of validity to reaching moral certainty of the 
contrary, which is the raison d’etre of a judgment.76 
 
69 Emphasis added.  See Aidan McGrath, ‘At the Service of the Truth’ p389: ‘…[T]he word “normal” is a very 
relative term.  If marriage is to be seen as the natural vocation of most men and women, then the “norm” cannot 
be pitched too high, otherwise the way is opened to the dreadful situation foreseen by Egan whereby the word 
“relationship” when referred to marriage is equated with “happy relationship” and capacity for marriage is 
extended to capacity for a successful and happy marriage’, citing E M Egan, ‘The Nullity of Marriage for 
Reason of Insanity or Lack of Due Discretion of Judgement’, in Ephemerides iuris canonici, 39 (1983), p54; E 
M Egan, 25 January 1979, in Studia Canonica, 14 (1980), p203, no 10; and E M Egan, 21 April 1980, in Studia 
Canonica, 15 (1981), pp331-332, no 15. 
70 For example, the tribunal accepted uncorroborated allegations that the respondent’s mother ‘suffered from 
severe post-natal depression from which she never recovered’ and ‘encephalitic Parkinsonism’, the significance 
of which is not explained.   
71 CIC, cc. 1061§2; and 1085§1.  See Appendix I.  That marriage involves a heterosexual relationship means 
that it can only exist between a man and a woman, not that it depends on a ‘sexual’ relationship.  Catholic 
doctrine clearly upholds the virginity of Mary, Mother of Jesus, the validity of whose marriage was never in 
doubt.  Also CCC, p111, para 496, and p112, para 499.  See Appendix IV. 
72 Beal, ‘The Substance of Things Hoped For’, p757.  Although dealing with the subject of invalid consent due 
to exclusion by a positive act of the will of an essential element or an essential property of marriage, Beal 
explains: ‘[T]he party may have difficulty distinguishing what he or she wanted, desired, and hoped for when 
entering marriage and what he or she actually intended’, indicating that hopes and desires do not go to validity. 
73 Benedict XVI, Allocution to the Roman Rota (2009).  See Appendix VII. 
74 DC, Article 212§2.  See Appendix V. 
75 DC, Article 212§1.  See Appendix V.  See also John Paul II, Allocution to the Roman Rota (1988).  See 
Appendix VII.  The Pope instructed that all possible causes for the breakdown of a marriage be considered and 
not just the hypothesis of incapacity. 
76 DC, Articles 250§1; 254§1; and 247.  See Appendix V.  See also Lynda Robitaille, ‘Through the Lens of 
Dignitas Connubii: The Judge’s Active Role in Marriage Nullity Cases’, Studia Canonica, 40 (2006), pp137-
182 (hereafter Robitaille, ‘Through the Lens of DC’), pp140-141: ‘The parties must understand the judge’s 
interpretation or moral certitude in regards to their marriage.  Otherwise, the judgment has not fulfilled its final 
end which is to discover the truth, and also to render justice’. 
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Finally, without explanation or discussion, and despite the deterioration in the respondent’s 
health, the tribunal decided that the respondent’s incapacity was not permanent.  The tribunal 
neither explained the judges’ competence to reach this conclusion nor its methodology.  The 
inference is that, despite the deterioration in his mental health after marriage the respondent is 
now capable of satisfying another spouse sexually; consequently he can meet canonical 
requirements and a future marriage should not be prohibited. 
 
Case 4:77 
 
This case illustrates the tribunal’s: willingness to pursue, and find proven, a ground of 
incapacity when that ground is not alleged by the plaintiff in the petition for nullity; 
willingness to pursue two separate grounds of incapacity in a party without expert opinion 
about that party; failure to consider the effect of extraneous pressures on the marriage; and 
failure to consider grounds individually, making it impossible to follow its reasoning. 
 
Facts:  Both parties are Catholic.  The plaintiff husband and respondent wife married when 
they were twenty-one and nineteen years old respectively.78  The common life lasted about 
twenty-seven years; four children were born.  The plaintiff alleged that he suffered 
psychiatric illness late in marriage.  The respondent claimed she suffered from dyslexia; her 
mental health also suffered late in the marriage.  The grounds alleged were: grave lack of 
discretion of judgment on the part of either or both parties; and the respondent’s inability to 
assume the essential obligations of marriage.  The additional ground of inability to assume 
the essential obligations of marriage on the part of the plaintiff husband was added later.  The 
tribunal obtained an expert report only for the plaintiff.  Both parties testified.  The plaintiff 
claimed that both parties came from unhappy homes. They met after the respondent’s father 
died.  The plaintiff became a Catholic and learned that redemption sets one free from 
unhappiness.  The marriage suffered extraneous pressures.  The plaintiff offered no 
witnesses.79  The respondent claimed that she was bullied at school.  She corroborated the 
plaintiff’s account of the marriage.  Most of the witnesses claimed not to know of problems 
77 09/72. 
78 The plaintiff was originally the respondent; the original female plaintiff renounced her case and the male 
respondent pursued the case as plaintiff.  No explanation was obvious from the Acts. 
79 As the original respondent, it is unclear whether or not he was aware of his right to do so. 
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until fifteen years after marriage when the plaintiff became ill, but the respondent’s mother 
claimed in evidence that he took anti-depressives for a short time while still at school. 
 
Expert Report:   The expert confirmed that he prepared his report at ‘the tribunal’s’ request.  
A consultant psychiatrist, he declared that his report was based solely on ‘two documents’.80  
He addressed questions put to him by the tribunal, concluding, on the basis of the plaintiff’s 
own account, that the plaintiff ‘possibly’ suffered anxiety in adolescence; this may have been 
a ‘character trait’, but there was no evidence that it ‘reached clinical intensity’.  The expert 
speculated further: the plaintiff’s religious faith ‘gave his life meaning and purpose’; his 
motivation for marriage was psychological - he wanted to leave an anxious environment and 
marriage was a ‘safe haven’; and his faith was a solution to his problems.  The expert opined 
that the plaintiff suffered from paranoid schizophrenia.  This has a late onset and is associated 
with ‘a preservation of the personality’; he could be prone to idolise the respondent.  
However, he concluded that the condition can be controlled by medication. 
 
Defender of the Bond: The defender highlighted: reliance on hearsay evidence; lack of 
evidence of pre-marital problems and of foreseeable problems; evidence of the parties’ 
understanding of marriage and capacity within it; and the late onset of problems.  
Highlighting the absence of expert opinion (thinking there was none, as was the case at the 
time), which he submitted was required, the defender specifically asked that, if the judges 
disagreed with the need for expert opinion, the case be returned to him for further 
consideration.81   
 
The Tribunal’s Understanding of the Law: The tribunal understood that grave lack of 
discretion of judgment can be found in three situations: ‘when there is a lack of a sufficient 
intellectual (abstract) knowledge of the object of consent; or where a partner has not attained 
sufficient critical knowledge proportionate to the conjugal contract; or either party lacks the 
capacity to deliberate with sufficient weighing of motives and freedom’.  Inability to assume 
the essential obligations of marriage ‘may be technically and medically verifiable, or in some 
80 This implies that he was not given the Acts. 
81 The defender’s expectation, therefore, would have been that the case would be returned to him: for further 
consideration if the judges deemed an expert report was not required; or for consideration of the expert report, 
should the judges deem a report was required. 
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cases, it can be possible to judge from the pattern of a person’s life and from consistent traits 
and disposition that a person lacked the capacity to assume the responsibilities of marriage’.82 
 
The Law applied: The only ground the tribunal found proven, was that of the plaintiff 
husband’s inability to assume the essential obligations of marriage.  The First Instance 
deferred judgment until an expert report was obtained.  All grounds were considered together.  
The question the tribunal addressed was: ‘whether they both understood the nature of the 
covenant into which they were entering and that they would be capable of fulfilling that 
covenant’.   
 
The tribunal acknowledged many obstacles to reaching moral certainty.  It accepted: expert 
opinion that ‘the plaintiff’s “sense of anxiety and apprehension may have been a character 
trait, [but] there is no evidence to suggest that it reached clinical intensity”’, but ‘the 
“predominant symptomatology” would present a “diagnostic label of paranoia/paranoid 
schizophrenia”, which does not manifest itself until much later’.  However, it gave weight to: 
expert evidence that when the plaintiff developed episodes of mental illness ‘he would have 
developed abnormal perceptions and abnormal thinking’; and witness testimony that the 
plaintiff took anti-depressants for a short period of time during adolescence; the latter being 
evidence of an underlying undiagnosed mental illness.  For the tribunal, the salient points 
were that the plaintiff was unhappy and married for ‘psychological reasons’.  Expert opinion 
confirmed that the respondent’s allegation of his possessiveness was consistent with his 
illness.  The tribunal also accepted the respondent’s difficulties with the sexual relationship, 
but acknowledged some contradiction and her later illness. 
 
On the one hand, the tribunal held: that the marriage ‘did in fact settle into a loving and 
caring relationship, open to children’; difficulties only arose with the manifestation of the 
plaintiff’s declining mental health; and, acknowledging the parties’ regret that help was not 
sought early, the marriage ‘began regrettably to wither’.  So, the tribunal concluded that 
neither party lacked the necessary discretion of judgment for marriage; they were resilient 
and determined to marry each other and understood their commitment.  On the other hand, 
finding for the plaintiff’s inability to assume the essential obligations of marriage, the tribunal 
held that although the parties sought to establish marriage, this ‘could not realistically be 
82 The judgment cited coram Serrano, 9 July 1987.  This judgment is not listed in Mendonça, Anthology. 
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sustained’.  Marriage was, for the plaintiff, ‘a relief from “anxiety and intimidation” and a 
“safe haven”’.  The plaintiff’s symptoms prevented him from entering ‘a consortium vitae 
between equals’.    
 
Discussion: First, the fact that the original plaintiff became the respondent may have led to 
the confusion as to whose inability to assume the essential obligations of marriage was 
alleged originally.  The Acts did not clarify the situation, so, it may have been alleged in the 
original respondent, who became the plaintiff.  However, although the Acts contain no 
objection to the ground of the plaintiff’s inability to assume the essential obligations of 
marriage, it was not included in the joinder of the issue; therefore there was no valid petition 
for this ground. This contravenes CIC and DC.83  Nevertheless, all four grounds were tested. 
 
Second, canonical procedure for appointing experts was not followed.  No expert was 
appointed for the respondent, despite two grounds of incapacity being alleged in her.  There 
is nothing in the Acts to establish: who chose or appointed the expert; why he was chosen in 
preference to either party’s psychiatrist; that the parties and the defender of the bond were 
notified;84 or any time-limit for submission of his report.  There was no decree outlining the 
questions and the questions which were put to the expert did not comply with DC although 
one question did address the issue of antecedence.85  The expert did not: provide a 
testimonial; explain his methodology; or clarify the degree of certainty he reached.  
Moreover, although the plaintiff’s condition had deteriorated, the reliability of his evidence 
was not addressed, either by the expert or by the tribunal.  The expert’s religious affiliation or 
views on Christian anthropology were unknown, but, that he acknowledged the part played 
by the plaintiff’s faith in alleviating his condition suggests that he accepts Christian 
anthropological principles.   
 
Third, the tribunal’s deferral of judgment until an expert report was submitted implies that 
moral certainty of nullity could not be reached in its absence.  There was no explanation for 
83 CIC, c. 1504, 2°.  See Appendix I.  Also DC, Article 116§2.  See Appendix V. 
84 Therefore, it appears that DC, Article 204 was breached.   As the defender of the bond requested an expert 
report and there is no further input from him, it is clear that he did not see it.  It seems clear that DC, Article 
56§4 was breached. 
85 DC, Articles 207; and 209.  See Appendix V. 
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not returning the case, together with the expert opinion, to the defender of the bond, who has 
the right to be heard last.86 
 
Fourth, the law section implied that it is possible to conclude for nullity ‘from consistent 
traits’ and a person’s ‘disposition’, as if these could constitute the required ‘grave anomaly’.  
The expert, however, found no evidence of pre-marital illness in the plaintiff but speculated 
that he may have suffered some degree of anxiety, which fell short of a clinical condition.  
This fails to establish the existence of a condition sufficiently severe at the material time to 
prevent the exercise of a natural right.  Although the expert states that paranoid schizophrenia 
is associated with a ‘preservation of the personality’, implying capacity to sustain 
relationships at least to some degree, the tribunal did not establish to what degree it occurred 
in the plaintiff.  
 
Fifth, the judges gave weight to the finding that the plaintiff married ‘for psychological 
reasons’ although this was mere speculation by the expert.  Moreover, wanting a ‘safe haven’ 
and having a proper understanding and motive for marriage are not mutually exclusive.  No 
weight was given to evidence of the plaintiff’s capacity to sustain the marriage for many 
years as a good spouse and parent.  The parties’ regret that they failed to seek assistance 
earlier, implies that deterioration could have been ameliorated or prevented, which is 
consistent with the expert’s opinion that the condition can be controlled by medication; yet 
the tribunal did not address this aspect of the illness.  Moreover, the judges’ acceptance that: 
the marriage ‘settled down initially into a loving and caring relationship, open to children’; 
difficulties ‘commenced with the manifestation of the [plaintiff’s] declining mental health’; 
and the marriage ‘began to wither’; makes it even more difficult to understand how they 
could, at the same time, conclude that the marriage never came into existence. 
 
Lastly, dealing with all grounds together makes it impossible to follow the argument as to 
how three grounds of personal incapacity failed and one succeeded.  Moreover, the judgment 
did not explain how many identified obstacles to reaching moral certainty were overcome.  
Difficulty was not distinguished from incapacity, unless one must conclude that all sufferers 
of the sub-type paranoid schizophrenia are incapable of assuming the essential obligations of 
marriage, regardless of either its severity at the material time or its propensity to control by 
86 DC, Article 243§1.  See Appendix V. 
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medication.  There was no discussion about the imposition of a vetitum, implying the 
tribunal’s belief that the plaintiff is capable of future marriage.  The affirmative decision was 
ratified at Second Instance without reference to the unproven grounds.  However, a vetitum 
was imposed on the plaintiff by ITSIS. 
 
Case 5:87 
 
This case demonstrates the tribunal’s willingness: to pursue grounds of psychological 
incapacity in the absence of evidence of any such impairment in the party in whom incapacity 
is alleged; and, ignoring the presumption of law, to find for nullity on the basis of absence of 
evidence proving validity on grounds of intention alleged in the absent respondent.88 
 
Facts: This was a mixed marriage; the plaintiff wife was Catholic and the respondent 
husband was a member of the Church of England.  They married when they were twenty-
eight and twenty-six years old respectively.  The plaintiff claimed eighteen years of common 
life; the marriage lasted seven years.  No children were born of the union; the couple 
discovered they were infertile.  The plaintiff alleged that she would not have married the 
respondent had she known the extent of his political affiliation.  The plaintiff alleged her own 
incapacity due to her grave lack of discretion of judgment and the respondent’s intention 
against the good of the spouses.  The plaintiff submitted a report from her general 
practitioner.  Only the plaintiff testified.89  She alleged that after two years of happy 
marriage, the respondent became more deeply involved in politics.  He became violent, but, 
believing in her marriage vows, she did not leave home.  The respondent became involved 
with a third party and sought divorce.  One witness, having heard of the problems directly 
from the plaintiff after the marriage failed, admitted having little contact with the couple at 
the material time.  This witness claimed to have voiced concerns about the respondent but 
could not pinpoint any reason.  The witness alleged that the plaintiff was stressed during the 
marriage and drank to excess, but this did not cause problems.  This witness found the 
respondent unsympathetic.  The other witness knew nothing of the material time, but 
87 09/54. 
88 The substantive law on the ground of simulation, governed by CIC, c. 1101§2, is not relevant to this study. 
89 As no copies of correspondence were available, it is not possible to establish that the respondent’s rights were 
protected.  However, the Acts stated that the respondent responded to citation declining to participate but he did 
not oppose the application.  There was, however, no decree of absence. 
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testified: the couple was happy initially; the plaintiff appeared ‘level-headed’; and the 
respondent was arrogant and immature.  The marriage ended because of infidelity and the 
respondent’s neglect of the plaintiff. 
 
Expert Report: The plaintiff’s general practitioner confirmed that she was his patient; he 
reported only physical ailments and did not report any psychological issues.   
 
Defender of the Bond: The defender of the bond highlighted: that marriage is a natural 
institution, consequently, incapacity is a most unnatural phenomenon; the plaintiff’s correct 
understanding of marriage; the lack of pressure to marry; the plaintiff’s love for the 
respondent; the couple’s happiness for four years until their infertility was discovered; the 
possible effect of extrinsic pressures; that the plaintiff’s claim that she would ‘probably’ not 
have married the respondent had she known of his interests and involvement, was given in 
hindsight; lack of corroboratory evidence of incapacity; the requirement to establish the 
severity of any ‘appreciable psychological condition’; and the sole claim by a witness that the 
plaintiff was ‘not worldly wise’.  The respondent’s behaviour was not conducive to 
harmonious marriage or to the plaintiff’s wellbeing, but there was no evidence to support the 
claim that this was his intention at the outset.  There was no indication of his motive for 
marriage. 
 
The Tribunal’s Understanding of the Law: Without specific citations, the tribunal made 
reference to Rotal judges’ understanding of the bonum conjugum90 as an essential element of 
marriage.91  Capacity for marriage has three elements: ‘due (cognitive/intellectual) 
knowledge’; critical knowledge , which is ‘the ability to form judgements and move the will 
and power to judge and reason, the capacity to compare, integrate and deduce new 
judgements’; and internal freedom, which is ‘freedom from immature, obsessive and 
overpowering ideas, fantasies, emotional pressures etc’. 
 
The Law Applied: The ground of the plaintiff’s incapacity was found not-proven.  The 
tribunal accepted: the plaintiff’s allegations as fact; evidence of initial happiness in the 
marriage; pre-marital ‘indications’ that the respondent was ‘not an easy man’; and post-
90 Good of spouses. 
91 The judgment cited Di Felici, Bruno and Pompedda. Whether the first of these was a decision of Felici or Di 
Felice is unclear. 
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marital deterioration in his behaviour.  The tribunal found that, although the plaintiff’s 
decision to marry may have been imprudent, it was not unreasonable at the time as it was 
based on lack of information due to concealment by the respondent ‘rather than her 
carelessness or recklessness’.92  Although the tribunal found for nullity on grounds of the 
respondent’s intention (rather than incapacity), it accepted: there were discrepancies in the 
plaintiff’s testimony; the marriage was happy initially; problems began after marriage; the 
respondent’s behaviour changed two years after marriage leading to deterioration in the 
relationship, which ‘may very well be as much due to the plaintiff beginning to realise that 
things were not satisfactory as to change in the respondent’.  
 
Discussion: The following breaches of DC occurred. 
 
First, as to the capacity of the plaintiff wife, there is no indication that the general 
practitioner’s report was requested by the tribunal or that it was approved as a ‘report already 
made’ by another expert.93  The doctor’s reason for compiling the report was unknown.  He 
did not reveal his: religion; views on Christian anthropology; methodology; or degree of 
certainty.  He answered no specific questions.  There was no indication that the defender of 
the bond was notified of his appointment.  Nothing in the report supported the plaintiff’s 
incapacity.  Although the tribunal held that the plaintiff’s incapacity was not proven, it 
implied that ‘carelessness or recklessness’ would have sufficed to cause her incapacity.  It 
could be argued, however, that weight was given to the expert report, but this was not 
obvious from the judgment. 
 
Second, the tribunal found for nullity on grounds of the absent respondent’s intention.  This 
appeared to be based solely on allegations of his behaviour after marriage.  The tribunal did 
not explore the respondent husband’s motives for marriage, let alone his motives for 
simulating marriage.94  Ignoring the presumption of law, it found for nullity on the absence 
of evidence supporting the respondent’s intention to promote the plaintiff’s well-being and 
happiness.95  Without explanation, it held that his behaviour was a manifestation of a 
92 Deceit was not alleged. 
93 DC, Article 204.  See Appendix V. 
94 For nullity to succeed on this ground, it is required to prove that an ulterior motive did not co-exist with a 
proper motive for marriage. 
95 The tribunal stated: ‘The truth is that nowhere in the evidence is there any sign of the respondent doing 
anything, or saying anything, that was intended to promote the plaintiff’s happiness and wellbeing, least of all 
228 
 
                                                            
character trait that was present antecedent to marriage and which influenced his intention.96  
There was no discussion regarding the imposition of a vetitum, mandated by DC when this 
ground is found proven.97  The decision was ratified at Second Instance with no mention of 
the ground of incapacity. 
 
Case 6:98 
 
This case demonstrates the tribunal’s error in attributing an expert’s report to the marriage 
under investigation, when it referred to another union.  Moreover, it shows the tribunal’s 
willingness to pursue grounds of incapacity in both parties without expert evidence relevant 
to either of them, even when the respondent could not be traced and was, therefore, unaware 
of the grounds alleged against him.  The plaintiff alleged her own grave lack of discretion of 
judgment and the respondent’s grave lack of discretion of judgment and inability to assume 
the essential obligations of marriage.  The tribunal, finding all grounds proven, dealt with 
grounds together, making it impossible to follow its argument in respect of the separate 
grounds of inherent incapacity. 
 
Facts: The (then unbaptised) plaintiff wife married the Presbyterian respondent when they 
were twenty and thirty-two years old respectively.  The common life lasted eighteen months.  
One child was born of the union.  The plaintiff and her present partner (not the respondent) 
married civilly and are now Catholics.  The plaintiff alleged that the respondent had a 
psychiatric history.  The plaintiff alleged the grounds of grave lack of discretion of judgment 
in either or both parties and the respondent’s inability to assume the essential obligations of 
marriage.  An expert report was submitted, but it refers to another union.  Only one party, the 
plaintiff wife, testified.  She alleged an unhappy childhood.  Her father died and her mother 
became an alcoholic and cohabited with another alcoholic who was violent.  The plaintiff was 
abandoned and placed in an orphanage at the age of four.  She was fostered several times.  
doing or saying anything with that aim that would have inconvenienced him or put him out’.  This ignores both 
the presumption of validity and the fact that the exchange of vows provides evidence of an honourable intention; 
the onus is on the party making the allegation to overturn these presumptions.  
96 ‘Influencing’ his decision was not distinguished from determining it.  The tribunal stated: ‘His violence later 
in the marriage clearly shows a scornful disregard for the plaintiff.  But this simply appears as a stronger 
manifestation of a character trait that was present before the marriage as well as in its early days.  The judges 
look in vain for any indication that the respondent wanted or intended this relationship to be a mutual one for the 
good of the plaintiff as well as for his own’. 
97 DC, Article 251.  See Appendix V. 
98 09/87. 
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She was diagnosed with dyslexia; thereafter she reports an uneventful schooling although she 
gained no qualifications.  Having lived with the respondent’s family, she married him six 
months after they met.  She claimed that he suffered from schizophrenia and he had been 
hospitalised several times from the age of twelve.  She first claimed she was aware of his 
illness, but later denied this.  She testified that both parties intended marriage to be 
permanent, faithful and open to the possibility of children.  After marriage, the respondent 
became violent when he consumed alcohol or failed to take his medication.  The violence 
increased but she stayed at home because she believed in the permanence of marriage and 
had nowhere to go.  Her doctor and friends advised her to divorce; she could no longer cope 
with the respondent’s mental illness.  Two character references were submitted for the 
plaintiff.  No witnesses testified.  Nevertheless, the tribunal contacted the respondent’s 
mother, who confirmed his psychiatric condition.  She reported that by marrying the 
respondent, the plaintiff thought she could help him, implying her prior knowledge of his 
illness.  Contact with the respondent was lost.  This witness’s present husband stated, also in 
a letter, that the respondent could ‘behave perfectly normally’ when taking his medication.  
He accused the respondent of attempted fraud.  He claimed that ‘in the opinion of the 
psychiatrist, the [plaintiff] wife … exhibited similar symptoms’ and any offspring had ‘a high 
percentage chance of inheriting such a dreadful disease’. 
 
Expert Report: A report from a Diocesan Safeguarding Coordinator was submitted.  It 
referred to a previous ‘application’, not by either party, but by the plaintiff’s present civil law 
husband, regarding a child of a previous partner.  The report stated: ‘work was carried out 
with the family, and the case was then closed’.   
 
Advocate’s pleadings: The plaintiff’s advocate pleaded: character references confirmed her 
reliability; the respondent’s antecedent condition was confirmed by evidence; and any 
discrepancies in testimony were minor.  In support of the plaintiff’s grave lack of discretion 
of judgment the advocate pleaded: her troubled childhood; she ‘had no idea of normal 
marriage’; she fell under the influence of her mother-in-law; she rushed into marriage after a 
short courtship; lack of evidence that she weighed up such a crucial decision; and her 
ignorance of the respondent’s illness until after marriage.  Supporting the respondent’s grave 
lack of discretion of judgment, the advocate, on the basis of the the plaintiff’s account,  
argued that the respondent’s deception about his age and violent behaviour ‘indicate’ an 
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approach to the sacrament of marriage which was totally contrary to Catholic understanding 
of marriage.  He concluded that the respondent was ‘not able to consider what he was doing’ 
and ‘it is clear’ that he ‘did not intend to establish the “totius vitae consortium”’.  He cited 
authority for affording full proof to parties’ depositions under certain conditions,99  and 
quoted Rotal judge Pinto as stating that it was sufficient to prove the existence of 
schizophrenia at the time of the celebration of the marriage, in order to find for nullity.100  In 
respect of the respondent’s inability to assume the essential obligations of marriage the 
advocate pleaded that there was evidence of violent behaviour and a diagnosis of 
schizophrenia.  He quoted Rotal judge Mattioli as stating that although a person might not 
have lost the faculty to understand and to will marriage he could still be unable to fulfil the 
essential obligations of marriage.101  
 
The Defender of the Bond: The defender highlighted the discrepancy in evidence regarding 
whether or not the plaintiff knew of the respondent’s illness before marriage and the lack of 
knowledge about the respondent’s response to treatment. 
 
The Tribunal’s Understanding of the Law: Although the law section of the judgment 
distinguished the two alleged grounds, it implied that only CIC canon 1095, 3º requires a 
psychological cause.  It suggested that ‘generally’ the psychological cause is personality 
disorder, but stressed that more important than the diagnosis is the effect of the cause on a 
person’s ‘natural capacity’ to enter marriage, ‘with its perpetual rights and obligations’.  
Importantly, the cause must be present at the time of consent, although possibly latent.  The 
law section stated that Rotal jurisprudence, ‘although cautious about the invalidating effects 
of this illness in its initial stages, is unanimous in its position that schizophrenia renders a 
person incapable of valid marital consent when it has reached its qualified or “manifest” and 
terminal stages’.102  However, it then goes on to say:  ‘it is also established jurisprudence 
99 Raymond Burke, La confession iudicalisve le dichiarazioni guidiziali delle oarte, in aa.vv. I Mezzi di Prova 
Nella Dause Matrimoniali Secondo la Giurisprudenza Rotalem Studii Giuridici XXXVIII, (Lib. Ed. Vaticana, 
1995), p29.  The advocate stated: ‘The declarations of the parties, according to the norm of canon 1536§2 and 
1679, are able to have the force of proof on the following conditions: 1) that there is no possibility of other 
proofs; 2) that there are witnesses to the truthfulness of the parties, inasmuch as this is possible; 3) there are 
other indications and circumstances’.  Also Pompedda, Studi di Diritto Processuale Canonico, Giuffrѐ Editore, 
(Milan, 1995), p215.  He also cites DC, Article 180§2; see Appendix V. 
100 Coram Pinto, 20 November 1969, SRRD 62 (1969), pp1024-1031, MDGB&I (1997), Vol 33, no 22, pp116-
121, at p119. 
101 Coram Mattioli, 28 November 1957, SRRD 62 (1969), pp1026, MDGB&I (1997), Vol 33, no 23, p119. 
102 The judgment cited coram Stanziewicz, 5 April 1979 and coram  Huot, 7 June 1979.  Emphasis added. 
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that, once the presence of the illness has been diagnosed before and after marriage, it must be 
necessarily concluded that it has affected consent.  It is a habitual illness and does not admit 
lucid intervals’.103  Again citing Rotal jurisprudence, it acknowledges that the expert’s task is 
‘to assist the Judges in understanding the exact nature of the personality defect, together with 
its causes and its effects on the person’s mental and affective processes’.104  The tribunal 
cited authority that schizophrenia affected the party’s capacity under both CIC canon 1095, 
2º,105 and 3º.106   The tribunal also acknowledged lack of corroboratory evidence, but citing a 
decree from the Holy Office, specifically addressed to the Vicariate Apostolic of Sweden, the 
tribunal held: the presumption that the full force of proof cannot be given to the deposition of 
a party was overturned;107 and this ‘new approach was taken into’ CIC, which ‘lists the 
depositions of the parties as the first category of proof’.  The tribunal acknowledged the 
caveats mentioned in canon 1536 and 1679.108 
 
The Law Applied: All three grounds were found proven.  On the basis of character 
references, the tribunal accepted the plaintiff’s account of her upbringing, courtship and 
marriage uncritically.  It interpreted the report from the Safeguarding Coordinator as referring 
to allegations by the child of this marriage, against the plaintiff’s present civil-law husband, 
albeit that matters had been resolved.  Finding for nullity on grounds of the respondent’s 
incapacity, the tribunal credited the advocate with presenting ‘a clearly reasoned and 
jurisprudentially founded argument for an affirmative decision on all grounds’, and 
considered the defender’s reference to the respondent’s treatment as ‘irrelevant given the 
established jurisprudence regarding those who suffer from schizophrenia’.  A vetitum was 
imposed. 
 
103 The judgment cited coram Fiore, 20 October 1984.  Emphasis added. 
104 Coram Stankiewicz, 26 March 1981, stating the principle that no one is bound to the impossible; coram 
Pompedda, 11 April 1988, RRDec 80 (1993), pp199-202, explaining the ‘ius ad communionem vitae’; and 
coram Faltin, 28 October 1988, RRDec 80 (1992), p579, n9. 
105 Coram De Jorio, 17 June 1970, in J García Faílde, Manual de Psiquiatría forense canonical, (1991), p241.   
This case does not appear to be published in English. 
106 Coram Huot, 5 June 1981, in M Pompedda, Studi di Matrimoniale Canonico (1993), p319; and coram 
Bruno, 21 July 1983.  Only Bruno’s decision is annotated in English; see Mendonça Anthology, p66, Case No: 
83-136. 
107 The decree from the Holy Office, 12 November 1947, concerned marriages within the Vicariate Apostolic of 
Sweden.  Also Rotal judgments: coram Mattioli, 24 March 1956, RRDec 48 (1956), 284; coram Felici, 2 April, 
1957, RRDec 49 (1957), 278; and coram Pinto, 22 April 1974. 
108 CIC, cc. 1536; and 1679.  See Appendix I. 
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Considering the plaintiff’s incapacity, the tribunal stated: ‘In addition to her psychological 
trauma’, she suffered physical illness.  She ‘jumped at the chance’ to live with the 
respondent’s family; the respondent’s mother’s disapproval of pre-marital intimate 
relationships led to pressure to marry.  The plaintiff was ‘desperate’ and ‘did not understand 
her doubts’.  Although doubtfully motivated and misplaced, she found the attention shown to 
her ‘too attractive’ to resist.  The tribunal held that the plaintiff was ‘severely emotionally 
immature’; her desire for acceptance ‘clouded’ her judgment and she ‘exercised no discretion 
in marrying the respondent’.    
 
Discussion: There was no indication as to: who sought the report; why it was submitted; or 
whether or not the tribunal accepted it as ‘expert’ opinion.  The Safeguarding Coordinator’s 
qualifications, experience, or religious affiliation were not specified.  The relevance of the 
report was unclear.  Despite the law section’s acknowledgement of the need for experts, the 
tribunal appointed none for either party; nor did it consider the caveats in Rotal jurisprudence 
regarding the invalidating effect of schizophrenia.109  Moreover, it failed to mention that 
Rotal judge Bruno’s cited decision involved four experts; the severity of the illness at the 
material time was confirmed.110  Rather, the tribunal concluded simply that so long as 
schizophrenia is diagnosed, nothing else requires consideration.  Presumably, the tribunal 
attributed weight to allegations of the respondent’s frequent hospitalisation, lack of steady 
employment, previous failed relationships and attempted fraud, as indicators of severity, but 
this was not obvious from the judgment.  Although the law section acknowledged the 
distinction between the two grounds of incapacity, the tribunal dealt with them together in 
respect of the respondent.  It is therefore, impossible to follow the reasoning in respect of 
these two heads of nullity.   
 
109 Other Rotal judges also recognise the caveats.  Mendonça Anthology, p1: Case No: 71-006, coram Di Felice, 
13 January 1971, Dec 63 (1980), 25-31: ‘According to approved jurisprudence, one who suffers from 
schizophrenia cannot elicit valid matrimonial consent because the disorder causes disturbance in the discretion 
of judgment.  The disorder must be in the qualified (manifest) state at the time of exchanging consent’.  Also p1: 
Case No: 71-067, coram Palazzini, 31 March 1971, Dec 63 (1980), 235-245: ‘… Hence, if [schizophrenia] is 
found to be present in a person in its qualified or manifest stage before and after the wedding, marriage of such a 
person can be declared null for lack of discretion of judgment’.  At p74: Case No: 84-145, coram Fiore, 20 
October 1984, Dec 76 (1989), 541-554: ‘…[I]n any qualified stage of this illness [schizophrenia], the person 
affected by it can be considered as deprived of the discretion of judgment proportionate to marriage. … Only an 
expert in psychiatric/psychological sciences can detect the actual presence and severity of the disorder. … 
[O]nce its presence is diagnosed before and after the marriage we must necessarily conclude that it had affected 
consent’. 
110 See Mendonça Anthology, p66: Case No 83-136, coram Bruno, Dec 75 (1988), 473-484. 
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It appears that in the absence of expert opinion and without applying Christian 
anthropological principles the tribunal assumed, on the basis of the plaintiff’s own account 
that she must have suffered psychological trauma because of her childhood experiences, 
resulting in severe emotional immaturity; her past, therefore, determined her future.  The 
tribunal did not explain the judges’ competence to assess her psychological condition, its 
severity and its effect at the material time.  Nor did it explain its methodology.  Despite the 
respondent’s mother’s account to the contrary, and the fact that the plaintiff lived in the 
respondent’s home prior to marriage, the tribunal held that she was ‘kept in the dark’ about 
the respondent’s illness, and this deception was compounded by his tendency to lie.  The 
relevance of this to her incapacity is unclear; deceit was not alleged.111  Without scientific 
explanation, failure to exercise discretion of judgment was equated with incapacity.  
Difficulty and imprudence were not distinguished from incapacity. The significance of the 
Safeguarding Coordinator’s input was not explained. Therefore, the pertinent questions 
remained unanswered.  Although without discussion, a vetitum was added in respect of the 
respondent and was confirmed at Second Instance.   
 
Intermediate Conclusion: 
 
These six cases demonstrate the tribunals’ willingness to pursue grounds of psychological 
incapacity even when: there was no valid petition; a respondent, in whom incapacity was 
alleged, was untraceable; and no expert report was sought for a party in whom incapacity was 
alleged.  No explanation was given as to how or why these cases fell under the exception 
provided in CIC canon 1680.  Moreover, in some of these six cases, the law sections of the 
judgments acknowledged the mandatory use of experts in incapacity cases.   
 
When expert opinion was sought, procedural law in respect of the appointment and 
instruction of experts was not followed.   Crucially, in no case were the questions mandated 
in DC put to the expert; therefore, these remained unanswered.   In Case 2, the expert report 
was sought for the wrong party, yet the tribunal found for incapacity in the other party, 
without expert opinion.  Moreover, it found for nullity also on grounds of the plaintiff’s error 
about a quality in the respondent, without identifying that quality.  In Case 3, in which an 
expert supported the party’s capacity strongly, the tribunal set the expert report aside, yet 
111 CIC, c. 1098.  See Appendix I. 
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found for the party’s incapacity.  In Case 4, one ground of nullity was alleged in the plaintiff 
(although two were heard) and two were alleged in the respondent.  An expert report was 
sought only in respect of the plaintiff.  The expert found no severe psychological anomaly 
operative at the material time, yet the tribunal found for the plaintiff’s incapacity on the 
ground that was not pleaded.  In Case 5, although incapacity was found not proven, the 
tribunal, nevertheless pursued the ground when there was no evidence of any psychological 
impairment; the plaintiff provided a medical report which confirmed only physical ailments.  
The tribunal found for nullity, however, on grounds of intention in the other (absent) party, 
ignoring the presumption of validity and relying on lack of evidence of validity.  In Case 6, 
the tribunal found for incapacity in both parties; no expert report was sought for either party.  
The (absent) respondent had a psychiatric history, but the plaintiff merely reported a difficult 
childhood, which the tribunal accepted as an inevitable cause of her incapacity.  In Cases 4 
and 6, the tribunal dealt with more than one ground of incapacity together, making it 
impossible to follow its argument; in Case 4, it dealt with the grounds in both parties (two 
grounds in each party), together, despite incapacity being a personal and inherent incapacity.  
In Cases 5 and 6, the tribunal did not seek the expert reports and it was unclear whether they 
accepted them as such; their relevance was unclear.  No reasons were given for not, in some 
cases, approaching the party’s own psychiatrist, who would have been more likely to be able 
to give a more detailed and accurate account of the party’s condition at the material time.  
Only in Cases 3 and 4 did the expert consider the ameliorating effect of medication; however, 
the tribunal gave no weight to this consideration; in Case 4 the expert held that there was no 
evidence that the party’s possible anxiety reached ‘clinical intensity’ prior to marriage, but 
the tribunal nevertheless found for his incapacity.  Only in Case 1, therefore, can it be said 
that the tribunal gave weight to the expert report and found the allegations of incapacity in 
both parties not proven on the basis that no anomaly antecedent to marriage was found. 
 
Furthermore, the tribunals’ understandings of law were incorrect in some of the cases.   The 
tribunals focused on whether or not a party failed to exercise discretion of judgment, thereby 
failing to distinguish imprudent decisions, or difficulty, from incapacity.  In Case 3, the 
tribunal understood that a sexual relationship was an essential element of marriage and 
therefore, focused on the parties’ sexual desires and expectations, which have no canonical 
relevance.  It concluded that one party’s failure to meet the other’s needs and expectations, 
amounted to incapacity; once again, this does not distinguish failure from incapacity.   
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 Except in Case 3 (in which the expert report supporting capacity was set aside) and Case 4 (in 
which the expert concluded that there was no evidence of anxiety having reached ‘clinical 
intensity’) it was impossible to demonstrate that the experts focused on the severity and effect 
of a pre-existing cause.  Moreover, as the rationale for appointing experts is unclear, it seems 
that in all the cases the tribunals decided arbitrarily both to engage experts and on the weight 
to be given to their opinions.   
 
3. A COMPARISON WITH THE DUBLIN REGIONAL TRIBUNAL 
 
A comparison is now made between the practice of the First Instance tribunals already 
studied (from the four dioceses in Southwark province, appealing to ITSIS) and that of the 
First Instance Regional Tribunal in Dublin, a tribunal serving several dioceses (appealing to 
the National Appeal Tribunal of Ireland), in the same year (2009).  The matrimonial business 
of the Dublin Tribunal is equivalent to that of the sum of the four diocesan tribunals in 
Southwark province.  First, what follows compares statistics in relation to: the overall number 
of cases heard; and the number of cases in which grounds of psychological incapacity were 
alleged.  Second, it compares the practice of the tribunals in terms of: their use of experts; 
procedural errors; interpretation of law; and the weight given to expert evidence. 
 
Statistics: Overall in 2009: ninety-five cases were heard in Southwark province; ninety cases 
were heard in Dublin.  Psychological incapacity was alleged in eighty-four in Southwark and 
in eighty-eight in Dublin.112   Grave lack of discretion of judgment (GLDJ) was alleged in 
eighty-one cases in Southwark, compared to eighty-seven in Dublin.   In Dublin, in fifty-
seven cases the ground (GLDJ) was alleged in both parties, and in thirty cases in one party.  
Therefore, compared to ninety-one petitions on GLDJ in Southwark, Dublin received one 
hundred and forty-four.  In Southwark, seventy-one were found proven and twenty were 
112 Therefore, psychological incapacity was alleged in all but two cases in Dublin.  In one of these two cases, 
(No 56), relative impotence was alleged in both parties and found proven in both parties.  Non-consummation 
was alleged.  After marriage each party discovered that the other had been sexually abused; counselling failed.  
The fact of non-consummation was proven by: (a) evidence given tempore non suspecto; (b) expert testimony 
from the plaintiff’s general practitioner; (c) expert evidence from a counsellor; and (d) a psychological 
assessment of the plaintiff by a psychologist.  The psychologist concluded that the parties had been traumatised 
by their past experiences and neither party could extend to the other the high level of support each required 
because of those experiences.  In the other case (No 48) grave fear was alleged in both parties and found proven 
in the plaintiff; in addition the plaintiff’s error and deceit were alleged but found not proven.   
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found not-proven, compared with eighty-seven proven and fifty-seven not-proven in Dublin.  
Southwark received thirteen cases alleging inability to assume the essential obligations of 
marriage (IAO), whereas Dublin received eleven.  In Dublin, two of these cases involved 
both parties; nine involved one party.   Therefore, compared with Southwark’s fourteen 
petitions, Dublin heard thirteen on IAO.  In Southwark, eleven were found proven and three 
were not, whereas in Dublin, four were proven and nine were not.   
 
So, in Dublin, of the one hundred and fifty-seven pleas of incapacity,113 ninety-one succeeded 
and sixty-six failed, as compared with one hundred and five pleas in Southwark, of which 
eighty-two succeeded and twenty-three failed.  The table below compares: the overall 
numbers of cases from the four First Instance diocesan tribunals in Southwark and the First 
Instance Regional Tribunal in Dublin; the number of cases in which incapacity was pleaded; 
the number of petitions for GLDJ and IAO; the numbers of affirmative (proven) and negative 
(not proven) decisions reached in respect of these two grounds of incapacity; and the number 
of cases receiving negative decisions on all grounds.   
113 There were one hundred and forty-four petitions on grave lack of discretion of judgment and thirteen on 
inability to assume essential obligations. 
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Table of Cases 
 
 
 
 
Cases from 4 First Instance 
Southwark Tribunals 
Cases from First Instance 
Regional Tribunal in Dublin 
No of cases overall 95 90 
No of cases pleading 
incapacity 
67+17 unavailable files = 84 88 
No of cases pleading se 
GLDJ 
64+17 unavailable files = 81 87 
No of cases pleading IAO 13 11 
No of pleas of GLDJ 91 144 
No of pleas of IAO 14 13 
Total No of pleas of 
incapacity  
105 157 
Affirmative decisions on 
GLDJ 
 
71 87 
Affirmative decisions on 
IAO  
11 4 
Negative decisions on GLDJ 20 57 
Negative decisions on IAO 3 9 
Total number of affirmative 
decisions on incapacity 
(proven invalidity) 
82 91 
Total number of negative 
decisions (not-proven) 
23 66 
No of cases receiving 
negative decisions on all 
grounds 
1 14 
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These figures demonstrate that the Dublin tribunal was equally willing to pursue 
psychological incapacity in almost all cases.  However, there is a significant difference 
between the numbers of incapacity petitions receiving not-proven decisions, and of cases 
which failed on all alleged grounds (i.e. negative decisions).114  It appears, therefore, that in 
Southwark the tribunals were reluctant to allow a case to fail completely, as one proven 
ground was sufficient to declare the marriage invalid.  This suggests that the Southwark 
tribunals were more liberal in declaring invalidity than the Dublin tribunal. 
 
The Use of Experts: The most significant difference in the practices of the tribunals 
compared concerns compliance with the mandatory requirement to consult an expert in 
marriage cases involving psychological incapacity: Dublin complied with this, Southwark did 
not.  Also, unlike Southwark, the Dublin tribunal employed a part-time psychologist who 
conducted a psychological assessment in almost all parties in whom psychological incapacity 
was alleged.115  Tests routinely used in these assessments included: the Wechsler Adult 
Intelligence Scale (WAIS); the Rorschach Projective Technique;116 the Eysenck Personality 
Questionnaire;117 and the Rotter Incomplete Sentence Test.118   
 
The exception permitted in CIC canon 1680 was invoked in few cases.  In these cases, whilst 
an expert was not consulted, the tribunal had ample evidence of incapacity from other 
sources.  For example, in one case, a medical document revealed that the plaintiff suffered 
pre-marital addiction, received ‘constant treatment’ and had a history of non-compliance with 
treatment.  This evidence, combined with witness evidence, of a dysfunctional family in 
which the plaintiff suffered sexual abuse, and of his father’s alcoholism, led the judges to find 
for his incapacity on grounds of his grave lack of discretion of judgment and inability to 
assume the essential obligations of marriage.119   A vetitum was imposed.  The Second 
Instance Tribunal ratified the decision and confirmed the vetitum.   
 
114 These figures are marked in the table above in bold. 
115 Arabic numbers, No 1 to No 98 are assigned to the Dublin cases.  E.g., No 15: This case involved an 
arranged marriage among the travelling community; grave lack of discretion of judgment was alleged in both 
parties.  The female plaintiff’s psychological assessment indicated that she functioned at a ‘very low level of 
intelligence – amongst the lowest 2% of the population’ and she ‘showed signs of serious immaturity’.  The 
tribunal found for her incapacity, but not that of the absent respondent.   
116 This measures personality characteristics and emotional functioning. 
117 This assesses character traits. 
118 This is designed to identify dysfunctional behaviour. 
119 No 24. 
239 
 
                                                            
In another case, in which grave lack of discretion of judgment was alleged in both parties, 
both parties came from dysfunctional families.120  Moreover, they met while in-patients in a 
psychiatric hospital.  Both parties had a history of attempted suicide; they were receiving 
continuous treatment.  Neither party worked; they received State disability benefits.  All 
witnesses opposed the marriage.  Witness evidence demonstrated that the plaintiff wife’s 
father died when she was an infant.  She was raised, in fear, by her mother and three aunts 
who had learning difficulties.  Acknowledging the plaintiff’s pre-marital, severe psychiatric 
illness, the tribunal considered that she had a poor understanding of marriage.  Before 
marriage, the respondent husband threatened suicide if the plaintiff left him, causing pressure 
on the plaintiff to marry.121  Both parties were hospitalised after marriage.  The plaintiff was 
forced to seek safe shelter shortly after marriage.  The respondent husband had been sexually 
abused.  He coped with stress by consuming alcohol.  Evidence confirmed his abusive 
behaviour at sexual, psychological and physical levels.  Counselling failed.  In light of these 
circumstances, the tribunal decided that there was no need for expert evidence.  It held that 
both grounds were proven and the marriage was declared invalid. 
 
Procedural Errors: At the Dublin tribunal, only its judgments and not the Acts were 
available for study; in Southwark the judgments and most of the Acts were available.  At the 
Dublin tribunal, therefore, it was impossible to study general procedure, for example, in 
terms of citing respondents, or of appointing and instructing experts.  However, with one 
exception, the tribunal’s reliance on expert opinion in psychological incapacity cases seemed 
to account for the apparent reluctance, unlike in Southwark, to pursue, or at least find proven, 
grounds in respondents who were uncooperative, and therefore not subject to psychological 
assessment.122  In this one exception, a plaintiff wife married a man who had been previously 
120 No 9. 
121 There was a history of psychiatric illness in the respondent’s family; his mother had been admitted frequently 
to a psychiatric hospital.  
122 E.g, In No 4, the respondent withdrew evidence; consequently, the ground alleged in her was not pursued, 
due to lack of evidence.  In Nos: 6, 17, and 24, because of the uncooperative respondents and lack of 
psychological reports, the tribunals held that there was insufficient evidence to consider incapacity grounds 
alleged in them and reached a not proven decision.  In No 15, although the sole judge found evidence that the 
respondent held views ‘not in keeping with Church teaching on marriage’, without objective evidence, ‘it would 
be rash’ to rely on suspicions.  In No 18, the respondent allegedly became violent when the plaintiff objected to 
her socialising alone; however, because of her lack of cooperation and consequent absence of a psychological 
assessment, the tribunal did not pursue any ground in her.  In No 24 the tribunal acknowledged there was a 
prima facie case for grounds in the respondent, but because of her lack of cooperation and consequent absence 
of a psychological report, no grounds were alleged in her.  
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married.123   The expert (the psychologist employed by the tribunal) found that although there 
were many indications of difficulties, there was ‘nothing to suggest that [any of these] was so 
severe as to deprive her’ of capacity to marry.  The tribunal, therefore, held that she was 
capable.  Also, regarding the non-cooperative respondent, the tribunal held that his alleged 
violent behaviour ‘raised questions’ but did not prove incapacity.   Second Instance, however, 
agreeing that the plaintiff had made a foolish decision, disagreed in respect of the respondent, 
holding that: he was ‘psychologically prone to violence’; and ‘excluded the giving of this 
love to the plaintiff’.  This tribunal did not distinguish wilful bad behaviour from incapacity.  
Third Instance,124 based on lack of evidence,125 also focused on the respondent’s behaviour, 
and consequent failures.126  Moreover, as we saw in Southwark Case 3, the tribunal accepted 
the plaintiff’s desires and expectations as rights, and held that the respondent, ‘failed not only 
to understand the necessity of giving himself to those expectations’, but completely failed ‘to 
recognise, even now, that his behaviour not alone was contrary to the expectation of Christian 
marriage, but actively militated against such expectations’.  A vetitum was imposed.  
Furthermore, this Third Instance tribunal confused withholding a substantial element of 
marriage, which goes to the heart of the ground of simulation, with incapacity, with which it 
is internally incompatible.127 
 
In other Dublin cases procedural errors, identified in some of the Southwark cases, were 
evident.  For example, some judges treated grounds together, even when the ground was 
alleged in both parties, making it impossible to follow the reasoning for individual grounds of 
personal incapacity.128  In one case, grave lack of discretion of judgment was alleged in both 
parties.129  The marriage was happy initially, produced seven children and lasted twenty-one 
years.  The respondent wife had a psychiatric history, which became very severe after 
marriage.  The expert found that, despite many deficiencies, she functioned ‘within average 
range of ability’ and although ‘some paranoid tendencies’ were indicated, negative findings 
did ‘not approach pathological levels at present’.  Nevertheless, and without argument, the 
123 No 2. 
124 Although the Roman Rota is the usual competent Third Instance tribunal, Third Instance competence was 
granted to a local, regional tribunal. 
125 E.g., ‘[There is] no evidence of an intimate, trusting, loving, interpersonal relationship’; and ‘no evidence of 
meaningful communication’.  
126 E.g., ‘His behaviour reveals how apart they were as a couple’. 
127 CIC, c. 1101§1.  See Appendix I.  Rotal jurisprudence, discussed later, holds that one cannot be incapable of 
positing consent and, at the same time be capable of withholding that consent ‘by a positive act of the will’. 
128 E.g., Nos: 12, 20, 24, 31.  
129 No 12. 
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tribunal found the ground proven in her but not in the plaintiff husband.  The tribunal held 
that the couple failed to get to know one another.  The tribunal, therefore, did not establish 
the severity and effect of the plaintiff’s condition at the material time, so the reasoning was 
unclear.  Second Instance ratified the decision for nullity. 
 
Although the expert reports were not available, it appeared from the judgments that, as in 
Southwark cases, many DC provisions may have been breached.  For example, although in 
most cases, and unlike the practice in Southwark, the expert examined the parties in whom 
incapacity was alleged, there was no evidence from the judgments that the expert had been 
given the Acts.  Nor was it clear that the expert: revealed either any degree of adherence to 
faith or to Christian anthropological principles;130 addressed the specific questions required 
by DC; or achieved any specific degree of certainty regarding findings.  Nor in many cases, 
was it clear that the expert: identified any specific ‘grave anomaly’ pre-existing marriage; 
focused on the effect of any such anomaly on the party’s capacity at the material time; or 
explained how the effect could be verified.  Moreover, the expert, at least in some cases, 
appeared to have assessed the parties in light of post-marital events, leaving the gravity of the 
party’s condition at the material time in doubt.  
 
For example, a Catholic plaintiff wife married a Muslim respondent.131  The marriage lasted 
eight years; two children were born.  The plaintiff claimed: she had a ‘nervous breakdown’ 
aged seventeen; and she acted ‘impulsively’ following the respondent’s early proposal of 
marriage.  The expert found: the plaintiff had psychological problems, including ‘extremely 
childish’ emotional functioning and ‘extremely high’ anxiety levels; and she suffered 
depression six months after the birth of her first child.  However, the tribunal discussed 
neither her alleged pre-marital ‘breakdown’ nor post-partum depression.  Like, in Southwark 
Case 3, the tribunal considered that the plaintiff ‘had high expectations’ and was not satisfied 
with five-star hotel accommodation.  It held: she married a man of another nationality, 
religion and culture, whom she barely knew, in order ‘to belong to someone’.  Consequently, 
she had poor insight and gravely lacked discretion of judgment, rendering the marriage 
invalid.  Therefore, as the tribunal did not identify a ‘grave anomaly’, its severity and effect 
130 However, as the expert was employed by the tribunal, this information might have been available to the 
tribunal. 
131 No 3. 
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at the material time was not demonstrated; nor did the tribunal distinguish an imprudent 
decision from an invalid one.  Nevertheless, a vetitum was imposed.   
 
In some cases, even though the Dublin tribunal focussed on the material time, it did not 
address the severity and effect of the (latent) condition.  For example, in one case, a plaintiff 
wife’s grave lack of discretion of judgment and inability to assume the essential obligations 
of marriage were alleged.132  The expert opined: because of many psychological problems, 
including ‘depressive tendencies’ and a ‘poor self-image’, the plaintiff was in a ‘very poor 
state emotionally’ when deciding to marry; but she developed anorexia ‘shortly after 
marriage’.  The expert found that although her ‘problems’ originated in childhood, they 
‘could have been added to’ by subsequent trauma, depression and ‘maladaptive use of denial 
as defence’.  However, the tribunal, dealing with both grounds together, held that her 
anorexia occurred antecedent to marriage; alcohol-abuse in her parental home was the root of 
all her problems.  The tribunal nevertheless found that her grave lack of discretion of 
judgment was not proven, but she was incapable of assuming essential marital obligations.  
Second Instance ratified the decision.  The reasoning was unclear. 
 
Another procedural error occurred in a case in which, instead of returning a ‘not-proven’ 
decision, the judges decided not to hear an alleged ground on the basis of the defender of the 
bond’s observations.133 
 
The Tribunal’s Understanding of Law:  Like in Southwark cases, instead of establishing 
the existence of a ‘grave cause’ and its severity, and demonstrating its effect on the party’s 
capacity for marriage at the material time, judges in Dublin frequently equated failure to 
exercise prudent judgment with incapacity to marry.  For example, in the law section of one 
judgment, whilst discussing grave lack of discretion of judgment, the judges credited 
Pompedda with stating: ‘with regard to matrimonial consent, something even more is 
required [than is required for placing a human act].134  That is, a certain foresight or 
intellectual consideration of the bond which is coming into being and the conjugal duties that 
132 E.g., No 20.   
133 No 24.  CIC, cc. 1514; 1608§4; and 1611.  See Appendix I.  Once the ground is accepted, it should be heard 
and if necessary a not-proven decision reached. 
134 No 71. 
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will derive from it’.135  This quotation implies that de facto consideration is required; not just 
capacity for it.  However, the tribunal did not reveal that Pompedda’s decision, in fact, 
involved a plaintiff suffering personality change following pre-marital cerebral trauma; 
expert opinion was that she was incapable of critical evaluation.136  Nor did the tribunal 
explain the significance of this decision to the extant case.  
 
In another case, the tribunal found a respondent, contrary to his own belief that marital 
problems were extraneous, incapable of assuming essential obligations.137  The expert 
reported: ‘some’ problems; impulsivity; immaturity; and anxiety.  Moreover, the judges 
acknowledged: lack of pre-marital problems; post-marital financial difficulties; and his post-
marital bad behaviour.  Although acknowledging the existence of difficulties and without 
reference to cause, the judges concluded: the respondent ‘did not take enough time to get to 
know the plaintiff’; he was unable to think towards the good of the spouses; and the parties 
were unsuited.  Therefore, he did not exercise discretion of judgment.  Second Instance 
ratified the decision of invalidity on grounds that he ‘lacked the qualities that would seem 
essential for marriage’.  Difficulty was not distinguished from incapacity; no ‘grave anomaly’ 
was identified, as is required by the norms of the Church. 
 
When grave lack of discretion of judgment was alleged in both parties, a suggestion of 
immaturity in the respondent (not proof) sufficed to convince the tribunal of incapacity.138  
The judges found for nullity only in the respondent wife.  The expert reported ‘immaturity’ 
(without further detail), but also ‘a serious personality defect’ (not disorder).  But the tribunal 
considered that the respondent: was ‘very unfocused’; ‘had plenty of time to sort herself out 
during the nine-year courtship; but ‘drifted into marriage without consideration’.  It held that 
expert opinion ‘suggests she did not have the maturity to handle what was happening’ and 
found the ground proven.139  Here, an expert finding of ‘immaturity’ proved incapacity 
without attribution to any specific cause – that is, a suggestion of ‘immaturity’ sufficed to 
cause nullity. 
 
135 The judgment cited coram Pompedda, 19 February 1974, SRRDec 66 (1974), pp105-106. 
136 Mendonça, Anthology, Case No: 74-030, coram Pompedda, 19 February 1974, Dec 66 (1983), 105-110, p17. 
137 No 31. 
138 No 23. 
139 Emphasis added. 
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In another case, the expert opined that a plaintiff wife was ‘immature’, but the tribunal gave 
weight to events which occurred after marriage; therefore, the seriousness of her underlying 
condition at the material time was not established.140  The plaintiff wife met the respondent 
husband three months after the death of his former wife.  They married two years later.  He 
had a child from his former marriage.  Grave lack of discretion of judgment was alleged in 
both parties.  Witness evidence referred to the plaintiff’s ‘depression’ before marriage.   The 
plaintiff alleged that she wanted a child but her post-marital pregnancy ended in its early 
stages.  The expert found that her many psychological problems, including immature 
emotional functioning and ambivalence, originated in childhood and concluded that she 
would have ‘problems’, even with a supportive partner.  The judges, accepting these findings, 
held that ‘she suffered from a disposition that led to a decision contrary to all common sense’.  
However, without reference to any specific cause, they held that her need to have a child was 
‘compounded’ by loss of the pregnancy.  The tribunal did not explain how a post-marital 
event could have affected consent.  Both grounds were found proven but the reasoning in 
respect of the respondent was clearer.  The tribunal accepted expert opinion that he: was 
‘obsessed with sex’; functioned emotionally ‘at the level of a young teenager’; and he dealt 
with grief in ‘an inappropriate manner’; therefore, he was not ‘psychologically free’.  A 
vetitum was imposed on both parties and confirmed at Second Instance. 
 
As well as high expectations, low self-esteem also featured in some cases as a cause of 
incapacity.  On one occasion, expert opinion supported a plaintiff husband’s ‘low level of 
insight’.141  Witness evidence showed that both sets of parents had reservations as to the 
suitability of the parties.  The tribunal considered that the plaintiff’s failure ‘to see the break 
in the relationship coming’ was ‘typical of someone with low self-esteem’.  Despite Rotal 
judge Burke’s warning against incorrectly interpreting such psychological concepts as ‘self-
esteem’, ‘freedom from shame or guilt’ and ‘self-doubt’, as these would have different 
meanings depending on whether or not one comes from a Christian or secular anthropological 
viewpoint,142 the tribunal held that the plaintiff’s ‘unrealistic expectations indicate that his 
140 No 7. 
141 No 26. 
142 Cormac Burke, writing judicially: Sentence of 9 July 1998, available at 
http://www.cormacburke.or.ke/node/469; and extra-judicially: ‘Psychiatry: A “Value-Free” Science?’, Linacre 
Quarterly, Vol 67:1 (February, 2000), pp59-88.  Coram Burke, ‘Decision 5 November 1992, RRD, Vol 84, 
pp527-528’, Studia Canonica, 32 (1993), pp486-496: Burke warns that personality traits, such as ‘low self-
esteem’ and ‘unassertiveness’, ‘serve to prove nothing about … consensual incapacity either under c. 1095 2° or 
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decision-making process was fundamentally flawed’; consequently, he lacked sufficient 
discretion of judgment.  Second Instance ratified the decision and a vetitum was imposed. 
 
Subjective findings of aberrant behaviour were accepted, too, without reference to a 
psychological cause.  For example, a plaintiff husband alleged that shortly before the 
marriage the respondent wife admitted a possible pregnancy.  Although he doubted it, she 
alleged he was the father.143  Despite their agreement to postpone children, the plaintiff 
offered support.  The pregnancy was confirmed; an abortion took place on honeymoon.   The 
expert found that the plaintiff husband had psychological problems, including high 
ambivalence and extreme emotional immaturity.  The tribunal held: his complicity in 
procuring the abortion displayed actions contrary to the good of children;144 he entered a pre-
nuptial agreement;145 he acted in haste; and he functioned emotionally at the level of a young 
teenager.  His grave lack of discretion of judgment was found proven.  Second Instance 
ratified the decision.  The Second Instance held: the plaintiff, ‘when faced with a conundrum 
displayed immaturity which would surprise the average man’; the couple ‘could have had 
[the child’s] paternity checked and if proven, the child could have been adopted or kept’; the 
decision to abort was immoral and demonstrated ‘complete lack of discretion of judgment’.   
Neither tribunal identified a serious anomaly other than ‘immaturity’, which was evidenced 
by behaviour.  Moreover, the tribunal did not distinguish immoral behaviour from incapacity.  
Given the plaintiff’s admission of complicity in the abortion and his willingness to enter a 
pre-nuptial agreement, the tribunal could have pursued grounds of his intentions against the 
good of children or of permanence, but did not do so.146  
c 1095 3°’.  See also Burke’s warning to judges: Rotal Decision 23 July 1988, available at: 
http://www.cormacburke.or.ke/node/470: ‘An ecclesiastical judge must bear the Pope's cautions very 
particularly in mind when presented with an expertise which gives a diagnosis of an inadequate or incapable 
personality in a contracting party, basing this largely on the “poor self-esteem” and/or “weak self-image” which 
the expert considers the party to possess’.  
143 No 4. 
144 The ground of a positive intention against the good of children was not alleged. 
145 The ground of a positive intention against permanence was not alleged. 
146 In another case, too, no serious psychopathology at the material time was identified; behaviour held sway.  In 
No 44, the respondent husband’s grave lack of discretion of judgment and inability to assume the essential 
obligations of marriage was alleged.  He admitted sexual abuse of his child from a previous relationship.  Judges 
held that if a condition ‘so affected the person concerned that the natural process of discerning and evaluating 
was radically undermined’, nullity of marriage would result.  Expert opinion was that the respondent’s 
personality functioning ‘is seriously disturbed’; his view of relationships is ‘extremely distorted’; he has poor 
insight and his subjective thinking is ‘extremely immature’.  Although not addressing his capacity at the 
material time, the judges held that a man who ‘could perpetrate such an outrage on his own child proves a 
radical distortion of behaviour, thought and understanding’. Thus, he gravely lacked discretion of judgment and 
was incapable of assuming the essential obligations of marriage.  Second Instance ratified the decision.   
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 Pre-marital pregnancy featured in another case also.  A plaintiff husband alleged that the 
respondent wife claimed a pre-marital pregnancy and threatened suicide.147  They married but 
the baby was adopted.  The marriage lasted eighteen years and produced four children.  The 
judges held that the expert finding of his ‘naivety’, ‘bewilderment’ and ‘poor insight’ at the 
material time, ‘greatly reinforced’ his own evidence that he entered marriage in doubt and 
under pressure; his thinking was ‘not at all realistic’, but ‘bizarre’.  The judges found for his 
grave lack of discretion of judgment, which Second Instance ratified.  No ‘grave’ 
pathological cause was identified and consequently its severity was not established and its 
effect was not demonstrated. 
 
In many cases, even when incapacity could have been argued, for example, when a party 
came from a dysfunctional family, or abused drugs, or expert evidence supported childish 
emotional functioning, or a ‘serious personality defect’, the judges, nevertheless, focused on 
failure, rather than incapacity.148  However, sometimes the distinction between failure and 
incapacity was clear.  In one case, the expert concluded that the plaintiff was: ‘very 
subjective’ in her outlook on life; ‘extremely anxious’; and inclined to ‘over-interpret’ 
147 No 17. 
148 No 9: Although the psychological assessment showed: poor self-image; ambivalence; a high level of inner 
tension; and overall emotional functioning which was ‘very childish for [his] years’; the tribunal found that the 
plaintiff husband was ‘a private man’, who ‘bottled up pressure’ and was ‘not communicative’.  He ‘seems to 
have been distracted by the recent death of his mother to whom he was attached’.  He was ‘over weight and 
bullied at school’.  The respondent wife was: ‘difficult to live with’; ‘jealous’; and ‘did not want him to have 
relationships with other women, even work colleagues’.  The judges concluded that the problems ‘should have 
been glaringly obvious’ to the plaintiff husband before marriage, but he ‘did not see them’; consequently he 
suffered from grave lack of discretion of judgment.  Second Instance ratified the decision on the basis of the 
psychological assessment demonstrating ‘personality problems’.  No 11: There was evidence of the respondent 
husband’s dysfunctional family and his abusive behaviour; judges concluded that he ‘failed to appreciate 
marriage as ‘totius vitae consortium’.  No 13: Grave lack of discretion of judgment was alleged in both parties.  
The plaintiff husband claimed that he was ‘stressed’ having taken over his father’s business when he died.  His 
mother, with whom he had a volatile relationship, had attempted suicide.  He took drugs and had a ‘whirlwind 
romance’.  The respondent wife became jealous and behaved irrationally; she claimed that the plaintiff took 
drugs, cross-dressed and had certain sexual preferences.  The plaintiff met a third party within six months of 
marriage.    Although the psychological assessment confirmed the plaintiff’s ‘serious personality defect’, the 
judges, finding for his incapacity, but not that of the respondent wife, acknowledged discrepancies in the 
principal parties’ accounts, but concluded: the plaintiff ‘did not take the necessary time to get to know the 
respondent sufficiently’; he ‘ignored all the warning signs’; and he ‘did not weigh up the consequences of his 
decision to marry’.  The judges made no reference to incapacity.   No 25: Grave lack of discretion of judgment 
was alleged in both parties; both grounds were found proven.  The tribunal held that the plaintiff husband ‘failed 
to evaluate the evidence before him prior to marriage’; he proceeded, despite reservations.  The ground in the 
respondent wife appeared to have been based on bad behaviour; there was police involvement because of her 
drinking.  Second Instance ratified the decision in respect of both grounds. 
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situations, ‘judging them to be more threatening than they are in reality’.149  However, the 
tribunal, taking into account witness evidence, which it considered contradictory and not 
corroboratory, held that no serious cause was established.  The Second Instance agreed: 
although the plaintiff’s background was difficult, there was no evidence of serious trauma.  
Allegations of youth, inexperience and immaturity were ‘too sweeping’ to assess.  She may 
have failed to reflect critically, but there was no evidence of incapacity; she had asked serious 
questions before committing herself.  She may not have been fully aware of the extent of 
problems but it was not possible to show lack of perception.  The couple ‘had radically 
different views’.  Although this case demonstrates inconsistency in the understanding of law, 
it showed that the judges, in this case, did not rely solely on the psychological assessment.   
 
Weight given to Expert Reports: As we have seen, weight was given to psychological 
assessments, even when, although based on objective tests, the expert had not focused on 
establishing a serious cause and demonstrating its effect at the material time.150  However, 
other cases demonstrated that some judges did not rely solely on expert opinion; other 
circumstances were taken into consideration.151  Moreover, some judges did not always 
149 No 5. 
150 There were many examples of this:  No 6: The psychological report supported the plaintiff wife’s: ‘extremely 
poor’ level of insight; depressive and paranoid tendencies; extreme impulsivity; high ambivalence; and 
emotional functioning below the level of a mature adult’.  Judges acknowledged evidence that problems began 
in childhood: her parents drank heavily; she left school aged fifteen to work abroad; her mother left the family 
home, leaving the plaintiff in a caring role as her younger brother suffered brain damage following an accident.  
The respondent was a heavy drinker, unreliable and inconsiderate.  The plaintiff’s sole reason for marriage was 
her pregnancy which she discovered having taken an overdose of drugs.  She was in no fit state to make a 
decision to marry.  Her grave lack of discretion of judgment was found proven.  Second Instance ratified the 
decision on the basis that she had a dysfunctional background, was left to her own devices, was forced to take 
responsibility for siblings and consequently latched on to the respondent.  She saw no alternative but marriage.  
The inference was that the plaintiff’s decision was not psychologically free.  In No10, judges found ‘serious 
conflict’ between the principal parties’ evidence regarding pressure from pre-marital pregnancy.  However, the 
plaintiff’s father described the news as an ‘earthquake’ and attested to the plaintiff’s religiosity.  The judges 
accepted that the psychological assessment revealed a ‘serious personality defect’ and in addition to witness 
evidence which ‘broadly supports’ the view that pressure made it ‘extremely difficult’ for the plaintiff to think 
clearly, found for his grave lack of discretion of judgment. 
151 No 16 involved an arranged marriage within the travelling community.  Grave lack of discretion of judgment 
was alleged in the plaintiff.  His psychological assessment revealed intellectual functioning within the lowest 
4% of the population, which raised questions about his capacity to understand and appreciate the nature and 
implications of the rights and duties of marriage.  There were serious problems in his personal development and 
maturation.  The sole judge held that when these ‘insights’ are placed alongside [other] ‘facts’, he was ‘seriously 
hampered in his capacity to consent at the age of seventeen; he had tried to resist but was powerless’.  Second 
Instance ratified the decision agreeing that through no fault of his own, he was unable to understand.  No 18 also 
involved a marriage within the travelling community; whilst not strictly an arranged marriage, the plaintiff’s 
brother chose the respondent.  The plaintiff’s psychological assessment revealed a polite and gentle character 
whose level of intellectual functioning was low and his emotional functioning was that of a dependent child.  
The tribunal held that this revealed radically defective personal development which reinforced the accrued 
evidence.  His grave lack of discretion of judgment was found proven and ratified at Second Instance.  No 22: 
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accept expert reports uncritically.  For example, in one case the expert concluded, citing 
many features, that a plaintiff wife had a ‘serious personality defect’, which ‘may have begun 
in childhood’.152  The tribunal, however, rejected the expert report and found no evidence of 
an antecedent ‘psychological grave anomaly’; rather, witness evidence proved extraneous 
causes for the failure of the marriage, which did not support invalidity; the plaintiff’s grave 
lack of discretion of judgment and inability to assume the essential obligations of marriage, 
although dealt with together, were found not proven.153 
 
In another case, in which grave lack of discretion of judgment was alleged in both parties, the 
psychologist reported many psychological features in the plaintiff wife, including: childish 
functioning; poor insight; and a high score on the Eysenck lie test.154   The tribunal, however, 
found that her psychological profile ‘falls short’ of proving grounds; naivety was not 
evidence of incapacity.  Likewise, although the expert suggested ‘immaturity’ in the 
respondent husband, the judges held that he behaved badly towards the plaintiff and witness 
evidence revealed nothing to indicate that either party misunderstood the consequences of 
their decision.  No grounds were proven.  Second Instance confirmed the decision with the 
same reasoning. 
 
Psychological reports did not, however, always support incapacity.  On one occasion, when 
grave lack of discretion of judgment was alleged in both parties, the plaintiff husband 
claimed he had a problematic childhood.155  The expert found that he: was ‘indecisive and 
somewhat ambivalent’; had ‘poor self-image’; and had ‘strong paranoid tendencies’.  But as 
there was ‘no gross abnormality’ and he had ‘reasonable ability to form and maintain 
relationships, he could have been helped by a supportive partner’.  The respondent wife did 
The psychological assessment in this case focused on the material time and revealed that the male plaintiff was 
‘in a very poor state emotionally’; this was exacerbated by over-consumption of alcohol and drugs from an early 
age; the sexual abuse he suffered had far-reaching negative consequences for subsequent personality 
development.  Judges, in conjunction with testimony that he had been abused aged eight years, consumed 
alcohol from age ten, smoked hash from age eleven, played truant from school and was excluded from school 
due to his disruptive behaviour, concluded for nullity on grounds of his grave lack of discretion of judgment 
because he was not in a position to make life-changing decisions.  A vetitum was imposed.  The respondent, on 
the other hand and in whom the ground was also alleged, was domineering, materialistic and ambitious and 
there were many ‘undesirable aspects’ to her character, but the judges found that it was doubtful if her ability to 
give consent was affected.  Therefore the ground was not proven.  Second Instance confirmed the decision.   
152 No 31. 
153 The same reasoning featured in No 23, in which the expert reported ‘serious personality defect’. 
154 No 71. 
155 No 21. 
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not cooperate; the judges held that the evidence suggested she made a mistake and 
unilaterally decided to end the relationship.  The tribunal found neither ground proven. 
 
In another case, the expert assessed both parties and found that the respondent wife suffered 
‘limitations in personality functioning’ but there was no evidence of pathological causes; she 
understood marriage but made a foolish choice.156  The tribunal found her grave lack of 
discretion of judgment not-proven.  The plaintiff husband, on the other hand, possessed 
‘sufficient intelligence’ but: was ‘emotionally underdeveloped’; had an ‘addictive 
personality’; and his personality functioning was seriously defective, especially in the area of 
‘intimate personal relationships’.  The tribunal held that, although not malicious, as a 
consequence of his own seriously distorted personality functioning, manifested in excessive 
drinking, and drug-abuse, he was prevented from being able to assess his fitness for a lifelong 
union.  Both his grave lack of discretion of judgment and inability to assume essential 
obligations were proved.  The distinction between the two grounds, however, was not clear. 
 
 
Intermediate Conclusion: 
 
Like the Southwark tribunals, the Dublin tribunal pursued psychological incapacity grounds 
in almost all cases heard in 2009.  This was true even when evidence supported other 
grounds.  Unlike Southwark, however, the Dublin tribunal consulted an expert routinely in 
psychological incapacity cases and was reluctant to pursue incapacity grounds in absent 
respondents.  Also, as was the case in Southwark, full compliance with DC was not evident.  
Moreover, and again like in Southwark, some expert opinions referred to childhood events as 
possible causes of later problems, but there was little evidence that expert opinions focused 
on establishing the party’s psychological status at the material time.   It was not clear how 
‘possible’ causes helped the judges to establish the extent to which they did, in fact, adversely 
affect the party concerned, to the degree of moral certainty and in light of Christian 
anthropological principles.  In Dublin, for example, the expert referred frequently to features, 
such as ‘extremely high ambivalence’, or ‘extreme anxiety’, without (crucially) reference to 
their effect on a party’s decision-making capacity.  In most of the Dublin cases, the expert 
appeared to link evidence of pre-marital adverse circumstances inevitably with subsequent 
156 No 1. 
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behaviour, without any indication of the application of Christian anthropology; in other 
words, parties’ past determined their future.157   Whilst there were some references to a 
party’s possible capacity with ‘a stronger partner’, there were none to recourse to spiritual 
help, as there was in one case in Southwark. 
 
Like in Southwark, the judges in Dublin, with few exceptions, focused on establishing failure 
to exercise discretion of judgment, but did not extrapolate as to whether the failure had a 
grave psychological basis.  Therefore, failure, even possible culpable failure, was equated 
with incapacity.  Although it was unclear how it could be measured, judges equated failure to 
give sufficient time or sufficient consideration to marriage, with incapacity.  Moreover, the 
judges’ focus on behaviour lead them to consider aberrant behaviour invalidating without 
distinguishing wilful behaviour from compulsive behaviour due to psychological anomalies.  
Post-marital behaviour was also given weight, but not necessarily linked to a psychological 
cause antecedent to marriage.  Nor was evidence of difficulty distinguished from incapacity.    
So, like in Southwark, few judges insisted on establishing a grave psychological and 
antecedent cause.  In Dublin, even when such conditions as ‘personality defect’ or 
‘depression’ were suggested or verified, their severity and effect on a party at the material 
time was not demonstrated.  Moreover, many judges accepted evidence of character traits, 
such as ‘naivety’ and ‘low self-esteem’, as sufficient to prove incapacity for marriage; both 
Southwark and Dublin tribunals gave weight to evidence of ‘desires’, ‘unrealistic 
expectations’ and ‘poor insight’, without establishing any resultant grave psychological 
impairment; this applied a broad interpretation to the term ‘essential rights and duties of 
157 The Rota, in 2004, criticised an expert report from the Dublin Regional Tribunal on this basis.  In ‘Decision 
Coram Defilippi, 19 January 2004 (Dublin)’, Studia Canonica, 40 (2006), pp211-244, at p238: ‘[The expert] did 
not in any way treat the question of the gravity of the imperfections in the petitioner’s personality.  She did not 
attempt to make any structural analysis of his personality.  And so, she did not in any way explain under what 
psychological aspect the man’s decision to marry was truly affected’.  Likewise, the judgment criticised the 
second expert, also from Dublin (p232), at 239: ‘[Immediately], without any medical-legal discussion, [the 
expert] arrives at her conclusions.  And these conclusions seem to suggest that ... we are dealing with only ... 
difficulties to establish a happy conjugal communion, and certainly not with a true incapacity ...’.  Moreover, at 
p240, the Rotal judgment concluded that the second expert’s opinion was not consistent with the accrued 
evidence; rather the expert ‘argues in a deterministic manner’ and ‘she did not make any structural analysis of 
the man’s personality.  She deduced, especially from the so-called “tests” (Rorschach Projective Personality 
[Test] and the “House Tree Person Projective Drawing Test”) some imperfections of the petitioner’s personality, 
and has attempted to explain, as if in a deterministic manner, that the man’s personality was disturbed as a result 
of [previous events] ... the expert omitted completely any discussion of the issue of the gravity of the man’s 
alleged disturbance and of the psychological effects, which perhaps resulted therefrom, on the decision to 
marry’.   In this case, the Rota agreed with the First Instance not-proven decision on both parties’ grave lack of 
discretion of judgment and disagreed with the Appeal Tribunal’s affirmative decision.  Therefore, the validity of 
the marriage was upheld. 
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marriage’, which limits the scope of canon 1095.  However, in Dublin there was evidence 
that at least some judges did not accept expert reports uncritically; if expert opinion 
conflicted with, or was not supported by, other evidence, it was rejected.  This rigour, 
combined with some judges’ insistence on establishing a grave and antecedent psychological 
basis for incapacity for marriage, led to a lack of uniformity, both of jurisprudence and of 
decisions.  Like in Southwark, however, there was no evidence that judges in Dublin 
discussed the imposition of a vetitum routinely; but it was applied in cases demonstrating 
serious aberrant behaviour.  In short, although Dublin did have the psychological assessment 
of the parties, neither Southwark nor Dublin focussed, as they should have, on the parties’ 
psychological status at the material time.  
 
4. THE PRACTICE OF THE ROMAN ROTA 
 
The decisions of the Roman Rota are written in Latin.  Some are published later, in 
anonymised format.  Of these, only some are translated, published in English, and made 
readily available to English-speaking practitioners.  A brief perusal of annotated Rotal cases 
heard between 1971 and 1988, and published in 1992, is carried out here, to ascertain the 
practice of the Rotal tribunals regarding the interpretation of canon 1095 and the use of 
experts.158  We deal first with cases of grave lack of discretion of judgment followed by those 
alleging inability to assume the essential obligations of marriage. 
 
Grave Lack of Discretion of Judgment:  
 
Rotal jurisprudence clarifies that canon 1095, based on the natural law principle that nobody 
is bound to the impossible,159 involves the examination of personal capacity, proportionate to 
the specific contract of marriage.160  But, there is no quantitative measure of capacity.161 
However, the Rota holds that whilst it is not necessary to identify a specific cause in terms of 
diagnosis,162 it is necessary to establish the existence of serious163 psychopathology,164 
158 Mendonça, Anthology.  See Appendix VII for full references, extracts and explanations.  This is the only 
compilation of its kind.  Mendonça examined a large number of Rotal decisions and identified their principal 
points of law.   
159 Case Nos: 77-063, p31-32; and 78-197, p39.  See Appendix VIII. 
160 Case Nos: 71-074, pp1-2; and 76-014, p29.  See Appendix VIII. 
161 Case No: 76-135, p28.  See Appendix VIII. 
162 Case Nos: 71-065, p1; 78-115, p38; and 83-118, p65.  See Appendix VIII. 
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whether permanent or temporary,165 and to demonstrate its effect on the party’s capacity for 
marital consent at the material time.166  Rotal jurisprudence is clear that Vatican II has not 
changed or expanded the notion of ‘essential rights and duties of marriage’.167 
 
Of the annotated cases studied, those found proven on grounds of grave lack of discretion of 
judgment, involved diagnoses of such serious conditions as: psychic immaturity;168 paranoid 
personality;169 neurotic anxiety;170 learning difficulties;171 transient mental disturbance;172 
schizophrenia;173 paranoid schizophrenia;174 schizoid personality;175 hysterical personality;176 
paranoid personality;177 passive-aggressive personality;178 borderline personality;179impulsive 
personality;180 obsessive-compulsive neurosis;181 obsessive-compulsive personality;182 anti-
social personality;183 manic depression (psychosis or neurosis);184 depressive disorders185 
including psychoneurosis,186 neurotic anxiety,187 depressive neurosis188 and reactive 
163 Case Nos: 72-135, p7; 80-053, p50; 76-082, p27; and 78-044, p35.  See Appendix VIII. 
164 Case Nos: 76-070, p26; 76-050, p26; and 76-082, p27.  See Appendix VIII. 
165 Case Nos: 74-043, p18; and 78-013, pp34-35.  See Appendix VIII. 
166 Case No: 76-142, p29.  See Appendix VIII. 
167 Case Nos: 77-052, p31 (conjugal love is not a juridic element) and 77-095, p32 (‘absolute communion of life 
and love’ is not required for validity). In Case No: 81-176, pp99-100, the judge criticised the [Canadian] inferior 
tribunal for interpreting Vatican II’s concept of the marital ‘communion of life and conjugal love’ as an essential 
element of marriage; rather it is a consequence and not a constitutive element of marriage.  He considered it 
‘absurd’ to argue that marriage is null in the absence of love.  See Appendix VIII. 
168 Case Nos: 79-052, p42; and 85-002, p76.  See Appendix VIII. 
169 Case No: 79-053, pp42-43.  See Appendix VIII. 
170 Case No: 79-151, p46.  See Appendix VIII. 
171 Case Nos: 80-214, p54; 83-037, p63; 83-176, pp67-68; and 83-085, p64.  See Appendix VIII. 
172 Case No: 85-016, p77.  See Appendix VIII. 
173 Case Nos: 71-006, p1; 71-067, p1; 71-135, p3; 71-236, p5; 72-018, p5; 72-118, p6; 83-080, p64; 72-207, p8; 
72-246, p9; 73-084, p13; 78-190, p38; 74-082, p18; 75-144, p24; 78-045, p35; 77-110, pp32-33; 79-058, p43; 
79-183, p48; 83-032, pp62-63; 83-122, pp65-66; 83-136, p66; and 84-145, p74.  See Appendix VIII. 
174 Case No: 7099, p2.  See Appendix VIII. 
175 Case Nos: 80-037, p49; 83-040, p63; and 85-005, p76.  See Appendix VIII. 
176 Case Nos: 71-137, p3; 72-148, p7; 73-132, p14; 74-191, p20; 72-226, p8; and 75-148, p25.  See Appendix 
VIII. 
177 Case No: 73-077, p13.  See Appendix VIII. 
178 Case No: 81-122, p58.  See Appendix VIII. 
179 Case No: 79-202, p49.  See Appendix VIII. 
180 Case No: 83-188, p68.  See Appendix VIII. 
181 Case Nos: 71-142, p3; 71-227, p5; 79-145, p46; 83-071, p63; 83-109, p65; 83-146, p66; and 86-020, p80.  
See Appendix VIII. 
182 Case Nos: 72-118, p6; 73-183, p16; 77-038, p30; 77-079, p32; 77-122, p33; 80-178, p53; 83-118, p65; 83-
165, p67; and 84-012, pp68-69.  See Appendix VIII. 
183 Case Nos: 79-062, p4;3 and 75-034, p21.  See Appendix VIII. 
184 Case Nos: 71-121, p3; 73-209, p16; and 84-096, p74.  See Appendix VIII. 
185 Case No: 78-002, pp34.  See Appendix VIII. 
186 Case No: 73-071, p13.  See Appendix VIII. 
187 Case No: 81-052, p56.  See Appendix VIII. 
188 Case Nos: 85-007, p76; 86-005, pp78-79; and 86-008, p79.  See Appendix VIII. 
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depression;189 psychic immaturity,190 including affective immaturity;191 immature personality 
(when the severity of its effect is properly demonstrated by experts);192 alcoholism;193 
homosexuality;194 anorexia nervosa;195 use of substances,196 drug dependence;197 personality 
change following organic brain injury;198 and post-traumatic stress (neurosis).199 
 
However, even when serious conditions were confirmed by experts, the Rota did not always 
reach moral certainty that consent was vitiated,200 either because the anomaly was not proven 
to be sufficiently severe,201 or because antecedence was not proven, and therefore, it could 
not have affected consent at the material time.202  These cases included diagnoses of: 
paranoid personality;203 learning difficulties;204 schizophrenia;205 paranoid schizophrenia;206 
schizophrenic reaction;207 schizoid personality;208 personality disorder;209 hysterical 
personality;210 hysteria;211 paranoid personality;212 passive aggressive personality;213 
dependent personality;214 borderline personality;215 obsessive-compulsive neurosis;216 
obsessive-compulsive personality;217 anti-social personality;218 manic depression;219 
189 Case No: 73-024, p11.  See Appendix VIII. 
190 Case Nos: 85-012, p77; 85-020, p78; 85-021, p78; 86-013, p79; and 86-014, p79.  See Appendix VIII. 
191 Case Nos: 83-156, p61; 84-079, p71; 84-097, p72; and 88-010, pp81-82.  See Appendix VIII. 
192 Case No: 79-010, p40.  See Appendix VIII. 
193 Case Nos: 72-140, p7; 82-012, p59; 82-153, p61; 83-174, p67; and 85-019, p77.  See Appendix VIII. 
194 Case No: 73-025, pp11-12.  See Appendix VIII. 
195 Case No: 82-180, pp61-62.  See Appendix VIII. 
196 In Case No: 72-185, p8, phenobarbital was used.  In Case No: 73-117, p14, Librium and Ecunil were used.  
Case No: 82-135, p60, involved (ab)use of Surmontil, Valium and Librium by a person with personality 
disorder; were used.  See Appendix VIII. 
197 Case No: 84-073, p71.  See Appendix VIII. 
198 Case Nos: 74-016, p17; and 74-030, p17.  See Appendix VIII. 
199 Case No: 86-017, pp79-80.  See Appendix VIII. 
200 Case No: 78-044, p35.  See Appendix VIII. 
201 Case Nos: 76-009, p25; 76-136, p28; and 79-050, p42.  See Appendix VIII. 
202 Case Nos: 76-056, p26; 79-159, p46; and 80-134, p52.  See Appendix VIII. 
203 Case No: 80-153, p52.  See Appendix VIII. 
204 Case Nos: 75-103, p23; and 80-231, p53.  See Appendix VIII. 
205 Case Nos: 72-108, p6; 75-124, p24; 76-066, p27; 77-024, p29; 78-091, p36; and 83-006, p62.  See Appendix 
VIII. 
206 Case No: 76-056, p26.  See Appendix VIII. 
207 Case No: 71-205, p4.  See Appendix VIII. 
208 Case No: 79-159, p46.  See Appendix VIII. 
209 Case Nos: 71-199, p4; 73-214, p16; 80-105, p51; 8093, p57; and 84-104, pp72-73.  See Appendix VIII. 
210 Case Nos: 71-238, p5; 73-031, p12; 77-173, p33; 80-155, p53; 81-015, pp55-56; and 84-119, p73.  See 
Appendix VIII.  
211 Case Nos: 79-091, p44; and 79-122, p45.  See Appendix VIII. 
212 Case Nos: 77-032, p30; and 80-011, p49.  See Appendix VIII. 
213 Case No: 79-104, p44.  See Appendix VIII. 
214 Case Nos: 81-009, p55; 81-040, p56; and 84-003, p68.  See Appendix VIII. 
215 Case No: 84-164, pp74-75.  See Appendix VIII. 
216 Case No: 71-155, p3.  See Appendix VIII. 
217 Case Nos: 74-157, p20; 79-050, p42; 83-168, p67; 83-197, p68; and 84-049, p70.  See Appendix VIII. 
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depressive disorders, such as depressive neurotic personality;220 psychic immaturity,221 
including affective immaturity,222 immature personality,223 and episodic neurotic reaction;224 
bisexualism;225 homosexuality;226 lesbianism;227 psychic impotence;228 old age;229 use of 
prescription drugs;230 organic physical illness giving rise to mental disturbance, such as 
meningitis;231 and physical trauma.232  So, even when serious anomalies, such as 
schizophrenia, manic depression, or personality disorders were diagnosed, the Rota held that 
these conditions admit of degrees of severity; if the severity and effect were not demonstrated 
to have vitiated consent, the validity of the marriage was upheld.  Therefore, these Rotal 
judgments revealed the following:  
 
• Rotal tribunals consulted experts routinely in psychological incapacity cases; 
when a party refused to cooperate with experts, incapacity alleged in that party 
was found not proven;233  
• A plea of incapacity is internally incompatible with: a plea of an intention by a 
positive act of the will to exclude marriage or an essential element or essential 
property of marriage; and a plea of force and fear;234 
• Rotal tribunals were frequently critical of inferior tribunals’ interpretation of 
law,235 and of their lack of canonical procedure.236 
218 Case Nos: 75-101, p23; 79-044, p41; 79-125, p45; 81-054, p56; 83-097, pp64-65; and 85-22, p78.  See 
Appendix VIII. 
219 Case Nos: 73-086, p13; and 84-038, p69.  See Appendix VIII. 
220 Case No: 78-146, p37.  See Appendix VIII. 
221 Case Nos: 77-049, p30; 77-056, p31; 79-025, p41; 81-125, p58; and 86-021, pp80-81.  See Appendix VIII. 
222 Case Nos: 79-191, p48; 80-103, p51; 80-195, p53; 80-227, p54; 82-058, pp59-60; 83-088, p64; 84-070, 
ppp70-71; 84-122, pp73-74; 84-146, p74; 84-166, p75; and 84-182, pp75-76.  See Appendix VIII. 
223 Case No: 83-150, p66.  See Appendix VIII. 
224 Case No: 84-080, pp71-72.  See Appendix VIII. 
225 Case No: 72-157, p8.  See Appendix VIII. 
226 Case Nos: 74-011, p17; and 78-099, p37.  See Appendix VIII. 
227 Case No: 73-008, p11.  See Appendix VIII. 
228 Case No: 84-025, p69.  See Appendix VIII. 
229 Case No: 83-072, pp63-64.  See Appendix VIII. 
230 Case No: 75-040, p21.  See Appendix VIII. 
231 Case Nos: 73-142, p15; 73-150, p15; and 76-050, p26.  See Appendix VIII. 
232 Case No: 83-153, p66.  See Appendix VIII. 
233 Case Nos: 8097, p57; and 72-108, p6.  See Appendix VIII. 
234 See Case Nos: 72-135, p7; 72-248, p9; and 79-095, p44 for incompatibility with a positive intention and Case 
No: 73-161, p15 for incompatibility with force and fear.  The rationale was that one cannot be psychologically 
incapable of marital consent and, at the same time, be capable of either excluding something essential to 
marriage ‘by a positive act of will’ or suffer force and fear.  See Appendix VIII. 
235 Case Nos: 72-277, p10; 75-052, p22; 77-095, p32; 79-009, p40; 79-201, p48; 83-097, pp64-65; and 83-168, 
p67.  See Appendix VIII. 
236 Case Nos: 84-070, pp70-71; and 77-049, p30.  See Appendix VIII. 
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 The routine use of experts in incapacity cases demonstrates that the Rota acknowledges 
judges’ incompetence to pronounce on medical matters.237  ‘Psychiatric and psychological 
principles should be integrated with juridic principles’ when dealing with incapacity cases.238  
Some judgments are explicit in: stating the requirement to consult experts,239 in order to 
establish the severity of the condition,240 and its effect at the material time;241 and describing 
the expert’s role.242  In many cases, more than one expert was consulted.243  When experts 
disagreed, the tribunal found cases not proven.244  Doubt about a diagnosis was sufficient to 
obstruct moral certainty.245  There is no doubt, however, that judges, not experts, made the 
decision about the nullity or otherwise of marriage.246  Moreover, expert opinions did not 
hold sway;247 they were treated with caution,248 and even criticised.249  According to Daniel, 
cases referred to the Rota without having established a grave psychopathological cause, are 
not ratified but are subjected to ordinary examination at the Rota.250  This is not the case, as 
we shall see, in the local tribunals studied in Chapter 6. 
 
237 Case Nos: 83-122, pp65-66; 83-188, p68; and 71-081, p2.  See Appendix VIII. 
238 Case No: 81-111, p58.  See Appendix VIII. 
239 The terminology used included such phrases as: ‘it is necessary’; ‘[advice] must be sought’; ‘the judge must 
seek’; ‘it is important’; ‘it is essential’; in all cases of incapacity.  For example: Case Nos: 71-168, p3; 71-175, 
pp3-4; 73-005, pp10-11; 76-082, p27; 80-200, p53; 81-025, p56; 81-125, p58; and 84-145, p74.  Others were 
explicit in relation to the type of condition with which they were dealing, for example:  Case No: 80-134, p52, 
(neurotic personality or actual neurosis); 76-135, p28, (schizophrenia); 80-086, p50, (traumatic neurosis); 78-
061, p36, (serious illness); 80-93, p57 and 83-040, p63, (personality disorder); 77-173, p33, (hysterical 
personality); 84-096, p74, (manic depressive illness); 81-125, p58, (serious or mental psychopathic disorders); 
80-103, p51, (psychological or psychiatric disorders); 73-142, p15, (mental disturbances); 73-150, p15, (alleged 
organic disorder of personality, caused by meningitis); 86-017, pp79-80, (the psychological effect of pre-marital 
pregnancy); 73-065, p12, 76-135, p28 and 73-208, p16, (schizophrenia); 80-237, p54, (psychopathic 
[personality] disorders); 80-93, p57, (personality disorder); 83-040, p63, (schizoid personality); and  84-096, 
p74, (mental illness).  See Appendix VIII. 
240 Case Nos: 73-030, p12; 76-135, p28; and 84-145, p74.  See Appendix VIII. 
241 Case Nos: 81-129, p58; and 82-152, pp60-61.  See Appendix VIII. 
242 Case No: 84-043, p70.  See Appendix VIII. 
243 Two experts were consulted in: Case Nos: 78-184, p38; 75-103, p23; and 75-124, p24.  Three experts were 
consulted in: Case No: 78-194, p39.  Four experts were consulted in: Case Nos: 83-136, p66; and 72-062, p6.  
Six experts were consulted in: Case No: 86-008, p79.  See Appendix VIII.  
244 Case Nos: 75-117, p24; 77-173, p33; 78-146, p37; 79-091, p44; 81-054, p56; 81-125, p58; and 82-169, p61.  
See Appendix VIII. 
245 Case No: 83-197, p68.  See Appendix VIII. 
246 Case Nos: 86-011, p81; 82-169, p61; and 84-043, p70.  See Appendix VIII. 
247 Case Nos: 72-018, p5; 72-062, p6; 73-008, p11; 73-214, p16; 75-040, p21; 75-101, p23; 75-124, p24; 77-
056, p31; 79-104, p44; 81-025, p56; 83-072, pp63-64; 83-150, p66; 84-049, p70; 84-070, pp70-71; and  84-104, 
pp72-73.  See Appendix VIII. 
248 Case No: 77-088, p32.  See Appendix VIII. 
249 Case No: 80-089, p51.  See Appendix VIII. 
250 William L Daniel, ‘Motives in Decernendo for Admitting a Cause of Marriage Nullity to an Ordinary 
Examination’, Studia Canonica, 45 (2011), pp67-120, page 74.  See Appendix IX. 
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Although not universally held, some Rotal judges go so far as to hold that the invalidating 
condition must be such that the appointment of a procurator for a person, suffering from 
grave lack of discretion of judgment, goes to validity of the decision.251  However, Rotal 
judge Pinto distinguishes juridic capacity to stand in court and capacity to elicit matrimonial 
consent.252   
 
It appears, therefore, that Rotal jurisprudence heeds the warning in the 1988 Papal Allocution 
that ‘it is important that the categories that belong to psychiatry or psychology are not 
automatically transferred to the field of canon law without making the necessary adjustments 
which take account of the specific competence of each science’.253  This is not obvious in 
many of the cases in Southwark and Dublin, even those in which experts were consulted.  
 
Inability to Assume the Essential Obligations of Marriage: 
 
Rotal jurisprudence also confirms the natural law basis for this ground of incapacity.254  The 
cause must be serious255 psychopathology;256 not light character flaws.257  There is consensus 
that the condition must be antecedent,258 but there is some dissonance as to whether or not it 
must be perpetual;259 however, a party needs to be able to assume the perpetuity of rights.260 
 
Cases found proven involved diagnoses of: schizophrenia;261 antisocial personality;262 
affective immaturity;263 affective immaturity/passive dependent personality;264 obsessive-
compulsive neurosis;265 obsessive-compulsive personality;266 borderline personality;267 
251 Case Nos: 72-247, p9; and 72-263, p10.  See Appendix VIII. 
252 Case No: 77-058, p31. The judgment would be null if, prior to or during the process, experts had declared a 
party incapable of standing in court; otherwise the validity of the decision must be upheld.  See Appendix VIII. 
253 John Paul II, Allocution to the Roman Rota (1988).  See Appendix VII.  
254 Case Nos: 72-008, p86; 74-001, p88; 80-111, p97; 85-044, p107; and 86-012, p108.  See Appendix VIII. 
255 Case No: 71-160, p86.  See Appendix VIII. 
256 Case No: 84-100, p106.  See Appendix VIII. 
257 Case Nos: 78-169, p94; 80-111, p97; and 81-065, p98.  See Appendix VIII. 
258 Case Nos: 74-001, p88; 80-069, p97; 80-061, pp96-97; 83-128, p103; and 84-100, p106.  See Appendix VIII. 
259 Case Nos: 76-017, p90; 79-109, p95; 82-023, p100; 82-168, pp101-102; and 85-017, pp107-108.  See 
Appendix VIII. 
260 Case No: 81-058, p98.  See Appendix VIII. 
261 Case No: 85-044, p107.  See Appendix VIII. 
262 Case Nos: 83-177, pp104-105; and 84-130, p106.  See Appendix VIII. 
263 Case Nos: 76-092, p91; and 77-002, pp91-92.  See Appendix VIII. 
264 Case No: 76-017, p90.  See Appendix VIII. 
265 Case Nos: 83-071, p90; and 83-109, p103.  See Appendix VIII. 
266 Case No: 80-117, p97.  See Appendix VIII. 
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hyper-sexuality;268 sexual neurosis;269 homosexuality;270 and anorexia nervosa.271  Diagnosis, 
by experts, was not sufficient to prove nullity; the severity and effect of the condition at the 
material time had to be demonstrated.272   
 
Cases found not proven involved diagnoses of conditions such as: psychopathic 
personality;273 schizoid personality;274 hysterical/paranoid personality;275 
hysterical/obsessive-compulsive/paranoid personality;276 psychoneurosis;277 antisocial 
personality;278 affective immaturity;279 psychic immaturity;280 obsessive/compulsive 
neurosis;281 obsessive-compulsive personality/passive-aggressive personality;282 depressive 
neurosis;283 manic-depressive psychosis;284 manic-depressive neurosis;285 relative 
incapacity;286 nymphomania;287 satyriasis;288 hyper-sexuality;289 frigidity;290 
homosexuality;291 bisexuality;292 trans-sexuality;293 impotence;294 incest-related 
psychological problems;295 alcoholism;296 and sterility.297 
 
267 Case No: 88-007, p109.  See Appendix VIII. 
268 Case Nos: 72-008, p86; 72-300, p87; 75-037, p89; and 85-017, p107-108.  See Appendix VIII. 
269 Case Nos: 79-171, p95; and 81-058, p98.  See Appendix VIII. 
270 Case Nos: 73-025, p87; 78-094, p93; 83-044, p103; and 83-130, pp103-104.  See Appendix VIII. 
271 Case No: 82-180, p102.  See Appendix VIII. 
272 Case No: 86-011, p108.  See Appendix VIII. 
273 Case No: 71-058, p86.  See Appendix VIII. 
274 Case No: 74-075, p88.  See Appendix VIII. 
275 Case No: 75-050, p89.  See Appendix VIII. 
276 Case No: 82-023, p100.  See Appendix VIII. 
277 Case No: 82-181, p102.  See Appendix VIII. 
278 Case Nos: 79-109, p95; 82-030, pp100-101; and 82-064, p101.  See Appendix VIII. 
279 Case No: 81-065, p98.  See Appendix VIII. 
280 Case Nos: 77-149, p92; and 84-091, pp105-106.  See Appendix VIII. 
281 Case Nos: 78-014, pp92-93; and 78-038, p93.  See Appendix VIII. 
282 Case No: 84-150, pp106-107.  See Appendix VIII. 
283 Case No: 78-136, pp93-94.  See Appendix VIII.  
284 Case No: 76-125, p91.  See Appendix VIII. 
285 Case No: 88-007, p109.  See Appendix VIII. 
286 Case Nos: 78-169, p94; 79-046, pp94-95; 80-039, p96; and 81-100, p98.  See Appendix VIII. 
287 Case No: 88-011, pp109-110.  See Appendix VIII. 
288 Case Nos: 72-222, pp86-87; and 75-112, p90.  See Appendix VIII. 
289 Case No: 74-001, p88.  See Appendix VIII. 
290 Case Nos: 77-116, p92; and 81-127, p99.  See Appendix VIII. 
291 Case Nos: 78-099, p93; 79-175, p96; 80-22, p96; 83-179, p105; and 86-001, p108.  See Appendix VIII. 
292 Case No: 82-043, p101.  See Appendix VIII. 
293 Case No: 75-049, p89.  See Appendix VIII. 
294 Case Nos: 75-017, p88; and 84-025, p105.  See Appendix VIII. 
295 Case No: 80-061, pp96-97.  See Appendix VIII. 
296 Case Nos: 83-128, p103; 83-174, p104; and 86-012, p108.  See Appendix VIII. 
297 Case No: 73-187, pp87-88.  See Appendix VIII. 
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Here too, some inferior tribunals were criticised for their procedural errors, including finding 
for nullity when a respondent was unavailable for assessment,298 and for their interpretation 
of law.299  In some cases the absence of an expert report convinced the Rota to decide that the 
case was not-proven, indicating their acknowledged incompetence in medical matters.300  In 
the annotated cases studied, there was no information on the use of the vetitum by the Rota.   
 
So, it seems clear that the Rota is upset by, and critical of, interpretations and decision of 
some local courts.  Many of the types of defects criticised by the Rota, however, were found 
in the Southwark and Dublin cases.  
 
Conclusion 
 
There is a stark contrast between Rotal practice and that of the local tribunals studied here at 
Southwark and Dublin.  Rotal judgments demonstrate a stricter interpretation and a more 
rigorous application of the law on experts than do these local tribunals.  There is a clear 
consensus among Rotal judges that in order to prove psychological incapacity, expert opinion 
is required to establish the existence of serious psychiatric illness or psychological 
impairment and its severity, and to demonstrate its effect on the parties’ capacity for marital 
consent at the material time of the marriage.  Whilst the Dublin tribunal adhered more 
rigorously to the requirement to consult an expert, than did the Southwark tribunals, the 
Dublin expert failed frequently to focus on the effect of a condition on the party’s capacity at 
the material time.  That Rotal judges’ focus on incapacity for, rather than failure to exercise, 
discretion of judgment, is demonstrated by a critical analysis of expert reports; unless reports 
demonstrate the severity and effect of the condition at the material time, to the satisfaction of 
the Rota, the validity of the marriage is upheld.  The judgments of Southwark and Dublin  
tribunals rarely reflect the same rigour - although these tribunals are required by the Papal 
Allocutions to follow Rotal jurisprudence exclusively. 
  
 
 
298 Case No: 80-97, p57.  See Appendix VIII. 
299 Case Nos: 75-050, p89; 78-169, p94; 79-046, pp94-95; 81-176, pp99-100; 82-023, p100; 82-030, pp100-101; 
82-172, p102; 83-140, p104; 84-025, p105; 84-056, p105; and 84-150, pp106-107.  See Appendix VIII. 
300 Case Nos: 75-112, p90; 80-111, p97; and 88-011, pp109-110.  See Appendix VIII. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
THE NON-USE OF EXPERTS IN PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY 
FOR MARRIAGE: CASE STUDIES 
 
As seen in Chapters 4 and 5, CIC canon 1680 mandates the use of experts in cases involving 
psychological incapacity for marriage, ‘unless from the circumstances this would obviously 
serve no purpose’.  Moreover, Papal Allocutions have clarified that: canon law, of which 
procedural law is a component, is inherently pastoral, and must be followed; procedural law 
provides for a fair trial, which is a right of the faithful; and tribunals must be ‘on guard 
against the temptation to exploit the proofs and procedural norms in order to achieve what is 
perhaps a “practical” goal, which might be considered “pastoral,” but is to the detriment of 
truth and justice’.  The 1988 Papal Allocution clarified that ‘only the most severe forms of 
psychopathology’ cause psychological incapacity to exercise the natural right to marry; also, 
‘a method that is scientifically sure’ must be employed to identify ‘the more serious forms’ of 
psychopathology and to distinguish them from ‘the slight’.  Furthermore, denial of the right 
of defence renders judicial decisions null. 
 
This Chapter identifies cases, appealed to ITSIS in 2009, in which, although psychological 
incapacity was alleged, no expert was consulted at First Instance.1  Whilst the intention is not 
to suggest that the substantive decisions reached on nullity are incorrect, an analysis of these 
cases aims to establish: the judges’ rationale for not seeking expert opinion; how tribunals 
assessed the psychological status of the parties at the material time; and whether the tribunals 
identified a ‘grave’ and antecedent ‘anomaly’ or rather (contrary to law) used as determinants 
allegations of character traits, ‘immaturity’, or aberrant behaviour, without examining their 
causes.   This will be done by exploring: the issues pertinent to the use of experts; procedural 
matters; the law sections of judgments; and the application of the law to the facts of the case. 
 
 
 
 
1 The few Dublin cases in which experts were not consulted have been dealt with in Chapter 5 because they 
demonstrated that sufficient evidence was already in the possession of the tribunal; hence there was clear 
justification for invoking the exception provided in CIC, c. 1680.  
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1. THE ISSUES FOR EXPERTS 
 
In the Southwark tribunal cases studied for 2009, there were eighty-nine pleas of incapacity 
under canon 1095, 2º and twelve such pleas under canon 1095, 3°, in which no expert was 
consulted.  No reasons were given in any of these judgments for not consulting experts, 
despite in some cases, allegations of psychiatric history, psychological impairment, or 
aberrant behaviour, and despite the absence of any documentation supporting a cause which 
would justify non-use of experts (on the basis of the exception in CIC canon 1680).2  It was, 
therefore, impossible either to establish the judges’ rationale for their failure to consult 
experts or to ascertain how these cases were deemed to fall under the canon 1680 exception.  
Moreover, the judges made no reference to the specific questions required under DC to be put 
to the expert - so these remained unanswered.  The judges neither explained how the fact of 
the parties’ psychological status, at the material time, was established (as required by CIC 
canon 1574), nor their competence without the help of experts to establish this fact.  
Therefore, one can only conclude that the tribunals did not acknowledge these mandatory 
requirements in psychological incapacity cases.  Thus, the provisions of CIC 1983 and DC 
governing the appointment and instruction of experts were not met in these cases. 
 
Furthermore, not only did the tribunals in these cases pursue grounds of incapacity where 
there was no obvious psychological cause, but they were inconsistent both in their pursuit and 
application of the grounds.   For example, when incapacity was alleged in a plaintiff, it was 
not always pursued in the respondent, despite similar pre-marital circumstances, on which the 
case relied, prevailing for both parties.3  Moreover, when post-marital behaviour not 
conducive to marital harmony was considered sufficient to prove incapacity in some cases,4 it 
was not in others.5  This inconsistency was evident even in some cases when psychiatric 
illness,6 or drug abuse,7 or both,8 was alleged in respect of respondents.  Reluctance to pursue 
grounds in respondents would be understandable if it were due either to the tribunals’ 
2 In 09/8; 09/44; 09/65; 09/76; 09/78; 09/80; various psychiatric illnesses were alleged.  
3 For example: 09/7: Both parties attended school in the UK while their families lived abroad; incapacity was 
alleged only in the plaintiff, due to ‘lack of confidence’ and ‘immaturity’.   
4 E.g., 09/11.  In 09/16, despite insubstantial corroboratory evidence, judges relied on alleged behaviour to find 
that a respondent ‘was not able to take on the responsibilities of marriage’.  
5 1-0/57; 09/69; and 09/85: Plaintiffs alleged addiction or illegal behaviour in respondents, but no grounds were 
pursued in these respondents.  
6  09/38; 09/49; and 09/90.   
7 09/19; and 09/50. 
8 09/15. 
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inability to trace respondents, or to respondents’ refusal to undergo psychological testing.  
However, it was evident that tribunals frequently pursued incapacity grounds in plaintiffs, 
cooperative respondents, and even some absent respondents, without any expert evidence; 
consequently, this possible explanation does not hold.  Rather, instead of consulting experts 
to establish the existence of a grave cause, and its severity and effect on the party’s capacity 
for marital consent, the argument is strengthened that many tribunals rely only on evidence of 
behaviour which is deemed by the judges not to be conducive to marital harmony. 
 
2. PROCEDURAL MATTERS 
It should be obvious from the Acts that due process was followed; whether or not due to 
failure to record significant procedures, this study revealed several procedural errors.  First, 
interestingly, some judges pursued the ground of incapacity regardless of a plaintiff’s belief 
in capacity.  This was contrary to the law which provides that: marriage is a spiritual matter 
(therefore, an allegation of its nullity is a serious matter of conscience); only the parties can 
allege nullity of their marriage (the judges cannot do so);9 and the onus of proof lies with the 
plaintiff.10  Cases in which parties believed in their own capacity and/or that of their spouse 
were, nevertheless, accepted and pursued as incapacity cases,11 despite evidence supporting 
other grounds.12   Therefore, judges appear to have been instrumental in deciding the grounds 
to be pursued.  However, it remained unclear as to whether or not many plaintiffs, on whom 
the onus of proof lies, understood the nature of canonical psychological incapacity; it was 
sometimes unclear as to whether or not they were even aware that psychological incapacity 
had been alleged.13  Even when a plaintiff’s testimony seems to have strongly supported her 
9 CIC, c. 1674.  See Appendix 1.  See Paulo Moneta, ‘Determination of the Formulation of the Doubt and 
Conformity of the Sentence’, in Dugan, pp93-113, at p97, for a warning that a judge ‘may not supersede’ 
parties’ wishes, in determining grounds ‘even if he were convinced he could better meet their interests’.    
10 CIC, c. 1526§1.   See Appendix 1. 
11 For example, the parties in whom grave lack of discretion of judgment was alleged believed in their own 
capacity in 09/17; 09/20; 09/33; and 09/56.  The plaintiffs believed both parties were capable in 09/19; 09/28; 
09/35; 09/43; 09/62; 09/82; 09/86; and 09/94.  
12 For example: In 09/49, evidence supports the plaintiff’s intention against the good of children, but the ground 
of her grave lack of discretion of judgment was pursued, albeit found not proven.  In 09/78: The plaintiff wife 
alleged that the respondent deceived her, but this ground was not pursued; rather her grave lack of discretion of 
judgment and the respondent’s inability to assume the essential obligations of marriage were tested. 
13 For example, in 09/31: The plaintiff husband believed that the marriage, which lasted seventeen years and 
produced four children, was happy initially; the original ground alleged was error about the quality of a person 
(canon 1097§2).   The judge, deeming the original ground to have been based on alleged ‘sexual difficulties’, 
decreed that the case should be heard on the grounds of the plaintiff’s grave lack of discretion of judgment.   
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capacity, the tribunal held that she gravely lacked discretion of judgment.14  Therefore, the 
basis in this case for the allegation of incapacity was unclear, as was the plaintiff’s 
understanding of the ground and what she was required to prove.  Although no serious 
psychopathology was identified, the tribunal concluded that her decision to marry was not 
based on mature reflection; therefore, she lacked a mature approach to marriage.  The judges, 
as such, equated lack of ‘mature’ reflection, without reference to its cause, with lack of 
capacity for marriage.  In other words, the judges equated failure with incapacity and focused 
on behaviour rather than establishing that the cause of the behaviour was psychopathological 
and it resulted in inherent incapacity.     
 
Second, in some cases, there was no valid plea.15  A plaintiff husband, after eleven years of 
marriage, alleged that the marriage was happy for five years, but the respondent stopped 
loving him and was unfaithful; these are not grounds for nullity.  The plaintiff admitted: 
knowing the nature of marriage; having honourable intentions; considering both parties 
capable of marriage; and being happy for five years.  He now doubted the respondent’s 
intentions.16  Nevertheless, the tribunal accepted the ground of the plaintiff husband’s grave 
lack of discretion of judgment.  Despite a three-year courtship, scant evidence from the 
plaintiff, and absence of reliable witness evidence, judges failed to explore the interpersonal 
relationship.  They found for the plaintiff’s incapacity on the basis of: his own account that 
the couple did not know each other well; the parties were only twenty-three and twenty-one 
years old respectively; and the respondent’s father thought she was not ready for marriage 
until she was at least twenty-one.  Consequently, the judges held that the parties were 
immature.  The judges’ finding that the plaintiff ‘misjudged marriage’ with the respondent, 
implied that a mistake suffices to cause nullity.  The Appeal Tribunal submitted the case to 
ordinary process.17  Despite citing: the 1987 Papal Allocution;18 Rotal jurisprudence, 
14 09/11: A plaintiff wife believed in her capacity.  Judges accepted that she assessed her prospective spouse 
accurately.  She: declined the respondent’s first proposal, implying capacity to assess the prevailing 
circumstances and to make a judgment on the basis of her findings; admitted discussing the future, implying 
capacity to plan ahead; admitted cohabitation without problems, implying capacity for an intimate interpersonal 
relationship with the respondent; acknowledged lack of pressure to marry, implying freedom; and declared her 
intention to honour fidelity, permanence and openness to children, implying correct knowledge and intention.   
15 CIC, cc. 1501; 1504; and 1620.  See Appendix 1.  DC, Articles 114; 115§1; 116§1; and 122.  See Appendix 
V.  Also William L Daniel, ‘The Rejection of a Libellus Due to Lack of Any Foundation Whatsoever (CIC, c. 
1505§2, 4º’, Studia Canonica, 43 (2009), pp361-387.  See also Chapter 5, fts 15 and 17. 
16 09/28.  CIC, c. 1101§2 is the relevant canon for an intention, by a positive act of will to exclude marriage or 
an essential element or an essential property of marriage.  See Appendix 1.  The respondent’s intention against 
the good of children was heard but found not-proven; the tribunal failed to locate her. 
17 This occurs when the First Instance decision cannot be ratified by the abbreviated process. 
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requiring absence of psychological freedom,19 and acknowledging the difficulty in proving 
incapacity after many years of marriage;20 and authors acknowledging that DC requires the 
use of experts to establish the severity and effect of an existing a grave anomaly;21 the Appeal 
Tribunal, nevertheless, focused (incorrectly) on behaviour as a determinant of incapacity.22  
The judges confirmed the First Instance judgment, neither seeking expert opinion nor 
explaining the methodology used to assess the plaintiff’s level of maturity or capacity at the 
material time.  No psychological cause was established; therefore its severity and effect on 
the plaintiff’s capacity could not be demonstrated.  The basis for these affirmative decisions, 
therefore, was unclear.  Although found not proven, another case alleging the absent 
respondent husband’s inability to assume the essential obligations of marriage was pursued, 
despite no indication of psychological impairment.23  The plaintiff wife merely alleged that 
the respondent, after four years of happy marriage, ‘deliberately chose to live a lifestyle’ 
which ‘in no way reflected the values, aims and beliefs he had previously committed to 
sharing’ - such an allegation neither constitutes a valid ground for nullity, nor supports 
incapacity.  Interestingly, in this case, the tribunal held that in the absence of a ‘proper 
psychological assessment’ of the respondent there was insufficient evidence to reach moral 
certainty of his incapacity.24  However, the tribunal found for nullity on the ground of the 
plaintiff’s error about a quality in the respondent, which was not even identified.  In another 
case, although the respondent husband’s inability to assume the essential obligations of 
marriage was not alleged, the tribunal appeared to address this ground, rather than his alleged 
18 The tribunal acknowledged that ‘only a “serious psychic anomaly” (a serious mental disorder or disturbance) 
can be the cause of an incapacity’ and that ‘this is not the same as the unconscious forces in the human psyche, 
accepted by modern Christian psychology’, citing Rulla, Antropologia della vocatione Cristiana, (Edizioni P di 
Pietro Marietti, 1985), p56.  
19 The judgment cited Rotal decision coram Burke, 5 November 1992.  The Appeal Tribunal acknowledged that 
‘the pathological lesion of the will ... must be so grave that the natural capacity of self-determination, in which 
lies the essence of freedom, has been lost ... it must be shown that freedom was not just affected, but really taken 
away’.   
20 The judgment cited Rotal decision coram Pompedda, 16 December, 1985 RRD, Vol 77, p586, holding that if 
there was no history of ‘treatment from doctors or experts in psychiatry or psychology, it seems almost 
impossible to conclude with certainty to a psychic anomaly or character disorder at the time of consent’. 
21 The Appeal Tribunal cited K Lüdickem & R Jenkins, Dignitas Connubii Norms and Commentary (Canon Law 
Society of America, 2006), p346.  Expert assistance was required to establish whether specific behaviour was 
due to the presence of a psychic condition, but was not required when ‘the proofs are so overwhelming that an 
expert report would serve no purpose, or when previous expert reports are available that can be used in the trial’.  
22 The judgment stated: ‘One of the best indicators of a person’s incapacity ... is the abnormality of his 
behaviour vis-à-vis his decision-making capacity in life in general’. 
23 09/77. 
24 The judges also acknowledged that the tribunal required not only signs ‘that a true communion of life did not 
happen, but that it could not happen, given the make-up’ of the person. 
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grave lack of discretion of judgment, which was found proven (albeit on the basis of post-
marital events).25 
 
Third, whilst canon law makes provision for cases to proceed to judgment, when a genuine 
search for a respondent’s whereabouts has proved unsuccessful, or when respondents refuse 
to participate, proceeding without legitimate citation invalidates the process.26  Contrary to 
the provisions of DC, efforts to find respondents, or proof of citation, were not always 
recorded, so it was impossible to demonstrate whether or not many respondents ever received 
their citations.27  This is particularly pertinent when incapacity is found proven in an absent 
respondent,28 and when confidential information is subsequently sent to addresses from 
which no response has been received.29  Denial of the right of defence goes to validity of a 
decision; it is imperative, then, that the respondent’s legitimate citation be demonstrated.  The 
method of citing respondents was inconsistent across the tribunals studied.   
 
25 09/82: The judgment stated: ‘It is clear that the respondent simply could not cope with the birth of his son.  
Whether this was because he had really wanted a girl, or because he felt he was not receiving enough attention, 
or he could not manage the responsibility involved, we do not know, but we do know that his reaction came 
soon after the birth, and showed an escalating inability to cope with the situation. ... [O]nce the child was born 
he either had to change his priorities and put the child first, or go; he appears to have chosen the latter’.  How 
this affected his decision-making faculties at the time of marriage was unclear. 
26 CIC, cc. 1508; and 1509§2.  See Appendix 1.  DC, Articles 130§2; 132§1; and 138§1.  See Appendix V. 
27 In many cases, although copies of the citation letters were not included in the Acts, nor was the method of 
citation recorded, decrees of absence merely stated that no response had been received from the respondent 
(09/16; and 09/45).  Sometimes respondents were not located; these letters were returned to the tribunal (09/4; 
09/28; and 09/60).  On other occasions two letters were sent to the same address, supplied by the plaintiff 
(09/21; 09/22; 09/50; 09/55; 09/56; 09/65; and 09/66).  Sometimes many years had elapsed since the plaintiff 
had contact with the respondent (09/28: eighteen years; 09/43: twenty-five years).  A plaintiff’s declaration 
(albeit sometimes under oath) that the respondent’s domicile was unknown appeared to suffice to decree the 
respondent absent (09/43; 09/44; 09/85; and 09/94); some of these decrees merely stated that following 
‘diligent’ searches  the respondent could not be found, but there was no evidence of any search having been 
made (e.g. 09/43; 09/44; and 09/94).  Moreover, in 09/44, a memorandum stated: ‘The original diligent enquiry 
required by Art 132§1 did not produce details of the respondent’s domicile’, but the only evidence of a search 
was the plaintiff’s statement that he made a Google search.  Other judgments merely stated that respondents 
were ‘cited according to the norms of the Law and practice of this tribunal … and when no reply had been 
received  … he was declared absent by the Presiding Judge according to the norms of Dignitas Connubii Article 
138§1’.   But, this Article applies to a party legitimately cited.  There was no evidence of a second citation, 
required by DC, Article 138§3 (09/57; and 09/62).  In other instances a respondent’s response declining to 
participate did not form part of the Acts, but was interpreted in the judgment as not wishing to have any further 
communication from the tribunal (09/20); consequently, DC, Articles 134§3 and 258§3 were invoked.  In 
contrast in 09/5, the plaintiff placed a notice in a local paper in an attempt to locate the respondent but to no 
avail. 
28 For example in 09/44, the respondent wife was not located.  In 09/76, the respondent declined to participate in 
the process; but on the basis of the plaintiff wife’s testimony of his behaviour and her suspicion of his 
depression, the tribunal, acknowledging that the evidence was sometimes ‘bizarre’ found for his incapacity 
because he was ‘seriously unsound mentally’. 
29 As occurred, for example, in 09/28: The parties had no mutual contact for eighteen years. 
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Two tribunals offer three options, but these options differ between these two tribunals.  One 
offers three possibilities to respondents: (a) to give evidence; (b) only to be kept informed of 
the process; and (c) to have no further contact from the tribunal.  Option (b) affords the 
respondent the possibility of exercising rights at a later stage of the trial.  The second tribunal 
offers the following possibilities: (a) to give evidence; (b) only to be informed of the 
outcome; and (c) to waive the exercise of rights.  Option (b) does not afford the respondent 
the possibility of being involved during the process of the case.  Moreover, when the 
respondent chose option (b), this tribunal’s decree of absence stated that the respondent has 
waived the exercise of rights, which is, in fact, option (c).30  The tribunal’s own 
understanding of the difference between options (b) and (c), is, therefore, questionable. 
 
A third tribunal, sometimes (but not always), offers four options to the respondent: (a) ‘I am 
willing to give evidence’; (b) ‘I do not wish to help with your enquiry’; (c) ‘I wish to be 
informed of the outcome of the case’; and (d) ‘I do not wish to receive any further contact 
from the tribunal’.  However, when a respondent chose option (c), the tribunal interpreted it 
as reason to invoke DC Article 258§3, which applies to someone choosing option (d).31  No 
tribunal offered the parties the option of entrusting themselves to the justice of the court, 
provided in DC.32  Even when respondents were cited it was sometimes unclear whether or 
not they had been informed of alleged grounds,33 which goes to their right of defence, even if 
they decline to participate.34  Furthermore, it was unclear whether or not they had been given 
the opportunity to: object to grounds; name witnesses or object to those named by the other 
party; appoint an advocate; or challenge the decision.35  There was no evidence of any 
encouragement given to a respondent who declined to give testimony.36  Advocates or 
30 09/33; 09/35; and 09/90. 
31 09/19.  DC, Article 258§3.   See Appendix V.  This article applies if a party has declared that he does not 
want any notice at all about the cause; he is thus considered to have renounced his right to obtain a copy of the 
sentence. 
32 DC, Article 134§§2 and 3.  See Appendix V. 
33 09/8; 09/76; and 09/78.  In 09/28, on the same day as the decree of absence was issued, a letter was sent to the 
respondent wife informing her of the alleged grounds.  This was returned as she was unknown at that address; 
there was no record of further efforts to locate her.  In 09/34, the respondent asked for the petition, which 
implies that it was not attached to the letter of citation as prescribed in DC, Article 127§3.       
34 John Paul II, Allocution to the Roman Rota (1989).   See Appendix VII. 
35 DC, Articles 101§1; 135§4; 139§2; 199; and 200.  See Appendix V. 
36 DC, Article 138§2.  See Appendix V.  See also John Paul II, Allocution to the Roman Rota (1989) in which he 
obliges judges ‘to offer the respondent all opportune information … and to seek patiently the party’s full 
cooperation in the process, also for the sake of avoiding a partial judgment in a matter of such gravity’.  See 
Appendix VII. 
267 
 
                                                            
procurators were rarely appointed, but there was no consistency of practice.37  Moreover, in 
one case, even when it was unclear whether a respondent husband was informed of the 
ground of inability to assume the essential obligations of marriage alleged against him, his 
lack of objection to the petition was interpreted as evidence that he ‘carefully considered the 
matter and feels he has nothing to add to the plaintiff’s petition’ and ‘[it is his] sincerely held 
belief that the petition should succeed’.38  No expert opinion was sought in this case, but on 
the basis of the plaintiff wife’s evidence that she suspected he was ‘suppressing his true 
sexuality’ and her character references the tribunal concluded that: she ‘presented the 
[psychological] causes in a good way’.  Despite the marriage having taken place twenty-one 
years previously and lasting five years, the tribunal concluded that the causes were: ‘rooted in 
[the respondent’s] personality’; ‘of a serious nature’; and were present at the time of 
marriage.   
 
Fourth, failure to publish evidence to the parties invalidates the procedural Acts.39  However, 
one tribunal’s decree of publication states: ‘all parties who have a right and who have 
expressed a desire to do so, should be given access [to the evidence]’.40  This not only 
ignores the tribunal’s obligation to publish the Acts, but shifts responsibility onto the parties 
to ask for access to the Acts.  Moreover, the Acts did not always demonstrate that: parties 
were given access to the observations of the defender of the bond; the decision was 
legitimately published (particularly to the respondent), which is required for it to be effective; 
 or parties were informed of the ways in which the decision could be challenged.41  Whilst 
proper procedure might have been followed, this was not evident from the Acts; thus, it was 
impossible to be certain that parties’ rights were protected sufficiently to verify legitimacy of 
the decisions.42 
37 In 09/15, a procurator, appointed for the respondent and in the absence of any expert opinion, argued, on the 
basis of the plaintiff’s evidence, that the respondent ‘would have had mental difficulties in contributing to the 
facts’, implying support for the plaintiff’s plea, rather than protection of the respondent’s interests.  09/56: An 
advocate was appointed after the publication of the acts, without explanation.  09/87: An advocate was 
appointed for the plaintiff, but not for the absent respondent.   
38 09/78. 
39 CIC, c. 1598§.  See Appendix I. DC, Article 229.  See Appendix V.  See also Chapter 4, ft 106.  In 09/43, the 
decree of publication recorded that DC, Article 134§3 applied to the respondent.  But, this Article applies to 
respondents whose mailing address is known, not to respondents whose whereabouts are unknown, as was the 
case in this instance. 
40 E.g., 09/30; and 09/48.  Emphases added. 
41 CIC, c. 1615.  See Appendix I.  DC, Articles 242§1; 257§§1 and 2.  See Appendix V.  See also Chapter 4, ft 
107. 
42 For example, in 09/57, the decree of formulation of the doubt claims that the ‘parties’ have been notified of 
their right of appeal according to Dignitas Connubii, Article 135§4 (but there was no further evidence of this).  
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 Fifth, the practice, evident in the cases studied in Chapter 5 (when experts were consulted), of 
judging independent grounds of nullity together, was also seen in these cases processed 
without expert evidence.  Consequently, it was impossible to follow the argument in relation 
to each individual ground.  This practice is, as we have seen, inconsistent with Rotal 
jurisprudence.  In some cases, even grounds considered by Rotal jurisprudence to be 
internally incompatible, were considered together, and found proven.43  In other cases, a 
ground in one party and a different ground in the other party were considered together.44 
 
It appears, therefore, that grounds of incapacity are used inappropriately by local tribunals, at 
least in many cases - and dialogue between the tribunals and the parties is insufficient to 
ensure that the parties are fully informed of: their rights; the processes involved; and the 
meaning of the alleged grounds.45  
 
3. AN EXAMINATION OF THE LAW SECTIONS OF JUDGMENTS 
What follows examines the law sections of these judgments to establish: whether or not the 
judges relied on Rotal jurisprudence; the judges’ understanding and application of the key 
canonical terms relevant to psychological incapacity, namely, ‘grave lack of discretion of 
judgment’, ‘inability to assume essential obligations’, and ‘the essential rights and obligations 
of marriage’; and whether or not the judges made any reference (and if so in what way) to the 
mandatory requirement to consult experts in incapacity cases. 
 
Rotal Jurisprudence:  Whilst law sections sometimes quoted the texts of canons,46 doctrinal 
documents,47 and publications,48 they did not always refer to Rotal jurisprudence.49  When 
The decree of publication claims to have notified ‘both parties and their advocates’, but no advocate was 
appointed.  The sentence was published on the same day as the appeal was lodged before Second Instance, 
which deprived the parties of the exercise of their right, under DC, Articles 279§1 and 281§1, to lodge an appeal 
before the First Instance judge within fifteen days. 
43 See Chapter 5, ft 234 and Case Nos: 72-135, p7; 72-248, p9; and 79-095, p44 in Appendix VIII.  In 09/42, the 
grounds of grave lack of discretion of judgment and an intention against the good of children were alleged in 
both parties; both grounds, considered together, were found proven in respect of the plaintiff, but were found not 
proven in respect of the respondent. 
44 In 09/33, one party’s grave lack of discretion of judgment and the other party’s intention against marriage are 
dealt with together.  
45 See Robitaille, ‘Through the Lens of DC’, p157. 
46 For example, mainly CIC, cc. 1095; 1055; 1056; 1057; and 1096. 
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the law sections did cite Rotal decisions, they did not always: give full references for those 
decisions; report the outcomes of those decisions; or explain their relevance to the case under 
consideration.  For example, in one case the judges considered grave lack of discretion of 
judgment and inability to assume the essential obligations of marriage in an absent 
respondent whose ‘depression’ was alleged; there was no supporting expert evidence.  The 
judges cited two Rotal decisions, but their relevance was unclear.50  The first Rotal decision, 
unlike the instant case, involved a party with ‘borderline personality disorder’ supported by 
expert evidence.  In the second decision, unlike the instant case, the Rota found incapacity 
not proven; it took exception to the lower tribunal’s interpretation of ‘discretion’.51 
 
Grave Lack of Discretion of Judgment: The law sections of these judgments were not 
consistent about the precise meaning of the term ‘grave lack of discretion of judgment’.  
When distinguishing grave lack of discretion of judgment and inability to assume the 
essential obligations of marriage, at least one law section inferred that only inability to 
assume the essential obligations required a psychological basis; grave lack of discretion of 
judgment did not require a psychological basis.52  In another case, judges recorded Rotal 
judge Lefebvre as describing ‘discretion of judgment’, positively, as ‘the ability’ to ‘show 
good intrapersonal and interpersonal integration’.53  In several other cases, judges quoted 
Rotal judge Pompedda, albeit writing extra-judicially, as ‘presenting the following synthesis 
of the three components of a “mature decision”:  
 
47 There were many references to doctrinal sources, but for example, 09/11; and 09/35: CCC.  09/11; 09/31; 
09/35; and 09/36: GS.  09/35: Genesis 2:24 and Mark: 10, 2-12.  09/36: Matthew: 19:6.  09/35; 09/42; and 
09/45: Papal Allocutions. 
48 Many published books and articles were cited, but for example, 09/28: Ladislas Örsy, Marriage in Canon 
Law (1988); 09/28: K Lüdickem & R Jenkins, Dignitas Connubii Norms and Commentary (CLSA, 2006); 
09/36: Cormac Burke, ‘Marriage Studies V’, in Gerald T Jorgensen (Ed), Sources in Matrimonial Law (CLSA 
2004), p14f, and Augustine Mendonça, “Consensual Incapacity for Marriage”, The Jurist, 54 (1994), pp 494ff); 
09/56: J Provost, ‘Canon 1095: Past, Present, Future’, The Jurist, 54 (1994), pp95-96; and 09/70: Viladrich, but 
no reference is given. 
49 For example, 09/4; 09/5 and 09/28; made no reference to Rotal jurisprudence.  
50 09/65: Pompedda, 25 November 1987, in SRRDec, 70 (1978), pp508-515 and Pompedda, 22 January 1979, 
SRRDec, 71 (1988), pp18-22.  See Mendonça, Anthology, pp39 and 40. 
51 There were many other examples: 09/23; 09/50; and 09/86 referred to Rotal judge, Stankiewicz, without any 
citation; in 09/65 the Rotal case cited upheld the validity of marriage; in 09/8; 09/50; and 09/86, although no 
neurotic disorder was evident, the law sections referred simply to ‘Rotal jurisprudence’ cases dealing with 
neurotic disorders; in 09/76; 09/77; 09/78, the Rotal decisions involved addiction; in 09/76 a Rotal decision 
involving a vendetta was cited; and in 09/84, the case involved borderline personality disorder, but these issues 
were not relevant to the case under consideration.   
52 09/65.   
53 09/23: An incomplete citation is given: Lefebvre, 1 March 1961. Charles Lefebvre was Dean of the Roman 
Rota from 1976 to 1978. 
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“Sufficient cognitive knowledge of the object and of the subject of consent; 
Sufficient critical evaluation of the object, of the motives and of the subject in relation to the 
contract; and  
Sufficient internal freedom either to evaluate the motives, that is, to deliberate, or to control 
impulses or internal limitations”’.54 
 
In several further cases, judges cited Pompedda, writing judicially, as describing, negatively,  
situations in which discretion of judgment can be lacking:  
 
‘A grave lack of discretionary judgement can be found in three situations: when there is a lack 
of a sufficient intellectual (abstract) knowledge of the object of consent; or where a partner 
has not attained sufficient critical knowledge proportionate to the conjugal contract; or either 
partner lacks the capacity to deliberate with sufficient weighing of motives and freedom’. 55 
 
However, judges did not mention that Pompedda upheld the validity of marriage in this cited 
Rotal decision.56  Referring to another of Pompedda’s decisions which did find for nullity on 
grounds of grave lack of discretion of judgment, the judges failed to mention that the plaintiff 
was diagnosed with a ‘neurotic-dysthymic and psychosexual disorder’ and that the Rotal 
decision acknowledged that even in cases of immaturity, incapacity is not a given.57  
Moreover, the judges did not always acknowledge the Rota’s insistence on the establishment 
of serious psychopathology and demonstration of its severity and effect.  In many cases of 
lack of discretion of judgment, judges focused was on whether or not a de facto ‘mature 
decision’ was made, rather than on the parties’ capacity to make it.58 
 
Judges from three different tribunals referred to decisions of Rotal judges Anné and Felici, 
stating that capacity to ‘reason and make new judgments flowing from acquired knowledge’ 
is required for discretion of judgment.59  Further, one of these tribunals, in several cases, 
states: 
54 09/22; 09/36; 09/48; 09/49; and 09/50:  M F Pompedda, ‘Maturità psichica e matrimonio nei canoni 1095, 
1096’,  Apollinaris, 57 (1984), p134.  Cardinal Pompedda was involved in the ecclesiastical tribunal system 
from 1955 until his retirement in 2004.  He was appointed Dean of the Roman Rota in 1993 and Prefect of the 
Supreme Tribunal of the Apostolic Signatura in 1999. 
55 E.g., 09/34; 09/72; and 09/90: coram Pompedda, 22 January 1979. 
56 Mendonça, Anthology, Case No: 79-009, p40. 
57 09/04; and 09/80, citing Mendonça, Anthology, Case No: 84-079, p71.   
58 Rotal decisions focus on capacity.  For example, ‘Decision Coram Defilippi, 19 January 2004 (Dublin)’, 
Studia Canonica, 40 (2006), pp211-244, at pp217-218, citing another Rotal decision, coram, Funghini, 19 May 
1993 (RRDec 85 (1993)), p404, n2.   
59 09/20; 09/48; 09/49; 09/54; and 09/85, cite coram Anné, 28 June 1965; 09/28 cites coram Felici, 20 
December 1957; and 09/36 refers to Felici without citation.  Cardinal Pericle Felici was Prefect of the Supreme 
Tribunal of the Apostolic Signatura at the relevant time. 
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 ‘According to Felici, it is not enough to be capable of exercising the cognitive faculty, one 
must be able to exercise a critical faculty, which alone renders one capable of forming a 
judgment and of moving the act of the will’.60 
 
However, judges in this same tribunal, and in another tribunal, record, possibly erroneously, a 
crucial difference in this same quotation, clearly focusing on de facto exercise, of the critical 
faculty: 
 
‘[I]it certainly does not suffice to be capable of exercising the cognitive faculty, but one must 
exercise the critical faculty’.61 
 
So, judges (some even within the same tribunal) differed in their interpretation of this Rotal 
jurisprudence despite the fact that the diocesan tribunal is that of one bishop;62 some judges 
held that for validity of marriage a party must exercise the critical faculty, whilst others 
required demonstration of capacity to exercise it.  In some cases, however, the judges quoted 
a Rotal decision which focused on personal capacity, and which warned against confusion 
between grave lack of discretion of judgment and parties’ incompatibility, or an imprudent 
choice of partner.63  Some judges also acknowledged that imprudent decisions, and difficulty, 
must be distinguished from incapacity.64  Perhaps these varying interpretations highlight the 
dangers encountered when Rotal decisions, published in Latin, are translated unofficially 
(usually by academics); they are not therefore ‘authentic’ translations.65 
 
Some law sections referred to Rotal explanations of the psychic nature of the cause of grave 
lack of discretion of judgment,66 and of the issues of its gravity,67 and proportionality to 
60 09/48; 09/49; and 09/50.  No references were given.  Emphases added. 
61 E.g., 09/22; and 09/36: citing coram Felici, 3 December 1957, RRDec 49: 788. Emphasis added.   
62 CIC, c. 1420§1.  See Appendix I.  Also, John Barry, in L&S, p821, para 2866.  Any dissonance in 
interpretation of law is, therefore, serious. 
63 09/48; and 09/85.  The decision was attributed to ‘Di Felici’ of 11 December 1975, SRRDec, but as Rotal 
judge Angelo Di Felice served from 1969-1986, this is likely to be an error; Rotal judge Pericle Felici served 
earlier.  In 09/80, Di Felice, in Mendonça, Anthology, Case No: 79-044, p41, was cited.  In this decision of 14 
March 1979, Di Felice rejected two presumptions of the Second Instance tribunal: (a) that full maturity was 
required in order to give valid consent; and (b) unhappiness in marriage is always a sign of psychological 
incapacity.  
64 09/51; 09/75; 09/76; 09/78; and 09/80. 
65 CLSGB&I publishes some local cases; they are therefore cited in other local judgments.  See Aidan McGrath, 
‘Moral Certainty and Cases Based on Canon 1095; Some Reflections’, in CLSGB&I Newsletter, No 169, 
(March 2012), pp50-72, at p58 in which he warns: ‘…[I]t is not sufficient simply to quote local jurisprudence ... 
it might well be mistaken, and an error remains an error no matter how often it is quoted!’ 
66 09/28, citing Rotal judge Burke’s decisions of 5 November 1992, Studia Canonica, 27 (1993), pp486-
496§§13-14) and 25 November, 1993, Studia Canonica, 29 (1995), pp241-253), requiring a grave ‘pathological 
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marriage,68 whilst others relied on Guiry’s ‘working definition of “maturity”’.69  Guiry, 
despite writing after the Papal Allocutions (1987 and 1988), which explained the need for 
severe psychopathology to prove incapacity, considered that canonical ‘immaturity’, 
sufficient to cause nullity, is not a psychopathological state.  Law sections, although 
acknowledging that terms such as ‘immaturity’ and ‘incompatibility’ were ‘imprecise’, 
nevertheless, considered them strong indicators of grave lack of discretion of judgment.70  In 
some cases, the law sections implied that there was no need to establish a grave psychological 
cause.71  Cause was considered irrelevant: a ‘mistake’ or an ‘influenced’ decision sufficed.72  
Moreover, time for reflection, provided for by a courtship, was essential.73  The law section 
of one judgment inferred that the canonical minimum age for marriage for a man, and two 
years in addition to the canonical minimal age for a woman, was insufficient for maturity to 
marry.74  Evidence of behaviour, without reference to its cause, was emphasised.75 
 
Inability to Assume the Essential Obligations of Marriage: Judges acknowledged the 
psychological basis for inability to assume the essential obligations of marriage in some 
cases,76 but not in all.77  There was dissonance as to whether this form of incapacity must be 
perpetual; the judges in one case held that it need not, but the reasoning was somewhat 
unclear:   
 
‘[Incapacity need not be perpetual], since one is dealing with a state and with obligations that 
arise at the very moment that the conjugal relationship is established.  These obligations 
lesion’; and 09/23 citing coram Parisella, 25 November 1976, requiring ‘mental illness’, such that ‘no union of 
life can be formed’.  
67 09/50; and 09/86 stating that Rotal jurisprudence ‘presupposes a serious psychological disorder’ and requires 
an objective link between the disorder and ‘the flawed process’ in lack of discretion.   
68 09/28 citing coram Sabatanni, 24 February 1961, coram Lefebvre, 6 July 1967 and coram Di Jorio, 30 April 
1969.  09/70; 09/81; and 09/82 citing coram Mark Said, 13 March 1965. 
69 09/70; 09/81; and 09/82, citing Robert Guiry, ‘Immaturity, Maturity and Christian Marriage’, Studia 
Canonica, 25 (1991), pp93-114, in which he relies on the Diagnostic and Statistical Mannual, published by the 
American Psychiatric Association (DSM).  See Cormac Burke, Sentence of 25 November 1993, for his criticism 
of ecclesiastical judges’ use of DSM. Available at:  http://www.cormacburke.or.ke/node/410. 
70 09/3; and 09/20. 
71 In 09/06; and 09/83, judges considered that inadequate ‘attitude’ and an inadequate ‘approach to life generally 
and to ... marriage in particular’ or lack of commitment, sufficed to prove nullity.   
72 09/28; 09/38; and 09/76: ‘Undue haste’ or misjudgment ‘for whatever reason’ could be sufficient to cause 
nullity.  In 09/75, ‘clouded judgment’ or making a ‘wrong’ decision sufficed.   
73 09/48; 09/49; 09/85; 09/33; and 09/38.   
74 09.75: ‘[N]o one would call sixteen-year olds mature’. 
75 This was true in many cases, for example: 09/7; 09/15; 09/70; 09/81; 09/82; and 09/88. 
76 09/37: 09/76; 09/77; 09/78; 09/55; and 09/80. 
77  In 09/16; and 09/44, ‘bad habits’ such as drunkenness or gambling were accepted, without distinguishing 
culpable behaviour from addiction, as causes of incapacity.  
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cannot admit of any discontinuity - they either arise or they do not, and they can only arise at 
the moment of consent, not thereafter.  Consequently, an incapacity, be it perpetual or not, 
which touches the essential obligations at the time of the exchange of consent must carry with 
it invalidity because one is dealing with a state which arises or does not arise at consent; in 
that moment there is the capacity to consent validly or not.  Drawing together all these 
elements, canon 1095§3 implies that a person may be rendered incapable of contracting if he 
is affected by a serious psychic cause which impedes him from assuming the essential 
obligations of marriage’.78 
 
This explanation does not distinguish capacity to assume perpetual obligations from capacity 
to assume them perpetually.  Since obligations are assumed at the moment of consent, all that 
is required for validity is capacity to assume perpetual obligations, not capacity to assume 
them perpetually, since post-marital events which then prevent one from fulfilling these 
obligations cannot invalidate marriage; consequently, it is confusing to say ‘obligations 
cannot admit of any discontinuity’.   Moreover, canon 1095, 3° does not ‘imply’ that a person 
‘may’ be rendered incapable of marriage if he is affected by a serious cause.  It states a fact: 
those, whose capacity is substantially and adversely affected, are incapable.  Therefore, the 
focus must be on establishing the severity and effect of the antecedent and serious cause, to 
determine whether or not the person is incapable.   
 
The Meaning of Essential Obligations of Marriage: Judges varied in their interpretation of 
‘essential obligations of marriage’.  Some judges referred to Rotal judges’ descriptions, 
limiting the term to the goods of spouses and children, or unity and indissolubility;79 
sometimes judges simply acknowledged these limitations.80  Nevertheless, despite the 
requirement to interpret laws, which restrict the free exercise of rights (such as canon 1095), 
strictly, some judges applied a broad interpretation to this term.81  They held that a ‘list’ 
which is ‘not taxative’, includes ‘maturity of personal conduct’, ‘kindness and gentleness’, 
‘manners in mutual relationships’, ‘stability of conduct’, ‘ability to adapt to circumstances’, 
‘responsibility for the material well being of the home and family’ and ‘sharing and 
consultation on important issues’, as part of ‘what may be understood as the essential rights 
and obligations of marriage’.82  Marriage comprised ‘a complex balance of emotions, desires, 
judgements, self-knowledge, maturity and commitment’, requiring ‘sufficient psychological 
78 09/65.  
79 09/17; 09/19; 09/31; 09/32; 09/43; 09/44; 09/56; 09/57; 09/62; 09/69; 09/79; and 09/94, citing Pinto’s 
decision of 30 May 1986, MDGBI, Vol 25, p46.  09/50 quotes Rotal judge Ragni, but without citation. 
80 For example, 09/78; and 09/86.  
81 CIC, c. 18.  See Appendix I. 
82 09/23; 09/30; 09/51; and 09/65.    
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maturity’ for a person ‘to perceive critically and freely and to choose marriage with all its 
rights, obligations and responsibilities’.83  Exchanging consent involved a ‘complex process’ 
in which the couple is ‘drawn into a complex of rights and obligations’.84  Whilst some 
judges acknowledged that marriage was within the natural capacity of the majority,85 others 
held that the doctrine and law of marriage has expanded.86 
 
Some law sections cited Rotal jurisprudence explaining that: psychological freedom means 
freedom from compulsion;87 impulsive behaviour does not necessarily indicate lack of 
freedom;88 and freedom requires ‘reasonable’, not pathological, motivation.89   Others simply 
acknowledged these principles.90  But, another held that capacity required freedom from any 
pressure, including persuasion of conscience.91   
 
The Mandatory Requirement for Experts: Despite law sections referring, as we have seen, 
to Rotal decisions which relied on grave, psychological, or physio-psychological causes for 
incapacity,92 few law sections referred to experts.  Interestingly, some law sections, although 
not referring to the need for experts, nevertheless, implied the requirement to make a 
psychological assessment of the party concerned.93  Moreover, some acknowledged: the 
complexity of the decision-making process;94 capacity concerned the time of the change of 
consent;95 and there was no legal ‘unit of measure’ of incapacity.96  
 
Furthermore, in one case the judges acknowledged that the focus must be on: ‘the operation 
of the critical faculty of the mind at the time consent was given’.  However, consideration 
83 09/50.  Emphasis added. 
84 E.g., 09/30; 09/51; and 09/65. 
85 09/42, citing Colagiovanni, 11 December 1985 RRDec 1985, p571.  Also 09/75; 09/78, citing Rotal Judge 
Doran’s lecture to the CLSGB&I, which in turn cites Thomas Doyle, but no reference is given. 
86 09/81; and 09/82, claiming that c. 1055 ‘extends the issue of ignorance beyond mere sexual matters’. 
87 09/36; and 09/87, citing coram  Faltin, November 11, 1988, in L’immaturità psico-affettiva nella 
giurisprudenza della Rota Romana, p169.  
88 09/28, citing Agustoni, 27 May 1980, in RRD, Vol 72, p402. 
89 09/84, citing Pinto, 18 December 1979. 
90 09/8; 09/49; 09/50; and 09/86.  
91 09/88. 
92 09/8; 09/50; 09/55; 09/80; and 09/86,   
93 09/8; 09/23; 09/28; 09/30; 09/36; 09/39; 09/48; 09/49; 09/78; 09/84; and 09/85. The terminology used 
included phrases such as: ‘A judge has to look into the “psychic condition” of the contractant(s)…’; ‘…hidden 
in the psyche of the human person are elements which influence our decision making’; ‘The Judges will use an 
assessment of the context of the act of consent, the psychological condition of the individual’, etc.  
94 09/50; 09/76; 09/77; and 09/78. 
95 09/8; 09/50; 09/70; 09/80; 09/81; and 09/86.   
96 09/8; and 09/50, citing Sabattani, but without any reference.  
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was to be given to: ‘any extrinsic or transitory influences’, which may have incapacitated the 
individual ‘to the required degree’; and ‘any inherent habitual psychological deficiencies 
which could be said to indicate that the person was a priori predisposed to a gravely defective 
exercise of discretion of judgment’, which might range from ‘a poorly developed personality 
to the extremes of psychological illness’.97  Moreover, some law sections acknowledged that: 
the invalidating cause must have affected the formation of the act of consent seriously and 
adversely; and establishing this fact involves identifying ‘the factors affecting the 
psychological faculties of a person’ and determining ‘their effects upon consent’.98  Whilst 
some judges acknowledged the value of expert opinion, they held that experts’ were reluctant 
to make ‘absolute’ diagnoses.99  Despite the foregoing, judges did not explain how these 
criteria could be established in the absence of an expert.  In one case, judges acknowledged 
both the psychological basis for canonical immaturity and its symptoms, but did not explain 
how this condition could be verified without expert opinion; rather they posed the question as 
to how psychological immaturity affects validity of consent.  They credited Rotal judge Anné 
with ‘what may be considered a fairly conclusive answer to that question:  
 
“[I]f from the life history of the future spouse, in the judgement of the experts,100 it is 
established that already before the wedding there existed a serious deficiency in intrapersonal 
and interpersonal integration, that person must be considered incapable of correctly 
understanding the nature of the communion of the whole life itself, … and likewise incapable 
of rightly judging and reasoning about this lasting communion of life that must be undertaken 
with another person”’.101 
 
Yet, without explanation, the judges proceeded to find for the plaintiff wife’s psychological 
immaturity, that is her grave lack of discretion of judgment, without expert opinion or any 
formal history of psychological impairment.  Throughout the cases studied, the judges 
97 09/30. 
98 Eg., 09/8; 09/50; and 09/86, citing Sabattani, but without reference.  
99 09/28.  The judges acknowledged that the assistance of experts would be required to establish whether 
behaviour had a psychological basis, citing K Lüdickem & R Jenkins, Dignitas Connubii Norms and 
Commentary (Canon Law Society of America, 2006), p346.  09/76; and 09/78, cited Rotal judge Serrano, 5 
April, 1973, in CLD 8, p718.  Serrano holds that incapacity can be ‘relative’, i.e., in relation to the particular 
spouse.  But Burke holds that this view is only held by few Rotal judges, and cites many others who hold his 
contrary view.  See Cormac Burke, ‘Some Reflections on Canon 1095’, Monitor Ecclesiasticus 117 (1992-I), 
pp133-150.  Available at: http://www.cormacburke.or.ke/node/272.  For further discussion on relative 
incapacity see: Cormac Burke, Sentence of 14 November 1996; Interlocutory Sentence of 16 November 1989;  
Sentence of October 20, 1994 (Peoria), and Sentence of 25 November 1993 (Dublin), Available at: 
http://www.cormacburke.or.ke/search/node/relative . 
100 Emphasis added. 
101 09/23, citing, coram Anne, July 22, 1969.  No further citation is given.   
276 
 
                                                            
mentioned neither the methods they used to assess parties’ capacity, nor their competence to 
do so. 
 
Law sections, therefore, did not clarify the precise meaning of key terms; even within the 
same tribunal, interpretations differed.   Few law sections required the existence of a grave 
anomaly preventing the exercise of the critical faculty; many required only that the critical 
faculty was not exercised.  Only one law section referred to personal potential.102  Moreover, 
some law sections focused on the quality of the decision to marry, equating ‘discretion of 
judgment’ with a de facto ‘mature decision’,103 whilst others emphasised the dissonance 
between ‘discretion of judgement’ and ‘maturity’.104  Moreover, the term ‘essential rights and 
obligations of marriage’ was interpreted broadly in many cases, to include harmonious 
behaviour, financial competence and ‘all’ matrimonial rights and duties.  Psychological 
freedom was not always distinguished from persuasion of conscience.  Therefore, despite the 
mandatory requirement to interpret canon 1095 strictly, it was interpreted broadly.  
Moreover, without reference to what is essential to marriage and notwithstanding its natural 
state, one law section explained that if a person entered marriage understanding it differently 
from ‘Church teaching’, they were considered incapable of exercising the natural right to 
marry.105  Given these differing interpretations it is hardly surprising to find dissonance 
regarding the requirement to use experts.  Therefore, law sections, in failing to require the 
establishment of a ‘grave cause’ identified by scientific means, let alone the demonstration of 
its severity and effect, did not reflect Rotal practice.  Nor did these law sections reflect Rotal 
judge Huot’s distinction between ‘discretion of judgement’ and ‘consent’:    
 
‘[D]iscretion of judgment is a natural condition pre-existing the act of consent.  It is a 
condition of a person and only in its effects it becomes a defect of consent. … [A] defect of 
discretion resulting from an abnormal constitution of the contractant [ should not be confused 
with] the contractant’s timid, amoral or impulsive character which he/she does not attempt to 
overcome, [because in the former circumstance the person] is impeded … whilst [in the latter] 
there is an unwillingness to conform to the principles of right conduct’.106   
 
102 09/81.  See also Zenon Grocholewski, ‘The Ecclesiastical Judge and the Findings of Psychiatric and 
Psychological Experts’, The Jurist, 47 (1987), pp449-470, at p456-457.   
103 E.g., 09/50; 09/60; 09/61; 09/66; and 09/86. 
104 E.g., 09/42, citing: John Paul II, Allocution to the Roman Rota (1987); and Corso, 14 March 1990, n4 in 
AAVV, L’immatruita psico-affettiva nella giurisprudenza della Rota Romana (Liberia Editrice Vaticaca, Citta 
del Vaticano, 1990), p238. 
105 09/65. 
106 See Mendonça, Case No: 84-104, coram Huot, 26 June 1984, Dec 76 (1989), pp432-441, pp72-73.   
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4. THE APPLICATION OF LAW TO THE FACTS OF THE CASE 
What follows is an examination of the application of law by the judges to the facts of 
individual cases in order to establish: how a party’s psychological status at the material time 
and hence, (in)capacity for marriage, was assessed and determined; what evidence was given 
weight; and the tribunals’ use of the vetitum. 
 
Assessment and Determination of Psychological Status:  Some plaintiffs, but not all, 
alleged psychiatric illness or psychological impairment in one or both parties.  However, it 
was unclear as to how the judges made an assessment of the party concerned, most 
particularly, at the material time.  It was not obvious that the tribunals studied, or the judges 
practising within them, used any systematic approaches in their treatment of incapacity cases 
when no expert evidence was sought.  For example, the way in which judges approached 
cases did not appear to be based on whether or not: the party in whom incapacity was alleged 
participated in the investigation and therefore, whether that party was available for any type 
of assessment; there was any allegation of psychiatric illness or psychological impairment; or 
there was corroborative evidence to support either the alleged incapacity or validity of 
marriage. 
 
First, sometimes the judges had evidence from both parties in whom incapacity was alleged 
but found for nullity in only one party despite the fact that both parties had potential for 
psychological impairment.  For example, in one case a plaintiff wife alleged: she took 
tranquillizers at the age of fourteen because of nervousness and fear of failure; she had poor 
relationships with family members; and she had a troubled background.107  Nevertheless, the 
respondent husband’s evidence supported validity.  He claimed: they had honourable 
intentions when they married and knew each other well; they were happily married for ten 
years; then, their needs changed.  He further alleged that: the plaintiff wife ‘wanted to be 
cared for’, whilst he was busy as his career progressed; the plaintiff began drinking to excess; 
and she became depressed.  The marriage lasted seventeen years and produced two children.  
The judges held that: the plaintiff wife was ‘swept up’ in the new liberated world in which 
she worked; she was unable to evaluate the marriage; she lacked freedom to marry because of 
her ‘need’ to be liberated from commitments to her own parents; the respondent showed the 
107 09/84. 
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plaintiff little affection; the plaintiff became depressed; and when her ‘fairy-tale’ marriage 
did not materialise, her nervous personality led to a ‘breakdown’.  The judges were satisfied 
that her ‘continuing dependent relationship’ was demonstrated by her early retirement to care 
for her ill mother; they held that she was ‘particularly needy’.  Without establishing the 
severity of  her alleged ‘nervousness’, nor demonstrating its effect on her capacity to marry at 
the material time, nor taking account of post-marital events, the judges found for her grave 
lack of discretion of judgment; and therefore the marriage was invalid.  Regarding the 
respondent, however, the judges held that although he had: a difficult childhood background; 
an alcoholic father who committed suicide; and difficulty being self-critical (evidenced by his 
failure to mention his adultery in testimony); he was independent and confident.  There was 
nothing to indicate lack of either maturity or understanding of marriage; therefore, his 
incapacity was not proven.  In this instance, therefore, for the tribunal, the plaintiff wife’s 
adverse childhood experiences determined her incapacity for marriage (rather than causing 
difficulty), but the respondent husband’s difficult childhood was not held to have determined 
his future; the reasoning was unclear. 
 
Second, and interestingly, in other cases, a poor family background sufficed despite lack of 
evidence of resultant trauma at the material time - the judges depended on testimony rather 
than establishing true psychological impairment.  In one case, a plaintiff wife, who alleged 
her own grave lack of discretion of judgment, claimed that she ‘inherited’ her mother’s 
‘paranoia’.  There was no formal diagnosis, reference to treatment, or evidence of impairment 
of day-to-day functioning.  Nevertheless, without corroborative evidence, the judges, finding 
for her grave lack of discretion of judgment, held that she: had a poor relationship with her 
parents; was insecure; was influenced by her mother who was ‘deeply’ religious; had a 
‘series’ of ‘inappropriate’ relationships, which, although not serious, indicated her lack of 
readiness for marriage; and she had ‘hit a low point’.  She was, therefore, ‘in no position’ to 
give the kind of ‘careful, reasoned, considered, critical, objective and balanced judgment that 
is essential’.108  In another case, judges considered previous failed relationships as an 
indicator of ‘neediness’ and, therefore, grave lack of discretion of judgment, although there 
was no history of psychopathology.109  Similarly, myalgic encephalitis (ME) featured in a 
case in which the plaintiff wife alleged her own inability to assume the essential obligations 
108 09/50. 
109 09/39. 
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of marriage.  She claimed she came from an unhappy home and that marriage, for her, was 
‘God’s will’.  There was no formal evidence of her medical condition, save the respondent’s 
corroboration of its existence, although the priest who officiated at the wedding thought the 
plaintiff was ‘not well’.  She had previous unsuccessful civil marriages.  The tribunal found 
for both her grave lack of discretion of judgment and inability to assume the essential 
obligations of marriage.110 
 
Third, sometimes the judges relied on the evidence of the plaintiff and the plaintiff’s 
witnesses alleging psychiatric illness, and, therefore, incapacity, in an absent respondent.  In 
one case, the absent respondent’s brother died before the marriage.  The respondent was 
allegedly diagnosed with clinical depression six months after marriage.  There was no 
evidence of his sickness absence from work or that he received medication, only cognitive 
behavioural therapy, after which his recovery began.  However, by this time the plaintiff wife 
suffered depression and the couple separated.  The plaintiff admitted that the respondent’s 
psychiatrist declared him ‘of sound mind’ when he left the marital home for another woman.  
Moreover, the judges acknowledged that it was impossible to establish when his illness 
became severe.  Nevertheless, they found for his grave lack of discretion of judgment and his 
inability to assume the essential obligations of marriage.  They held: he was completely 
dependent on the plaintiff; he was ‘incapable’ of making a decision to marry; and his illness 
‘had its roots’ in his late brother’s psychiatric illness.  Moreover, without reference to degrees 
of severity, the judges held that ‘depression’ was ‘an extremely serious illness’ that ‘radically 
disrupts an individual’s ability to make decisions’ and was ‘a very debilitating mental illness 
that distorts the sufferer’s perception of what is real’.111  This implies that, for the judges, 
depression, regardless of its severity, causes invalidity. 
 
Fourth, judges accepted an allegation of incapacity in a plaintiff husband although the 
psychiatric illness was alleged in the absent respondent wife.  The plaintiff alleged his own 
grave lack of discretion of judgment on the basis that, due to his youth and ignorance, he did 
not understand the significance of the respondent’s illness; rather, he found it interesting.  
The plaintiff husband, although alleging that the respondent received electro-convulsive 
therapy, was unaware of any medication received by the respondent wife at the material time 
110 09/80. 
111 09/65. 
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and he admitted that her condition deteriorated after marriage.  He also admitted that the 
respondent’s parents ‘probably’ had reservations about the marriage because they would have 
seen their daughter marrying a ‘feckless student, with no job’.   He considers that both parties 
were ‘possibly’ escaping from ‘relatively unhappy’ circumstances.  However, he had a poor 
recollection of the two-year courtship; he remembered nothing of the wedding, not even the 
venue.  Nevertheless, the judges, relying on the plaintiff’s self-assessment that he had an 
‘inadequate understanding of the nature of marriage’ and was ‘immature’, held that: he had a 
poor role model of marriage and family life; and he had a disabled brother who received the 
greater share of attention.  Furthermore, the couple’s lack of desire for children indicated ‘a 
distorted view of the nature of marriage’.  Consequently, he failed to evaluate both marriage 
itself and the respondent as a spouse; he was thus gravely lacking in discretion of 
judgment.112 
 
Fifth, judges accepted an allegation of incapacity in a plaintiff when the respondent became 
psychiatrically ill after marriage (although the plaintiff alleged pre-marital substance abuse 
by the respondent).  The plaintiff wife alleged her own grave lack of discretion of judgment.  
The judges questioned her failure to give ‘more serious thought to the wisdom of what she 
was doing’; she relied on prayer and God’s grace for a happy marriage.  The judges held that 
her decision to marry was not unreasonable (as others who knew the circumstances thought it 
would be a successful marriage because the respondent had ceased using drugs).  Moreover, 
the judges acknowledged that assertions of naivety are insufficient to prove nullity.  
Nevertheless, they concluded, without explanation, that the plaintiff ‘was more than naïve’ 
and ‘dependent’ on the respondent, thus lacking discretion of judgment.113  ‘Unfounded 
optimism’ was considered indicative of grave lack of discretion of judgment in other cases 
also.114  Moreover, wilful substance abuse was not always distinguished from dependence.115  
However, in one case, the tribunal did hold that a respondent husband, accused of substance 
abuse, was ‘self-assured and confident’; therefore his incapacity was not proven.116 
112 09/44. 
113 09/15. 
114 09/30; and 09/86. 
115 In 09/8, the judges considered that the respondent’s condition at the material time was ‘largely irrelevant’; 
‘drugs affect people’s minds’.  In 09/16; and 09/44, ‘bad habits’ such as drunkenness or gambling were 
accepted, without distinguishing culpable behaviour from addiction.  In 09/76; 09/77; and 09/78, judges 
distinguished abuse and addiction.  See Patrick S Morris, ‘Alcoholism and Marital Consent’, Studia Canonica, 
34 (2000), pp155-195, at p156-157. 
116 09/39. 
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 Sixth, an allegation that a party was adversely affected by psychiatric illness in a family 
member sufficed for a judge to accept a plea of incapacity.  For example, a plaintiff wife who 
demonstrated foresight as a teenager in arranging to live with her grandparents because of her 
volatile relationship with her father (who, she claimed, suffered depression), alleged her own 
grave lack of discretion of judgment.  Although she admitted cohabiting happily with the 
respondent for two years before marriage, and she had no history of psychiatric illness or 
psychological impairment, the judges held that her poor relationship with her father ‘pushed’ 
the parties ‘closer together’ and ‘the maturity shown [in her behaviour] was concerned only 
with day to day practicalities of life’; the ground was considered proven.117  Likewise, judges 
heard cases on incapacity grounds when psychiatric illness was alleged in a parent or parents, 
even though there was no evidence of psychopathology in the party in whom incapacity was 
alleged.118  Moreover, in one case, in which grave lack of discretion of judgment was alleged 
in an absent respondent wife, the judges accepted allegations of her ‘family history’ of 
depression.  Despite witness’ evidence that she was mature and experienced because of a 
previous long-term relationship, the judges, relying largely on allegations of post-marital 
behaviour, concluded that her previous failed relationships were a reflection of her parents’ 
lifestyle of successive marriages and cohabitation with several partners.  They held that the 
(absent) respondent had ‘leanings towards depression’, and that her past experiences ‘must 
have had an effect on her’.  Consequently, she entered marriage, understanding it as her 
parents did, constituting grave lack of discretion of judgment.119    
 
Seventh, it was abundantly clear in one case that the judges (erroneously) understood canon 
1095 2º did not require a psychological cause.  Both parties’ grave lack of discretion of 
judgment was alleged, in addition to the absent respondent wife’s inability to assume the 
essential obligations of marriage.  Judges acknowledged that: ‘without a psychological 
assessment’ it was not possible to determine the cause of the respondent’s behaviour; and her 
problems possibly began after marriage.  Consequently, it was not possible to find for her 
inability to assume the essential obligations.  Nevertheless the judges (without expert 
opinion) concluded that both parties gravely lacked discretion of judgment.120  Likewise, in 
117 09/4. 
118 In 09/5; and 09/87, psychiatric illness was alleged in one parent and in 09/5, it was alleged in both parents. 
119 09/56. 
120 09/55. 
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another case, the plaintiff wife alleged that the absent respondent husband (whose previous 
marriage also failed) was violent.  The marriage lasted fourteen years and five children were 
born.  The plaintiff, alleging her own grave lack of discretion of judgment, testified that her 
pre-marital pregnancy was not the cause of the marriage.  However, the judges held that it 
was.  There was no evidence of psychopathology; rather, the judges relied on her own 
admission that she was ‘unable’ to resist the ‘showering of gifts’ from the respondent.  They 
held that her immaturity was demonstrated by ‘the often seen “moth flying too near to the 
flame” that can be present in human nature’.121  Therefore, if present in human nature, no 
abnormality was identified.   In another case, judges held that a plaintiff suffered ‘mental 
turmoil’ because of his drinking, but this was not the cause of his incapacity; rather, it was a 
witness’ opinion that his ‘personality was not right for marriage’, which was persuasive.122 
 
So, in these cases of psychological incapacity, the judges appeared to consider that no 
psychopathology needed to be established.  Judges accepted cases on the basis of 
unsubstantiated allegations of: pre-marital ‘nervous breakdown’;123  ‘depression’;124 and 
‘immaturity’, without reference to their severity.125  Moreover, it was clear that judges were 
willing to pursue allegations, not only when psychiatric illness or psychological trauma, were 
alleged or implied, but also on the basis of behaviour alone, for example: pre-marital misuse 
of alcohol,126 and aggression,127 sometimes deteriorating after marriage and leading to 
imprisonment.128  When there was no suggestion of psychopathology, judges explained that 
‘immaturity’ can be indicated by: ‘rearranging the furniture in the marital home without 
consultation’;129 making decisions without involving the other party;130 being unable to cope 
with a spouse’s behaviour;131 poor performance as a parent,132or in marriage;133 failure to 
121 09/22. 
122 09/35. 
123 09/66. 
124 09/65. 
125 Grave lack of discretion of judgment was found proven in 09/35; 09/38; 09/39; 09/42; 09/56; 09/69; 09/70; 
09/80; 09/85; 09/88; and 09/92.  In 09/48; and 09/49, the grounds were found not proven.  
126 09/35. 
127 09/94: The female plaintiff, in whom the ground is alleged, claims that she had counselling while at school 
because she was an ‘angry teenager’. 
128 09/16. 
129 09/36. 
130 09/42. 
131 09/38. 
132 09/66. 
133 09/86: Judges acknowledged that all was well until the respondent’s employers relocated but the couple 
could not move because of the plaintiff’s family business.  They held: the plaintiff ‘was not equipped to deal 
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discuss marital problems;134 irresponsible behaviour,135 such as heavy drinking on Friday 
nights;136 or having unrealistic expectations.137  Moreover, despite the legal presumption of 
capacity, judges sought evidence of maturity and found for nullity in its absence.138  This 
held true also when considering other grounds.139  Even when judges found it difficult to 
define what was required by law for capacity, they concluded that whatever was required, 
was absent, with specific reference to ‘conjugal love’.140 
 
Weight Given to Allegations: Without establishing any resultant psychological trauma, 
judges gave weight to allegations of an extraordinary wide range as indicators of incapacity, 
from how a party felt, through events or circumstances occurring at the material time, to 
vague assertions of immaturity.  These were as follows: feeling ‘let down’ by parents;141 a 
party needing to feel respected;142 experiencing ‘cold feet’,143 remote144 or recent 
bereavement;145 the marriage of friends at the material time;146 baptism of a child occurring 
at the time of the marriage;147 marrying ‘on the rebound’;148 parties having different 
personalities;149 parties coming from different socio-economic backgrounds;150 one party 
being professionally subordinate to the other;151 a party requiring a visa;152 a turbulent 
courtship;153 youth;154 parties having nothing,155  or little, in common;156 parties keeping 
with this’; he was ‘hopelessly ill-prepared’ to deal with a person such as the respondent, although he did come 
to appreciate this, but when it was ‘too late’.  
134 09/66. 
135 09/69. 
136 09/90:  Friday-night drinking was ‘indicative of someone out of her depth’. 
137 09/94. 
138 09/04; 09/51; 09/83; and 09/92.  In 09/38: The plaintiff could not remember what led to the marriage forty 
years previously; judges held that it ‘should never have taken place’. 
139 09/54. 
140 09/83.   
141 09/38. 
142 09/78; and 09/79. 
143 09/78. 
144 09/33. 
145 09/35; 09/36. 
146 09/55. 
147 09/76.  The civil marriage was validated when the couple’s child was baptised. 
148 09/43. 
149 09/35; and 09/51. 
150 09/38; and 09/69. 
151 09/23: The female plaintiff, married a widower with children; professionally she had been his subordinate. 
152 09/61: The timing of the marriage was, allegedly, influenced by the respondent’s need for a visa.   
153 09/ 51; and 09/75.  The hope was that marriage would improve the situation.  
154 09/6; 09/36; and 09/38.   
155 09/66; and 09/69. 
156 09/94. 
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separate finances;157 ‘pressure to marry’;158 failure to communicate;159 failure to evaluate the 
impact of alcohol consumption (despite witness evidence that nobody could have predicted 
it);160 failure to cooperate with civil authority;161 inability ‘to accept the respondent’s 
prodigality’;162 ‘emotional insecurity’;163 academic maturity ‘outmatching’ emotional 
maturity;164 ‘naivety’;165, lack of self-determination;166 ‘drifting into marriage’;167 having a 
‘weak  character’ evidenced by ‘flitted from job to job’;168 being ‘spoilt’;169 and having a 
‘selfish attitude’.170    A party’s ‘desires’ and ‘lack of self-esteem’,171 even when the tribunal 
acknowledged that the party was ‘very much in control of her decision to get married’,172 
nevertheless, carried weight.   Both being influenced by parents,173 and conversely, not taking 
parental advice or that of others,174 were considered indicative of immaturity, or at least of 
indicating either that ‘all was not well’ before marriage,175 or a party’s ‘inability’ to weigh 
the situation properly.176  Even post-marital aggression;177 post-marital traumatic stress;178 
and incurred debts,179 were considered pertinent, but how these circumstances affected 
consent given at the material time was not clarified by the judges. 
 
Whilst some of these circumstances, prevailing at the material time, could be held to have 
caused some degree of influence or even pressure, the judges did not establish the strength of 
any such influence or pressure.  Nor did they identify any ‘grave anomaly’.  Therefore, the 
inference was that these circumstances must have had a detrimental effect on the parties, 
157 09/36; and 09/50. 
158 09/3. 
159 09/ 56; and 09/79. 
160 09/57. 
161 09/61. 
162 09/79. 
163 09/86. 
164 09/50. 
165 09/55.  In 09/20, despite many obstacles, the judges, without explanation, declared that they could arrive at 
moral certainty and ‘safely assume the plaintiff’s naïveté coming from rural Ireland’. 
166 09/79. 
167 09/20. 
168 09/66. 
169 09/38; and 09/56. 
170 09/56. 
171 09/51. 
172 09/65. 
173 09/50. 
174 09/36. 
175 09/75; and 09/94. 
176 09/39. 
177 09/20. 
178 09/45. 
179 09/55. 
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resulting in serious character flaws supporting incapacity for marriage.  This goes against the 
Christian anthropological principle that one’s past does not necessarily determine one’s 
future.  Sometimes, an imprudent decision,180 or finding that ‘something’ was wrong,181 
sufficed.  Moreover, the judges found that an invalidating defect can even exist in the 
circumstances themselves (and not, as should be the case, inherent in the parties).182   
 
As seen in the study of the law sections, in many cases, judges, instead of seeking to establish 
the required serious ‘anomaly’, considered that failure to exercise the critical faculty, or 
failure to give sufficient thought or consideration to the decision to marry, sufficed to prove 
nullity.183  Moreover, the seriousness or depth of pre-marital discussions about marriage and 
the degree to which discretion of judgment was exercised was considered relevant, without 
reference to how this could be measured.184  Lack of evidence proving that the parties gave 
sufficient thought to the decision sufficed for the tribunal to conclude that they did not.185  
Even when a plaintiff husband admitted having de facto pre-marital discussions and judges 
accepted that he had a proper understanding of marriage, the judges held that he failed to 
make a proper assessment of the decision to marry.186  Ignoring ‘warning signs’187 (even 
when judges accepted this was a free choice188), or a party’s own testimony that they failed to 
plan ahead, sufficed to support incapacity,189 as did failure to consider an alternative to 
marriage.190  A pre-marital sexual relationship was held to ‘demonstrate a disordered 
180 09/21: The tribunal held that whilst the decision to marry ‘is difficult to explain’, the ‘only’ explanation was 
that the respondent had exerted ‘control’ over the plaintiff. 
181 09/45.  See also ft 72 above. 
182 09/80. 
183 09/3; 09/5; 09/6; 09/7; 09/8; 09/11; 09/15; 09/19; 09/20; 09/21; 09/22; 09/31; 09/32; 09/38; 09/42; 09/43; 
09/44; 09/51; 09/60; 09/68; 09/69; 09/81; 09/83; 09/90; 09/92; and 09/94.  For example, the terminology used 
included: ‘the decision ... lacked any balanced, reasoned, objective, critical, balanced (sic), exercise of 
judgement’; ‘this was not a reasoned decision’; ‘[the decision] was not based on a mature reflection’; ‘the 
plaintiff gave no thought [to the decision]’; ‘the plaintiff failed to bring sufficient reflective thought to bear on 
the nature of marriage ... she was thus gravely lacking the discretion of judgment required for marriage’; ‘there 
would seem to have been little discussion about children’. In 09/79: A sole judge held: ‘The question the Court 
has to decide is not the maturity of the plaintiff, but whether or not he brought sufficient reflective thought to 
bear on the decision to marry’. 
184 09/5; 09/6; 09/7; 09/15; 09/20; 09/21; 09/34; 09/48; 09/51; 09/79; 09/83; 09/92.  
185 09/4; 09/15; and 09/38. 
186 09/79.  
187 09/4; and 09/81. 
188 09/16.  
189 09/92; 09/57; and 09/79.  
190 09/83.  
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understanding of the place of a sexual relationship within marriage’, constituting grave lack 
of discretion of judgment, without reference to moral responsibility.191   
 
Moreover, in some cases judges focused on a party’s motive or intention.  Whilst motive 
might influence a decision (for example, when someone wishes to escape a difficult or 
intolerable situation), it can, nevertheless, co-exist with a proper motive and intention to 
marry.192  Therefore, to prove incapacity, the existence of a consequent and sufficiently 
severe psychological determinant impairment must be established,193 but this was not 
obvious in the judgments.194  Furthermore, although some law sections acknowledged the 
distinction between psychological pressure and persuasion of conscience, these were not 
distinguished in concrete cases.  Even when a party believed marriage ‘was the right thing to 
do’, the judges held that marriage for this reason indicated: a lack of commitment;195 the ‘sole 
motive’ for marriage in a case of pre-marital pregnancy;196 or that ‘love for the plaintiff was 
not uppermost in the respondent’s mind’.197  Moreover, when judges accepted that a 
plaintiff’s faith informed her decision, they held that her grave lack of discretion of judgment 
was evidenced by her failure to heed ‘alarm bells’.198 
 
Throughout these cases, therefore, the focus of the judges’ attention was on behaviour, 
sometimes even exclusively within marriage - and if this was considered not conducive to 
marital harmony, judges found for incapacity.199  Post-marital events having an adverse effect 
on marital relationships were also given weight.  These included: the birth of children;200  
illness;201 death;202 relocation;203 and infidelity.204  In many cases, several decades had 
191  09/79; and 09/94. 
192 See Cormac Burke, ‘Sentence of 14 November 1996’,  available at:  
http://www.cormacburke.or.ke/node430.   
193 Mendonça, Anthology, Case No; 79-095, coram Fiore, 26 May 1979, Dec 71 (1988) pp295-299, p44. 
194 09/31; 09/32; 09/34; 09/60; and 09/79.  
195 09/69. 
196 09/66. 
197 09/81.  Mendonça, Anthology, Case No: 77-052, coram Anné, 26 April 1977, Dec 69 (1987), pp221-227, 
p31: ‘…  the right to “communio vitae” is juridic. …. Conjugal love is not a juridic element’.  Case No: 77-095, 
coram De Jorio, 25 June 1977, Dec 69 (1987), pp343-351, at p32: ‘[A]bsolute communion of life and love 
would be beyond the capacity of most people’. 
198 09/90. 
199 In 09/88, the judges held that the respondent’s alleged behaviour was ‘reprehensible’, indicating ‘total lack of 
respect’ for the plaintiff and demonstrating ‘a complete lack of affective maturity’.   
200 09/82.   
201 09/66. 
202 09/36.   
203 09/34; and 09/43.   
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elapsed since the marriage; therefore, establishing a party’s psychological status at the 
material time would be difficult even with expert assistance.205 
 
Use of the Vetitum: A vetitum (a prohibition against future marriage) or monitum (a warning 
against a future marriage) was imposed in four cases of proven grave lack of discretion of 
judgment.  Although there was no evidence of discussion, reasons were given in only two of 
these cases;206 yet, all were confirmed at Second Instance.  ITSIS imposed one additional 
vetitum when this ground was proven.207  In one other case, in which a party was found 
incapable of assuming the essential obligations of marriage, the tribunal imposed a vetitum, 
simply declaring, without explanation, that the alleged psychiatric condition, of the un-
located respondent wife, was ‘permanent’.208  In no other case did the judges discuss the 
possibility of imposing a vetitum.  Nor did they explain how they considered the proven 
ground of incapacity not to be permanent;209 in some cases they simply asserted, without 
explanation, that the party’s condition was ‘not permanent’.210  In one case, judges stated 
simply that a vetitum was ‘inappropriate’.211  Interestingly, in another case, the judges, 
finding for the plaintiff’s grave lack of discretion of judgment, acknowledged that her 
‘behaviour and attitudes have not changed’.  Yet they did not discuss a possible vetitum, 
despite her desire to enter a new marriage to a Catholic and in the Catholic Church.212 
  
 
 
204 09/19; 09/28; 09/30; 09/62; and 09/83. 
205 In 09/17, the marriage took place forty years earlier and in 09/20, the marriage took place almost fifty years 
earlier. 
206 In 09/19 a vetitum was imposed on the plaintiff because of subsequent failed relationships.  In 09/36, the 
judges were not convinced that the plaintiff understood marriage; a monitum was suggested.  In 09/45, a vetitum 
was imposed on the respondent; although the reason was not stated, there was evidence that he suffered 
psychological trauma after marriage.  In 09/80, a vetitum was added in respect of the plaintiff; the reason was 
unclear. 
207 09/8: A vetitum was added in respect of the respondent at Second Instance.  No discussion or reason was 
obvious. 
208 09/44: The plaintiff husband, asserting that the respondent’s condition was one of ‘a psychotic, delusional 
state’, was ‘loath to give a diagnosis’.  See Robitaille, ‘Through the Lens of DC’, p154: ‘In the judgment, the 
reasons for the nullity of the union must be clear, as well as the reasons for the imposition of the vetitum, and the 
procedure for having it lifted’. 
209 The imposition of a vetitum is mandatory when the cause of incapacity is permanent; consideration of a 
vetitum is mandatory in cases of simulation, but this was not obvious in judgments: see DC, Article 251 in 
Appendix V. 
210 09/17; 09/31; 09/32; 09/43; 09/62; 09/68; 09/79; and 09/94. In 09/69 the judges accepted the plaintiff’s word 
that her present relationship is ‘a very stable relationship on every level’. 
211 09/57.   
212 09/11. 
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Conclusion 
 
The local tribunals studied were willing, not only to pursue incapacity grounds in the absence 
of any psychiatric illness or psychological impairment and without expert opinion, but 
without explaining how the cases fell under the permitted exception of proceeding without an 
expert.  Therefore, the exception has become the rule.213  This is in breach of canonical 
requirements expressed in CIC and DC, which have been explained repeatedly in: Rotal 
jurisprudence; Papal Allocutions; and a Declaration of the Church’s Supreme Tribunal.  
Whilst the judges in the Regional Tribunal of Dublin consulted experts routinely, the 
existence of true psychopathology, and the demonstration of its severity and effect on the 
party concerned at the material time, was nevertheless, and like in the Southwark tribunals, 
not always established.  There was also inconsistency in practice amongst local tribunals in 
the application of both procedural and substantive law.  How much of the dissonance in 
interpretation of substantive law is due to lack of access to authentic translations of Rotal 
decisions is unclear. 
 
The focus of attention, therefore, in all these tribunals, unlike the Rota, was on behaviour, 
without reference to its cause.  This led judges to address, not the psychological capacity of 
the party to elicit valid consent, but rather whether or not the party gave what the judges 
deemed to be ‘sufficient’ thought and consideration to the decision to marry.  Moreover, if 
the judges considered that a party behaved in a way which the judges deemed not conducive 
to marital harmony, the judges found for nullity.  This implies a reasoning that if a party 
behaved in such a way, they could not have understood marriage as the Church understands it 
or they could not have behaved otherwise.  This, however, leaves no room for wilful bad 
behaviour or negligence or other moral irresponsibility.  Moreover: allegations, even when 
uncorroborated, given in hindsight and through the prism of failure, were frequently accepted 
as facts; and post-marital events were often given weight without explanation as to their 
relevance to consent already exchanged.  There was, therefore, little evidence that the 
principles of Christian anthropology were applied; less than ideal childhood experiences were 
213 Gerard T Jorgensen, ‘The Role of the Expert in Tribunal Proceedings’, CLSGB&I Newsletter, 142 (2005), 
pp62-73, at 66, citing G Versaldi, ‘The Role of Experts in Marriage Procedures’, Forum, 9 (1998), 2:91 and M F 
Pompedda, ‘Incapacity to Assume the Essential Obligations of Marriage’, R Sable (Ed), Incapacity for 
Marriage: Jurisprudence and Interpretation, (Pontificia Universitas Gregoriana, 1987) p210.  Jorgensen 
accepts that judges ‘go beyond their competence’ in psychological incapacity cases; non-use of experts must 
‘remain the exception’.  
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seen as root causes of incapacity as were allegations of immaturity, without reference to 
cause or severity.  In many cases there was no distinction between: failure (even culpable 
failure) and incapacity; difficulties and incapacity; wilful behaviour and compulsive 
behaviour; character traits or personality defects and personality disorders; or imprudent 
decisions or mistakes and invalid decisions. 
 
Therefore, in the local cases studied, it was impossible to establish, from the Acts: whether 
parties’ rights were upheld; the judges’ rationale for not seeking expert evidence; or the 
judges’ argument from a canonical presumption of validity to a finding for the contrary.  Nor 
was it possible to establish the existence of an antecedent ‘grave anomaly’ in each case; 
consequently, the severity and effect of any such anomaly could not be demonstrated.  
Moreover, judges failed to explain their competence to establish the existence of 
psychological causes and to assess their severity and effect on a party’s capacity for marriage 
at the material time, in the absence of any expert assistance.  Nor did they explain: the 
methodology used; how evidence was weighed; or how obstacles to reaching moral certainty 
were overcome.  This is particularly pertinent when the questions required by law to be put to 
the expert remained unanswered.  Despite the requirement to consider all possible causes for 
the failure of the marriage, the tribunals failed to do this also. 
 
Tribunals, therefore, leave themselves open to criticism for their apparent failure to engage in 
dialogue with parties, thereby instructing them of their rights, the meaning of grounds for 
nullity, and the process involved.  They can be criticised for not ensuring that the Acts 
demonstrate: prima facie bases for pleas; that respondents were legitimately cited; the 
tribunals’ methods of citation; that parties’ rights were protected regarding access to 
evidence, observations of the defender of the bond, and reasoned decisions, which go to 
efficacy and validity of the decisions themselves; and an explanation to parties as to how they 
can have recourse against the decisions.  Moreover, in failing to consult experts, they have 
deprived parties of the ‘scientifically sure’ methods of psychological assessment required by 
Papal Allocutions to provide evidence of incapacity to marry.  It appears, therefore, that 
although canonical procedures are already in place to ensure a fair trial, much could be done 
at local level to ensure that these are followed within the tribunals themselves. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
Roman Catholic Canon Law provides for the use of experts in a wide range of areas of 
ecclesial life.  Constructive dialogue with experts is, therefore, an important factor in the 
administrative forum, namely: the restoration of art, the restoration and building of churches, 
and the administration of finance and alienation of property; the admission of candidates to 
Holy Orders and Religious Institutes and the exercise of ministry; and the teaching office of 
the Church which occurs in universities, schools, catechesis and missionary activity.  It is 
also an important factor in the judicial forum with regard to the management of marriage 
nullity cases in the tribunals of the Church.  The laity may play a significant role as experts in 
all of these areas and they are not always explicitly required to be Catholics.  However, CIC 
places the norms governing experts under ‘judicial processes’.  Thus, the law on experts in 
the administrative forum remains vague (and an examination of CIC 1917 and CCEO does 
little to clarify the CIC provisions).  Despite the important role experts play, and failure to 
consult them when mandated by law can invalidate the subsequent decisions, the law does 
not define ‘expert’.  
 
With regard to art, architecture and finance, consultation with experts is mandated by law.  
However, the law is unclear as to: the qualifications required of the experts (and indeed, in 
some cases the disciplines from which they are to be drawn and their role); and whether they 
are to be consulted individually or collectively.  Moreover, the law is not always clear as to 
who is responsible for appointing the experts.  There is no explicit requirement that these 
experts have expertise in canon law, despite their involvement in canonical affairs.  Nor does 
the law oblige the Church to provide (or provide for), any special training for experts or for 
their continual professional development.  There are also areas upon which the commentators 
fail to clarify the canonical position.  Although they acknowledge the need for formal 
qualifications, commentators are often unhelpful as to precisely what expertise is required; 
some require only competence.   Moreover, few commentators suggest appointing experts 
from outside the Church.  They are silent as to whether the experts are to be consulted 
individually or collectively and many are silent on the effect of non-compliance with 
mandatory consultation.  Commentators are also divided on the meaning of terms relevant to 
the appointment of experts, for example: whether ‘Christ’s faithful’ means ‘full communion’ 
for the purposes of appointment of an expert to an office; whether ‘the fourth degree’ of 
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consanguinity or affinity’ is inclusive for the purpose of disqualifying a candidate for 
appointment as an expert; and what constitutes a ‘grave reason’ for removal of an expert from 
office.      
 
The Church has a particularly difficult task in relation to assessing candidates’ suitability 
(including psychological fitness) for admission to Holy Orders and Religious Life and during 
ministry following admission.  The practice of routine psychological testing in assessing 
suitability is questionable.  Moreover, the candidate’s right to privacy and confidentiality 
must be balanced against the rights of the community which they will serve.  This right to 
privacy is especially pertinent when the psychiatric and psychological status of candidates 
and, indeed, priests and religious, needs to be established by the relevant ecclesiastical 
authorities.  Yet, although experts in these fields must be consulted in prescribed 
circumstances, the law is vague as to: the precise disciplines and qualifications required of 
the experts; the methods of testing suitability to be used by them; and the use, storage and 
disposal of expert reports. 
 
Despite the importance the Church places on education, its stringent provisions for the 
training of all teachers, catechists and missionaries, and the high standards of teaching it 
requires, CIC does not use the term ‘expert’ to describe educators.  However, it is clear that 
the highest standards are required in all educational institutions.  Professional knowledge, 
expertise, and specialist, scientific and pedagogical skills are required of these educators, and 
over a wide range of subjects.  Interestingly, the later CCEO, reflecting the advances in 
technology since the promulgation of CIC, not only calls on ‘experts’ in social media to assist 
bishops, but obliges bishops to train experts and to legislate on this matter at local level.  
There is no doubt, however, that CIC and Vatican documents require both that experts be 
trained and used in the field of education.  Therefore, Bishops’ Conferences could do much to 
clarify the ambiguities in the law, such as: the disciplines from which experts are to be 
drawn; whether they can be drawn from outside the Church; the professional qualifications 
required of them; whether or not failure to consult them when mandated by law invalidates 
subsequent decisions; what educational institutions and subjects require the teacher to have a 
mandate; who is responsible for obtaining or granting the mandate; what warrants removal of 
the mandate; what canons govern higher institutes of religious studies; and what constitutes 
an ‘equivalent’ title to a pontifical doctorate.  As canonists disagree about many of these 
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issues, clarification is required and would improve the understanding of rights and roles in 
this field. 
 
The law relating to experts in the judicial forum enjoys greater clarity than it does in the 
administrative forum.  Much has been achieved since the promulgation of CIC in resolving 
any doubt about the mandatory requirement to consult experts in the special cases of 
psychological incapacity for marriage under canon 1095: experts must be consulted.  Papal 
Allocutions (1987 and 1988) have focused on the need to consult experts to establish, by 
scientifically sure methods, the existence of psychopathology and its severity and to 
demonstrate its effect on the party’s capacity to marry at the material time of exchanging 
consent.  Moreover, the Church’s supreme Tribunal issued a Declaration (1997) outlining the 
limited circumstances in which the exception to the general rule provided in canon 1680 (that 
is, the mandatory requirement to consult experts in psychological incapacity cases) can be 
invoked.  DC (2005) put the mandatory requirement to consult experts when any incapacity 
enshrined in CIC canon 1095 was pleaded beyond doubt.  It further clarified the judge’s 
obligations in: appointing the expert; in posing specific questions to him; and in interpreting 
expert reports in light of Christian anthropology.  It also clarified what was required in and of 
the expert in terms of personal qualities and professional functions.  Some canonists rightly 
acknowledge the requirements to engage experts in psychological incapacity cases and the 
limited circumstances in which the exception can be invoked.  However, other canonists find 
innovative ways of circumventing the principle of the mandatory use of experts and do not 
explain their reasons for invoking the exception: this has the potential to damage society’s 
view of the Church on which the parties involved rely for a just decision.   
 
The study of cases heard in 2009 in Southwark and Dublin demonstrated a stark contrast 
between the practice of the Roman Rota and that of local tribunals, despite the fact that local 
tribunals are charged with following Rotal jurisprudence exclusively.  Psychological 
incapacity cases from the Rota demonstrated the routine use of experts.  Affirmative 
decisions relied, not simply on expert evidence of the existence of a serious condition, but on 
demonstrating its effect on the party concerned at the material time.  Without this, and 
indeed, when there was disagreement amongst the experts consulted, the validity of the 
marriage was upheld by the Rota.  In contrast, on the basis of the records, the Southwark 
tribunals rarely consulted experts in these incapacity cases and, when they did, the rationale 
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for so doing was not obvious.  Although the Dublin tribunal consulted an expert routinely, the 
expert reports did not always focus on identifying true psychopathology, and, more 
importantly, on the severity and effect of any such anomaly on the party at the material time.  
Moreover, in both Southwark and Dublin, the provisions of CIC and DC regarding the 
appointment and instruction of experts were not met.  In some Southwark cases, the expert 
report was not sought for the party in whom incapacity was alleged; in another case the 
expert report was set aside and the judges found for the party’s incapacity, although the 
expert report supported strongly the party’s capacity.  Crucially, in both the Southwark and 
Dublin tribunals, the questions which are required to be put to the experts remained 
unanswered.   
 
When experts were not consulted in Southwark cases and no reasons were given, one can 
only conclude that the tribunals concerned did not acknowledge the mandatory requirements 
to do so.  Moreover, as the judgments neither explained clearly the methodology used to 
assess the psychological status of the party concerned, nor the argument from a presumption 
of personal capacity for, and validity of, marriage, to a finding for the contrary, it was not 
possible to ascertain the causal link between psychopathology and the failed marriage.  Both 
in Southwark and in Dublin the judges’ interpretation of law varied, even within their own 
tribunal.  First, most judges employed a broad interpretation of ‘the essential matrimonial 
rights and obligations’ which limit the scope of canon 1095.  Second, ignoring Christian 
anthropology, many judges considered that difficult childhood experiences determined a 
party’s future, rendering them incapable of marriage at the material time.  Third, instead of 
looking for signs of psychopathology and the party’s capacity to marry, judges addressed the 
question as to whether or not a party exercised discretion of judgment.  These interpretations 
led the judges to focus on behaviour without reference to its cause.  These practices are in 
need of reform.  Church norms require the judge to look beyond behaviour to its cause; it is 
the role of the expert, not the judge, to determine, by scientifically sure means, whether or not 
the behaviour has a psychopathological basis and its effect on the party at the material time.  
The expert’s advises the judge, whose role it is to declare whether or not this leads him to 
moral certainty of nullity.   
 
So, decisions for nullity appeared to be based on parties satisfying judges that the parties 
failed to exercised due diligence in their decision to marry or failed to behave in a way 
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conducive to marital harmony.  There was little evidence from the Acts of the cases in 
Southwark particularly that the existence of any serious psychopathology was established, let 
alone its severity and its effect on the party’s capacity at the material time, to exercise the 
natural law right to marry.  Consequently, tribunals failed to distinguish: failure to exercise 
(even culpable failure) discretion of judgment and incapacity; difficulty and incapacity; wilful 
behaviour and compulsive behaviour; character traits or slight personality defects and serious 
personality disorders; imprudent decisions or mistakes and invalid decisions.  The tribunals 
should have engaged experts and instructed them to focus on the effect of psychopathological 
causes at the material time.  The tribunals must improve their practice in this regard; it is 
important that justice is not only done, but is seen to be done. 
 
Moreover, failure to record procedures, and, indeed, procedural errors, made it impossible to 
establish, from the Acts, whether or not parties’ rights were protected sufficiently to ensure 
validity of the decisions.   The Church, therefore, is left open to criticism.  The law requires 
consultation with experts in order to assist in decision-making; sometimes that consultation 
goes to validity of the decision.  The Church, therefore, needs to be seen to engage in 
sufficient dialogue with experts, and indeed with parties to marriage nullity cases, whether 
Catholic or not, in the quest for expertise to assist in this decision-making process.  Invalid 
decisions as a result of non-compliance with church norms can have serious repercussions for 
both the Church community and for perceptions of it in wider society.  As the stable 
patrimony of the Church needs to be protected, candidates for Holy Orders and Religious 
Life need to be deemed suitable, seminarians and the Catholic community require education 
to a high standard in order to fulfil the Church’s mission, so parties to marriage nullity cases 
need their status in life (freedom or otherwise to marry) determined.  To declare a person 
psychologically incapable of exercising a right of natural law is to say something very 
profound about that person; such a declaration requires an objective and scientific basis.  
 
In short, as the norms governing the use of expert in the administrative forum are unclear on 
some key issues, the Church could benefit from more detailed provisions - and the Bishops’ 
Conference is the obvious competent body to address this; however, by way of contrast, the 
legal structure for the use of experts in the judicial forum are already in place and clear - but 
these norms need to be more rigorously enforced. 
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